In social psychology, pluralistic ignorance (also known as a collective illusion or collective delusion) is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly believe that others predominantly hold an opinion different from their own. In such cases, many people in a group may go along with a view they do not hold because they think, incorrectly, that most other people in the group hold it. Pluralistic ignorance encompasses situations in which a minority position on a given topic is wrongly perceived to be the majority position, or the majority position is wrongly perceived to be a minority position.

Pluralistic ignorance can arise in different ways. An individual may misjudge overall perceptions of a topic due to fear, embarrassment, social desirability, or social inhibition. Individuals may develop collective illusions when they fear backlash for holding beliefs they think differ from society's beliefs. From a group-level perspective, divergence between public behavior and private opinion can result from conservative lags (change in attitude without a change in behavior), liberal leaps (change in behavior without a change in attitude), and social identities (conforming to societal expectations of how one should behave based on the traditional ideals of the group).

However, pluralistic ignorance describes the coincidence of a belief with inaccurate perceptions, not the process by which those inaccurate perceptions are formed. Related phenomena, such as the spiral of silence and false consensus effect, demonstrate that pluralistic ignorance is not unique in its inaccurate assumption of others' opinions, and these misconceptions can lead to negative consequences, such as groupthink and the bystander effect.

History

Floyd Allport first discussed the phenomenon of "literal attitude behavior inconsistency" in 1924, observing society's tendency to conform to social norms at a large scale even in the absence of personal agreement with those norms.

Although social psychologists such as Allport and Katz initiated the development of the concept, work on pluralistic ignorance has been heavily conducted by sociologists and public-opinion researchers.

This is not a unanimous stance among those who have studied pluralistic ignorance. Sargent and Newman acknowledge that the individual aspects are important to discuss but argue that they are insufficient to provide a full picture of the phenomenon. They found that, on average, individuals' comfort with campus drinking practices was lower than what they believed to be the average. In one subset of experiments, they tracked changes in attitudes toward alcohol consumption among men and women over the semester. Among men, private attitudes shifted toward the perceived norm, consistent with cognitive dissonance; women showed no comparable shift. Additionally, students' perceived deviance from the alcohol-use norm correlated with several measures of campus alienation. Although the deviance was perceived rather than actual, it was associated with feelings of isolation and with greater discrepancies between individual beliefs and perceived group beliefs, a pattern characteristic of pluralistic ignorance. Overall, the study indicated pluralistic ignorance: students believed others’ comfort with drinking was significantly higher than their own, even though actual comfort levels were similar.

Additional research has found pluralistic ignorance among both those who indulge and those who abstain. Examples include beliefs about traditional vices such as gambling, smoking and drinking, as well as lifestyles such as vegetarianism. The latter illustrates that pluralistic ignorance can result from the structure of underlying social networks, not exclusively from cognitive dissonance, indicating multiple pathways for its emergence.

Applications

Racial segregation in the United States

Pluralistic ignorance has been cited as exacerbating support for racial segregation in the United States. It has also been proposed as a reason for the illusory popular support that kept the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in power, as many opposed the regime but assumed that others supported it; consequently, most people were afraid to voice their opposition.

Alcohol consumption on college campuses

Another case concerns campus drinking in countries where alcohol use is prevalent at colleges and universities. Students drink at weekend parties and sometimes at evening study breaks. Many drink to excess, some on a routine basis. The high visibility of heavy drinking, combined with reluctance to show any public concern or disapproval, gives rise to pluralistic ignorance: Students believe that their peers are much more comfortable with this behavior than they themselves feel.

"The Emperor's New Clothes" fairy tale

Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale "The Emperor's New Clothes" is a fictional case of pluralistic ignorance. In the story, two con artists claim to make the finest clothes, said to be invisible to those unworthy or foolish. Out of fear of being judged, the emperor's court and townspeople remain silent about seeing nothing until a child says that the emperor is not wearing any clothes, prompting others to acknowledge the truth.

Public concern for climate change

thumb|upright=1.5 | Research found that 80–90% of Americans underestimate the prevalence of support for major [[climate change mitigation policies and climate concern among fellow Americans. While 66–80% Americans support these policies, Americans estimate the prevalence to be 37–43%—barely half as much. Researchers have called this misperception a false social reality, a form of pluralistic ignorance.]]

Pluralistic ignorance has been cited to explain why large majorities of the public remain comparatively quiet about climate change—while solid majorities in the United States and the United Kingdom report concern, many people mistakenly believe they are in the minority. Over multiple studies, about 80–89 percent of the world's people want governments to do more to address climate change and nearly two-thirds support action that would cost them personally, but most think they are the minority—believing that only ~30% support stronger climate action. It has been suggested that pollution-intensive industries contribute to this underestimation of public support for climate solutions. For example, in the U.S., support for pollution pricing is high, yet public perception of public support is much lower.

Tulip mania of 1634

Tulip mania has been cited as an example of how investors can be swept up in financial frenzy due to collective illusion. Members of the Dutch elite pursued unique collections of spring-flowering bulbs, and prices rose rapidly.

Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia

A 2020 study found that the vast majority of young married men in Saudi Arabia privately support women working outside the home but substantially underestimate how widely other similar men share that view. When informed of the high level of support, men were more likely to help their wives obtain jobs.

Causes of divergence in public vs. private opinion

Pluralistic ignorance can arise from several aspects of human interaction. At the group level, three key causes are commonly discussed.

Conservative lag

The conservative lag is the most common cause of pluralistic ignorance and has also been labeled "conservative bias".

Another consequence is groupthink, in which small, cohesive groups make poor decisions. When a person's attitude appears to conflict with the perceived majority, it can leave the individual "embittered" and "suspicious of those around them". It may motivate speaking out against the perceived majority view or withdrawing entirely. By contrast, a false consensus in the same setting would involve a student believing that most others dislike heavy drinking when, in fact, most enjoy it and say so.

A study by Ross, Greene, and House used brief questionnaires with Stanford undergraduates to examine the false consensus effect. Participants reported the choice they would make in various scenarios and estimated what "people in general" would do, considering traits such as shyness, cooperativeness, trust, and adventurousness. Those who chose a given option tended to rate that option as relatively probable for "people in general," while those who rejected it rated it as relatively improbable. The subjects' own choices influenced their estimates of commonness.