Theistic science, also referred to as theistic realism, is the proposal that the central scientific method of requiring testability, known as methodological naturalism, should be replaced by a philosophy of science that allows occasional supernatural explanations which are inherently untestable.

Supporters of theistic realism or theistic science include intelligent design creationism proponents J. P. Moreland, Stephen C. Meyer and Phillip E. Johnson. and these concepts lack any mainstream credence. The intelligent design movement began with the publication of Of Pandas and People in 1989, and Johnson later became its de facto leader.

In an essay written in 1996, Johnson wrote of the intelligent design movement that "My colleagues and I speak of 'theistic realism' — or sometimes, 'mere creation' — as the defining concept of our movement. This means that we affirm that God is objectively real as Creator, and that the reality of God is tangibly recorded in evidence accessible to science, particularly in biology." Johnson presents theistic realism as a philosophical justification for intelligent design in his book, Reason in the Balance. According to Johnson, true knowledge begins with the acknowledgment of God as creator of the universe, the unifying characteristic of which is that it was created by God. Theistic realism relies on a concept of God which involves the notions that He is real, personal, and acting in the world through mechanistic creationism.

The Wedge Document of 1999 states "Design theory promises to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist world view, and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions."

He suggests that generally God uses secondary causes, but miracles may be needed when theistic scientists are unable to find a materialistic explanation. In 1997 he wrote "Why couldn't a scientist think as follows? God has created the world, and of course He created everything in it directly or indirectly. After a great deal of study, we can't see how he created some phenomenon P (life, for example) indirectly; thus probably he has created it directly."

Plantinga employs a conflict thesis in assessing the relationship between religion and science. These views have been criticised by Christian physicist Howard J. Van Till, who rejects the conflict thesis, for relying on "folk exegesis" in his assessment of the bible's teachings on creation. Van Till argues that the problem is not evolution, but its misuse for "naturalistic apologetics".

Philosopher and Roman Catholic priest Ernan McMullin also disagrees with Plantinga's call for a theistic science, stating that it should not be considered to be science at all, and suggesting that Plantinga seriously understates the evidential support for evolution. Plantinga only disagrees with naturalism, not with evolution.

Mousavirad

Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad has proposed his own account of theistic science, which diverges from others in several key respects:

A. Some contemporary philosophers, such as Roy Clouser, argue that neutrality in science is impossible and that all sciences rest on specific religious or naturalistic assumptions. Mousavirad rejects this sweeping claim. He maintains that only certain areas of science involve religious or naturalistic presuppositions, while the majority of scientific domains remain independent of religion, though they may still rely on other philosophical assumptions.

B. Theistic science, as debated by philosophers like J.P. Moreland, typically centers on the natural sciences. In contrast, Mousavirad argues that theistic science is more appropriately applied to the social sciences. This is because natural sciences, by their nature, rarely contain overt religious or anti-religious presuppositions, whereas social sciences frequently do.

C. Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga seek to categorically reject methodological naturalism. Mousavirad takes a more nuanced position: while methodological naturalism is not always feasible—since scientists inevitably draw on religious or secular assumptions—it can still function as a practical convention to facilitate a shared scientific discourse. The deeper problem with methodological naturalism, he contends, arises when it is conflated with epistemological naturalism.

Others

Similar ideas have been expressed by George M. Marsden and Mehdi Golshani (the latter referring to it as 'Islamic science').

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