The Six-Day War, or the 1967 Arab–Israeli war (5–10June 1967), was fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, primarily Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the war, Israel captured and occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Military hostilities broke out amid poor relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who had been observing the 1949 Armistice Agreements signed at the end of the First Arab–Israeli War. In 1956, regional tensions over the Straits of Tiran (giving access to Eilat, a port on Israel's southeastern tip) escalated in what became known as the Suez Crisis, when Israel invaded Egypt over the Egyptian closure of maritime passageways to Israeli shipping, ultimately resulting in the reopening of the Straits of Tiran to Israel and the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) along the Egypt–Israel border.

In the months before June 1967, tensions again became dangerously heightened: Israel reiterated its post-1956 position that another Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping would be a definite casus belli. In May, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that the Straits of Tiran would again be closed to Israeli vessels. He mobilized the Egyptian military into defensive lines along the border with Israel and ordered the immediate withdrawal of all UNEF personnel.

The war began on 5 June 1967 with Operation Focus, an Israeli surprise attack consisting of a series of airstrikes against Egyptian airfields and other facilities as the UNEF was leaving the zone. On the fifth day, Syria joined the war by shelling Israeli positions in the north.

Egypt and Jordan agreed to a ceasefire on 8 June, and Syria on 9 June, and it was signed with Israel on 11 June. The Six-Day War resulted in more than 15,000 Arab fatalities; Israel suffered fewer than 1,000. Alongside the combatant casualties were the deaths of 20 Israeli civilians killed in Arab forces air strikes on Jerusalem, 15 UN peacekeepers killed by Israeli strikes in the Sinai at the outset of the war, and 34 US personnel killed in the USS Liberty incident, in which Israeli air and naval forces assaulted a United States Navy spy ship.

When hostilities ceased, Israel had occupied the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank including East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt. The displacement of civilian populations as a result of the Six-Day War had long-term consequences, as around 280,000 to 325,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Syrians fled or were expelled from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, respectively. Nasser resigned in shame after Israel's victory, but was reinstated after a series of protests across Egypt. In the aftermath of the conflict, Egypt closed the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975.

Background

thumb|On 22 May 1967, President Nasser addressed his pilots at [[Bir Gifgafa Airfield in Sinai: "The Jews are threatening war—we say to them ahlan wa-sahlan (welcome)!" In the following years, there were numerous minor border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. In early November 1966, Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi signed a mutual defense agreement with Egypt. Soon thereafter, in response to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerilla activity, including a mine attack that left three dead, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attacked the village of as-Samu in the Jordanian-ruled West Bank. Jordanian units that engaged the Israelis were quickly beaten back. King Hussein of Jordan criticized Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to come to Jordan's aid and "hiding behind UNEF skirts".

In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the Soviet Union that Israel was massing on the Syrian border. Nasser began massing his troops in two defensive lines in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel's border (16 May), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and Sinai (19 May), and took over UNEF positions at Sharm el-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran. Israel repeated declarations it had made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war or justification for war,

On 30 May, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. On 31 May, having earlier declined Hussein's invitation to send troops to Jordan, Iraqi president Abdul Rahman Arif agreed to deploy troops and armored units in Jordan to confront Israel. They were later reinforced by an Egyptian contingent. On 1 June, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, and on 4 June the decision was made to go to war. The next morning, Israel launched Operation Focus, the surprise air strike that launched the war.

Military preparation

Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from sorties, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day, as opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two. This enabled the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the war's first day, overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force and allowing the IAF to knock out other Arab air forces the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see Controversies relating to the Six-Day War). Pilots were extensively schooled about their targets, memorized layouts in detail, and rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total secrecy.

The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai. These designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along the few roads leading through the desert rather than through the difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the Egyptian defenses head-on, instead surprising them from an unexpected direction.

James Reston wrote in The New York Times on 23 May 1967: "In discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's] army and the other Arab forces, without the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis. ... Even with 50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop."

On the eve of the war, Israel believed it could win a war in 3–4 days. The United States estimated Israel would need 7–10 days, with British estimates supporting the U.S. view.

Armies and weapons

Armies

The Israeli army had a total strength, including reservists, of 264,000, though this number could not be sustained during a long conflict, as the reservists were vital to civilian life.

Against Jordan's forces on the West Bank, Israel deployed about 40,000 troops and 200 tanks (eight brigades). Israeli Central Command forces consisted of five brigades. The first two were permanently stationed near Jerusalem and were the Jerusalem Brigade and the mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai Gur's 55th Paratroopers Brigade was summoned from the Sinai front. The 10th Armored Brigade was stationed north of the West Bank. The Israeli Northern Command comprised a division of three brigades led by Major General Elad Peled which was stationed in the Jezreel Valley to the north of the West Bank.

On the eve of the war, Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its 160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all seven of its divisions (four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), four independent infantry brigades and four independent armored brigades. Over a third of these soldiers were veterans of Egypt's continuing intervention into the North Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists. These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs, and more than 1,000 artillery pieces.

Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000 and was deployed along the border with Israel. Professor David W. Lesch wrote that "One would be hard-pressed to find a military less prepared for war with a clearly superior foe" since Syria's army had been decimated in the months and years prior through coups and attempted coups that had resulted in a series of purges, fractures, and uprisings within the armed forces.

The Jordanian Armed Forces included 11 brigades, totaling 55,000 troops. Nine brigades (45,000 troops, 270 tanks, 200 artillery pieces) were deployed in the West Bank, including the elite armored 40th, and two in the Jordan Valley. They possessed sizable numbers of M113 APCs and were equipped with some 300 modern Western tanks, 250 of which were U.S. M48 Pattons. They also had 12 battalions of artillery, six batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm mortars, a paratrooper battalion trained in the new U.S.-built school and a new battalion of mechanized infantry. The Jordanian Army was a long-term-service, professional army, relatively well-equipped and well-trained. Israeli post-war briefings said that the Jordanian staff acted professionally but was always left "half a step" behind by the Israeli moves. The small Royal Jordanian Air Force consisted of only 24 British-made Hawker Hunter fighters, six transport aircraft and two helicopters. According to the Israelis, the Hawker Hunter was essentially on par with the French-built Dassault Mirage III – the IAF's best plane.

One hundred Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the Jordanian border. Two squadrons of Iraqi fighter-aircraft, Hawker Hunters and MiG 21s, were rebased adjacent to the Jordanian border.

In the weeks leading up to the war, Saudi Arabia mobilized forces for deployment to the Jordanian front. A Saudi infantry battalion entered Jordan on 6 June, followed by another on 8 June. Both were based in Jordan's southernmost city, Ma'an. By 17 June, the Saudi contingent in Jordan had grown to include a single infantry brigade, a tank company, two artillery batteries, a heavy mortar company, and a maintenance and support unit. By the end of July, a second tank company and a third artillery battery had been added. These forces remained in Jordan until the end of 1977, when they were recalled for re-equipment and retraining in the Karak region near the Dead Sea.

The Arab air forces were reinforced by aircraft from Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to make up for the massive losses suffered on the first day of the war. They were also aided by volunteer pilots from the Pakistan Air Force acting in an independent capacity. PAF pilots like Saiful Azam shot down several Israeli planes.

Weapons

With the exception of Jordan, the Arabs relied principally on Soviet weaponry. Jordan's army was equipped with American weaponry, and its air force was composed of British aircraft.

Egypt had by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air forces, consisting of about 420 combat aircraft, all of them Soviet-built and with a large number of top-of-the-line MiG-21s. Of particular concern to the Israelis were the 30 Tu-16 "Badger" medium bombers, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Israeli military and civilian centers.

Israeli weapons were mainly of Western origin. Its air force was composed principally of French aircraft, while its armored units were mostly of British and American design and manufacture. Some light infantry weapons, including the ubiquitous Uzi, were of Israeli origin.

{| class="wikitable"

|-

!width=10% | Type

!width=40% | Arab armies

!width=40% | IDF

|-

! AFVs

| Egypt, Syria and Iraq used T-34/85, T-54, T-55, PT-76, and SU-100/152 World War II-vintage Soviet self-propelled guns. Jordan used US M47, M48, and M48A1 Patton tanks. Panzer IV, Sturmgeschütz III and Jagdpanzer IV (ex-German vehicles all used by Syria)

|| M50 and M51 Shermans, M48A3 Patton, Centurion, AMX-13, M32 tank recovery vehicle. The Centurion was upgraded with the British 105 mm L7 gun prior to the war. The Sherman also underwent extensive modifications including a larger 105 mm medium velocity, French gun, redesigned turret, wider tracks, more armor, and upgraded engine and suspension.

|-

! APCs/IFVs

| BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50, BTR-60 APCs

|| M2, / M3 Half-track, Panhard AML

|-

! Artillery

| M1937 howitzer, BM-21, D-30 (2A18) howitzer, M1954 field gun, M-52 105 mm self-propelled howitzer (used by Jordan)

|| M50 self-propelled howitzer and Makmat 160 mm self-propelled mortar, M7 Priest, Obusier de 155 mm Modèle 50, AMX 105 mm self-propelled howitzer

|-

! Aircraft

| MiG-21, MiG-19, MiG-17, Su-7B, Tu-16, Il-28, Il-18, Il-14, An-12, Hawker Hunter used by Jordan and Iraq

|| Dassault Mirage III, Dassault Super Mystère, Sud Aviation Vautour, Mystere IV, Dassault Ouragan, Fouga Magister trainer outfitted for attack missions, Nord 2501IS military cargo plane

|-

! Helicopters

| Mi-6, Mi-4

|| Super Frelon, Sikorsky S-58

|-

! AAW

| SA-2 Guideline, ZSU-57-2 mobile anti-aircraft cannon

|| MIM-23 Hawk, Bofors 40 mm

|-

! Infantry weapons

| Port Said submachine gun, AK-47, RPK, RPD, DShK HMG, B-10 and B-11 recoilless rifles

|| Uzi, FN FAL, FN MAG, AK-47, M2 Browning, Cobra, Nord SS.10, Nord SS.11, RL-83 Blindicide anti-tank infantry weapon, Jeep-mounted 106 mm recoilless rifle

|}

Nuclear weapons

Fighting fronts

Initial attack

thumb|Israeli troops examine destroyed Egyptian aircraft

thumb|Dassault Mirage at the [[Israeli Air Force Museum. Operation Focus was mainly conducted using French built aircraft.]]

The first and most critical move of the conflict was a surprise Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force. Initially, both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been attacked by the other country. The Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with hardened aircraft shelters capable of protecting Egypt's warplanes. Most of the Israeli warplanes headed out over the Mediterranean Sea, flying low to avoid radar detection, before turning toward Egypt. Others flew over the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively shutting down their entire air defense system: they were worried that rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there. It did not make a great deal of difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover and well below the lowest point at which its SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.

Although the powerful Jordanian radar facility at Ajloun detected waves of aircraft approaching Egypt and reported the code word for "war" up the Egyptian command chain, Egyptian command and communications problems prevented the warning from reaching the targeted airfields. The Israelis employed a mixed-attack strategy: bombing and strafing runs against planes parked on the ground, and bombing to disable runways with special tarmac-shredding penetration bombs developed jointly with France, leaving surviving aircraft unable to take off.

The runway at the Arish airfield was spared, as the Israelis expected to turn it into a military airport for their transports after the war. Surviving aircraft were taken out by later attack waves. The operation was more successful than expected, catching the Egyptians by surprise and destroying virtually all of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with few Israeli losses. Only four unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when the strike began. A total of 338 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100 pilots were killed, although the number of aircraft lost by the Egyptians is disputed.

Among the Egyptian planes lost were all 30 Tu-16 bombers, 27 out of 40 Il-28 bombers, 12 Su-7 fighter-bombers, over 90 MiG-21s, 20 MiG-19s, 25 MiG-17 fighters, and around 32 transport planes and helicopters. In addition, Egyptian radars and SAM missiles were also attacked and destroyed. The Israelis lost 19 planes, including two destroyed in air-to-air combat and 13 downed by anti-aircraft artillery. One Israeli plane, which was damaged and unable to break radio silence, was shot down by Israeli Hawk missiles after it strayed over the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Another was destroyed by an exploding Egyptian bomber.

The attack guaranteed Israeli air supremacy for the rest of the war. Attacks on other Arab air forces by Israel took place later in the day as hostilities broke out on other fronts.

The large numbers of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed by Israel on that day were at first regarded as "greatly exaggerated" by the Western press, but the fact that the Egyptian Air Force, along with other Arab air forces attacked by Israel, made practically no appearance for the remaining days of the conflict proved that the numbers were most likely authentic. Throughout the war, Israeli aircraft continued strafing Arab airfield runways to prevent their return to usability. Meanwhile, Egyptian state-run radio had reported an Egyptian victory, falsely claiming that 70 Israeli planes had been downed on the first day of fighting. Gonen sent additional units to Arish, and the city was eventually taken.

Brigadier-General Avraham Yoffe's assignment was to penetrate Sinai south of Tal's forces and north of Sharon's. Yoffe's attack allowed Tal to complete the capture of the Jiradi defile, Khan Yunis. All of them were taken after fierce fighting. Gonen subsequently dispatched a force of tanks, infantry and engineers under Colonel Yisrael Granit to continue down the Mediterranean coast towards the Suez Canal, while a second force led by Gonen himself turned south and captured Bir Lahfan and Jabal Libni.

Mid-front (Abu-Ageila) Israeli division

Further south, on 6 June, the Israeli 38th Armored Division under Major-General Ariel Sharon assaulted Um-Katef, a heavily fortified area defended by the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division under Major-General Sa'adi Naguib (though Naguib was actually absent) of Soviet World War II armor, which included 90 T-34-85 tanks, 22 SU-100 tank destroyers, and about 16,000 men. The Israelis had about 14,000 men and 150 post-World War II tanks including the AMX-13, Centurions, and M50 Super Shermans (modified M-4 Sherman tanks).

Two armored brigades in the meantime, under Avraham Yoffe, slipped across the border through sandy wastes that Egypt had left undefended because they were considered impassable. Simultaneously, Sharon's tanks from the west were to engage Egyptian forces on Um-Katef ridge and block any reinforcements. Israeli infantry would clear the three trenches, while heliborne paratroopers would land behind Egyptian lines and silence their artillery. An armored thrust would be made at al-Qusmaya to unnerve and isolate its garrison.

As Sharon's division advanced into the Sinai, Egyptian forces staged successful delaying actions at Tarat Umm, Umm Tarfa, and Hill 181. An Israeli jet was downed by antiaircraft fire, and Sharon's forces came under heavy shelling as they advanced from the north and west. The Israeli advance, which had to cope with extensive minefields, took a large number of casualties. A column of Israeli tanks managed to penetrate the northern flank of Abu Ageila, and by dusk, all units were in position. The Israelis then brought up ninety 105-mm and 155-mm artillery cannons for a preparatory barrage, while civilian buses brought reserve infantrymen under Colonel Yekutiel Adam and helicopters arrived to ferry the paratroopers. These movements were unobserved by the Egyptians, who were preoccupied with Israeli probes against their perimeter.

thumb|Israeli armor of the Six-Day War: pictured here the [[AMX 13]]

As night fell, the Israeli assault troops lit flashlights, each battalion a different colour, to prevent friendly fire incidents. At 10:00 p.m., Israeli artillery began a barrage on Um-Katef, firing some 6,000 shells in less than 20 minutes, the most concentrated artillery barrage in Israel's history. Israeli tanks assaulted the northernmost Egyptian defenses and were largely successful, though an entire armored brigade was stalled by mines, and had only one mine-clearance tank. Israeli infantrymen assaulted the triple line of trenches in the east. To the west, paratroopers commanded by Colonel Danny Matt landed behind Egyptian lines, though half the helicopters got lost and never found the battlefield, while others were unable to land due to mortar fire.

Those that successfully landed on target destroyed Egyptian artillery and ammunition dumps and separated gun crews from their batteries, sowing enough confusion to significantly reduce Egyptian artillery fire. Egyptian reinforcements from Jabal Libni advanced towards Um-Katef to counterattack but failed to reach their objective, being subjected to heavy air attacks and encountering Israeli lodgements on the roads. Egyptian commanders then called in artillery attacks on their own positions. The Israelis accomplished and sometimes exceeded their overall plan and had largely succeeded by the following day. The Egyptians suffered about 2,000 casualties, while the Israelis lost 42 dead and 140 wounded.

Yoffe's attack allowed Sharon to complete the capture of the Um-Katef, after fierce fighting. The main thrust at Um-Katef was stalled due to mines and craters. After IDF engineers had cleared a path by 4:00 pm, Israeli and Egyptian tanks engaged in fierce combat, often at ranges as close as ten yards. The battle ended in an Israeli victory, with 40 Egyptian and 19 Israeli tanks destroyed. Meanwhile, Israeli infantry finished clearing out the Egyptian trenches, with Israeli casualties standing at 14 dead and 41 wounded and Egyptian casualties at 300 dead and 100 taken prisoner.

Other Israeli forces

Further south, on 5 June, the 8th Armored Brigade under Colonel Albert Mandler, initially positioned as a ruse to draw off Egyptian forces from the real invasion routes, attacked the fortified bunkers at Kuntilla, a strategically valuable position whose capture would enable Mandler to block reinforcements from reaching Um-Katef and to join Sharon's upcoming attack on Nakhl. The defending Egyptian battalion outnumbered and outgunned, fiercely resisted the attack, hitting several Israeli tanks. Most of the defenders were killed, and only three Egyptian tanks, one of them damaged, survived. By nightfall, Mandler's forces had taken Kuntilla.

With the exceptions of Rafah and Khan Yunis, Israeli forces had initially avoided entering the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had expressly forbidden entry into the area. After Palestinian positions in Gaza opened fire on the Negev settlements of Nirim and Kissufim, IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin overrode Dayan's instructions and ordered the 11th Mechanized Brigade under Colonel Yehuda Reshef to enter the Strip. The force was immediately met with heavy artillery fire and fierce resistance from Palestinian forces and remnants of the Egyptian forces from Rafah.

By sunset, the Israelis had taken the strategically vital Ali Muntar ridge, overlooking Gaza City, but were beaten back from the city itself. Some 70 Israelis were killed, along with Israeli journalist Ben Oyserman and American journalist Paul Schutzer. Twelve members of UNEF were also killed. On the war's second day, 6 June, the Israelis were bolstered by the 35th Paratroopers Brigade under Colonel Rafael Eitan and took Gaza City along with the entire Strip. The fighting was fierce and accounted for nearly half of all Israeli casualties on the southern front. Gaza rapidly fell to the Israelis.

Meanwhile, on 6 June, two Israeli reserve brigades under Yoffe, each equipped with 100 tanks, penetrated the Sinai south of Tal's division and north of Sharon's, capturing the road junctions of Abu Ageila, Bir Lahfan, and Arish, taking all of them before midnight. Two Egyptian armored brigades counterattacked, and a fierce battle took place until the following morning. The Egyptians were beaten back by fierce resistance coupled with airstrikes, sustaining heavy tank losses. They fled west towards Jabal Libni.

The Egyptian Army

During the ground fighting, remnants of the Egyptian Air Force attacked Israeli ground forces but took losses from the Israeli Air Force and from Israeli anti-aircraft units. Throughout the last four days, Egyptian aircraft flew 150 sorties against Israeli units in the Sinai.

Many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to prevent the Israelis from reaching the Suez Canal, or engaged in combat in the attempt to reach the canal, but when the Egyptian Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila, he panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt.

Meanwhile, President Nasser, having learned of the results of the Israeli air strikes, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to order a general retreat from the Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence of withdrawal.

Next fighting days

thumb|upright=1.35|The capture of Sinai. 7–8 June 1967

thumb|thumbtime=0:56|A newsreel from 6 June about the first Israeli–Egyptian fighting

thumb|An Israeli gunboat passes through the Straits of Tiran near Sharm El Sheikh.

As Egyptian columns retreated, Israeli aircraft and artillery attacked them. Israeli jets used napalm bombs during their sorties. The attacks destroyed hundreds of vehicles and caused heavy casualties. At Jabal Libni, retreating Egyptian soldiers were fired upon by their own artillery. At Bir Gafgafa, the Egyptians fiercely resisted advancing Israeli forces, knocking out three tanks and eight half-tracks, and killing 20 soldiers. Due to the Egyptians' retreat, the Israeli High Command decided not to pursue the Egyptian units but rather to bypass and destroy them in the mountainous passes of West Sinai.

Therefore, on the next two days (6 and 7 June), all three Israeli divisions (Sharon and Tal were reinforced by an armored brigade each) rushed westward and reached the passes. Sharon's division first went southward then westward, via An-Nakhl, to Mitla Pass with air support. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's division, while its other units blocked the Gidi Pass. These passes became killing grounds for the Egyptians, who ran right into waiting Israeli positions and suffered heavy losses in both soldiers and vehicles. According to Egyptian diplomat Mahmoud Riad, 10,000 men were killed in a day and many others died of thirst. Tal's units stopped at various points to the length of the Suez Canal.

Israel's blocking action was partially successful. Only the Gidi pass was captured before the Egyptians approached it, but at other places, Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross the canal to safety. Due to the haste of the Egyptian retreat, soldiers often abandoned weapons, military equipment, and hundreds of vehicles. Many Egyptian soldiers were cut off from their units had to walk about on foot before reaching the Suez Canal with limited supplies of food and water and were exposed to intense heat. Thousands died as a result. Many Egyptian soldiers chose instead to surrender to the Israelis, who eventually exceeded their capabilities to provide for prisoners. As a result, they began directing soldiers toward the Suez Canal and imprisoned only high-ranking officers, who were expected to be exchanged for captured Israeli pilots.

According to some accounts, during the Egyptian retreat from the Sinai, a unit of Soviet Marines based on a Soviet warship in Port Said at the time came ashore and attempted to cross the Suez Canal eastward. The Soviet force was reportedly decimated by an Israeli air attack and lost 17 dead and 34 wounded. Among the wounded was the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Shevchenko.

During the offensive, the Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit to infiltrate Alexandria harbor. The divers sank an Egyptian minesweeper before being taken prisoner. Shayetet 13 commandos also infiltrated Port Said harbor but found no ships there. A planned commando raid against the Syrian Navy never materialized. Both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements at sea to intimidate the other side throughout the war but did not engage each other. Israeli warships and aircraft hunted for Egyptian submarines throughout the war.

On 7 June, Israel began its attack on Sharm el-Sheikh. The Israeli Navy started the operation with a probe of Egyptian naval defenses. An aerial reconnaissance flight found that the area was less defended than originally thought. Around 4:30 a.m., three Israeli missile boats opened fire on Egyptian shore batteries, while paratroopers and commandos boarded helicopters and Nord Noratlas transport planes for an assault on Al-Tur, as Chief of Staff Rabin was convinced it was too risky to land them directly in Sharm el-Sheikh. The city had been largely abandoned the day before, and reports from air and naval forces finally convinced Rabin to divert the aircraft to Sharm el-Sheikh. There, the Israelis engaged in a pitched battle with the Egyptians and took the city, killing 20 Egyptian soldiers and taking eight more prisoners. At 12:15 p.m., Dayan announced that the Straits of Tiran constituted an international waterway open to all ships without restriction.

On 8 June, Israel completed the capture of the Sinai by sending infantry units to Ras Sudar on the western coast of the peninsula.

Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible:

  1. The surprise attack that quickly gave the Israeli Air Force complete air superiority over the Egyptian Air Force.
  2. The determined implementation of an innovative battle plan.
  3. The lack of coordination among Egyptian troops.

These factors also proved to be decisive elements on Israel's other fronts.

West Bank

thumb|upright=1.35|The Jordan [[Salient (military)|salient, 5–7 June.]]

Egyptian control of Jordanian forces

King Hussein gave of his army to Egypt on 1 June, on which date Egyptian General Riad arrived in Amman to take control of the Jordanian military.

Egyptian Field Marshal Amer used the confusion of the conflict's first hours to cable to Amman that he was victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting of a squadron of Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which he said was an Egyptian aircraft en route to attack Israel. In this cable, sent shortly before 9:00 a.m., Riad was ordered to attack.

Initial attack

One of the Jordanian brigades stationed in the West Bank was sent to the Hebron area to link with the Egyptians.

The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against Egypt.

Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began taking place in Jerusalem at 9:30 a.m., and the fighting gradually escalated as the Jordanians introduced mortar and recoilless rifle fire. On General Narkis's orders, the Israelis responded only with small-arms fire, firing in a flat trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites, or the Old City. At 10:00 a.m. on 5 June, the Jordanian Army began shelling Israel. Two batteries of 155-mm Long Tom cannons opened fire on the suburbs of Tel Aviv and Ramat David Airbase. The commanders of these batteries were instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel. Some shells hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv.

By 10:30 a.m., Eshkol had sent King Hussein a message via Odd Bull promising not to initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of the war. Hussein replied that it was too late and "the die was cast". Israeli civilian casualties totalled 20 dead and over 1,000 wounded. Some 900 buildings were damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital, which had its Chagall-made windows destroyed.

Around midday, eight Iraqi Hawker Hunters attacked the Kfar Sirkin airfield, destroying a Noratlas transport aircraft and a Piper Super Cub. Four Jordanian Hunters also hit a factory hall in Netanya, killing one civilian and wounding seven.

Israeli cabinet meets

When the Israeli cabinet convened to decide on a plan of action, Yigal Allon and Menahem Begin argued that this was an opportunity to take the Old City of Jerusalem, but Eshkol decided to defer any decision until Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted. Uzi Narkiss made proposals for military action, including the capture of Latrun, but the cabinet turned him down. Dayan rejected multiple requests from Narkiss for permission to mount an infantry assault towards Mount Scopus but sanctioned some limited retaliatory actions.

Initial response

Shortly before 12:30 p.m., the Israeli Air Force attacked Jordan's two airbases. The Hawker Hunters were refueling at the time of the attack. The Israeli aircraft attacked in two waves; the first cratered the runways and knocked out the control towers, and the second destroyed all 21 of Jordan's Hawker Hunter fighters, six transport aircraft, and two helicopters. One Israeli jet was shot down by ground fire.

Three Israeli Vautours also attacked H-3, an airfield in western Iraq used by the Iraqi Air Force. During the attack, three MiG-21s, one Hunter, one de Havilland Dove and one Antonov An-12 were destroyed on the ground. They also damaged the runway, although it was repaired by the next morning.

On 7 June, four Vautours escorted by four Mirages attacked the H-3 airfield for the third time. This resulted in an air combat with Hunters, piloted by Iraqis, as well as a Jordanian and Pakistani pilot Saiful Azam. One Iraqi Hunter was shot down and its pilot killed, while the Israelis lost two Vautours and one Mirage, with three crewmen dead and two taken prisoner.

Jordanian battalion at Government House

thumb|upright|Israeli paratroopers flush out Jordanian soldiers from trenches during the [[Battle of Ammunition Hill.]]

A Jordanian battalion advanced up Government House ridge and dug in at the perimeter of Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations observers, and opened fire on Ramat Rachel, the Allenby Barracks and the Jewish section of Abu Tor with mortars and recoilless rifles. UN observers fiercely protested the incursion into the neutral zone, and several manhandled a Jordanian machine gun out of Government House after the crew had set it up in a second-floor window. After the Jordanians occupied Jabel Mukaber, an advance patrol was sent out and approached Ramat Rachel, where they came under fire from four civilians, including the wife of the director, who were armed with old Czech-made weapons.

The immediate Israeli response was an offensive to retake Government House and its ridge. The Jerusalem Brigade's Reserve Battalion 161, under Lieutenant-Colonel Asher Dreizin, was given the task. Dreizin had two infantry companies and eight tanks under his command, several of which broke down or became stuck in the mud at Ramat Rachel, leaving three for the assault. The Jordanians mounted fierce resistance, knocking out two tanks.

The Israelis broke through the compound's western gate and began clearing the building with grenades, before General Odd Bull, commander of the UN observers, compelled the Israelis to hold their fire, telling them that the Jordanians had already fled. The Israelis proceeded to take the Antenna Hill, directly behind Government House, and clear out a series of bunkers to the west and south. The fighting often conducted hand-to-hand, continued for nearly four hours before the surviving Jordanians fell back to trenches held by the Hittin Brigade, which were steadily overwhelmed. By 6:30 am, the Jordanians had retreated to Bethlehem, having suffered about 100 casualties. All but ten of Dreizin's soldiers were casualties, and Dreizin himself was wounded three times.

Israeli invasion

thumb|upright|Silhouette of Israeli paratroops advancing on Ammunition Hill

During the late afternoon of 5 June, the Israelis launched an offensive to encircle Jerusalem, which lasted into the following day. During the night, they were supported by intense tank, artillery and mortar fire to soften up Jordanian positions. Searchlights placed atop the Labor Federation building, then the tallest in Israeli Jerusalem, exposed and blinded the Jordanians. The Jerusalem Brigade moved south of Jerusalem, while the mechanized Harel Brigade and 55th Paratroopers Brigade under Mordechai Gur encircled it from the north.

A combined force of tanks and paratroopers crossed no-man's land near the Mandelbaum Gate. Gur's 66th paratroop battalion approached the fortified Police Academy. The Israelis used Bangalore torpedoes to blast their way through barbed wire leading up to the position while exposed and under heavy fire. With the aid of two tanks borrowed from the Jerusalem Brigade, they captured the Police Academy. After receiving reinforcements, they moved up to attack Ammunition Hill.

The Jordanian defenders, who were heavily dug-in, fiercely resisted the attack. All of the Israeli officers except for two company commanders were killed, and the fighting was mostly led by individual soldiers. The fighting was conducted at close quarters in trenches and bunkers and was often hand-to-hand. The Israelis captured the position after four hours of heavy fighting. During the battle, 36 Israeli and 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.

The 66th battalion subsequently drove east and linked up with the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus and its Hebrew University campus. Gur's other battalions, the 71st and 28th captured the other Jordanian positions around the American Colony, despite being short on men and equipment and having come under a Jordanian mortar bombardment while waiting for the signal to advance. Fearful that Israeli soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's Jewish community, Hebron's residents flew white sheets from their windows and rooftops. The Harel Brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan River.

thumb|upright|From left, General [[Uzi Narkiss, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Chief of Staff Lt. General Yitzhak Rabin in the Old City of Jerusalem after its fall to Israeli forces]]

On 7 June, Israeli forces took Bethlehem after a brief battle that left some 40 Jordanian soldiers dead, with the remainder fleeing. The same day, one of Peled's brigades seized Nablus; it then joined one of Central Command's armored brigades to fight the Jordanian forces, as the Jordanians held the advantage of superior equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.

Again, the IAF's air superiority proved paramount as it immobilized the Jordanians, leading to their defeat. One of Peled's brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the Jordan river crossings together with the Central Command's 10th. Engineering Corps sappers blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges with captured Jordanian mortar shells, while elements of the Harel Brigade crossed the river and occupied positions along the east bank to cover them, but quickly pulled back due to American pressure. Anticipating an Israeli offensive deep into Jordan, the Jordanians assembled the remnants of their army and Iraqi units in Jordan to protect the western approaches to Amman and the southern slopes of the Golan Heights.

As Israel continued its offensive on 7 June, taking no account of the UN ceasefire resolution, the Egyptian-Jordanian command ordered a full Jordanian withdrawal for the second time, in order to avoid an annihilation of the Jordanian army. This was complete by nightfall on 7 June.

During this period, false Egyptian reports of a crushing victory over the Israeli army and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon attack Tel Aviv sporadically influenced Syria's decision to enter the war. without consultation or government authorization.

The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armor. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (the 8th Armored Brigade and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the front at Givat HaEm, and another two (infantry and one of Peled's brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center. The Golan Heights' unique terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several kilometers running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the area channeled both forces along east–west axes of movement and restricted the ability of units to support those on either flank. Thus the Syrians could move north–south on the plateau itself, and the Israelis could move north–south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage Israel possessed was the intelligence collected by Mossad operative Eli Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions. Syria had built extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers.

As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so effective. The Syrian forces proved unable to put up effective defense largely because the officers were poor leaders and treated their soldiers badly; often officers would retreat from danger, leaving their men confused and ineffective. The Israelis also had the upper hand during close combat that took place in the numerous Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the Uzi, a submachine gun designed for close combat, while Syrian soldiers were armed with the heavier AK-47 assault rifle, designed for combat in more open areas.

Israeli attack: first day (9 June)

thumb|right|Israeli tanks advancing on the Golan Heights. June 1967

On the morning of 9 June, Israeli jets began carrying out dozens of sorties against Syrian positions from Mount Hermon to Tawfiq, using rockets salvaged from captured Egyptian stocks. The airstrikes knocked out artillery batteries and storehouses and forced transport columns off the roads. The Syrians suffered heavy casualties and a drop in morale, with some senior officers and troops deserting. The attacks also provided time as Israeli forces cleared paths through Syrian minefields. The airstrikes did not seriously damage the Syrians' bunkers and trench systems, and the bulk of Syrian forces on the Golan remained in their positions.

About two hours after the airstrikes began, the 8th Armored Brigade, led by Colonel Albert Mandler, advanced into the Golan Heights from Givat HaEm. Its advance was spearheaded by Engineering Corps sappers and eight bulldozers, which cleared away barbed wire and mines. As they advanced, the force came under fire, and five bulldozers were immediately hit. The Israeli tanks, with their manoeuvrability sharply reduced by the terrain, advanced slowly under fire toward the fortified village of Sir al-Dib, with their ultimate objective being the fortress at Qala. Israeli casualties steadily mounted.

Part of the attacking force lost its way and emerged opposite Za'ura, a redoubt manned by Syrian reservists. With the situation critical, Colonel Mandler ordered simultaneous assaults on Za'ura and Qala. Heavy and confused fighting followed, with Israeli and Syrian tanks struggling around obstacles and firing at extremely short ranges. Mandler recalled that "the Syrians fought well and bloodied us. We beat them only by crushing them under our treads and by blasting them with our cannons at very short range, from 100 to 500 meters." The first three Israeli tanks to enter Qala were stopped by a Syrian bazooka team, and a relief column of seven Syrian tanks arrived to repel the attackers.

The Israelis took heavy fire from the houses, but could not turn back, as other forces were advancing behind them, and they were on a narrow path with mines on either side. The Israelis continued pressing forward and called for air support. A pair of Israeli jets destroyed two of the Syrian tanks, and the remainder withdrew. The surviving defenders of Qala retreated after their commander was killed. Meanwhile, Za'ura fell in an Israeli assault, and the Israelis also captured the 'Ein Fit fortress.

In the central sector, the Israeli 181st Battalion captured the strongholds of Dardara and Tel Hillal after fierce fighting. Desperate fighting also broke out along the operation's northern axis, where Golani Brigade attacked thirteen Syrian positions, including the formidable Tel Fakhr position. Navigational errors placed the Israelis directly under the Syrians' guns. In the fighting that followed, both sides took heavy casualties, with the Israelis losing all nineteen of their tanks and half-tracks. The Israeli battalion commander then ordered his twenty-five remaining men to dismount, divide into two groups, and charge the northern and southern flanks of Tel Fakhr. The first Israelis to reach the perimeter of the southern approach laid on the barbed wire, allowing their comrades to vault over them. From there, they assaulted the fortified Syrian positions. The fighting was waged at extremely close quarters, often hand-to-hand.

On the northern flank, the Israelis broke through within minutes and cleared out the trenches and bunkers. During the seven-hour battle, the Israelis lost 31 dead and 82 wounded, while the Syrians lost 62 dead and 20 captured. Among the dead was the Israeli battalion commander. The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion took Tel 'Azzaziat, and Darbashiya also fell to Israeli forces.

thumb|thumbtime=1:16|A [[Universal Newsreel from 9 June about the war and UN reactions.]]

By the evening of 9 June, the four Israeli brigades had all broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced. Thousands of reinforcements began reaching the front, those tanks and half-tracks that had survived the previous day's fighting were refuelled and replenished with ammunition, and the wounded were evacuated. By dawn, the Israelis had eight brigades in the sector.

Syria's first line of defense had been shattered, but the defenses beyond that remained largely intact. Mount Hermon and the Banias in the north, and the entire sector between Tawfiq and Customs House Road in the south remained in Syrian hands. In a meeting early on the night of 9 June, Syrian leaders decided to reinforce those positions as quickly as possible and to maintain a steady barrage on Israeli civilian settlements.

Israeli attack: second day (10 June)

Throughout the night, the Israelis continued their advance, though it was slowed by fierce resistance. An anticipated Syrian counterattack never materialized. At the fortified village of Jalabina, a garrison of Syrian reservists, levelling their anti-aircraft guns, held off the Israeli 65th Paratroop Battalion for four hours before a small detachment managed to penetrate the village and knock out the heavy guns.

Meanwhile, the 8th Brigade's tanks moved south from Qala, advancing to Wasit under heavy artillery and tank bombardment. At the Banias in the north, Syrian mortar batteries opened fire on advancing Israeli forces only after Golani Brigade sappers had cleared a path through a minefield, killing 16 Israeli soldiers and wounding four.

On the next day, 10 June, the central and northern groups joined in a pincer movement on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces retreated. At 8:30 a.m., the Syrians began blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents and retreating. Several units joined by Elad Peled's troops climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions mostly empty. When the 8th Brigade reached Mansura, from Wasit, the Israelis met no opposition and found abandoned equipment, including tanks, in perfect working condition. In the fortified Banias village, Golani Brigade troops found only several Syrian soldiers chained to their positions.

During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon ceasefire to occupy strategically strong positions. To the east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the ceasefire line known as the "Purple Line".

Time magazine reported: "In an effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire, Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of the city of Quneitra three hours before it actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender of their headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan area."

Conclusion

thumb|A [[Universal Newsreel from 13 June about the war]]

By 10 June, Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan Heights, and a ceasefire was signed the next day. Israel had seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. About a million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew by at least 300 kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east, and 20 kilometers of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that proved useful in the Yom Kippur War six years later.

Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an honorary degree from Hebrew University, Yitzhak Rabin gave his reasoning behind the success of Israel:

<blockquote>Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so accurately that no one in the world understands how it was done and people seek technological explanations or secret weapons; our armoured troops who beat the enemy even when their equipment was inferior to his; our soldiers in all other branches ... who overcame our enemies everywhere, despite the latter's superior numbers and fortifications—all these revealed not only coolness and courage in the battle but ... an understanding that only their personal stand against the greatest dangers would achieve victory for their country and for their families, and that if victory was not theirs the alternative was annihilation.</blockquote>

In recognition of contributions, Rabin was given the honor of naming the war for the Israelis. From the suggestions proposed, including the "War of Daring", "War of Salvation", and "War of the Sons of Light", he "chose the least ostentatious, the Six-Day War, evoking the days of creation".

Dayan's final report on the war to the Israeli general staff listed several shortcomings in Israel's actions, including misinterpretation of Nasser's intentions, overdependence on the United States, and reluctance to act when Egypt closed the Straits. He also credited several factors for Israel's success: Egypt did not appreciate the advantage of striking first and their adversaries did not accurately gauge Israel's strength and its willingness to use it.

In Egypt, according to Heikal, Nasser had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in June 1967. and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers were listed as killed or missing in action. An additional 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were captured. Egyptian losses were reported at 700 tanks according to President Nasser, although Israeli officials claimed to have destroyed 509 Egyptian tanks. Egyptian aircraft losses range from 282 to 350. Iraq lost 9 aircraft; Lebanon lost one.

Controversies

Preemptive war or war of aggression

When hostilities began, Egypt and Israel both announced that they had been attacked by the other. The Israeli government later abandoned its initial position, acknowledging Israel had struck first and calling the attack a preemptive move to prevent an anticipated invasion by Egypt. The Arab view was that it was unjustified to attack Egypt. Many scholars consider the war a case of preventative war as a form of self-defense. Others have assessed it as a war of aggression.

Allegations of atrocities committed against Egyptian soldiers

It has been alleged that Nasser did not want Egypt to learn of the true extent of his defeat and so ordered the killing of Egyptian army stragglers making their way back to the Suez canal zone. Both Israeli and Egyptian sources have also alleged that Israeli troops killed unarmed Egyptian prisoners.

Allegations of military support from the US, UK and Soviet Union

It has been alleged that the US and the UK gave Israel direct military support during the war, including the supply of equipment (despite an embargo) and the participation of US forces in the conflict. Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories have been disputed and it has been claimed that some were given currency in the Arab world to explain the Arab defeat. It has also been claimed that the Soviet Union, in support of its Arab allies, used its naval strength in the Mediterranean as a major restraint on the US Navy.

The US features prominently in Arab conspiracy theories purporting to explain the June 1967 defeat. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, a confidant of Nasser, claims that President Lyndon B. Johnson was obsessed with Nasser and conspired with Israel to bring him down. The reported Israeli troop movements seemed all the more threatening because they were perceived in the context of a US conspiracy against Egypt. Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign Ministry claims it saw the reported Israeli troop movements as credible because Israel had reached the level at which it could find strategic alliance with the United States.

During the war, Cairo announced that American and British planes were participating in the Israeli attack. Nasser broke off diplomatic relations following this allegation. Nasser's image of the United States was such that he might well have believed the worst. Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States as a political cover-up for domestic consumption. Lutfi Abd al-Qadir, the director of Radio Cairo during the late 1960s, who accompanied Nasser to his visits in Moscow, theorized that both the Soviets and the Western powers wanted to topple Nasser or to reduce his influence.

USS Liberty incident

On 8 June 1967, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty, a United States Navy electronic intelligence vessel sailing off Arish (just outside Egypt's territorial waters), nearly sinking the ship, killing 34 sailors and wounding 171. Israel said it had misidentified the ship as the Egyptian vessel El Quseir, apologized for the mistake, and paid compensation to the victims or their families and to the US for damage to the ship. After an investigation, the US accepted Israel's explanation and the issue was closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987. Others, including United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Moorer, some survivors of the attack, and intelligence officials familiar with transcripts of intercepted signals on the day, have rejected these conclusions as unsatisfactory and maintain that the attack was made in the knowledge that the ship was American.

Aftermath

thumb|Israel and the territories Israel occupied in the Six Day War

The Six-Day War's political importance was immense. Israel demonstrated again that it was able and willing to initiate strategic strikes that could change the regional balance. Egypt and Syria learned tactical lessons and launched an attack in 1973 in an attempt to reclaim their lost territories.

After following other Arab nations in declaring war, Mauritania remained in a declared state of war with Israel until about 1999. The US imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to all Middle East countries, including Israel, that remained in force until the end of 1967, despite urgent Israeli requests to lift it. The other 700,000 remained. In the Golan Heights, over 100,000 fled. According to research by Haaretz, a total of 130,000 Syrian inhabitants fled or were expelled from the territory, most of them pushed out by the Israeli army.<gallery heights="180" mode="packed">

File:Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge during the second Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1967.jpg|Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge

File:Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge during the 1967 hostilities.tif|Palestine refugees flee across the Allenby Bridge

File:Expulsion of Syrians from Golan Heights.jpg|Forced transfer and displacement. Syrian civilians, hands raised, before Israeli soldiers, leave their homes in the Golan Heights

</gallery>

Israel and Zionism

After the war, Israel experienced a wave of national euphoria, and the press praised the military's performance for weeks. New "victory coins" were minted to celebrate. The world's interest in Israel grew, and its economy, which had been in crisis before the war, flourished due to an influx of tourists and donations, as well as the extraction of oil from the Sinai's wells. The aftermath of the war also saw a baby boom that lasted four years.

The war's aftermath also had religious significance. Under Jordanian rule, Jews were expelled from Jerusalem and effectively barred from visiting the Western Wall, despite Article VIII of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which required making arrangements for Israeli Jewish access to it. Jewish holy sites were not maintained and Jewish cemeteries had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each religious group was granted administration over its holy sites. For the first time since 1948, Jews could visit the Old City of Jerusalem and pray at the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews are permitted to pray, an event celebrated every year on Yom Yerushalayim.

The Temple Mount, home to the Al-Aqsa compound, is the holiest site in Jewish tradition, but has been under sole administration of the Jordanian Muslim Waqf, and Jews are barred from praying there, though they are allowed to visit. In Hebron, Jews gained access to the Cave of the Patriarchs – the second-holiest site in Judaism – for the first time since the 14th century (previously Jews were allowed to pray only at the entrance). Other Jewish holy sites, such as Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem and Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, also became accessible.

The war inspired the Jewish diaspora, which was swept up in overwhelming support for Israel. According to Michael Oren, the war enabled American Jews to "walk with their backs straight and flex their political muscle as never before. American Jewish organizations which had previously kept Israel at arm's length suddenly proclaimed their Zionism." Thousands of Jewish immigrants arrived from Western countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France and South Africa after the war. Many of them returned to their countries of origin after a few years; one survey found that 58% of American Jews who immigrated to Israel between 1961 and 1972 returned to the United States. Nevertheless, immigration to Israel of Jews from Western countries, which was previously only a trickle, was a significant force for the first time.

Most notably, the war stirred Zionist passions among Jews in the Soviet Union, who by that time had been forcibly assimilated. Many Soviet Jews applied for exit visas and began protesting for their right to immigrate to Israel. After diplomatic pressure from the West, the Soviet government began granting Jews exit visas in growing numbers. From 1970 to 1988, some 291,000 Soviet Jews were granted exit visas, of whom 165,000 immigrated to Israel and 126,000 to the United States. The great rise in Jewish pride in the wake of Israel's victory also fueled the beginnings of the baal teshuva movement, the return of secular Jews to religious Judaism. The war gave impetus to a campaign in which the leader of the Hasidic Lubavitch movement directed his male followers around the world to wear tefillin (small leather boxes) during morning prayers.

Jews in Arab countries

In the Arab nations, populations of minority Jews faced persecution and expulsion following the Israeli victory, contributing to the Jewish exodus from Arab lands, which had been ongoing since 1948. As a result, Jewish populations in Arab countries further diminished as many Jews emigrated to Israel and other Western countries. According to historian and ambassador Michael Oren:

<blockquote>Mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco, burning synagogues and assaulting residents. A pogrom in Tripoli, Libya, left 18 Jews dead and 25 injured; the survivors were herded into detention centers. Of Egypt's 4,000 Jews, 800 were arrested, including the chief rabbis of both Cairo and Alexandria, and their property sequestered by the government. The ancient communities of Damascus and Baghdad were placed under house arrest, their leaders imprisoned and fined. A total of 7,000 Jews were expelled, many with merely a satchel.</blockquote>

Antisemitism in Communist countries

After the war, a series of antisemitic purges began in Communist countries. Some 11,200 Jews from Poland immigrated to Israel during the 1968 Polish political crisis and in 1969.

War of Attrition

After the war, Egypt initiated clashes along the Suez Canal in what became known as the War of Attrition.

Palestinian terrorism

As a result of Israel's victory, Palestinian leadership concluded that the Arab world could not defeat Israel in open warfare, which in turn led to an increase in terrorist attacks with an international reach. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been established in 1964 and became more active after the Six-Day War; its actions gave credibility to those who claimed that only terror could end Israel's existence. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine also emerged after the war, with its leader, George Habash, speaking of turning the occupied territories into an "inferno whose fires consume the usurpers".

After the war, the entire Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe except Romania broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.

Mao-era China contended that the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War demonstrated that only people's war, not other strategies or methods, could defeat imperialism in the Middle East.

The Six-Day War laid the foundation for future discord in the region, as the Arab states resented Israel's victory and did not want to give up territory.

On 22 November 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, the "land for peace" formula, which called for Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967 and "the termination of all claims or states of belligerency". Resolution 242 recognized the right of "every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in 1978, after the Camp David Accords. In 2005, Israel withdrew all military forces and evacuated all civilians from the Gaza Strip. Its army frequently reenters Gaza for military operations and retains control of the seaports, airports and most of the border crossings.

Long term

thumb|During the Six-Day War Israel captured the [[West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights.]]

Israel made peace with Egypt after the Camp David Accords of 1978 and completed a staged withdrawal from the Sinai in 1982. The position of the other occupied territories has for decades been a bitter cause of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the Arab world in general. Jordan and Egypt eventually withdrew their claims to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, respectively. Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994.

After the Israeli occupation of these territories, the Gush Emunim movement launched a large settlement effort in these areas to secure a permanent foothold. There are now hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers in the West Bank. They are a matter of controversy within Israel, both among the general population and within different political administrations, supporting them to varying degrees. Palestinians consider them a provocation. The Israeli settlements in Gaza were evacuated in August 2005 as a part of Israel's disengagement from Gaza.

See also

  • Catch 67, a 2017 Israeli philosophy book on the West Bank occupation that launched a public dialogue on the war's 50th anniversary
  • Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister
  • Israeli MIAs
  • Ras Sedr massacre
  • Syrian towns and villages depopulated in the Arab–Israeli conflict

References

Explanatory notes

  1. <br>It was twenty minutes after the capture of the Western Wall that David Rubinger shot his "signature" photograph of three Israeli paratroopers gazing in wonder up at the wall. As part of the terms for his access to the front lines, Rubinger handed the negatives to the Israeli government, who then distributed this image widely. Although he was displeased with the violation of his copyright, the widespread use of his photo made it famous, and it is now considered a defining image of the conflict and one of the best-known in the history of Israel.

::* Gideon Rafael [Israeli Ambassador to the UN] received a message from the Israeli foreign office: "Inform immediately the President of the Sec. Co. that Israel is now engaged in repelling Egyptian land and air forces." At 3:10&nbsp;am, Rafael woke ambassador Hans Tabor, the Danish President of the Security Council for June, with the news that Egyptian forces had "moved against Israel".

::* [At Security Council meeting of 5 June], both Israel and Egypt claimed to be repelling an invasion by the other.

::* "Egyptian sources claimed that Israel had initiated hostilities [...] but Israeli officials – Eban and Evron – swore that Egypt had fired first".

::* "Gideon Rafael phoned Danish ambassador Hans Tabor, Security Council president for the month of June, and informed him that Israel was responding to a 'cowardly and treacherous' attack from Egypt...".

Citations

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<!--ref name=SchiffHaber1976p11>Israel, Army and defense – A dictionary, Zeev Schiff & Eitan Haber, editors, Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1976, Tel Aviv Hebrew</ref-->

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<!--ref name="TimeSamu1">Middle East: Incident at Samu, Time, 25 November 1966</ref-->

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General and cited sources

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Further reading

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  • Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab–Israeli Air Wars 1947–1982. Osprey Aviation.
  • Alteras, Isaac. (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.–Israeli Relations, 1953–1960, University Press of Florida. .
  • Bachmutsky, Roi. "Otherwise occupied: The legal status of the Gaza strip 50 years after the six-day war." Virginia Journal of International Law 57 (2017): 413+ online .
  • Barzilai, Gad (1996). Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East. New York University Press.
  • Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press.
  • Bober, Arie (ed.) (1972). The other Israel. Doubleday Anchor. .
  • Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). International Law: A Dictionary. Scarecrow Press.
  • Borowiec, Andrew. (1998). Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship. Greenwood Publishing Group. .
  • Brecher, Michael. (1996). Eban and Israeli foreign policy: Diplomacy, war and disengagement. In A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor of Amos Perlmutter, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), pp.&nbsp;104–117. Routledge.
  • Bregman, Ahron (2000). Israel's Wars, 1947–1993. Routledge. .
  • Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge.
  • Christie, Hazel (1999). Law of the Sea. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
  • Colaresi, Michael P. (2005). Scare Tactics: The politics of international rivalry. Syracuse University Press.
  • Cristol, A Jay (2002). Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Brassey's.
  • Eban, Abba (1977). Abba Eban: An Autobiography. Random House.
  • El-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel Ghani. (1993). The October War. The American University in Cairo Press. .
  • Finkelstein, Norman (June 2017). Analysis of the war and its aftermath, on the 50th anniversary of the June 1967 war (3 parts, each about 30 min)
  • Gelpi, Christopher (2002). Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining. Princeton University Press.
  • Gerner, Deborah J. (1994). One Land, Two Peoples. Westview Press. , p.&nbsp;112
  • Gerteiny, Alfred G. & Ziegler, Jean (2007). The Terrorist Conjunction: The United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and Al-Qā'ida. Greenwood Publishing Group. , p.&nbsp;142
  • Gilbert, Martin. (2008). Israel – A History. McNally & Loftin Publishers. . Chapter available online: Chapter 21: Nasser's Challenge .
  • Goldstein, Erik (1992). Wars and Peace Treaties, 1816–1991. Routledge.
  • Hajjar, Sami G. The Israel-Syria Track, Middle East Policy, Volume VI, February 1999, Number 3. Retrieved 30 September 2006.
  • Handel, Michael I. (1973). Israel's political-military doctrine. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
  • Herbert, Nicholas (17 May 1967). Egyptian Forces On Full Alert: Ready to fight for Syria. The Times, p.&nbsp;1; Issue 56943; col E.
  • Higham, Robin. (2003). 100 Years of Air Power and Aviation. TAMU Press. .
  • Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (2003). The international politics of the Middle East. Manchester University Press.
  • Hopwood, Derek (1991). Egypt: Politics and Society. London: Routledge.
  • Hussein of Jordan (1969). My "War" with Israel. London: Peter Owen.
  • James, Laura (2005). The Nassar And His Enemies: Foreign Policy Decision Making In Egypt On The Eve Of The Six Day War. The Middle East Review of International Affairs. Volume 9, No. 2, Article 2.
  • Jia, Bing Bing. (1998). The Regime of Straits in International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law). Oxford University Press, USA. .
  • Katz, Samuel M. (1991) Israel's Air Force; The Power Series. Motorbooks International Publishers & Wholesalers, Osceola, WI.
  • Koboril, Iwao and Glantz, Michael H. (1998). Central Eurasian Water Crisis. United Nations University Press.
  • Lavoy, Peter R.; Sagan, Scott Douglas & Wirtz, James J. (Eds.) (2000). Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Cornell University Press. .
  • Leibler, Isi (1972). The Case For Israel. Australia: The Executive Council of Australian Jewry. .
  • Little, Douglas. "Nasser Delenda Est: Lyndon Johnson, The Arabs, and the 1967 Six-Day War," in H.W. Brands, ed. The foreign policies of Lyndon Johnson : beyond Vietnam (1999) pp 145–167. online
  • Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. (1994). Transcript, Robert S. McNamara Oral History, Special Interview I, 26 March 1993, by Robert Dallek, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. Retrieved 20 July 2010.
  • Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. University of California Press.
  • Maoz, Zeev (2006). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy. The University of Michigan Press.
  • Miller, Benjamin. (2007). States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge University Press.
  • Morris, Benny (1997). Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Murakami, Masahiro. (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies . United Nations University Press. .
  • Nordeen, Lon & Nicole, David. (1996). Phoenix over the Nile: A history of Egyptian Air Power 1932–1994. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution. .
  • Oren, Michael. (2006). "The Six-Day War", in Bar-On, Mordechai (ed.), Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military History. Greenwood Publishing Group. .
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  • The Photograph: A Search for June 1967. Retrieved 17 July 2010.
  • The three soldiers – background to that photograph
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  • Legal Aspects: The Six Day War – June 1967 and Its Aftermath – Professor Gerald Adler
  • General Uzi Narkiss – A historic radio interview with General Uzi Narkiss taken on 7 June – one day after the Six-Day War, describing the battle for Jerusalem
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  • Position of Arab forces May 1967 . Retrieved 22 July 2014.