In cryptography, a Schnorr signature is a digital signature produced by the Schnorr signature algorithm that was invented by Claus Schnorr. It is known for its simplicity, among the first whose security is based on the intractability of certain discrete logarithm problems. It is efficient and generates short signatures. In the case of Schnorr signatures, this simply requires subtracting <math>s</math> values:

: <math>s' - s = (k' - k) + x (e' - e)</math>.

If <math>k'=k</math> but <math>e'\ne e</math> then <math>x</math> can be simply isolated. In fact, even slight biases in the value <math>k</math> or partial leakage of <math>k</math> can reveal the private key, after collecting sufficiently many signatures and solving the hidden number problem. to Schnorr's identification protocol. Therefore, (as per Fiat and Shamir's arguments), it is secure if <math>H</math> is modeled as a random oracle.

Its security can also be argued in the generic group model, under the assumption that <math>H</math> is "random-prefix preimage resistant" and "random-prefix second-preimage resistant". In particular, <math>H</math> does not need to be collision resistant.

In 2012, Seurin provided an exact proof of the Schnorr signature scheme. In particular, Seurin shows that the security proof using the forking lemma is the best possible result for any signature schemes based on one-way group homomorphisms including Schnorr-type signatures and the Guillou–Quisquater signature schemes. Namely, under the ROMDL assumption, any algebraic reduction must lose a factor <math>f({\epsilon}_F)q_h </math> in its time-to-success ratio, where <math>f \le 1</math> is a function that remains close to 1 as long as "<math>{\epsilon}_F</math> is noticeably smaller than 1", where <math>{\epsilon}_F</math> is the probability of forging an error making at most <math>q_h</math> queries to the random oracle.

Short Schnorr signatures

The aforementioned process achieves a t-bit security level with 4t-bit signatures. For example, a 128-bit security level would require 512-bit (64-byte) signatures. The security is limited by discrete logarithm attacks on the group, which have a complexity of the square-root of the group size.

In Schnorr's original 1991 paper, it was suggested that since collision resistance in the hash is not required, shorter hash functions may be just as secure, and indeed recent developments suggest that a t-bit security level can be achieved with 3t-bit signatures.

See also

  • DSA
  • EdDSA
  • ElGamal signature scheme

References

  • RFC 8235
  • BIP 340: Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1