Treaty of Paris (1898)

The Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, commonly known as the Treaty of Paris of 1898, was signed by Spain and the United States on December 10, 1898, and marked the official end of the Spanish–American War. Under it, Spain relinquished all claim of sovereignty over the West Indies archipelagos and islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, the Western Pacific island of Guam in the Marianas archipelago in Micronesia, and the Western Pacific archipelago of the Philippines in Southeast Asia to the United States. The cession of the Philippines involved a compensation of $20 million from the United States to Spain. The treaty came into effect on April 11, 1899, when the documents of ratification were exchanged. It was the first treaty negotiated between the two governments since the 1819 Adams–Onís Treaty.

The Treaty of Paris marked the end of the Spanish Empire, apart from some small holdings. It had a major cultural impact in Spain known as the "Generation of '98". It marked the beginning of the United States as a world power. In the U.S., many supporters of the war opposed the treaty, which became one of the major issues in the election of 1900 when it was opposed by Democrat William Jennings Bryan, who opposed imperialism. Republican President William McKinley supported the treaty and was reelected.

Background

The Spanish–American War began on April 25, 1898, due to a series of escalating disputes between the two nations, and ended on December 10, 1898, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. It resulted in Spain's loss of its control over the remains of its overseas empire. After much of mainland in the Americas had achieved independence, Cubans tried their hand at revolution in 1868–1878, and again in the 1890s, led by José Martí. The Philippines at this time also became resistant to Spanish colonial rule. August 26, 1896, presented the first call to revolt, led by Andrés Bonifacio, succeeded by Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. Aguinaldo then negotiated the Pact of Biak-na-Bato with the Spaniards and went into exile to Hong Kong along with the other revolutionary leaders.

The Spanish–American War that followed had overwhelming public support in the United States due to the popular fervor towards supporting Cuban freedom.

On September 16, President William McKinley issued secret written instructions to his emissaries as the Spanish–American War drew to a close:

Negotiations

Article V of the peace protocol between United States and Spain on August 12, 1898, read as follows:

The composition of the American commission was somewhat unusual in that three of its members were senators, which meant, as many newspapers pointed out, that they would later vote on the ratification of their own negotiations. These were American delegation's members:

William R. Day, chairman, who had resigned as U.S. Secretary of State to lead the commission
William P. Frye, a senator from Maine
Cushman Kellogg Davis, a senator from Minnesota
George Gray, a senator from Delaware
Whitelaw Reid, a former diplomat and a former nominee for Vice President

thumb|250px|[[John Hay, Secretary of State, signing the memorandum of ratification on behalf of the United States]]

The Spanish commission included the following Spanish diplomats:

Eugenio Montero Ríos,
Buenaventura de Abarzuza,
José de Garnica,
Wenceslao Ramírez de Villa-Urrutia,
Rafael Cerero, and
Jules Cambon (French diplomat).

The American delegation, headed by former Secretary of State William R. Day, who had vacated his position as U.S. Secretary of State to head the commission, arrived in Paris on September 26, 1898. The negotiations were conducted in a suite of rooms at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the first session, on October 1, the Spanish demanded that before the talks got underway, the return of the city of Manila, which had been captured by the Americans a few hours after the signing of the peace protocol in Washington, to Spanish authority. The Americans refused to consider the idea and, for the moment, it was pursued no further.

Felipe Agoncillo, a Filipino lawyer who represented the First Philippine Republic, was denied participation in the negotiation.

For almost a month, negotiations revolved around Cuba. The Teller Amendment to the declaration of war made it impractical for the United States to annex the island as it had with Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.

The negotiators then turned to the question of the Philippines. Spanish negotiators were determined to hang onto all they could and hoped to cede only Mindanao and perhaps the Sulu Islands. Others had recommended retaining only the island of Luzon. However, in discussions with its advisers, the commission concluded that Spain, if it retained part of the Philippines, would be likely to sell it to another European power, which would likely be troublesome for America. On November 25, the American Commission cabled McKinley for explicit instructions. Their cable crossed one from McKinley saying that duty left him no choice but to demand the entire archipelago. The next morning, another cable from McKinley arrived:

This position was proposed by U.S. negotiators, though they considered it unsound, and was formally rejected on November 4. Spain was in distressed financial condition, and was responsible for considerable Cuban debt, having been sovereign when the debts were incurred. Estimating U.S. costs in the war at $300 million and regarding Porto Rico as worth only a fraction of that, the negotiators favored acquisition of the Philippines as indemnity for the balance. Seeking a solution to avoid collapse of the negotiations, Senator Frye suggested offering Spain $10 or $20 million, describing the purpose as the assumption of existing debts incurred for improvements of a pacific nature. The State Department approved, though it considered this odious. After some discussion, the American delegation offered $20 million on November 21, one tenth of a valuation that had been estimated in internal discussions in October, and requested an answer within two days. Montero Ríos said angrily that he could reply at once, but the American delegation had already departed from the conference table. When the two sides met again, Queen-Regent Maria Christina had cabled her acceptance. Montero Ríos then recited his formal reply:

Work on the final draft of the treaty began on November 30. It was signed on December 10, 1898.

Ratification

Spanish ratification

In Madrid, the Cortes Generales, Spain's legislature, rejected the treaty, but Maria Christina signed it as she was empowered to do by a clause in the Spanish constitution.

U.S. ratification

{|class="wikitable" style="margin:0 0 1em 1em; width: 315px; float:right;"

|160px

|150px

|colspan=3 |<small>George F. Hoar (MA-R) (left), Eugene Hale (ME-R) (center), and George G. Vest (MO-D) (right) led the opposition to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris within the Senate.</small>

In the Senate, there were four main schools of thought on U.S. imperialism that influenced the debate on the treaty's ratification. Republicans generally supported the treaty, but those opposed either aimed to defeat the treaty or exclude the provision that stipulated the acquisition of the Philippines. Most Democrats, particularly in the South, opposed expansion. A minority of Democrats also favored the treaty on the basis of ending the war and granting independence to Cuba and the Philippines. During the Senate debate on ratification, Senators George Frisbie Hoar and George Graham Vest were outspoken opponents. Hoar stated:

Some anti-expansionists stated that the treaty committed the United States to a course of empire and violated the most basic tenets of the constitution. They argued that neither the Congress nor the President had the right to pass laws that governed colonial peoples who were not represented by lawmakers.

Some Senate expansionists supported the treaty and reinforced such views by arguing: