Royal Lao Air Force

The Royal Lao Air Force (; – AVRL), best known to the Americans by its English acronym RLAF, was the air force component of the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR), the official military of the Royal Lao Government and the Kingdom of Laos during the Laotian Civil War between 1960 and 1975.

The original Lao military aviation establishment was the Laotian Aviation (), established by the French on 28 January 1955 as a small aerial observation and transport arm of the then National Lao Army (ANL). As the French withdrew from Indochina, the Lao Aviation was supported by American aid. With the addition of offensive capabilities, it morphed into the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF).

The RLAF struggled into existence in the face of its enemies, while dealing with its own internal divisions as well as bucking a tide of pilot and aircraft losses. As it expanded from its 1960 foundation, and as the fighting power of the Royal Lao Army was diminished and broken during the 1960s, the RLAF came to carry the weight of the battle against Vietnamese communist invaders and local Pathet Lao insurgents. Despite its continual drain of heavy pilot and aircraft losses, the RLAF grew to the point where it flew 30,000 combat sorties annually against its enemies in the years 1970 through 1972, as well performing essential logistics duties.

The RLAF began its operations as a liaison, logistics and transport unit. Its initial stock were a melange of French and American supplied rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft inherited from its predecessor, Aviation Laotienne. On 9 January 1961, the new RLAF was supplied with six AT-6 Texans as its first strike aircraft. Although these were quickly lost, they were replaced by five T-28 Trojans. Despite ongoing losses, the T-28 inventory would eventually burgeon under American auspices to 75 Trojans on board in 1973. It would also acquire ten AC-47 gunships for a time. Pilot procurement for the swelling fleet would always be problematic, with the inadequate roster of Lao and Hmong pilots being filled out with Thai mercenary pilots, and a few Americans from Air America. By the time American aid was withdrawn in 1973, dooming the force, the RLAF would total 180 aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters.

Structure

The RLAF, along with the Royal Lao Navy, and the Royal Lao Army, was placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense in Vientiane. The RLAF received assistance over the years from France, the US and Thailand. Initially a transport organisation beginning operations with the Morane-Saulnier MS.500 Criquet and then the C-47, it acquired a light strike capability with the North American T-6 Texan and later the T-28 Trojan.

List of U. S. Ambassadors to Laos during the Laotian Civil War

On 29 May 1961, President John F. Kennedy issued a directive letter to the United States Ambassador to Laos Leonard S. Unger granting Unger the authority to control "...all the functions of a Military Assistance Advisory Group...".

The serving ambassador thus became a de facto commander of the Royal Lao Air Force during the Laotian Civil War; it existed only through U. S. support from 1962 through 1975.

Leonard S. Unger (25 July 1962 – 1 December 1964)
William H. Sullivan (23 December 1964 – 18 March 1969)
G. McMurtrie Godley (24 July 1969 – 23 April 1973)
Charles S. Whitehouse (20 September 1973 – 12 April 1975)

List of Aviation Laotienne and RLAF Commanders

Brigadier general Sourith Don Sasorith (1957–1959)
Brigadier general Thao Ma (1959–1966)
Major general Sourith Don Sasorith (1966–1973)
Brigadier general Bouathong Phothivongsa (1973–1975)

Air Commanders

Lieutenant colonel Lee Lue – Wing Leader of the Hmong T-28 fighter-bomber special squadron (1967–1969)
Major Vang Sue – Wing Leader of the Hmong T-28 fighter-bomber special squadron (1969–1972)

History

French beginning

Plans to create an air wing for the Laotian National Army (ANL) were first laid by the French in May 1954. Proposed equipment consisted of French Morane-Saulnier MS.500 Criquets, de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beavers, helicopters, as well as Douglas C-47 transports. On 6 August 1954, as Laos became independent, the departing French military lent Criquets to the ANL for artillery observation. The treaty of independence granted France the right to maintain a military training mission in Laos. Beginning on 28 January 1955, the military mission provided a staff of instructors headed by a colonel to train 200 Laotian military personnel in air operations; that same day, the Laotian Aviation () was officially founded at Wattay Airfield, near Vientiane. Its initial unit was the 1st Observation and Liaison Squadron, which served a double purpose as its Criquets were used for training Lao pilots, as well as ongoing military duties.

Some 6,500 Royal Lao Army troops out of its 30,000 personnel were surrounded by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. Because Laos lacked a functional road network, the RLAF's first mission was aerial resupply of these besieged troops. The French air crews operated the transports while Laotians were being trained. One of these cadets was Thao Ma, an ex-paratrooper who later rose to command the Royal Lao Air Force.

The French-crewed C-47s were used for this operation, in conjunction with C-46 Commandos leased from Civil Air Transport. "Civilian" C-47s under contract were used to drop the Royalist Paratroop Battalion in Xieng Khouang to counter Pathet Lao expansion into the province. As part of this action, Lao pilots in training flew reconnaissance missions in the Criquets. The four Sikorsky H-19 helicopters of the new air force were insufficient for such duties as medevacing the ill and wounded, so two additional H-19s were acquired from the Royal Thai Air Force in October 1955. These were supplied without markings, and were officially Thai Airways craft.

In late 1956, the C-47 transports were crewed by newly trained Lao. In 1957, the last 85 French instructors left Laos. By the time of their departure, most of the Lao aircraft were grounded due to lack of maintenance.

American takeover

The United States of America took up the slack as the French departed, setting up the Programs Evaluation Office as a sub rosa military mission in January 1954. It supplied 100 instructors to replace the departing French mentors. It also supplied six C-47s, two DHC L-20s, and two L-19 Bird Dogs. They also began airfield construction throughout the country.

A few more DHC L-20s were delivered in 1957; its short takeoff and landing capabilities well suited it for the primitive conditions of Laotian airstrips. One or more of these L-20s arrived with a .50 caliber machine gun still mounted; the natural use for such an armed craft was as a gunship for strafing ground targets.

In July 1958, a coup brought Phoumi Nosavan to power in Laos; he subsequently requested additional aid from the United States. By the following year, PEO planned to reinforce the Lao air force with six North American T-28 Trojans. It also became apparent that the aviation support available for the Royalist government's war against the Communists was insufficient, even when augmented by Air America contract flights. The U.S. Air Force 315th Air Division sent a detachment incountry dressed in civilian clothing on a month's temporary duty to operate C-119G Flying Boxcars, C-123 Providers, and C-130 Hercules transports in support of the Royalists. After they flew 72 sorties, they were withdrawn on 27 April 1959 because of international political pressure.

Two French Alouette helicopters were purchased for the Lao air force in 1960. In August, Kong Le's Neutralist paratroopers launched a coup to unseat Nosavan; once he gained power, he requested aid from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Three months later, Nosavan launched an American-backed countercoup from his base in Savannakhet, successfully attacking the Neutralists in Vientiane. Nosavan received aerial logistical support not only from the diminished Lao air force, but from Royal Thai Air Force H-19s and four Air American H-34s, as well as a Bird & Son C-46. In addition to logistical support from these craft, Bird and Son dropped paratroopers onto Vientiane from the C-46.

When Kong Le retreated from Vientiane, he took with him two usable C-47s and two L-20 Beavers from Aviation Laotienne and formed the Neutralist Laotian Air Force. Nosavan's offensive followed Kong Le's forces to the Plain of Jars.

American response to Soviets

In response to the Soviet air bridge, U. S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had his officials prompt Thailand to supply six AT-6 Texans to the RLAF as a light strike capability on 9 January 1961. In return, the Thais were compensated by the Americans with five jet Cessna T-37 Tweets. Three Lao pilots for the AT-6s were already available, including Thao Ma. The new light strike craft flew their first successful sorties on 15 January. One of the T-6s was shot down on 17 January 1961. The RLAF augmented its pilots' ranks with four volunteer Thai pilots from the Royal Thai Air Force's 63rd Squadron, who began flying missions by mid February. Most of the remaining T-6s became casualties in March, with two colliding in midair, one falling to ground fire, and another lost on a training flight. The RLAF was temporarily nearly wiped out.

During March and April 1961, in an abortive attempt to beef up RLAF firepower, 18 U. S. Air Force officers volunteered for discharge and entry into Operation Millpond. These pilots were commissioned into the RLAF They were augmented by four Air America pilots. However, political considerations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs Invasion precluded use of the Invaders.

The United States began its own air bridge in April 1961, as well as photographic reconnaissance efforts. RLAF transport capacity was augmented to 13 C-47s, and were used for the RLAF's first significant airlift when they carried three battalions of Royal Lao troops to Sam Neua. The U. S. also supplied ten more AT-6s for ground attack missions to the RLAF via the medium of the Thai air force. During a four plane sortie by AT-6s flown from Luang Prabang's airfield during April 1961, Lieutenant Khampanh of the RLAF downed a Soviet Ilyushin Il-4 of its air bridge fleet, using unguided missiles to do so. This was the RLAF's sole air-to-air victory. However, shortcomings of the aging AT-6s were becoming apparent to the U. S. and T-28s being retired by the Republic of Vietnam Air Force were earmarked for the RLAF, but not delivered because of the truce.

The upshot of infantry clashes on the Plain of Jars was a directive from U.S. President John F. Kennedy in May 1961 that the U.S. Ambassador to Laos would serve as the de facto military commander in Laos. His approval was needed for all air strikes in country. The Air Attaché's office served as his staff for employment of air power in Laos.

10 May 1962 armistice limited RLAF operations, with the T-6s becoming non-operational, although Lao aviation cadets were forwarded to Lopburi, Thailand for T-28 training in June 1962. However, during the truce, Vang Pao used his CIA supported Hmong army of hilltribesmen to begin grubbing out short landing strips to be used for logistical support of his troops by helicopters and STOL aircraft.

The International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed on 23 July 1962, and went into effect in October. On 6 October 1962, the last of the American Military Advisory Group departed Laos in conformance with the Agreement. The following day, 40 Vietnamese communists having been repatriated out of the 7,000 known to have been in Laos, the North Vietnamese proclaimed they had honored the Agreement. Lip service to observing the Agreement would shape the entire American effort to organize and operate the RLAF, with all the American technicians and advisors accredited under diplomatic cover as military attachés.

Expansion

thumb|right|250px|A RLAF [[T-28 Trojan|T-28D Nomad armed trainer taxies at Long Tieng airfield, September 1972]]

By the time fighting broke out again in Laos, the RLAF had five T-28 pilots trained at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia

One of the "new" T-28s soon crashed in Vientiane due to a failed coup. Another T-28 disappeared from inventory when Lieutenant Chert Saibory, who had defected from the RTAF to the RLAF, defected once more in September 1963. He flew his T-28 into North Vietnam, where he was imprisoned. Also in March 1964, Ambassador Unger lobbied his State Department for an expanded role for the RLAF. The A and B Teams were under control of Ambassador Unger.

Also during June 1964, a flight of A Team T-28s bombed Kong Le's Neutralist headquarters at Khang Khay in a successful attempt to make him switch his alliance from the Pathet Lao to side with the Royalists. As a followup, the A Team also attacked the Chinese Cultural Center on the Plain of Jars; the Center was reputedly a Chinese-staffed training camp for Lao communist troops. Losses escalated. A T-28 was shot down by Vietnamese 37 mm anti-aircraft guns on 14 August. On 18 August 1964, Lieutenant Colonel Viripong, commander of the RTAF's 223rd Squadron, went down in an RLAF T-28 on the Plain of Jars while on an unauthorized mission, while another T-28 was lost in North Vietnam.

In January 1965, an ordnance accident at Wattay Airbase caused the loss of eight RLAF T-28s and a C-47. The losses greatly reduced the operations of the Thai B Team pilots until May. In that month, the RLAF scored its first victories over tanks, destroying two, along with five trucks.

Summer 1965 marked the beginning of internal dissension within RLAF ranks. The charismatic aggressive commander of the RLAF, General Thao Ma, evoked jealousy from other Royalist generals. There was a purported assassination attempt against Thao Ma on 3 July 1965.

In mid-1965, the American "civilian" aviation specialists secretly supplied to the Royalist government were organized into Air Operation Centers. An Air Operation Center was established in each of Laos' five military regions,

By Spring 1966, the RLAF had grown to 40 T-28s. Thai B Team pilots continued to be crucial to RLAF operation, with 23 arriving in Laos in early 1966. Also, in an effort to increase the pool of T-28 pilots, the CIA began training several dozen Hmong pilot candidates in Thailand. Seven of them would graduate as T-28 pilots; others would become transport or liaison pilots; a few would become helicopter pilots. Washouts from the program were repurposed as aerial observers, often flying with the Raven FACs.

By 9 November 1966, Operation Waterpump had graduated 42 new Lao T-28 pilots. However, because of defections and casualties, only 24 still remained on the RLAF rolls. In an attempt to project RLAF needs into the future, Ambassador William H. Sullivan predicted that perhaps seven defecting Lao pilots could be recovered from Thailand, and that six more Lao pilot cadets were about to graduate from training. Sullivan foresaw a need for 55 to 60 Lao pilots to man 44 to 48 T-28s. He noted the importance of having T-28 pilots with a common language with Lao ground troops, for whom the RLAF flew close air support. Until a sufficient number of Lao pilots had been trained, Thai pilots, whose language was akin to Lao, would fill the close air support role, leaving U. S. Air Force planes free to strike interdiction targets. By the end of 1966, over half of the year's combat sorties had been flown by B Team pilots.

Under General Sourith

thumb|right|RLAF T-28s lay destroyed after a North Vietnamese sapper attack at Luang Prabang airfield, 1967.

thumb|right|250px|North American T-28 Trojan trainer aircraft, ex-Royal Laotian Air Force.

In early 1967, North Vietnamese sappers struck the Luang Prabang airfield on two occasions, destroying 17 RLAF T-28s.

From 20 to 27 May 1967, the RLAF joined the U. S. Air Force in the second series of air strikes directed against Route 110 of the Sihanouk Trail in southern Laos. The RLAF contributed 41 sorties to the effort.

Unlike Ma, General Sourith countenanced gold and opium smuggling using RLAF transports. However, beginning at noon on 30 July 1967, Sourith directed two days of RLAF T-28 air strikes on a smuggler's caravan of 300 mules carrying 16 tons of opium that entered western Laos from Burma at Ban Khwan.

During the end of 1967, seven RLAF T-28s flew support for Royalist troops engaged in the Battle of Nam Bac; unfortunately, a lack of air-ground coordination rendered the air strikes ineffective. RLAF logistical support of ground troops via helicopter also proved inadequate. In the wake of the disastrous defeat at Nam Bac in early 1968, the Royal Lao Army became ineffective, increasing the combat burden on the RLAF. The air arm was augmented to 45 to 50 T-28s, with 25 to 30 additional ones held in reserve in Thailand. The RLAF also had on strength nine UH-34s helicopters and 16 C-47s.

In February 1968, the RLAF suffered a serious loss, when a flight of three T-28s on a close air support mission in poor weather flew headlong into a ridge in Military Region 2. There were no survivors. In another demoralizing incident, on 21 March 1968, a RLAF C-47 crew was arrested at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam for smuggling gold and opium. Subsequently, Ambassador Sullivan declined to supply five more C-47s to the RLAF, on the grounds they would be used for smuggling.

By June 1968, because of T-28 losses, pilot losses, and resultant low morale, RLAF tactical air was diminished to flying its lowest sortie rate in four years. The "civilian" aviation specialists supplied from the USAF were increased to ten per Air Operations Center, taking charge of all T-28 support functions for a gain in short term efficiency. As a result, RLAF strike sorties for December tripled over January's score, totaling 1,522 missions. By year's end, the RLAF T-28s had flown approximately 10,000 combat sorties. By contrast, the RLAF's transport C-47s were still brazenly misused for opium and gold smuggling, and chartered out as civilian airliners.

In 1969, the RLAF's advisors started a couple of programs aimed at raising the T-28 pilots' morale. Most immediate was a combat pay bonus paid for every strike sortie flown. Escape and evasion training was also offered in Hua Hin, Thailand; it also doubled as seaside R&R. However, with no stand-down, operations continued. On 27 June 1969, the advanced RLAF base at Muang Soui was overrun by North Vietnamese sappers and infantry. On 11 July 1969, the most famous of the RLAF's Hmong pilots, Captain Lee Lue, was shot down and killed after flying over 1,000 combat sorties in less than 18 months. Between April and September 1969, the first two Lao forward air controllers were trained. In late 1969, the Hmong mercenaries on the ground, supported by RLAF and U. S. air strikes, recaptured most of the Plain of Jars. The first three AC-47 Spooky gunships were received from the U. S. and Vietnamese Air Forces, and the first missions flown on 5 September. There were teething problems–air crews were expected to fly C-47s by day as well as AC-47s at night; gunners burned out guns; munitions were fired just for resale value of the brass; Vang Pao was initially reluctant to employ them for fear of friendly casualties. The experience of the pilots helped though; for instance, Captain Khamphanh (of the air-to-air victory) had logged over 7,000 flying hours. Nevertheless, the three Spookies soon proved their worth and began averaging about 50 nocturnal combat sorties per month.

By January 1970, the People's Republic of China had taken advantage of a pre-existing treaty to build a highway south from Yunnan Province through western Laos toward the Thai/Lao border. The Chinese dispatched a truck convoy southwards on that road. As it was approaching Pak Beng, it came under air attack by two B Team T-28s of the RLAF, with 15 trucks destroyed. Further air assaults on that road were deterred, however, by the stationing of 400 antiaircraft guns of various calibers along its length.

In March 1970, the North Vietnamese again attacked on the Plain of Jars. A few days later, on 18 March, an advanced RLAF air base at Sam Thong was overrun. In the fighting on the Plain des Jarres, the RLAF lost three T-28Ds, plus two O-1 and one U-17 light aircraft. The need for air power became so desperate that Air America C-7 Caribous were used as makeshift bombers, dropping barrels of napalm on the invading Vietnamese. Communist forces pushed close enough to the RLAF bases at Muang Soui and Long Tieng that combat sortie time dwindled enough that one Hmong T-28 pilot flew 31 missions in a single day.

The effects of the Vietnamization effort of 1970 carried over into Laos. An expanded training program for Lao T-28 pilots was begun. A Combined Operations Center under Colonel Bouathong Phontivongsa coordinated air activities with the Army General Staff. The RLAF T-28s flew a greater proportion of their missions under Forward Air Control. However, the RLAF faced some major problems. Pilot mortality was one, with T-28 pilots surviving only an average of 20 months in combat. Also, by August 1970, smuggling had evolved to the point where 70 tons of M16 rifles and other ordnance were exchanged with the Nationalist Chinese for opium at Ban Houayxay. Another weak point, never really solved, was the dearth of qualified Lao maintenance and logistics personnel. An attempt to solve the shortage was made when all the RLAF T-28s were released from U. S. control to the RLAF, with an expanded training program being run, A Rand Corporation study characterized RLAF performance as outstanding, noting that some RLAF pilots had flown over 1,000 combat sorties to date.

In May 1971, the RLAF base at Pakse was threatened by communist troops, so its T-28s were moved back into Thailand to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base. However, on 11 June, the eight available T-28s flew 88 destructive sorties against attacking Vietnamese communists, with one pilot notching up 14 missions.

In July 1971, the RLAF AC-47 squadron had been brought up to its authorized strength of 10 planes. However, the squadron soon suffered a serious loss when its commanding officer, Colonel Thao Ly, was shot down in flames.

In late 1972, General Vang Pao launched his final offensive, trying once again to retake the Plain of Jars. RLAF tactical air had by now gone beyond the close air support mission to serve as flying artillery; for example, it was tasked with flying up to 80 daily sorties in advance of Vang Pao's Task Force Delta advance, beginning 24 August. The shortcomings of this approach became apparent on 9 September, when a bad drop by a T-28 inflicted 80 casualties on friendly ground troops and smashed their advance on the enemy.

RLAF and Air America UH-34 copters joined USAF CH-53s and eight Air America C-47s in a huge offensive airlift of Vang Pao's troops. After a month, the offensive stalled in a welter of miscoordination among the three air fleets. Also, by the end of 1972, the American drawdown of the Vietnam War effort began to affect the RLAF.

In April 1973, the armistice was breached, and the RLAF resumed combat operations.

On 20 August 1973, General Thao Ma led a convoy of 60 truckloads of troops back into Laos and conquered Wattay Air Base. He and six other Lao pilots launched in T-28s and reprised an attempt at an aerial coup by bombing the government headquarters. However, a Royal Lao Army counter-attack recaptured Wattay, and Ma was shot down while landing. Although he survived the crashlanding, he was promptly executed.

By mid-1974, Air America wrapped up its operations in Laos. The American supply line was nearly closed. Starved of fuel, spares, and munitions, the RLAF rapidly wasted away. The Combined Operations Center was closed. Out country training of personnel ceased. Soon, the RLAF pilots were flying a mere two hours per month.

On 14 April 1975, the RLAF flew its final combat sortie. At Vang Pao's command, nine T-28s struck a column of Pathet Lao trucks moving south into Vientiane, causing heavy casualties. The following month, as Communist agitators fomented mass demonstrations against the Royal Lao Government, many RLAF pilots defected to Thailand. Sixteen T-28s that they took were later handed on to the Philippine Air Force. Imprisoned RLAF pilots were released to fly for the new government. Between 1975 and 1977, there were nine defections by them into Thailand. The LPLAAF thus lost two of its 29 T-28s; four UH-34 helicopters, a C-47, a T-41, and an Antonov AN-2 also made the trip south, with the latter being returned. Laotian Aviation ground personnel in the field often wore the standard ANL French all-arms M1947 drab green fatigues ().

Laotian Aviation officers wore the standard ANL summer service dress uniform in light khaki cotton, which was patterned after the French Army M1946/56 khaki dress uniform (); for formal occasions, a light summer version in white cotton was also issued. The open-collar jacket had two pleated breast pockets closed by pointed flaps and two unpleated at the side closed by straight ones whilst the sleeves had false turnbacks; the front fly and pocket flaps were secured by gilt buttons. The uniform was worn with a matching Khaki shirt and black tie on service dress whereas the white version was worn with a white shirt and a black tie instead.

Reflecting the increasing American influence, a new set of distinctive uniforms was introduced for the RLAF in 1964. Officers received a blue-grey overseas dress uniform, consisting of a tunic and slacks whose cut was modelled after the U.S. Air Force M1947 service dress. The American-style open-collar, four-buttoned tunic had two pleated breast pockets closed by scalloped flaps and two built-in pockets at the side closed by straight flaps. The front fly and pocket flaps were secured by silver buttons bearing the standard FAR wreathed trident emblem. On active service, the blue-grey dress uniform was worn with a light blue shirt and blue-grey tie, replaced on formal occasions by a white shirt and black tie; a short-sleeved light blue shirt was worn on hot weather.

Light blue and blue-grey work uniforms were also issued to RLAF ground and flight personnel, which consisted of a light cotton shirt and pants. The former was based on the French Army's M1948 shirt () which featured a six-buttoned front and two pleated breast pockets closed by pointed flaps, was provided with shoulder straps () and had long sleeves with buttoned cuffs. It was worn with matching trousers similar to the French M1945/52 pattern (), which had two pleats at the front hips, side slashed pockets and an internal pocket at the back, on the right side.

Despite occasional attempts at standardization, a great deal of latitude was noted in flight clothing; on combat missions RLAF aircrews relied on an inconsistent American-run supply system supplemented by items purchased during training in Thailand. Although U.S. K-2B Olive Green (OG) flight suits were provided, Laotian pilots often wore commercial black and camouflage flight suits or standard issue Royal Lao Army (RLA) OG and camouflage combat jungle fatigues in lieu, usually with a US Air Force survival mesh vest. RLAF ground personnel adopted in the 1960s U.S. Army OG-107 utilities, followed in 1971 by the M1967 Jungle Utility Uniform. Olive green U.S. M-1951 field jackets were also issued to all-ranks.

Headgear

Laotian Aviation officers received the ANL service peaked cap in both light khaki and white-topped versions, which was copied after the French M1927 pattern () to wear with either the light khaki or white service dress uniforms. The peaked caps were worn with the standard gilt metal ANL cap device, a wreathed Airavata crest bearing the Laotian Royal Arms (Erawan) – a three-headed white elephant standing on a pedestal and surmounted by a pointed parasol – set on a black teardrop-shaped background patch.

Ground and flight personnel generally wore the standard ANL and CEFEO headgear of the period, which consisted of French M1946 and M1957 light khaki sidecaps ( and ), M1946 "Gourka" tropical berets (), M1949 bush hats () A blue-grey overseas flight cap (with silver cord piping in the flap for officers), styled after the French M1957 sidecap, was also adopted.

Besides regulation headgear, unofficial Olive Green and camouflage cloth berets, baseball caps and U.S. Boonie hats found their way into the RLAF from the United States, Thailand and South Vietnam, to which were soon added Laotian-made copies; a red embroidered baseball cap was given to graduate pilots of the T-28 fighter-bomber course held at the RLAF Flying School in Seno Airbase, near Savannakhet.

Footwear

White and brown low laced leather shoes were prescribed to wear with either the earlier ANL khaki service/work uniform or the white summer dress for all-ranks; after 1964 black shoes were required for RLAF officers wearing the new blue-grey officers' dress uniform on formal occasions.

Laotian Aviation personnel in the field initially wore a mixture of American and French regulation footwear, including brown leather U.S. M-1943 Combat Service Boots, French M1917 brown leather hobnailed ankle boots (), French M1953 brown leather "Rangers" () and French Pataugas olive canvas-and-rubber jungle boots,

Air Force ranks

Initially, the Laotian Aviation wore the same rank insignia as their French and ANL counterparts, whose sequence followed closely the French Air Force pattern defined by the 1956 regulations. Junior officers () ranks were worn on black removable shoulder boards () or shoulder strap slides () similar to the Army pattern, with the addition of a pair of stylized wings on the inner end. NCOs () and airmen () wore metal or cloth chevrons on both upper sleeves or pinned to the chest.

In 1959, the Royal Lao Army adopted a new distinctively Laotian-designed system of military ranks, which became in September 1961 the standard rank chart for all branches of service of the newly created Royal Lao Armed Forces. Under the new regulations, RLAF officers were now entitled to wear on their service or dress uniforms stiffened shoulder boards edged with gold braid identical to the standard RLA pattern, except that the background colour was blue-grey instead of red. Junior officers added an appropriate number of five-pointed gold stars to their boards whilst NCOs wore chevrons on the upper sleeve. Airmen wore no insignia. However, these regulations were slowly implemented, and for a time U.S. Air Force rank insignia were worn by RLAF personnel as an interim measure. By the late 1960s the RLAF adopted the same American-style system as their RLA counterparts, in which metal pin-on or embroidered cloth rank insignia – either in yellow-on-green full-colour or black-on-green subdued form – were worn on the right collar of flight suits and jungle fatigues. RLAF pilots sent for training in Thailand wore on the right shoulder a Laotian national emblem with "Laos" tab.

Endnotes

References

Andrea Matles Savada (ed.), Laos: a country study (3rd ed.), Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 1995. , – [https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/frd/frdcstdy/la/laoscountrystudy00sava_0/laoscountrystudy00sava_0.pdf]
Bernard C. Nalty, Jacob Neufeld, and George M. Watson, An Illustrated Guide to the Air War over Vietnam, Salamander Books Ltd, London 1982.
Bernard C. Nalty, War against Trucks: Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1968–1972, Air Force Museums and History Program, Washington D.C. 2005. , 9780160724930.
Brig. Gen. Soutchay Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operations and Activities in the Laotian Panhandle, Indochina monographs series, United States Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C. 1981. , 9780923135058 for 1989 reprint. – [https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA132062.pdf]
Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C. 1993. , 9780912799803.
Joseph D. Celeski, Special Air Warfare and the Secret War in Laos: Air Commandos 1964–1975, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 2019. – [https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19555.1]
Kenneth Conboy and Don Greer, War in Laos 1954–1975, Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., Carrollton, Texas 1994.
Kenneth Conboy and Simon McCouaig, The War in Laos 1960–75, Men-at-arms series 217, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1989.
Kenneth Conboy and Simon McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces, Elite series 33, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1991.
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos, Boulder CO: Paladin Press, 1995. , 9781581605358.
Ken Conboy, The Erawan War – Volume 1: The CIA Paramilitary Campaign in Laos, 1961-1969, Asia@War Volume 24, Helion & Company Limited, Warwick UK 2021.
Ken Conboy, The Erawan War – Volume 2: The CIA Paramilitary Campaign in Laos, 1969-1974, Asia@War Volume 28, Helion & Company Limited, Warwick UK 2022a.
Ken Conboy, The Erawan War – Volume 3: The Royal Lao Armed Forces 1961-1974, Asia@War Volume 37, Helion & Company Limited, Warwick UK 2022b.
Larry Davis and Don Greer, Gunships, A Pictorial History of Spooky – Specials series (6032), Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., Carrollton, Texas 1982.
Timothy Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: United States Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975, Columbia University Press, 1993. – [https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA243492.pdf]
Maj. Gen. Oudone Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army advice and support, Indochina monographs series, United States Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C. 1981. – [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822003063724&view=1up&seq=10]
Martin Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos, Third Edition, Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East, No. 67, Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, Plymouth, UK 2008. , 0-8108-5624-7 – [https://pt.scribd.com/document/733304594/Historical-Dictionaries-of-Asia-Oceania-And-the-Middle-East-67-Martin-Stuart-Fox-Historical-Dictionary-of-Laos-Historical-Dictionaries-of-Asia]
Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos, South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1996. , 9781883642365.

Secondary sources

Arnold Issacs, Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, et al., Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos, Boston Publishing Company, Boston 1987. , 9780201116786.
Alfred William McCoy, Cathleen B. Read, Leonard Palmer Adams, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, Harper & Row, New York 1972. , 9789971470227.
Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to Military Helicopters, Salamander Books Ltd, London 1981.
Christopher Robbins, Air America, Avon, New York 1979. , 9780399122071.
Christopher Robbins, The Ravens: Pilots of the Secret War in Laos, Asia Books, Bangkok 2000. , 9789748303413.
David Corn, Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, Simon & Schuster, New York 1994.
Denis Lassus, Les marques de grade de l'armée française, 1945–1990 (1er partie-introduction), in Militaria Magazine No. 159, October 1998, Histoire & Collections, Paris. (in French)
Denis Lassus, Les marques de grade de l'armée française, 1945–1990 (2e partie-les differents types de galons), in Militaria Magazine No. 161, December 1998, Histoire & Collections, Paris. (in French)
Kenneth Conboy, Kenneth Bowra, and Simon McCouaig, The NVA and Viet Cong, Elite 38 series, Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford 1992.
Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ABC-CLIO, 2011. , 9781851099610.
Theodore G. Shackley and Richard A. Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA, Potomac Books Inc., 2006. , 1574889222
Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (translated by Merle Pribbenow), Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002. , 9780700611751.
Paul Gaujac, Officiers et soldats de l'armée française d'après le TTA 148 (1943–1956), Histoire & Collections, Paris 2011. (in French)

External links

Country Study – Kingdom of Laos
Laos Air Force
Vang Pao's air War
Royal Lao Armed Forces heraldry
Royal Lao Air Force rank insignia