right|300px|thumb|The hall at [[Shanghai Jinjiang Hotel|Jinjiang Hotel, site of the signing of the communiqué.]]
The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), was a diplomatic document issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on February 27, 1972, on the last evening of President Richard Nixon's visit to China.<!-- note: this citation style is based on the recommendation from the State Department as found at this URL: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/citing-frus -->
Background
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was sent to China for secret diplomatic missions in 1971, which included early deliberations over the communiqué and planning for Richard Nixon to visit the country. Premier Zhou Enlai served as the Chinese liaison in the negotiations, with whom Kissinger had 25 hours of documented meetings. Kissinger did not use translators from the State Department due to concerns of leaking.
Kissinger's secret visits involved seven drafts over the contents of the Shanghai Communiqué. Kissinger was initially interested in drafting a communiqué that only mentioned the mutual interests between the United States and China, but Zhou sought to include disagreements between their respective states in order to create a more meaningful document. This move towards an honest representation of relations impressed Kissinger, who increasingly held a favorable view on Chinese leadership.
Further negotiations over the communiqué took place with White House Chief of Staff General Alexander Haig representing the United States while preparing in China a month prior to Nixon's visit. Informed by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, Haig emphasized the border threat that the Soviet Union posed to China and argued that there was a significant mutual interest between the United States and China in information sharing and otherwise militarily countering the Soviet Union. Zhou and Mao Zedong both viewed the remarks as disingenuous and ignorant of Chinese defense capabilities. However, they believed that Haig's statements reflected a genuine desire from the United States for détente. Kissinger resolved the disagreement on February 26 by removing all language pertaining to treaties.
The finished communiqué was signed on the evening of February 27, 1972 at the Jinjiang Hotel in Shanghai.
Document
The document covers three main aspects for the United States and China. The United States formally acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China". The use of the word "acknowledge" rather than "accept" is often cited as an example of the United States' ambiguous position regarding the future of Taiwan. American negotiators used the term "acknowledge" to refer to knowledge and understanding (renshi dao (认识到) in Chinese), but it was translated into Chinese by their Chinese counterparts as cheng ren (), which meant recognition and acceptance, a much stronger term. The discrepancy has been cited as an example of how the Chinese government has applied the Maoist doctrine of protracted war.
The communiqué also included wishes of a peaceful coexistence and to expand the economic and cultural contacts between the two nations through bilateral trade, although no concrete steps were mentioned. Both nations agreed in the communiqué to increase "people-to-people contacts" and commerce prospects while also working toward the "normalization" of relations. The communiqué stated that the normalization of relations would contribute "to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world".
Each country had something to gain from the communiqué. For the United States, this represented a geopolitical realignment to counter-balance Soviet influence. This alignment significantly weakened the Soviet Union's strategic position in the Cold War and would become the demise of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc. The Communiqué made it possible for the United States to reorient its foreign policy and successfully isolate the Soviet Union. The Soviets now faced enemies on both the eastern and western fronts as a result of the Sino-American collaboration which upset the balance of power. This was especially clear during the arms race when the United States confronted China during negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control, pushing them to take a defensive stance. Within the Communist bloc, ideological divisions were revealed and widened by the Shanghai Communiqué. Soviet hegemony was challenged by the distinct courses taken by countries like Yugoslavia and Romania. The communique exposed the fact that not all Communist nations adopted Moscow's policies, undermining the legitimacy of Soviet doctrine and its capacity to keep its allies united. Nixon's visit significantly changed the global power dynamics by opening the door to new trade opportunities with China and may have brought an end to the Cold War in East Asia. This would also open up opportunities for greater influence in China through engagement. On the other hand, China saw the end of their diplomatic isolation from the United States and gained international recognition. China also regained the seat in the United Nations from Taiwan.
Legacy
The Shanghai Communiqué represented the United States' first direct public diplomatic negotiations with People's Republic of China since its 1949 founding.
After the signing of the communiqué, political scientist Lucian Pye said that in contrast to American practices, "the Chinese do not treat the signing of a contract as signaling a complete agreement; rather they conceive of the relationship in longer and more continuous terms, and will not hesitate to suggest modifications immediately on the heels of an agreement."
The aftermath of the Watergate scandal later in 1972 led Nixon to deprioritize further diplomatic efforts with the PRC.
Relations between the two countries were officially normalized with the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, issued on January 1, 1979, which is the same day that Taiwan Relations Act retroactively entered into force, and the day after official diplomatic relations with Republic of China ended.
In a February 2017 opinion piece for The Diplomat, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations president Stephen Orlins praised the Shanghai Communiqué for the cross-strait stability it offered for Taiwan. Orlins said the communiqué helps ensure confidence with Western investment in Taiwan because of the wide-ranging impacts of the reform and opening up in China and continued high-level cross-strait dialogue.
See also
- Ping-pong diplomacy
- Three Communiqués
- China-United States relations