Suitcase nuclear device

frame|H-912 transport container for Mk-54 [[Special Atomic Demolition Munition|SADM]]

A suitcase nuclear device (also suitcase nuke, suitcase bomb, backpack nuke, snuke, mini-nuke, and pocket nuke) is a tactical nuclear weapon that is portable enough that it could use a suitcase as its delivery method.

During the 1950s and 1960s both the United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons small enough to be portable in specially designed backpacks.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have ever made public the existence or development of weapons small enough to fit into a normal-sized suitcase or briefcase. The W48 however, does fit the criteria of small, easily disguised, and portable. Its explosive yield was extremely small for a nuclear weapon.

In the mid-1970s, debate shifted from the possibility of developing such a device for the military to concerns over its possible use in nuclear terrorism. The concept became a staple of the spy thriller genre in the later Cold War era.

Etymology

The term "suitcase (nuclear/atomic) bomb" was introduced during the 1950s with the prospect of reducing the size of the smallest tactical nuclear weapons even further, albeit purely as a "figure of speech" for miniaturization, not necessarily for the delivery in actual suitcases.

Overview

The value of portable nuclear weapons lies in their ability to be easily smuggled across borders, transported by means widely available, and placed close to targets of strategic value, or as means to render enemy land uninhabitable. In nuclear weapon design, there is a trade-off in small weapons designs between weight and compact size. Extremely small (as small as diameter and long) linear implosion type weapons, which might conceivably fit in a large briefcase or typical suitcase, have been tested, but the lightest of those weighed nearly and had a maximum yield of only 0.19 kiloton (the Swift nuclear device, tested in Operation Redwing's Yuma test on May 27, 1956). The largest yield of a relatively compact linear implosion device was under 2 kilotons for the cancelled (or never deployed but apparently tested) US W82-1 artillery shell design, with yield under 2 kilotons for a artillery shell in diameter and long.

Soviet Union and Russia

The potential existence and whereabouts of suitcase-sized Soviet nuclear bombs became an increasingly fierce subject of debate in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Major concerns regarding the new Russian government's overall security and control of its nuclear stockpile were raised on 30 May 1997, when an American congressional delegation sent to Russia met with General Aleksandr Lebed, former Secretary of the Russian National Security Council. However, Lebed subsequently "changed the total number of suitcase nukes several times, stating in the end that the number was between 100 and 500, but probably closer to 100", Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "ridiculed Lebed's account as "absolute stupidity" and said that "all Russian nuclear weapons are under the total and absolutely reliable control of the Russian armed forces", while a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Defence, Vladimir Utavenko, stated that "there are no nuclear bombs in Russia out of [the] control of the Russian armed forces." Utavenko also questioned the credibility of Lebed on this particular issue because "he never dealt with nuclear security questions and cannot know the situation." "I have spoken to the people who made these bombs, so I know that they exist," The devices, "identified as RA-115s (or RA-115-01s for submersible weapons)" weigh from fifty to sixty pounds. They can last for many years if wired to an electric source. In case there is a loss of power, there is a battery backup. If the battery runs low, the weapon has a transmitter that sends a coded message either by satellite or directly to a GRU post at a Russian embassy or consulate. According to Lunev, the number of "missing" nuclear devices (as found by General Lebed) "is almost identical to the number of strategic targets upon which those bombs would be used." Lunev said that he had personally looked for hiding places for weapons caches in the Shenandoah Valley area Searches of the areas identified by Lunev have been conducted, "but law-enforcement officials have never found such weapons caches, with or without portable nuclear weapons."

The existence of such weapons and their potential usefulness, yield and lethality after a prolonged number of years remains controversial. "Even assuming that some portable nuclear devices were lost, it would be very difficult to use them ... at least not in the fashion that they were originally designed for."

Former Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers has claimed that he, along with other Green Berets special forces troops, practiced infiltrating Warsaw Pact countries with backpack-sized nuclear weapons, with a mission to "detonate a portable nuclear bomb." These were known as Green Light teams.

In 1994, the United States Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, preventing the government from developing nuclear weapons with a yield of less than 5 kilotons, thereby making the official development of these weapons in the US unlawful. This law was repealed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.

Israel

Allegations were made in the 1990s that Israel had developed suitcase nuclear bombs during the 1970s.

References

External links

Suitcase Nukes by National Terror Alert Response Center
Suitcase Nukes: Permanently Lost Luggage by SAST REPORT
Alexander Lebed and Suitcase Nukes
Are Suitcase Bombs Possible?
"Suitcase Nukes": A Reassessment, 2002 article by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
W54 SADM photo by Brookings Institution
Article discussing the development of smaller nuclear weapons in the U.S.A.