Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (; 9 June 1861 – 14 September 1916) was a French theoretical physicist who made significant contributions to thermodynamics, hydrodynamics, and the theory of elasticity. Duhem was also a prolific historian of science, noted especially for his pioneering work on the European Middle Ages. As a philosopher of science, Duhem is credited with the "Duhem–Quine thesis" on the indeterminacy of experimental criteria. Duhem's opposition to positivism was partly informed by his traditionalist Catholicism, an outlook that put him at odds with the dominant academic currents in France during his lifetime.

Early life and education

Pierre Duhem was born in Paris on 10 June 1861. He was the son of Pierre-Joseph Duhem, who was of Flemish origins, and Marie Alexandrine née Fabre, whose family hailed from Languedoc. Duhem carried out this intellectual project in his Traité de l'Énergétique (1911), but was ultimately unable to reduce electromagnetic phenomena to thermodynamic first principles.

Duhem shared Ernst Mach's skepticism about the physical reality and usefulness of the concept of atoms. He therefore did not follow the statistical mechanics of James Clerk Maxwell, Ludwig Boltzmann, and Gibbs, who explained the laws of thermodynamics in terms of the statistical properties of mechanical systems composed of many atoms.

Duhem was an opponent of Albert Einstein's theory of relativity. In 1914, Duhem commented that Einstein's relativity theory "has turned physics into a real chaos where logic loses its way and common-sense runs away frightened". In his 1915 book La Science Allemande, he argued strongly against relativity.

History of science

thumb|right|130px|[[Nicole Oresme, a prominent medieval scholar. Duhem came to regard the medieval scholastic tradition as the origin of modern science.]]

Duhem is well known for his work on the history of science, which resulted in the ten volume Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (The System of World: A History of Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus). As a traditionalist Catholic, Duhem rejected the Enlightened conception of the European Middle Ages as intellectually barren. Instead, he endeavored to show that the Medieval Church had helped to foster the growth of Western science. Duhem's work as a historian of medieval science began with his research on the origins of statics, in the course of which he encountered the works of medieval mathematicians and philosophers such as John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and Roger Bacon. Duhem came to see in them the true founders of modern science, who in his view had anticipated many of the discoveries of Galileo Galilei and later early modern scientists. Duhem claimed that "the mechanics and physics of which modern times are justifiably proud" had proceeded, "by an uninterrupted series of scarcely perceptible improvements, from doctrines professed in the heart of the medieval schools."

Duhem helped to reintroduce the concept of "saving the phenomena" into the modern philosophy of science. In addition to the debates of the Copernican Revolution on "saving the phenomena" (, sozein ta phainomena, contrasted with providing a physical explanation) Duhem was motivated by the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, who wrote concerning the epicycles and eccentrics of classical astronomy that

Philosophy of science

In the philosophy of science, Duhem is best known for arguing that hypotheses are not straightforwardly refuted by experiment and that there are no crucial experiments in science. Duhem’s formulation of his thesis is that “if the predicted phenomenon is not produced, not only is the questioned proposition put into doubt, but also the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicist”. Duhem's views on the philosophy of science are explained in his 1906 work The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. In this work, he opposed Newton's statement that the Principia's law of universal mutual gravitation was deduced from 'phenomena', including Kepler's second and third laws. Newton's claims in this regard had already been attacked by critical proof-analyses of the German logician Leibniz and then most famously by Immanuel Kant, following Hume's logical critique of induction. But the novelty of Duhem's work was his proposal that Newton's theory of universal mutual gravity flatly contradicted Kepler's Laws of planetary motion because the interplanetary mutual gravitational perturbations caused deviations from Keplerian orbits. Since no contingent proposition can be validly logically deduced from any it contradicts, according to Duhem, Newton must not have logically deduced his law of gravitation directly from Kepler's Laws.

Opposition to the English inductivist tradition

Duhem argues that physics is subject to certain methodological limitations that do not affect other sciences. In his The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory