Srebrenica massacre

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The Srebrenica massacre, also known as the Srebrenica genocide, was the July 1995 genocidal killing of more than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War. It was mainly perpetrated by units of the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska under Ratko Mladić, though the Serb paramilitary unit Scorpions also participated. In addition, 25,000 to 30,000 Bosniaks, mainly women and children, were abused and forcibly moved out of Srebrenica. The massacre constitutes the first legally recognised genocide in Europe since the end of World War II.

Before the massacre, the United Nations (UN) had declared the besieged enclave of Srebrenica a "safe area" under its protection. A UN Protection Force contingent of 370 On 13 July, peacekeepers handed over some 5,000 Muslims sheltering at the Dutch base in exchange for the release of 14 Dutch peacekeepers held by the Bosnian Serbs.

A list of people missing or killed during the massacre contains 8,372 names. The Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo established that 83% of those killed were civilians. , nearly 7,000 genocide victims had been identified through DNA analysis of body parts recovered from mass graves. Some Serbs have claimed the massacre was retaliation for civilian casualties inflicted on Bosnian Serbs by Bosniak soldiers from Srebrenica under the command of Naser Orić. These 'revenge' claims have been rejected and condemned by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the UN.

The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY (in 2004) and the International Court of Justice (in 2007) have ruled the Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide. In 2002, the government of the Netherlands resigned, citing its inability to prevent the massacre. In 2013, 2014 and 2019, the Dutch state was found liable by its supreme court and the Hague district court, of failing to prevent more than 300 deaths.

In 2005, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the massacre as "a terrible crime – the worst on European soil since the Second World War",

Following the declaration of independence, Bosnian Serb forces, supported by the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), attacked Bosnia and Herzegovina, to secure and unify the territory under Serb control, and create an ethnically homogenous Serb state of Republika Srpska. In the struggle for territorial control, the non-Serb populations from areas under Serbian control, especially the Bosniak population in eastern Bosnia, near the Serbian borders, were subject to ethnic cleansing.

Ethnic cleansing

Srebrenica, and the surrounding Central Podrinje region, had immense strategic importance to the Bosnian Serb leadership. It was the bridge to disconnected parts of the envisioned ethnic state of Republika Srpska. Capturing Srebrenica and eliminating its Muslim population would also undermine the viability of the Bosnian Muslim state. In neighbouring Bratunac, Bosniaks were either killed or forced to flee to Srebrenica, resulting in 1,156 deaths. Thousands of Bosniaks were killed in Foča, Zvornik, Cerska and Snagovo.

1992–1993: Struggle for Srebrenica

Over the remainder of 1992, offensives by Bosnian government forces from Srebrenica increased the area under their control. In July 1992 Bosnian forces attacked neighbouring Serb villages in Srebrenica and Bratunac, killing 69. By January 1993 they had linked with Bosniak-held Žepa to the south and Cerska to the west. The Srebrenica enclave had reached its peak size of , though it was never linked to the main area of Bosnian-government controlled land in the west and remained "a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled territory". Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) forces under Naser Orić used Srebrenica as a staging ground to attack neighboring Serb villages inflicting many casualties. In 1993, the Serb village of Kravica was attacked by ARBiH, which resulted in Serb civilian casualties. The resistance to the Serb siege of Srebrenica, by the ARBiH under Orić, was seen as a catalyst for the massacre.

Serbs started persecuting Bosniaks in 1992. Serbian propaganda deemed Bosniak resistance to Serb attacks as a ground for revenge. According to French General Philippe Morillon, Commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in testimony at the ICTY in 2004:

Over the next few months, the Serb military captured the villages of Konjević Polje and Cerska, severing the link between Srebrenica and Žepa, and reducing the Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometres. Bosniak residents of the outlying areas converged on Srebrenica and its population swelled to between 50,000 and 60,000, about ten times the pre-war population. General Morillon visited Srebrenica in March 1993. The town was overcrowded and siege conditions prevailed. There was almost no running water as the advancing Serb forces had destroyed water supplies; people relied on makeshift generators for electricity. Food, medicine and other essentials were scarce. The conditions rendered Srebrenica a slow death camp.

Starvation

With the failure to demilitarize and the shortage of supplies getting in, Orić consolidated his power and controlled the black market. Orić's men began hoarding food, fuel, cigarettes and embezzled money sent by aid agencies to support Muslim orphans. Basic necessities were out of reach for many in Srebrenica due to Orić's actions. UN officials were beginning to lose patience with the ARBiH in Srebrenica and saw them as "criminal gang leaders, pimps and black marketeers".

A former Serb soldier of the "Red Berets" unit described the tactics used to starve and kill the besieged population:

When British journalist Tony Birtley visited Srebrenica in March 1993, he took footage of civilians starving to death. The Hague Tribunal in the case of Orić concluded:

Situation deteriorates

By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave. The situation in Srebrenica and other enclaves had deteriorated into lawless violence as prostitution among young Muslim girls, theft and black marketeering proliferated. Already meager resources dwindled further, and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, ammunition and fuel, eventually being forced to start patrolling on foot. Dutch soldiers who left on leave were not allowed to return,

By mid-1995, the humanitarian situation in the enclave was catastrophic. In May, following orders, Orić and his staff left the enclave, leaving senior officers in command of the 28th Division. In late June and early July, the 28th Division issued reports including urgent pleas for the humanitarian corridor to be reopened. When this failed, Bosniak civilians began dying from starvation. On 7 July, the mayor reported eight residents had died. On 4 June, UNPROFOR commander Bernard Janvier, a Frenchman, secretly met with Ratko Mladić to obtain the release of hostages, many of whom were French. Mladić demanded of Janvier that there would be no more airstrikes.

In the weeks leading up to the assault on Srebrenica by the VRS, ARBiH forces were ordered to carry out diversion and disruption attacks on the VRS by the high command. On one occasion on 25 June, ARBiH forces attacked VRS units on the Sarajevo–Zvornik road, inflicting high casualties and looting VRS stockpiles.

6–11 July 1995: Serb takeover

The Serb offensive against Srebrenica began in earnest on 6 July. The VRS, with 2,000 soldiers, were outnumbered by the defenders and did not expect the assault to be an easy victory. Five UNPROFOR observation posts in the south of the enclave fell in the face of the Bosnian Serb advance. Some Dutch soldiers retreated into the enclave after their posts were attacked, the crews of the other observation posts surrendered into Serb custody. The defending Bosnian forces numbering 6,000 came under fire and were pushed back towards the town. Once the southern perimeter began to collapse, about 4,000 Bosniak residents, who had been living in a Swedish housing complex for refugees nearby, fled north into Srebrenica. Dutch soldiers reported the advancing Serbs were "cleansing" the houses in the south of the enclave.

thumb|A Dutch YPR-765 of the type used at Srebrenica

On 8 July, a Dutch YPR-765 armoured vehicle took fire from the Serbs and withdrew. A group of Bosniaks demanded the vehicle stay to defend them, and established a makeshift barricade to prevent its retreat. As the vehicle withdrew, a Bosniak farmer manning the barricade threw a grenade onto it and killed Dutch soldier Raviv van Renssen. On 9 July, emboldened by success, little resistance from the demilitarised Bosniaks and lack of reaction from the international community, President Karadžić issued a new order authorising the 1,500-strong VRS Drina Corps to capture Srebrenica. Lieutenant Colonel Karremans was filmed drinking a toast with Mladić during the bungled negotiations on the fate of the civilian population grouped in Potočari.

Massacre

The two highest-ranking Serb politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, both indicted for genocide, were warned by VRS commander Mladić (found guilty of genocide in 2017) that their plans could not be realized without committing genocide. Mladić said at a parliamentary session of 12 May 1992:

Increasing concentration of refugees in Potočari

thumb|Headquarters in [[Donji Potočari|Potočari for soldiers under United Nations command; "Dutchbat" had 370 soldiers in Srebrenica during the massacre. The building was a disused battery factory.]]

By the evening of 11 July, approximately 20,000–25,000 Bosniak refugees from Srebrenica were gathered in Potočari, seeking protection within the UNPROFOR Dutchbat headquarters. Several thousand had pressed inside the compound, while the rest were spread throughout neighbouring factories and fields. Though most were women, children, elderly or disabled, 63 witnesses estimated there were at least 300 men inside the compound and between 600 and 900 in the crowd outside.

Conditions included "little food or water" and sweltering heat. A UNPROFOR Dutchbat officer described the scene:

Testimony of Ramiza Gurdić:

Deportation of women

As a result of exhaustive UN negotiations with Serb troops, around 25,000 women from Srebrenica were forcibly transferred to Bosniak-controlled territory. Some buses apparently never reached safety. According to a witness account by Kadir Habibović, who hid himself on one of the first buses from the base in Potočari to Kladanj, he saw at least one vehicle full of Bosniak women being driven away from Bosnian government-held territory.

Column of Bosniak men

thumb|Map of military operations during the Srebrenica massacre. The green arrow marks the route of the Bosniak column.|upright=1.3

On the evening of 11 July, word spread that able-bodied men should take to the woods, form a column with the ARBiH's 28th Division and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian government-held territory in the north. They believed they stood a better chance of surviving by trying to escape, than if they fell into Serb hands. Around 10 pm on 11 July the Division command, with the municipal authorities, took the decision to form a column and attempt to reach government territory around Tuzla. Dehydration, along with lack of sleep and exhaustion were further problems; there was little cohesion or common purpose. Along the way, the column was shelled and ambushed. In severe mental distress, some refugees killed themselves. Others were induced to surrender. Survivors claimed they were attacked with a chemical agent that caused hallucinations, disorientation and strange behaviour. Infiltrators in civilian clothing confused, attacked and killed refugees. Many taken prisoner were killed on the spot.

Around midnight, the column started moving along the axis between Konjević Polje and Bratunac. It was preceded by four scouts, 5 km ahead. Members walked one behind the other, following a trail a demining unit had marked with paper to guide them.

The column was led by 50–100 of the best soldiers from each brigade, carrying the best equipment. Elements of the 284th Brigade were followed by the 280th Brigade. Civilians accompanied by other soldiers followed, and at the back was the independent battalion. The column was 12–15 km long, two and a half hours separating head from tail. The Drina The VRS Main Staff ordered all available manpower to find any Muslim groups observed, prevent them crossing into Muslim territory, take them prisoner and hold them in buildings that could be secured by small forces.

Ambush at Kamenica Hill

During the night, poor visibility, fear of mines and panic induced by artillery fire split the column in two. On the afternoon of 12 July, the front section emerged from the woods and crossed the asphalt road from Konjević Polje and Nova Kasaba. Around 6pm, the VRS Army located the main part of the column around Kamenica. Around 8pm this part, led by the municipal authorities and wounded, started descending Kamenica Hill towards the road. After about 40 men had crossed, soldiers of the VRS arrived from the direction of Kravica in trucks and armoured vehicles, including a white vehicle with UNPROFOR symbols, calling over the loudspeaker, to surrender. Shooting and shelling began, which continued into the night. Armed members of the column returned fire and all scattered. Survivors at least 1,000 engaged at close range by small arms. Hundreds appear to have been killed as they fled the open area and some were said to have killed themselves to escape capture.

VRS and Ministry of Interior personnel persuaded column members to surrender, by promising them safe transportation towards Tuzla, under UNPROFOR and Red Cross supervision. Appropriated UN and Red Cross equipment was used to deceive them. Belongings were confiscated and some executed on the spot.

Trek to Mount Udrč

The central section of the column managed to escape the shooting, reached Kamenica around 11am and waited for the wounded. Captain Golić and the Independent Battalion turned back towards Hajdučko Groblje, to help the casualties. Survivors from the rear, crossed the asphalt roads to the north or the west, and joined the central section. The front third of the column, which had left Kamenica Hill by the time the ambush occurred, headed for Mount Udrč (); crossing the main asphalt road. They reached the base of the mountain on Thursday 13 July and regrouped. At first, it was decided to send 300 ARBiH soldiers back to break through the blockades. When reports came that the central section had crossed the road at Konjević Polje, this plan was abandoned. Approximately 1,000 additional men managed to reach Udrč that night.

Snagovo ambush

From Udrč, the marchers moved toward the Drinjača River and Mount Velja Glava. Finding Serbs at Mount Velja Glava, on Friday, 14 July, the column skirted the mountain and waited on its slopes, before moving toward Liplje and Marčići. Arriving at Marčići in the evening of 14 July, they were ambushed again near Snagovo by forces equipped with anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and tanks. Brigade Commander Blagojević suggested the Drina Corps' press unit record this testimony on video. Several times, Bosniak men attacked one another, in fear the other was a Serb soldier. Survivors reported seeing people speaking incoherently, running towards VRS lines in a rage and committing suicide using firearms and hand grenades. Although there was no evidence to suggest what exactly caused the behaviour, the study suggested fatigue and stress may have induced this. Almost without exception, the thousands of prisoners captured after the take-over were executed. Some were killed individually, or in small groups, by the soldiers who captured them. Most were killed in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July, just north of Srebrenica.

The mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained for hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site, usually in an isolated location. They were unarmed and often steps were taken to minimise resistance, such as blindfolding, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures, or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial shooting were shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer.

Aerial photos, and excavations, confirmed the presence of a mass grave near this location. Bullet cartridges, found at the scene, showed that the victims were first lined up on one side of the road, whereupon their executioners shot from the other. The 150 bodies were covered with earth where they lay. It was later established they had been killed by gunfire. All were male, aged 14–50, and all but three were wearing civilian clothes. Many had their hands tied behind their backs. Nine were later identified on the Srebrenica missing persons list.

The men were called outside in small groups. They were ordered to strip to the waist and remove their shoes, whereupon their hands were tied behind their backs. During the night of 14 July, the men were taken by truck to the dam at Petkovci. Those who arrived later could see immediately what was happening. Bodies were strewn on the ground, hands tied behind their backs. Small groups of five to ten men were taken out of the trucks, lined up and shot. Some begged for water but their pleas were ignored.

Dražen Erdemović—who confessed to killing at least 70 Bosniaks—was a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment. Erdemović appeared as a prosecution witness and testified: "The men in front of us were ordered to turn their backs ... we shot at them. We were given orders to shoot." On this point, a survivor recalls:

thumb|Satellite photo of [[Nova Kasaba mass graves]]

Erdemović said nearly all the victims wore civilian clothes and, except for one person who tried to escape, offered no resistance. Sometimes the executioners were particularly cruel. When some soldiers recognised acquaintances, they beat and humiliated them, before killing them. Erdemović had to persuade fellow soldiers to stop using machine guns; while it mortally wounded the prisoners, it did not cause death immediately and prolonged their suffering.

Aerial photos, taken on 17 July of an area around the Branjevo Military Farm, show many bodies lying in a field, as well as traces of the excavator that collected the bodies. Erdemović testified that, at around 3pm on 16 July, after he and fellow soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Detachment had finished executing prisoners at the Farm, they were told there was a group of 500 Bosniak prisoners from Srebrenica, trying to break out of a Dom Kulture club. Erdemović and other members of his unit refused to carry out more killings. They were told to meet with a Lieutenant Colonel at a café in Pilica. Erdemović and his fellow soldiers travelled to the café and, as they waited, could hear shots and grenades being detonated. The sounds lasted 15–20 minutes after which a soldier entered the café to inform them "everything was over".

There were no survivors to explain exactly what happened in the Dom Kulture. Over a year later, it was still possible to find physical evidence of this crime. As in Kravica, many traces of blood, hair and body tissue were found in the building, with cartridges and shells littered throughout the two storeys. It could be established that explosives and machine guns had been used. Human remains and personal possessions were found under the stage, where blood had dripped down through the floorboards.

Two of the three survivors of the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm, were arrested by Bosnian Serb police on 25 July and sent to the prisoner of war compound at Batković. One had been a member of the group separated from the women in Potočari on 13 July. The prisoners who were taken to Batković survived and testified before the Tribunal.

Čančari Road 12 was the site of the reinterment of at least 174 bodies, moved from the mass grave at the Branjevo Military Farm. Only 43 were complete sets of remains, most of which established that death was due to rifle fire. Of the 313 body parts found, 145 displayed gunshot wounds of a severity likely to prove fatal.

14–17 July: Kozluk

thumb|Exhumation of the Srebrenica massacre victims

The exact date of the executions at Kozluk is unknown, though most probably 15–16 July, partly due to its location, between Petkovci Dam and the Branjevo Military Farm. It falls within the pattern of ever more northerly execution sites: Orahovac on 14 July, Petkovci Dam on 15 July, the Branjevo Military Farm and Pilica Dom Kulture on 16 July. Another indication is that a Zvornik Brigade excavator spent eight hours in Kozluk on 16 July and a truck belonging to the same brigade made two journeys between Orahovac and Kozluk that day. A bulldozer is known to have been active in Kozluk on 18 and 19 July.

Among Bosnian refugees in Germany, there were rumours of executions in Kozluk, during which 500 or so prisoners were forced to sing Serbian songs as they were being transported to the execution site. Though no survivors have come forward, investigations in 1999 led to the discovery of a mass grave near Kozluk. The grave at Kozluk had been partly cleared before 27 September 1995, but no fewer than 340 bodies were found there. Čančari Road 3 is known to have been a secondary grave linked to Kozluk, as shown by the glass fragments and labels from the Vitinka factory.

13–18 July: Bratunac–Konjević Polje road

On 13 July, near Konjević Polje, Serb soldiers summarily executed hundreds of Bosniaks, including women and children. The men found attempting to escape by the Bratunac-Konjević Polje road were told the Geneva Convention would be observed if they gave themselves up. In Bratunac, men were told there were Serbian personnel standing by to escort them to Zagreb for a prisoner exchange. The visible presence of UN uniforms and vehicles, stolen from Dutchbat, were intended to contribute to the feeling of reassurance. On 17 to 18 July, Serb soldiers captured about 150–200 Bosniaks in the vicinity of Konjević Polje and summarily executed about one-half. The report of the march to Tuzla includes the account of an ARBiH soldier who witnessed executions carried out by police. He survived because 30 ARBiH soldiers were needed for an exchange of prisoners following the ARBiH's capture of a VRS officer at Baljkovica. The soldier was exchanged in late 1995; at that time, there were still 229 men from Srebrenica in the Batković camp, including two who had been taken prisoner in 1994.

RS Ministry of the Interior forces searching the terrain from Kamenica as far as Snagovo killed eight Bosniaks.

After the massacre

thumb|ICMP's Podrinje Identification Project (PIP) was formed to deal with the victims of the Srebrenica massacre. PIP includes a facility for storing, processing, and handling exhumed remains. Much are only fragments or commingled body fragments since they were recovered from secondary [[mass graves. The photo depicts one section of the refrigerated mortuary.]]

During the days following the massacre, US spy planes overflew Srebrenica and took photos showing the ground in vast areas around the town had been removed, a sign of mass burials.

On 22 July, the commanding officer of the Zvornik Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurević, requested the Drina Corps set up a committee to oversee the exchange of prisoners. He asked for instructions on where the prisoners of war his unit had already captured should be taken and to whom they should be handed over. Approximately 50 wounded captives were taken to the Bratunac hospital. Another group was taken to the Batković camp, and these were mostly exchanged later.

Several Bosniaks managed to cross over the River Drina into Serbia at Ljubovija and Bajina Bašta. 38 were returned to RS. Some were taken to the Batković camp, where they were exchanged. The fate of the majority has not been established. After 19 July, small Bosniak groups were hiding in the woods for days and months, trying to reach Tuzla. They did not know what to do next or where to go; they managed to stay alive by eating vegetables and snails. In Srebrenica, the refuse that had littered the streets since the departure of the people was collected and burnt, the town disinfected and deloused. Others remained where they were, splitting up into smaller groups of no more than ten. Some wandered around for months, either alone or groups of two, four or six men.

Zvornik 7

The most famous group of seven men wandered about in occupied territory for the entire winter. On 10 May 1996, after nine months on the run and over six months after the end of the war, they were discovered in a quarry by American IFOR soldiers. They immediately turned over to the patrol; they were searched and their weapons were confiscated. The men said they had been in hiding near Srebrenica since its fall. They did not look like soldiers and the Americans decided this was a matter for the police. The operations officer of the American unit ordered that a Serb patrol should be escorted into the quarry whereupon the men would be handed over to the Serbs.

The prisoners said they were initially tortured after the transfer, but later treated relatively well. In April 1997 the local court in Republika Srpska convicted the group, known as the Zvornik 7, for illegal possession of firearms and three of them for the murder of four Serbian woodsmen. When announcing the verdict the presenter of the TV of Republika Srpska described them as "the group of Muslim terrorists from Srebrenica who last year massacred Serb civilians". The trial was condemned by the international community as "a flagrant miscarriage of justice", and the conviction quashed for 'procedural reasons' following international pressure. In 1999, the three remaining defendants in the Zvornik 7 case were swapped for three Serbs serving 15 years each in a Bosnian prison.

Reburials in the secondary mass graves

upright=.8|thumb|Grave of a 13-year-old

From August to October 1995, there was organised effort to remove the bodies from primary gravesites and transport them to secondary and tertiary gravesites. In the ICTY court case Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, the trial chamber found that this reburial effort was an attempt to conceal evidence of the mass murders. The trial chamber found that the cover-up operation was ordered by the VRS Main Staff and carried out by members of the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades. In one case, the remains of a single person were found in two locations, 30 km apart. In addition to the ligatures and blindfolds found, the effort to hide the bodies has been seen as evidence of the organised nature of the massacres and the non-combatant status of the victims.

Greek volunteers controversy

10 Greek volunteers fought alongside the Serbs in the fall of Srebrenica. They were members of the Greek Volunteer Guard, a contingent of paramilitaries requested by Mladić, as an integral part of the Drina Corps. The volunteers were motivated to support their "Orthodox brothers" in battle. They raised the Greek flag at Srebrenica, at Mladić's request, to honour "the brave Greeks fighting on our side" and Karadžić decorated four. In 2005, Greek deputy Andrianopoulos called for an investigation, and in 2011, a judge said there was insufficient evidence to proceed.

Post-war developments

1995–2000: Indictments and UN Secretary-General's report

In November 1995, Karadžić and Mladić were indicted by the ICTY for their alleged direct responsibility for the war crimes committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica.

2002: Dutch government report

The failure of Dutchbat to protect the enclave became a national trauma in the Netherlands and led to long-running discussions. In 1996, the Dutch government asked the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies to research the events. The report was published in 2002—Srebrenica: a 'safe' area. It concluded the Dutchbat mission was not well considered and well-nigh impossible. The report is often cited; however, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting labelled it "controversial", as "the sheer abundance of information makes it possible for anyone to pluck from it whatever they need to make their point". One author claimed some sources were "unreliable", and only used to support another author's argument. Responding to the report, the Dutch government accepted partial political responsibility for the circumstances in which the massacre happened and the second Kok cabinet resigned.

2002: First Republika Srpska report

In September 2002, the Republika Srpska Office of Relations with the ICTY issued the Report about Case Srebrenica. The document, by Darko Trifunović, was endorsed by leading Bosnian Serb politicians. It concluded that 1,800 Bosnian Muslim soldiers died during fighting and a 100 more from exhaustion. "The number of Muslim soldiers killed by Bosnian Serbs out of personal revenge or lack of knowledge of international law is probably about 100 ... It is important to uncover the names of the perpetrators to accurately and unequivocally establish whether or not these were isolated instances." The report examined the mass graves, claiming they were made for hygiene reasons, questioning the legitimacy of the missing person lists and undermining a key witness' mental health and military history. The International Crisis Group and UN condemned the manipulation of their statements.

2003: Srebrenica Genocide Memorial

thumb|Wall of names at the [[Srebrenica Genocide Memorial]]

In September 2003, former US President Bill Clinton officially opened the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial to honour the victims of the genocide. The total cost was around $6 million. "We must pay tribute to the innocent lives, many of them children who were snuffed out in what must be called genocidal madness", Clinton said.

2004: Second Republika Srpska report and apology

In March 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina directed the Republika Srpska (RS) to conduct a full investigation into the events at Srebrenica, and to report its results by September of that year. The Chamber had no power to implement the directive, after its dissolution in late 2003. The RS published reports in September 2003, which the Human Rights Chamber concluded did not fulfil the RS' obligations.

The Srebrenica Commission, officially named the Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995, was established in December 2003, and submitted its final report on 4 June 2004, in October 2004 after delayed information was supplied. The report acknowledged men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serbs, citing a provisional figure of 7,800. Because of "limited time" and the need to "maximize resources", the commission "accepted the historical background and the facts stated in the second-instance judgment Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, when the ICTY convicted him for 'assisting and supporting genocide' in Srebrenica". On 10 November 2004, the government of Republika Srpska issued an official apology. The statement came after a government review of the report. "The report makes it clear that enormous crimes were committed in the area of Srebrenica in July 1995. The Bosnian Serb Government shares the pain of the families of the Srebrenica victims, is truly sorry and apologises for the tragedy", the Bosnian Serb government said.

Republika Srpska Srebrenica Working Group

After a request by Ashdown, the RS established a working group to implement the recommendations of the report by the Srebrenica Commission. The group was to analyze the documentation in the report's confidential annexes and identify all possible perpetrators who were officials in RS institutions. A report on 1 April 2005 identified 892 such persons still employed by the RS, and the information was provided to the State Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the understanding names would not be made public until official proceedings opened.

2005: Release of Scorpions massacre video

On 1 June 2005, video evidence was introduced at the Slobodan Milošević trial to testify to the involvement of police from Serbia in the massacre. The video, the only undestroyed copy of 20 and previously available for rental in the Serbian town of Šid, was obtained and submitted to the ICTY by Nataša Kandić, director of the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center.

The video shows an Orthodox priest blessing members of a Serbian unit known as the Scorpions. Later these soldiers are shown physically abusing civilians. They were later identified as four minors as young as 16 and two men in their early twenties. The footage shows the execution of four of the civilians and them lying dead in a field. The cameraman expresses disappointment the battery is almost out. The soldiers then ordered the two remaining captives to take the dead bodies into a nearby barn, where they were also killed upon completing this. She said she was already aware of his death and had been told his body was burned following the execution; his remains were among those buried in Potočari in 2003. The executions took place on 16–17 July, in Trnovo, about 30 minutes from the Scorpions' base near Sarajevo.

2005: 10th anniversary

In June 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution commemorating the 10th anniversary, by 370 to 1 (Ron Paul). It stated the "innocent people executed at Srebrenica ... should be solemnly remembered and honored; the policies ... implemented by Serb forces ... meet the terms ... in ... the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." Missouri passed a resolution recognising the genocide and St. Louis issued a proclamation declaring 11 July Srebrenica Remembrance Day.

In his message to the commemoration, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan paid tribute to the victims of "a terrible crime – the worst on European soil since the Second World War", on a date "marked as a grim reminder of man's inhumanity to man". He said the "first duty of the international community was to uncover and confront the full truth about what happened, a hard truth for those who serve the UN because great nations failed to respond adequately. There should have been stronger military forces in place, and a stronger will to use them". Annan added that the UN bore its share of responsibility, having made serious errors of judgement, "rooted in a philosophy of impartiality and non-violence which, however admirable, was unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia; because of that the tragedy of Srebrenica would haunt the UN's history forever".

2006: Further mass graves and list of participants

thumb|A boy at a grave during the 2006 funeral of genocide victims

thumb|Exhumed grave, 2007

By 2006, 42 mass graves had been uncovered. 2,070 victims had been identified, while body parts in 7,000 bags awaited identification. In August 2006 over 1,000 body parts were exhumed from a mass grave in Kamenica.

In August 2006, Sarajevan newspaper Oslobođenje published a list of 892 Bosnian Serbs who had allegedly participated in the massacre and believed to still be employed by state institutions. They were listed among 28,000 Bosnian Serbs reported to have taken part by a Republika Srpska report. The list had been withheld from publication with the report, by the chief prosecutor of the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, Marinko Jurčević who claimed "publishing this information might jeopardise the ongoing investigations".

In December 2006, the Dutch government awarded the Dutch UN peacekeepers an insignia because they believed they "deserved recognition for their behaviour in difficult circumstances", noting the limited mandate and ill-equipped mission. However, survivors and relatives called it a "humiliating decision" and responded with protest rallies in The Hague, Assen and Sarajevo.

2007–08: Arrests of Tolimir and Karadžić

thumb|Women at the monument for victims, at the annual memorial ceremony in Potočari, 11 July 2007

In May 2007, former Bosnian Serb general Zdravko Tolimir was apprehended by police from Serbia and Republika Srpska. He was turned over to NATO forces at the Banja Luka International Airport where he was read the ICTY indictment and arrested. Mladić's deputy in charge of intelligence and security, and a key commander, Tolimir is believed to have been an organiser of the network protecting Mladić, helping him elude justice. Tolimir—"Chemical Zdravko"—is infamous for requesting the use of chemical weapons and proposing military strikes against refugees at Žepa. In June 2007, he was turned over to the ICTY. Radovan Karadžić, with similar charges, was arrested in Belgrade in 2008, after 13 years on the run, and brought before Belgrade's War Crimes Court.

2009: EU Parliament resolution

On 15 January 2009, the European Parliament voted in favour of a resolution calling for recognition of 11 July as a day for EU commemoration of the genocide. Bosnian Serb politicians rejected it, stating such a commemoration is unacceptable to the Republika Srpska.

2010 and 2013: Serbia's official apologies

In 2010, the Serbian Parliament passed a resolution condemning the massacre, and apologizing for Serbia not doing more to prevent it. The motion was passed narrowly with 127 out of 250 MPs voting in favour, with 173 legislators present. The Socialist Party of Serbia, formerly under Slobodan Milošević and under new leadership, voted for. Opposition parties claimed the text was "shameful", either stating the wording was too strong or too weak. Some victims' relatives were unhappy with the apology, as it did not use the word 'genocide', but rather pointed at the Bosnian genocide case ruling. President Boris Tadić said the declaration is the highest expression of patriotism and it represents distancing from the crimes. Sulejman Tihić, former Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina must adopt a similar resolution condemning crimes against Serbs and Croats. In April 2013, President Tomislav Nikolić stated: "I kneel and ask for forgiveness for Serbia for the crime committed in Srebrenica. I apologise for the crimes committed by any individual in the name of our state and our people."

2010: Second Republika Srpska report revision

thumb|Bosniak mourners at the reburial ceremony for an exhumed victim of the Srebrenica massacre

On 21 April 2010, the government of Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, initiated a revision of the 2004 report saying the numbers killed were exaggerated and the report was manipulated by a former peace envoy. The Office of the High Representative responded by saying: "The Republika Srpska government should reconsider its conclusions and align itself with the facts and legal requirements and act accordingly, rather than inflicting emotional distress on the survivors, torture history and denigrate the public image of the country". On 12 July 2010, at the 15th anniversary, Milorad Dodik said he acknowledged the killings, but did not regard what happened as genocide.

2011: Arrest of Mladić

In May 2011, Mladić was arrested in Lazarevo, Serbia after remaining at large for 16 years, sheltered by Serbian and Bosnian Serb security forces and family. His capture was considered to be a pre-condition for Serbia obtaining candidate status for EU membership.

2015: Russia vetoes UN resolution

In July 2015, Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have condemned the massacre as a genocide. It was intended to mark the 20th anniversary. China, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela abstained and the remaining 10 members voted in favour. The veto was praised by Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić who said Russia had "prevented an attempt of smearing the entire Serbian nation as genocidal" and proven itself as a true and honest friend.

2024: International Day of Commemoration

In May 2024, 11 July was designated as the annual International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 78/282.

The UN resolution, which was sponsored by Germany and Rwanda, was passed with 84 countries voting for the resolution, 68 abstaining, and 19 voting against. Politico described Serbia launching a "full-blown diplomatic offensive" to block the initiative, with Serbian leaders staging multiple press conferences and visiting the UN headquarters to meet with key stakeholders to try to sway the vote.

Victims

The Bosnian Book of the Dead documented 8,331 victims killed in the massacre. The figure includes 1,416 soldiers who were taken as prisoners of war, or 17%, meaning that 83% killed were civilians. Of the 8,331, 5,113 were from Srebrenica, 1,766 from Bratunac, 900 from Vlasenica, 437 from Zvornik and 115 from Rogatica/Žepa.

the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) had identified 6,993 persons missing from the fall of Srebrenica, mostly through analysing DNA profiles extracted from exhumed remains and matching them to profiles of relatives of the missing. The ICMP estimates total deaths was just over 8,000.

Legal proceedings

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

thumb|[[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia]]

In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, including genocide.

General Radislav Krstić, who led the assault alongside Mladić, was convicted in 2001 of aiding and abetting genocide and received a sentence of 35 years. Colonel Vidoje Blagojević received 18 years for crimes against humanity. Krstić was the first European to be convicted of genocide since the Nuremberg trials, and only the third person convicted under the 1948 Genocide Convention. The ICTY's final ruling against Krstić, legally recognized the Srebrenica massacre, as an act of genocide: