The , also known as the Taft–Katsura Memorandum, was a 1905 discussion between senior leaders of Japan and the United States regarding the positions of the two nations in greater East Asian affairs, especially regarding the status of Korea and the Philippines in the aftermath of Japan's victory during the Russo-Japanese War. The memorandum was not classified as a secret, but no scholar noticed it in the archives until 1924.

The discussions were between William Howard Taft, then the United States Secretary of War and Prince Katsura Tarō, the Japanese Prime Minister, on 27 July 1905. Katsura stated Japan's reasons for its making a protectorate of Korea and repeated that Japan had no interest in the Philippines, which the U.S. had acquired after the defeat of Spain during the 1898 Spanish–American War.

In 1924, Tyler Dennett was the first scholar to see the document and described it as containing "the text of perhaps the most remarkable 'executive agreement' in the history of the foreign relations of the United States." The consensus of historians is that Dennett greatly exaggerated the importance of a routine discussion which changed nothing and set no new policies. Historians pointed out there was no formal agreement on anything new. President Theodore Roosevelt later agreed that Taft had correctly stated the American position. In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of China and Korea was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them.

Main features of the Agreement

The Taft–Katsura Agreement consists of the English and Japanese versions of the meeting notes of the secret conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Katsura and U.S. Secretary of War Taft held in Tokyo on the morning of 27 July 1905. The memorandum detailing these discussions was dated 29 July 1905.

Three significant issues were discussed during the meeting:

  • Katsura's views on peace in East Asia formed, according to him, the fundamental principle of Japan's foreign policy and were best accomplished by a good understanding among Japan, the United States, and Great Britain.
  • On the Philippines, Taft observed that it was in Japan's best interests to have the Philippines governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States. Katsura claimed that Japan had no aggressive designs on the Philippines.
  • Regarding Korea, Katsura observed that Japanese colonization of Korea was a matter of absolute importance, as he considered Korea to have been a direct cause of the recently concluded Russo-Japanese War. Katsura stated that a comprehensive solution of the Korean problem would be the war's logical outcome. Katsura further stated that if left alone, Korea would continue to join improvident agreements and treaties with other powers, which he said to have created the original problem. Therefore, he stated that Japan must take steps to prevent Korea from again creating conditions that would force Japan into fighting another foreign war.

Taft concurred that the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea would directly contribute to stability in East Asia. Taft also expressed his belief that Roosevelt would concur in his views in this regard.

There were three substantive areas of understanding in the conversation. Firstly, Taft said to Katsura that some supporters of Russia in America were publicly claiming that the recent war was a prelude to certain aggression by Japan against the Philippines. Taft stated that Japan's only interest in the Philippines would be to have the islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States. Katsura strongly confirmed that was Japan's only interest in the Philippines and, since that was already the case, Japan had no aggressive interest toward the Philippines.

Discovery by historians

Although there was never a signed agreement or secret treaty, only a memorandum of a conversation, and the conversations were kept secret for 20 years, Roosevelt commented to Taft, "Your conversation with Count Katsura (sic) absolutely correct in every respect. Wish (sic) that you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you said."

See also

  • Root–Takahira Agreement
  • Japan–United States relations
  • Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905
  • Hague Secret Emissary Affair

References

Bibliography

  • Kirk W. Larsen, and Joseph Seeley. "Simple conversation or secret treaty? The Taft–Katsura Memorandum in Korean historical memory." Journal of Korean Studies (2014): 59–92. online
  • Ralph Eldin Minger. "Taft's Missions to Japan: A Study in Personal Diplomacy." Pacific Historical Review (1961) 30#3: 279–294. online
  • Seung-young Kim<!-- Kim isn't familyname/"lastname" not last in Korea-->. American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882–1950 and After: Perception of Polarity and US Commitment to a Periphery (Springer, 2009).