Operation Searchlight was a military operation carried out by the Pakistan Army in an effort to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in former East Pakistan in March 1971. Pakistan retroactively justified the operation on the basis of anti-Bihari violence carried out en masse by the Bengalis earlier that month. Ordered by the central government in West Pakistan, the original plans envisioned taking control of all of East Pakistan's major cities on 26 March, and then eliminating all Bengali opposition, whether political or military within the following month.

West Pakistani military leaders had not anticipated prolonged Bengali resistance or later Indian military intervention. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major Bengali-held town to West Pakistan in mid-May 1971. The operation also directly precipitated the 1971 Bangladesh genocide, in which between 300,000 and 3,000,000 Bengalis were killed while around 10 million fled to neighbouring India as refugees.

Bengali intelligentsia, academics, and Hindus were widely targeted alongside Bengali nationalistswith widespread, indiscriminate extrajudicial killings. The nature of these systematic purges enraged the Bengalis, who declared independence from West Pakistan to establish the new nation of Bangladesh in the erstwhile region of East Bengal.

The widespread violence resulting from Pakistan's Operation Searchlight ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War, in which Mukti Bahini guerrillas fought to remove Pakistani forces from East Pakistan. The civil war escalated in the following months as East Pakistani loyalists, primarily Biharis, formed militias to support West Pakistani troops on the ground against the Mukti Bahini. However, the conflict took a decisive turn in the Bengalis' favour following the ill-fated Operation Chengiz Khan, which resulted in direct Indian military intervention in the civil war, eventually prompting Pakistan's unconditional surrender to the joint command of Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini on 16 December 1971.

Background

After the Bengali Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 313 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on the Six Point Programme. On 28 February 1971, Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, under the pressure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March 3rd. The PPP had already started lobbying to weaken the stand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Bhutto was heard saying that he wanted the Bengalis to stay away. The Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program of non-cooperation (largely outlined in the 7 March Awami League rally), which was so successful that the authority of the Pakistani government became limited to military cantonments and official government institutions in East Pakistan.

Clashes between Bengalis and the Pakistan Army, as well as between Bengalis and Biharis, erupted and soon became widespread. President Yahya Khan flew to Dacca to hold talks with Mujibur Rahman, then leader of the Awami League, in March and was later joined by Bhutto, whose party had secured the second-largest share of seats (81 out of 300) in the general elections. Unwilling to transfer federal power from West Pakistan to East Pakistan as demanded by the Awami League (fearing a transfer of power would weaken or destroy the multiethnic Pakistani federation) or to lose face by backing down in face of the non-cooperation movement, the West Pakistani generals, most of whom (including Commander-in-Chief Gul Hassan Khan) supported the PPP, finally decided on a military crackdown against the rebelling Bengalis in East Pakistan.

After the convening of the Pakistan National Assembly was postponed by Yahya Khan on 1 March, ethnic Biharis in East Pakistan, who supported West Pakistan, were targeted by the Bengali majority.

Prior to the launch of the operation, a final meeting was held at the Army General Headquarters (GHQ). The Governor of East Pakistan, Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, objected to the planned operation. Air Commodore Muhammad Zafar Masud, the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) of the Pakistan Air Force base in Dacca, also objected to the operation. Masud was wary of a military crackdown, suspecting that it would only provoke East Pakistan's Bengali-majority population into more violence. However, under pressure during the meeting from Pakistan Army and Air Force generals, Yahya Khan gave orders to his commanders to launch the operation. Syed Mohammad Ahsan was subsequently relieved of the governorship. When the operation came into effect, Zafar Masud refused to conduct air sorties and was likewise removed from his post on 31 March.

Operational plan

Planning process

The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, GOC 14th Division, and Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a follow-up to decisions taken at a meeting of the Pakistan Army staff on 22 February. The 16th infantry division from Quetta and the 9th division from Kharian, West Pakistan, were ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid-February also as a result of that meeting.

The governor of East Pakistan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, opposed the use of military force and was subsequently removed from his position. His successor, Lieutenant General Shahabzada Yakub Khan, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of East Pakistan, held a similar view and resigned shortly thereafter. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan became the Governor and GOC of East Pakistan. On 17 March, General Raja was given authority to plan the operation via telephone by General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. On the morning of 18 March, General Raja and Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote the plan at the GOC's office at Dhaka (Dhaka) cantonment. The plan was written on a "Light Blue Office Pad with a Lead Pencil" by General Farman, containing "16 Paragraphs Spread Over Five Pages".

General Farman defined the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim Raja dealt with the distribution of forces and tasks assigned to the individual brigades and other units. It assumed that the Bengali Army and other military units would revolt at the onset of operations, and the planners suggested that all armed Bengali units should be disarmed prior to commencing the operation and the political leadership arrested during a planned meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked.

The handwritten plan was reviewed by General Abdul Hamid Khan and Lt. General Tikka Khan on 20 March at the flag staff house. General Abdul Hamid Khan objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units but approved the disarming of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), armed police and other paramilitary formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed. The amended plan was approved and distributed to various area commanders.

The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March 1971 in Dhaka, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their activities. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st field command centre to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division. The initial plan to arrest by a company of No 3 SSG, led by major ZA Khan, was scheduled at 0100 on 26 March night.

Major components of the plan

Operational premises

As outlined by the Pakistani planners, the operation aimed to eliminate the Awami League apparatus and any civilians and personnel of the armed forces supporting the Awami League movement in defiance of martial law. Cunning, surprise, deception and speed was emphasised as crucial for success. Use of free and greater force was authorised. Search and assault of civilian areas and Hindu areas also were authorised.

Requirements for success

Requirements for success:

  1. Operation to be launched simultaneously all across East Pakistan.
  2. Maximum number of political and student leaders, and those among cultural organisations and teaching staff to be arrested.
  3. Operation must achieve 100% success in Dhaka. Dhaka University would be occupied and searched.
  4. Free and greater use of fire authorised for securing cantonments.
  5. All internal and international communications to be cut off, including telephone, television, radio and telegraph.
  6. All East Pakistani (Bengali) troops to be neutralised by seizing weapons and ammunition.
  7. To deceive the Awami League, President Yahya Khan to pretend to continue dialogue, even if Mr. Bhutto disagrees, and to agree to Awami League demands.

The designated centres of offensive operations under that plan were Dhaka, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Saidpur and Sylhet, areas where West Pakistani army units were concentrated. Pakistani Army units and paramilitary elements in other areas of East Pakistan were to maintain control of their respective areas and await reinforcements during the initial phase of the operation. Once Dhaka had been secured, the 9th and 16th divisions from Pakistan were to be airlifted into East Pakistan as reinforcements. Cities with airfields (Chittagong, Sylhet, Jessore, Rangpur, Comilla) would be reinforced via C-130 aircraft or heliborne troops directly from Dhaka.

Although the plan did not specify the time needed to subdue East Pakistan, it was assumed that after the arrest of the political leadership and disarming of the Bengali military and paramilitary units, civilians could be terrorised into submitting to martial law within a week. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan estimated that no resistance would remain after 10 April. (regiments normally had 915 soldiers each) containing purely West Pakistani personnel (mainly hailing from Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi background) before 25 March 1971. This division also had 5 field artillery regiments, a light anti aircraft regiment, a commando battalion (the 3rd), all of which contained a majority of Pakistani personnel, in various East Pakistani bases.

320px|right|thumb|Depiction of Operation Searchlight at the Liberation War Museum

20% of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) personnel were also from West Pakistan, while the support elements of the various units and cantonments were mostly of mixed nationality. Most of the individual unit commanders and majority of the officers were from West Pakistan. West Pakistani Army personnel were also posted at Station HQ, Dhaka, Pakistan Ordnance Factory, Gazipur, Central Ordnance Depot, Dhaka, Ammunition Depot, Rajendrapur, Embercation Unit – Chittagong and with some field intelligence units.

The Pakistan Air Force had 20 F-86 Sabre Jets and 3 T-33 Trainers at the Dhaka airbase. The Army aviation wing had a flight of 2 Mil Mi-8 and 2 Alouette III helicopters, under the command of Major Liakat Bukhari posted in East Pakistan. The whole squadron was transferred to Dhaka after 25 March 1971. in East Pakistan. PNS Babur, flagship of the Pakistan Navy would visit East Pakistan after the operation started. Twenty-five thousand Anser and Mujahid members, all of whom had weapons training, were scattered around the province. The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a 15,000 strong paramilitary force, was divided into 17 operational wings (each wing contained 3 to 6 companies of 150 men each) in 7 sectors (headquartered in Dhaka, Mymenshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Sylhet and Chittagong) and was deployed around the country.

The EPR companies were often divided into sections (15–20 soldiers) and platoons (20–35 soldiers) and deployed in camps near the border or in border outposts. Unlike regular army units, EPR companies were commanded by JCO/NCOs (army companies normally were commanded by Captains or Major ranked officers), and EPR wings contained only light anti-tank weapons and a mortar platoon with 6 mortars as artillery. EPR Headquarters and 2,500 EPR troops were posted in Dhaka. The majority of the EPR officers were from West Pakistan, serving on deputation from the regular army for 2 to 3 years.

Pre operational steps implementation

The planners needed to ensure that all Pakistani unit commanders became aware of their role prior to commencing the operation, which had to be done while maintaining complete secrecy. The concentration of forces and allocation of supplies, as well as arrival of reinforcements from West Pakistan and briefing of area commanders had to be carried out without raising suspicion. Senior Pakistani officers visited major garrisons and personally briefed garrison commanders on the operation. General Farman was sent to Khulna, General Khadim briefed Chittagong, while Brig. El-Edrus and Col. Saadullah visited Sylhet and Rangpur.

Secrecy through operations security had been strictly maintained; only a few Lt. Colonels learned about the plan beforehand on a need to know basis. Although some Bengali officers had become suspicious of the all-West Pakistani officer briefings, no one outside the briefings learned the details beforehand.

Managing logistics

The main ammunition depots were located in Rajendrapur near Dhaka and 9000 tons of arms and ammunition were in Chittagong aboard MV Swat, so it was decided to speed up the unloading of the ship. Pakistani troops started arriving in Dhaka via PIA flights carrying "special passengers", in addition to the 13 FF and 22 Baluch which had already arrived.

Pakistanis planned to send a brigade to East Pakistan to enhance the chance of success prior to 25 March, and the new arrivals were part of that processes.

Shuffling of armed forces personnel

The army also took steps to enhance their chances of success by relocating Bengali officers away from sensitive areas, and bringing Pakistani troops to the cities. The rotation back to West Pakistan of two Pakistan Army units, the 25th Punjab and the 20th Baluch was delayed, while the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch regiments were flown to Dhaka from West Pakistan before 25 March. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other garrisons in East Pakistan before 25 March.

Brig. Mozumdar, who had refused to fire on Bengali civilians blocking the unloading of MV Swat, was relieved of his post on 24 March by Gen. Khadim himself on the pretext that he was needed to address 2 EBR at Joydebpur and Brig. M.H. Ansari (West Pakistani – Station Commander Dhaka) took command of Chittagong area. Maj. Khaled Musharraf, Brigade Major of the 57th Brigade in Dhaka, was sent to 4th EBR in Comilla as 2IC on 22 March.

Lt. Col. Masudul Hasan Khan (CO 2nd EBR) was relieved of his post on 23 March, and Lt. Col. Quazi A.F.M.A Raquib took over on 25 March. Pakistanis refrained from mass transfer of Bengali officers, as that might have compromised security of the plan. Bengali officers were urged to take leave (although all leave had been cancelled since February 1971), while West Pakistani officers were told to stay put. Families of West Pakistani officers and soldiers were evacuated from East Pakistan, and when possible families of some West Pakistani civilians were brought into the cities.

Dispersion of Bengali units before 25 March

Denied permission by General Hamid to disarm the regular Bengali army units en masse before the crackdown, the Pakistani command employed other ploys to minimise the threat of these formations.

Bengali units were sent out of the cantonments, or were broken into smaller units and deployed away from each other, and cut off from the main radio and wireless communication grid before or on 25 March. Bengali officers were sent on leave, or were posted away from command centres or units directly involved in the operation. In some cases, West Pakistani officers took command of Bengali formations. Some Bengali soldiers were sent on leave, and some were disarmed on various pretexts whenever possible without raising alarm.

The 1st EBR (at 50% strength), was sent out of Jessore cantonment to Chaugacha near the border for winter training, where they stayed until 29 March. Companies of the 2nd EBR were disbursed around areas outside Dhaka and their radio communication net was shut off. The 3rd EBR had its companies disbursed around Ghoraghat, and at Parvatipur outside the Saidpur cantonment. The 4th EBR units were deployed between Brahmanbaria and Shamshernagar. Only in Chittagong did the regular Bengali army units remain in their respective bases.

West Pakistani EPR troops were posted in the cities whenever possible, while Bengali EPR troops were sent to the border outposts. Most EPR units were away from the main action areas, and would need at least a day to reach the major cities. The EPR wireless net was shut off on the night of 24 or 25 March.

Operation Searchlight: 25/26 March to 10 April

This is a brief description of the units engaged and the result of Pakistani military action from 25 March until 10 April, when the operation was supposed to end. This only covers events in the areas that were the major focus of Operation Searchlight, not the Bengali resistance throughout East Pakistan. In some areas, Pakistani assault and mass murders started clashes with the Bengali forces on 25 March. In other areas, no clashes took place until as late as 30 March.

Dhaka

250px|right|thumb|Operation Searchlight: The location of Pakistani targets in Dhaka on 25 March 1971. Map is not to exact scale.

Pakistani troops in Dhaka, commanded by Maj. Gen. Farman, had the following objectives:

  • Impose curfew at 01:10, close telephone/telegraph/radio stations, and shut all presses down
  • Seal off the city by taking over road, rail and river communication and patrol rivers
  • Arrest Sheikh Mujib and 15 top Awami League leaders during operation
  • Conduct house to house searches in Dhanmondi and Hindu areas
  • Subdue Dhaka University, EPR HQ and Rajarbagh police line, disarm 2nd and 10th EBR
  • Take over and protect the ammunition factory at Gazipur and the arms depot at Rajendrapur.

Pakistani forces:

In addition to the Eastern Command HQ, the headquarters of the 14th division and the 57th brigade were also located in Dhaka cantonment. The regular army units present were: the 57th Brigade containing: 18th and 32nd Punjab (C.O: Lt. Col. Taj) regiments, 13th Frontier Force regiment, 22nd Baluch regiment, 604th Intelligence unit and the 31st Field Artillery Regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Zahid Hassan).

The 14th division HQ had the following units attached to it: 43rd Light Ack-Ack regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Shaffat Ali – Pakistani), elements of the 3rd Commando Battalion (CO: Lt. Col. Z.A. Khan – Pakistani), 19th Signal Regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Ifthekhar Hussain -Pakistani) and the 149th infantry workshop. PAF personnel were stationed at the Tejgaon Airport. 2,500 EPR troops were attached with the EPR HQ (the 13th, 15th and 16th wings, plus the EPR HQ wing) at Pilkhana. Each EPR wing contained 3 companies, although most EPR troops were at Pilkhana, 2 companies were deployed in Mirpur, two at the President house and one at the Governor house in the city.

W. Pakistani Brig. Nissar Ahmad Khan was the director general of all EPR while Lt. Col. Anwar Hossain Shah (W. Pakistani) commanded EPR Dhaka sector troops. The Rajarbag police line housed at least 2,000 armed police. 2nd EBR (C.O: Lt. Col. Rakib – Bengali) was at Joydebpur to the north of Dhaka, with one company in Tangail and one at Mymensying and a small detachment at Gazipur. EPR 2nd wing HQ (C.O – Capt. Qamar Abbas – W. Pakistani) was also at Mymensingh, containing no Bengali officers.

Course of events:

The Pakistani plan of action for Dhaka, as drawn up by Maj. Gen. Farman, was:

  1. 13th Frontier Force to stay in cantonment as reserve and provide security
  2. 43rd Light Ack Ack regiment was to secure Tejgaon airport
  3. 22nd Baluch regiment would disarm the EPR and seize wireless at Pilkhana EPR HQ
  4. 32nd Punjab was to neutralise Rajarbag Police line
  5. 18th Punjab was to fan out and secure Nawabpur and old Dhaka
  6. 31st Field was to secure Second capital, Mohammadpur and Mirpur
  7. A platoon from 3 SSG was to capture Sheikh Mujib
  8. 22nd Baluch and 32nd Punjab was to neutralise Dhaka University "rebels"
  9. 22 Baluch would be reinforced at Pilkhana

Bengali EPR officers were detained by the Pakistanis in Pilkhana and the troops were mostly ordered to stand down and relax, while 22nd Baluch took over security duties at Pilkhana on 25 March morning hours. Rumor spread in the city after dusk that Yahia Khan had left and Awami League volunteers put up makeshift barricades in the streets, but these did not cause any significant delay to Pakistani troop movements. The volunteers manning the barricades were the first civilians to be shot by Pakistani troops. Although the operation was to start at 0110 hours, Pakistani troops moved out at 11:30 pm from Dhaka cantonment as the Pakistani field commander wished to cut the reaction time of the Bengali forces. The army was given a 6-hour deadline to achieve its goal in Dhaka. Pakistan Army troops quickly shut off all communication channels in Dhaka before commencing the operation.

The 10th Bengal was easily disarmed in the cantonment and later eliminated. The 31st Field was deployed in the second capital of Dhaka city itself and secured the northern part of the city. The commandos, accompanied by Major Belal and Lt. Col. Z.A. Khan easily captured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the beginning of the crackdown, but most of the Awami League senior leadership managed to evade capture and escape to India.

22nd Baluch at the EPR HQ attacked and subdued the disorganised resistance of the EPR after an all night battle. Pakistanis captured the EPR troops posted at Mirpur, the President House and the Governor House without resistance, but many managed to flee while others were executed.

thumb|Grave of the 1971 martyrs, in front of [[Jagannath Hall, Dhaka University.]]

thumb|Memorial in front of university staff quarters apartment building at 34, Secretariat Road, Dhaka

Contingents from the 18th and 32nd Punjab regiments surrounded and assaulted the Dhaka University area, subdued the light resistance from the Awami League volunteers, killed over a hundred unarmed students present in the resident halls, murdered 10 professors, then moved on to attack the Hindu areas and the old town on the morning of 26 March. The Police at Rajarbag, aided by Awami League volunteers, put up a fierce resistance, but were eventually overcome and most survivors were captured or scattered.

Pakistani forces had used artillery and armour liberally, disregarding civilian safety altogether during the operation. The city was secured before dawn and a curfew was imposed. Surviving EPR and police fled the city, some crossed the Buriganga river to gather at Jingira. Sporadic attacks on the Army took place during 26 March – 5 April, but barring the failure to arrest Awami League leaders, the Army had achieved its objectives. Pakistani soldiers had also destroyed the Shaheed Minar, offices of The Daily Ittefaq, Daily People and the Kali temple at Ramna, none of which had any military value.

Captured Bengali soldiers, EPR and police personnel were either summarily executed or imprisoned without trial. From 26 March to 6 April, in an operation dubbed "GREAT FLY-IN" PIA Boeings and C 130 Transports would fly the 9th (made of the 27th, 313ed and 117th Brigades) and 16th (34th and 205th Brigades) divisions (a total of 5 Brigade HQs, containing 16 infantry battalions) to Dhaka, and elements of these formations would be flown to various locations in East Pakistan to reinforce Pakistani garrisons.

Two mortar batteries and two wings each of EPCAF and West Pakistan Rangers, accompanied by a considerable number of Tochi and Thal Scouts were also deployed. PAF No. 6 Squadron had 9 C-130B/E Hercules Aircraft available in March 1971. 5 C-130B and 1 C-130E were employed to transfer troops from West to East Pakistan under Operation Great Fly-In. Although Lt. Col. Masoudul Hossain Khan had informed Maj. K M Shafiullah of the Pakistani crackdown on 26 March via telephone, the unit did not take any action until 27 March. Pakistani troops took control of the Rajendrapur factory on 26 March and began to replenish munitions from that depot.

EPR 2nd wing (4 companies, one in Mymenshing, while other were posted to the north at Naqshi, Karaitoli and Lengura) was HQed at Mymenshing, along with a company of 2 EBR and a mixed company of W. Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistani unit attacked the EPR company on 27 March but was wiped out on 28 March, while other 2nd Wing companies neutralised Pakistani soldiers (either arrested them and sent them across the border or killed them) and deployed in towns to the east and west of Mymensingh by 29 March.

The 2nd EBR, under Major Shafiullah, revolted on 28 March, and regrouped at Mymensingh on 29 March. Shafiullah initially deployed his forces at Tangail, Bahadurabad, Sirajgaung, and Gaffargaon by 31 March, intending to launch an attack on Dhaka.

Shafiullah cancelled this plan on 31 March and joined the forces of Khaled Mosharraf north of Comilla with the 2nd EBR troops. Shafiullah deployed his forces as follows: 1 company each at Narshindi, Ashuganj, Ajabpur, Brahmanbaria, Sarail, Taliapara, 2 EBR HQ at Teliapara, and 1 company sent to Shadipur in Sylhet, and 1 to Chittagong to help Major Zia.

Pakistani forces (27th Brigade) moved north from Dhaka on 1 April, one column headed for Tangail while the other for Narshindi. EPR forces ambushed them near Tangail, but Pakistanis broke through despite heavy casualties and Tangail fell on 9 April. Two columns headed north from Tangail, one towards Jamalpur and the other towards Mymensingh. Despite being repeatedly ambushed by Bengali forces, Jamalpur fell on 14 April and Mymensingh by 22 April.

PAF bombed Narshindi on 6 April, dispursing the EPR forces, and the army column (31st Baluch) attacked EPR positions near Narshindi on 8 April. This was repulsed, but the next attack, aided by artillery and Saber jets, broke through on 9 April and Narshindi fell on 12 April. Mopping up action was conducted by the 27th Brigade, which secured Mymensingh, Sylhet and part of Comilla division by June.

Chittagong

250px|right|thumb|Operation Searchlight: The location of Pakistani targets in Chittagong on 25 March 1971. Map is not to exact scale.

Chittagong housed the only oil refinery in East Pakistan, had a large fuel depot, was the largest seaport and MV Swat, with 9000 tons of arms and ammunition was in port. Bengali units substantially outnumbered the West Pakistani Chittagong garrison, which was a cause of concern for Pakistani planners. Bengali officers of EPR and EBR had discussed a preemptive strike on Pakistan forces, but the senior Bengali officers (Lt. Col M.R. Choudhury -Chief Instructor, EBRC) and Major Ziaur Rahman (2IC, 8 EBR), dissuaded Captain Rafiq (Sector Adjutant, EPR) from rebelling in the belief that the Pakistani army would not take action against civilians, but confirmed that they would revolt in case of any Pakistani attack. Attempts to unload arms and ammunition from MV Swat were a partial failure during 20–25 March, as civilian protestors blocked any attempt to take the arms to the cantonment and many were shot by the army. Brig. Mazumdar was relieved of his post because of this failure.

Pakistani units were given the following objectives in Chittagong:

  • Disarm EBRC units, 8 EBR, EPR and police units
  • Seize police armoury, radio station and telephone exchange
  • Liaise with Pakistani Navy
  • Arrest Lt. Col. M.R. Choudhury and Awami League leaders.

The Chittagong garrison was to be reinforced by the bulk of 53rd Brigade troops from Comilla on 26 March.

Pakistani forces:

The Chittagong cantonment is located to the north of the city, while the Naval base was near the airport on the south end of the city. The port facilities are positioned between the airport and the naval base. The 20th Baluch regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Fatami-Pakistani), minus its advance party, was the only army unit present in the cantonment besides a company from the 31st Punjab and elements from the 3rd Commando battalion. These were supported by a section of 6 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29 Cavalry. 20 Baluch had 400 troops, 29th Cavalry had 100 soldiers, while another 100 troops were attached with various service units. Some plain cloths Commandos were in the city while an EPR platoon guarded the airport.

Course of events:

24-25 March

The daytime witnessed nothing unusual, Pakistani and Bengali troops continued normal activities, while civilians barricaded streets to impede army movements. 1 Company of Bengali soldiers unloaded the MV Swat, all day and night, which would be finished by 26 March midday. Pakistani navy secured the airport just after dusk, capturing all EPR personnel stationed there. Commodore Mumtaj prevented any massacre of Bengali Naval personnel at the naval base but also ensured they caused no mischief. The port facility was secured by a Pakistani infantry company by 9:00 PM. Communication networks were partially shutdown.

On 24 March, around 8:30 PM, Captain Rafiq was informed of troop movements in Dhaka by Chittagong Awami League leader Dr. Zafar. He immediately went to the EPR HQ and successfully took control of the facility by 10:30, imprisoning about 300 Pakistani EPR members, then sent a prearranged signal to all Bengali EPR companies attached to the Chittagong EPR sector to imprison all Pakistani soldiers and come to the city. This is the only instance where Bengali units launched a preemptive strike against the Pakistanis during the operation. Captain Rafiq deployed his troops in Agrabad (100 soldiers), Railway Hill (150) and Court hill (a platoon). The rest guarded the EPR HQ. The EPR Ramgarh contingent was told to blow up the Shuvopur bridge. As per his discussions with Lt. Col. M.R. Choudhury and Major Zia, he had assumed they would take over the cantonment – an assumption that would have fatal consequences.

20 Baluch, under Lt. Col Fatami, sent 6 truck loaded with troops to secure EBRC around 11:30 pm. Rafiqul-Islam (1981) claimed that they killed a thousand Bengali troops, but this is highly unlikely because Fatimi's unit only had six hundred soldiers who were anyway being phased out, and no other source including pro-Bengali sources such as Samir Bhattacharya (2013, p. 729) corroborate this claim; he puts the West Pakistani strength at six hundred and the Bengali soldiers' strength at five thousand soldiers, a ratio of over eight to one. However, Lt Col. M.R. Choudhury was among those killed by the West Pakistanis, while surviving Bengali personnel were scattered. Pakistani forces had partially achieved their objectives by securing the cantonment, the port and the airport, and they awaited reinforcements from Comilla before taking further steps.

Bengali officers were divided in their opinion, some wanted to take on the 20 Baluch at EBRC to save Bengali lives, but ultimately it was decided that such a move would be suicidal. 8 EBR left the city and took position across the Kalurghat bridge around 1:15 am. 8 EBR CO, Lt. Col. Janjua was killed by his second in command Major Ziaur Rahman.

Pakistani troops from the Naval base launched an unsuccessful attack on the EPR HQ in the early hours (2:00 am – 4:00 am) of 26 March. Around 4:00 March 26, Major Bahar (CO 53rd Brigade Signal Company -Bengali), warned Captain Rafiq of 80 to 100 vehicles bearing the bulk of 53rd Brigade troops under Brig. Iqbal Shaffi was moving towards Chittagong. Captain Rafiq sent an EPR Machine gun platoon under Subadar Musa, with a mortar and rocket launcher to delay the Pakistani column near Kumira, 12 miles north of Chittagong.

M. R. Siddiqui (Awami League leader) had phoned Captain Haroon (2IC 17th EPR Wing) in Kaptai around 9:40 pm about the situation in Chittagong. By 11:30 pm Captain Haroon had taken control of the wing, put Pakistani personnel in jail, and had signalled EPR troops in border areas to move to Chittagong by 3:30 am. Captain Haroon with his troops reached Kalurghat Bridge by 26 March morning, where Major Zia ordered him to stay with the 8 EBR troops, along with 2 EPR companies coming from Teknaf Rangamati EPR Company imprisoned their Pakistani members and took position to the north east of cantonment by the early hours of 26 March. Bengali plan of resistance had fallen apart, EPR troops were to remain without the expected reinforcements throughout the battle.

26 March

53rd Brigade detachment had moved out around 3:00 am from Comilla, but was repeatedly faced delays on the way because of barricades, damaged culverts and other obstacles thrown up by civilians during their 100-mile journey to Chittagong, forcing them to stop and make makeshift repairs and diversion roads before moving on. They captured the partially damaged Suvapor Bridge intact around 10:00 am then stopped to make repairs. Brig. Shaffi was ordered to make for Chittagong, so he resumed his advance with the infantry, commando troops and some mortars after midday, when his engineers put up a path across the ravine, leaving his engineers and mortar battery at Shuvopur. By 7 pm, 26 March, this group had reached Kumira (Comeera), by which time Captain S.A. Bhuyan (after talking with Captain Rafiq over phone) of EBRC had reinforced the EPR Platoon at Kumira with 70 soldiers, and had divided his forces in 3 platoons to set up an ambush.

20 Baluch with some tanks had secured the area immediately around the cantonment in the morning. During the day Pakistani troops from naval base and EPR soldiers had several clashes inside the city, especially around the Agrabad area and the Railway hill resulting in Pakistani soldiers being bottled up in the naval base. Bengali positions in the city came under shellfire from Pakistani Naval ships and artillery, while Bengali troops at the port facility were disarmed around midday and shot before dusk. Around 2:30 pm local Awami League leader M. A. Hannan made a declaration of Independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the Kalurghat Radio station, which was not picked up by many people.

Around 7 pm, Brig. Shaffi's troops were ambushed near Kumira, losing 10 killed, and suffering almost 100 casualties, including Lt. Col. Shahpur Khan (CO 24 FF). Brig. Shaffi himself had to flee for the hills, and 2 truck full of arms were recovered by the Bengalis. Half the convoy was outside the ambush firing range and Pakistanis, commanded by Major Amzad Hussain (Bengali −2IC 24 FF) fought back, and a 2-hour long battle ensued. The mortars were handled by Captain Fazlur Rahman Bhuyan (Bengali), who ironically was a Kakul Academy batch mate of Captain S.A. Bhuyan, leading the Bengali ambush. The Pakistani column lost all contact with Comilla and the GHQ at Dhaka, raising fears that it had been wiped out, which, if true, might have crippled the Pakistani effort.

The EPR HQ and Railway hill came under intense bombardment by Pakistani naval ships (PNS Jahangir and 2 gunboats) and artillery during the day. Pakistani troops launched two attacks on the Railway hill and EPR HQ after a 2-hour barrage around 8:30 pm, but both attacks were repulsed. Pakistanis continued to shell both areas throughout the night.

At the end of 26 March, both Pakistani and Bengali troops had been denied land based reinforcements. Pakistani troops were stuck at Kumira, while Major Zia was keeping any EPR troops heading to the city at Kalurghat. Pakistani troops were in control of the northern and southern part of the city, and they were getting reinforcements through the air. The 2nd SSG (CO: Lt. Col Sulayman) was flown to Chittagong, while ammunition was flown out to replenish Pakistani forces around the province. Bengali troops were stuck in the middle (literally and figuratively) so the lack of communication and co-ordination between Maj. Zia and Captain Rafiq meant Bengali positions would come under intense pressure. Major Zia apportioned his troops to different parts of Chittagong city for various operations. From the Kalurghat radio station he broadcast declaration of independence of Bangladesh with himself as the provisional head of state in the evening.

The 25th Punjab regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Shafqat Baluch) minus 1 company, attached to the 23rd brigade. Pakistani EPR troops from EPR sector HQ.

Bengali forces: EPR sector no 4 was HQed in Rahshaji and contained no Bengali officers, and about a company of EPR troops were at the sector HQ in Rajshahi. EPR wing no 6 (4 companies, HQ Nawabganj to the west of Rajshahi) and No 7 Wing (5 companies, HQ Naogaon, CO: Nazmul Huq – Bengali) was attached to the Rajshshi sector. No. 6 Wing had no Bengali officers and its companies were at the Wing HQ, and on the Indian border at Charghat, Godagari and Mankosha.

No. 7 wing companies were at the Wing HQ and on the Indian border between Panchbibi and Rohanpur. Police and Bengali volunteers were also present in Rajshahi. Pakistani officers had posted non Bengali personnel at the Sector HQ kotes and communication centre during the second week of March.

Course of events:

The CO of 25 Punjab, Lt. Col. S. Baluch was away and joined his unit on 25 March. As per the plan, he sent a company to Pabna, a town to the east of Rajshahi sitting on the vital road link to Dhaka, on the same day to establish Pakistani presence. Pakistan troops began patrolling Rajshahi from 25 March, and the situation was normal, if tense the following day. Bengali police had dug bunkers expecting an attack, but nothing happened. EPR 6 Wing troops at Nawabgaung did not face anything unusual during 25–26 March.

The situation at Naogaon was different. Bengali troops at Rohanpur had clashed with Pakistani troops on 23 March, and on 26 March soldiers at Naogaon revolted after receiving news of the countrywide Pakistani crackdown. The Bengali troops managed to imprison all Pakistani personnel while they were at dinner. Major Nazmul Huq joined his troops and began assembling the wing companies at Naogaon.

Situation explodes: 27 March

25th Punjab took defensive positions near the Rajshshi police line and EPR HQ on 27 March. Although a truce was negotiated between the police and Pakistani army, an attack was launched on the police lines after 12:00 PM, which fell after a 3-hour battle. Rajshahi police had contacted the EPR at Naogaon prior to the Pakistani attack, but received no help as EPR troops could not cover the 60 mile distance in time. But as the news of this Pakistani attack alerted the Bengali EPR soldiers, and they began to take measures.

Pakistani EPR troops relocated to the cantonment the same day with most of the arms from the sector HQ, while some took position at the circuit house. Warned by the non Bengali sector adjutant Captain Ishaq, some Bengali EPR troops revolted, armed themselves, and sporadic clashes took place after dark which led to nothing. Bengali EPR personnel left Rajshahi the following day. The situation during 28 March – 2 April was uneventful except for thousands of civilians leaving the city to escape Pakistani retribution and prosecution.

Pakistani EPR troops suddenly attacked Bengali troops at Nawabgaung on the same day, but were forced to surrender after a 3-hour battle. The 6 wing soldiers contacted Major Nazmul Huq at Naogaon and also joined the revolt.

Escalation of hostilities: 28–29 March

The 25 Punjab company in Pabna was deployed in small detachments around the town. A mixed force of Bengali EPR, police and volunteers attacked the company on 27 March, and which caused casualties on both sides (including the company CO Captain Asghar and Lt. Rashid, 3 JCOs and 80 Pakistani troops). After a botched Heli evacuation attempt, Major Aslam led 2 platoons from Rajshahi to Pabna on 28 March and extricated the survivors. This column was ambushed near Ishwardi on 29 March by a Bengali force under Captain Rashid, lost 40 soldiers including Major Aslam, and only 18 soldiers ultimately reached Rajshahi after 3 days.

The 23rd Field company in Bogra was deployed in 2 groups, one guarding the ammunition dump while the other patrolling the town without incident during 25–29 March. Attempts to reinforce this group from Rangpur had not succeeded. A Bengali EPR company under Captain Gias moved to Bogra, 35 miles from Naogaun on 28 March morning, reaching the place in the evening. With the aid of 200 armed police and several hundred civilian volunteers, a Pakistani patrol was ambushed on 29 March, and surviving Pakistanis fled to Rangpur. Captain Gias left Bogra the following day. Local Bengali fighters attacked the ammunition dump on 1 April, put surviving Pakistani troops in jail and freed the town.

Ring around Rajshahi

After securing Pabna and Bogra, Major Nazmul Huq focused on Rajshahi, around which Bengali fighters had been gathering since 28 March. After keeping a small reserve at Naogaon, Major Nazmul Huq concentrated a mixed force of EPR, Police and volunteers around Rajshahi by 1 April. Captain Gias commanded a mixed force of almost 1,000 fighters from Nawabgaung while Captain Rashid led another 1,000 from Panba to Rajshahi. Sporadic clashes with Pakistanis started on the following day.

A three pronged attack was launched on the town, with Captain Gias attacking from the south, Captain Rashid from the east and another group from the northwest on 4 April. After a fierce 4 hour battle causing severe casualties on both sides, Pakistani forces left the town and took up a strong defensive position around the cantonment at Sapura, using minefields and barbed wire to beef up the place. Between 1–5 April, the PAF had launched airstrikes to little effect on Rajshahi. Bengali fighters launched several attacks on the cantonment between 6–10 April, and although the Pakistanis were ultimately confined in an area only 800 yards square, the Punjab regiment managed to survive.

Rajshahi town remained free until 15 April. On 10 April 3 EPR companies took position to block the Pakistani 57th infantry brigade at Nagarbari. Pakistani forces softened the position by airstrikes on 10 April, a launch borne forced probed it the following day. At night Pakistani assault force crossed the Jamuna River and secured the position, forcing the battered remnants of Bengali fighters to flee towards Pabna. Brig. Arbab began cleaving a path of terror and destruction as he headed for Rajshahi with the 57th brigade.

Rangpur-Saidpur

Pakistani Army objectives for Rangpur were:

  • Secure both towns, Telephone exchange and Radio station in Rangpur.
  • Diasarm 3 EBR at Saidpur and EPR Sector HQ at Dinajpur
  • Secure Ammo dump at Bogra
  • Arrest Awami League leaders in Rangpur

Pakistani forces:

EPR 8 wing had 2 companies at Dinajpur and the rest was deployed near the border at Biral and Basudevpur. EPR 0 wing companies were deployed at Thakurgaon, Ruhia, Chilahati, Tetulia and Panchagarh. EPR 10 wing companies were posted at Rangpur, Chilamari, Patgram, Mogolhat and Joymonirhut. Rangpur and Saidpur also had some armed police in the city. 29th Cavalry had 50% Bengali personnel. and its anti tank weapons were given to the 26 FF company in Dinajpur for training purposes, further diminishing its firepower. 26 FF planned to disarm the EPR troops at Dinajpur during a Bara Khana

Pakistani troops moved into Rangpur on 25 March around 12:00 am and took up positions around the city. Capt. Nawajesh had barely escaped from the EPR HQ with some men, but the Pakistanis neutralised the police and remaining EPR troops easily. Pakistani troops also took control of Saidpur without any resistance.

Captain Ashraf, after persuading 3 EBR 21C Major Akthar of his desire to stay loyal to Pakistan, was sent to Thakurgaon with a 3 EBR company from Saidpur on 26 March morning. There were no clashes between Pakistani and Bengali forces although the situation remained tense and some Biharis began looting Bengali property at Saidpur. At Thakurgaon the EPR troops did not react to the martial law declaration. The following morning EPR troops entrenched themselves at the wing HQ.

There were civil demonstrations at Thakurgaon during 26–27 March, and Pakistani troops fired at the crowds causing some casualties. Things remained unchanged until 28 March, when EPR companies deployed on the border became aware of the countrywide Pakistani crackdown from radio intercepts, and began to neutralise Pakistani EPR personnel in their midst. Capt. Nawajeshuddin met with EPR company commanders of the 10th wing and decided to take control of the Tista bridge, thus cutting off all territory north of the Tista river from Pakistani control on 28 March.

On 28 March around 11:30 am a rumour spread among EPR troops in Dinajpur that they might be attacked, and clash with the 26th FF company erupted around 3:00 pm. The combatants began shelling each other with anti tank weapons and mortars and began exchanging fire from entrenched positions at their respective HQs. EPR troops posted in the city rushed to the EPR HQ, the police also joined the EPR troops, Lt. Rafiq was executed by Pakistanis later. Brig. Malik decided to disarm the 3 EBR and 29 Cavalry Bengali personnel on the same day.

Disarming Bengali soldiers

29 cavalry Bengali troops were divided into small groups for patrolling on 28 March, and their return was staggered from Rangpur. Pakistani troops first disarmed Bengali guards at Rangpur cantonment, then each Bengali patrol group was surrounded by waiting Pakistani soldiers on their return and disarmed. Bengali officers and soldiers of 23rd Field and 29 cavalry were neutralised this way and most were executed.

3 EBR companies were at Parvatipur (CO Maj. S. Shaffat Hussain – Pakistani), Thakurgaon (CO Captain Ashraf – Bengali), Ghoraghat (2 companies, CO Maj. Nizamuddin – Bengali) and Saidpur (Rear party and HQ company, OC Capt. Anwar). 3 EBR companies conducted routine work during 26–28 March, when the news on Pakistani attacks on Bengalis caused all except the one in Saidpur to revolt. Bengali troops at Ghoraghta were the first to react by setting up the failed ambush under Lt. Rafiq at Palashbari on 28 March. Other EBR companies stayed in their positions until 31 March.

26 FF attacked the 3 EBR barracks on 30 March (1 April, 3:00 am, according to other sources) The initial attack on the Bengali positions was launched from the north, the second from the north west, while small groups of Pakistani troops infiltrated the positions to take out defensive strong points.

After a few hours, surviving Bengali troops decided to retreat and left their position in 2 groups, having suffered 55 casualties out of 120 soldiers. Families were left behind and after some Pakistani soldiers abused them (including raping the wives of officers), they were moved to the Saidpur and Rangpur jail. Several Bengali officers attached to the 23rd Brigade were executed while several Bengali officers were sent to West Pakistan.

EPR 10th wing troops had taken control of the Tista bridge on 28 March, and had deployed 2 companies near the bridge, 1 at Lalmanirhat airfield and the other 2 at Kurigram and Mogolhut. No clashes with Pakistani troops took place until 1 April.

Helicopters began ferrying 48 Punjab and 4 FF troops began to Rangpur after the disarming of Bengali troops. On 1 April a 4 FF platoon probed the area around Tista Bridge, and in the ensuing clash Maj. Ejaj was killed. The following day an infantry company with 29 cavalry reconnaissance troops moved to the bridge. They directed artillery on the Bengali position and with the aid of air strikes and tanks managed to force the Bengalis to fall back slightly by evening.

Another Pakistani column moved north and crossed the river at a different point and attacked and captured Lalmunirhat airfield. The outflanked EPR troops abandoned the bridge, and by 4 April the airport was fully operational, with troops and supplies being flown in and families flown out. Apart from small hit and run attacks, Pakistani position remained secured north of the Tista river. On 11 April around 3:30 am 4 EPR companies attacked the airfield, but Pakistani resistance forced them to break off the attack at daybreak.

Bengali deployment around Saidpur 1 April

EPR troops at Thakurgaon began to take up positions north of Saidpur from 31 March. On 2 April, Bengali officers and EPR JCOs of 8 and 9 wings decided to deploy troops around Saidpur. Thakurgaon EPR contingent moved to Nilphamari to the north of Saidpur, Bhushibandar to the west of it. Small contingents were deployed in areas in between these two positions. Pakistani troops moved to Parvatipur, south of Saidpur after 3 EBR company had gone south to Phulbaria on 2 April.

On 4 April Bengali commanders held another near Bhatgaon and decided to attack Saidpur, after which 1 EBR and 3 EPR companies (CO captain Ashraf) dug in at Bhushibandar, another EPR company (CO Capt. Anwar) went to Badarganj (west of Parvatipur), and another company stayed at Bhatgaon. 3 EBR companies attacked Parvatipur on the same day, the Pakistani troops and armed Biharis retreated to Saidpur. The significance of the deployment of the Bengali forces in the west, south and north of Saidpur in a semicircle, with the road east to Rangpur open, was not lost to the Pakistani commanders.

Pakistani counterattack from Rangpur/Saidpur

Bengali troops lacked proper communication equipment for co-ordinating an attack on Saidpur and although Indian authorities had been contacted for help, none had been received. Pakistani troops, reinforced through the air after the capture of Lalmunirhut, began to attack Bengali positions from 6 April onwards. Task forces were created from the 26 FF, 48 Punjab and 4 FF battalions, accompanied by a squadron/troop from the 29 cavalry and artillery pieces from the 23rd Field regiment,

The Bengali resistance had put up an unexpected stiff resistance and had managed to derail the initial Pakistani estimate of pacifying East Pakistan by 10 April. The initial successes were not sustainable as the Bengali forces began to suffer from lack of trained men, officers, co-ordination among scattered troops and lack of central command structure, proper supplies (despite limited aid from BSF).

Lacking everything except unskilled volunteers, Mukti Bahini fought a conventional battle against an enemy enjoying superiority in number of trained men, firepower, and complete air superiority and played to the strength of Pakistanis. Choosing to attack Bengali forces all over Bangladesh simultaneously, Gen. Niazi concentrated battalion and brigade size forces on company and battalion size defence positions repeatedly, used air strikes and artillery to soften targets, and employed Heli-borne troops to outflank positions and hammered through to reach chosen objectives. Pakistani troop convoys were repeatedly ambushed, but these only delayed the Pakistani advance temporarily.

By using their superiority of weapons and command of air ruthlessly, with little regard for safety of civilians and often targeting civilian areas to spread terror, the Pakistani army began to fan out of their bases and take over the province. By late April, all the major cities had fallen, by mid May all major towns had been captured and by mid June the battered remnant of Bengali fighters had been driven across the border into India. The Bengali resistance, suffering from a lack of trained men, proper logistics and co-ordination, lost the conventional battle against the Pakistan forces.

Temporary Pakistani occupation

Lt. General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi had been posted as GOC East Pakistan Command on 11 April 1971, while Gen. Tikka Khan was retained as the governor of the province. General Khadim Raja was relieved from the command of the 14th division, and General Farman continued to serve as advisor on civilian affairs to the governor.

The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, after being reinforced by "Operation GREAT FLYIN", was reorganised to run the counterinsurgency operation. The 9th division (HQ Jessore, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza commanding) was given the 57th (HQ in Jhenida) and 107th (HQ in Jessore) brigades for controlling Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali districts. The 16th Division (HQ Natore, Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah commanding) was given the 23rd (HQ Rangpur), 205th (HQ Bogra) and 34th (HQ Nator) brigades and was to control Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna and Rajshahi districts. The 14th division (HQ Dhaka, Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan) controlled the rest of the province with the 27th (HQ Mymenshingh), 313th (HQ Sylhet), 117th (HQ Comilla) and the 53rd (HQ Chittagong) brigades.

E.P.C.A.F (East Pakistan Civil Armed Force) was organised to replace the EPR. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Jamshed, this force contained 17 combat wings, 7 sector wings (Sector HQs at Dhaka, Mymeshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Comilla and Chittagong), totalling an estimated 20,000 personnel (West Pakistanies and Biharis), serving under the command of Pakistani army officers. The force was deployed to patrol the border, maintain internal security and support army operations.

Razakars and Shanti Committees were formed to support the army occupation. Mostly recruited from Bengalis and ex-EPR servicemen, an estimated 40,000 Razakers (against a target of 100,000 recruits) of mixed effectiveness was eventually fielded. Al-Badr and Al-Shams, formed by Jaamat-i-Islami, contributed another 5,000 members each. Pakistan also deployed hundreds of West Pakistani civilians and 5,000 police to support the occupation.

Admiral Mohammad Shariff, who was a rear-admiral at that time, and the principal commander of Navy of East Pakistan, released his autobiography, entitled, "Admiral's Diary". In his autobiography, Admiral Shariff provided the account of Operation Searchlight, as he said Shariff concluded, "The initial military success in regaining the law and order situation in East Pakistan in March 1971 was misunderstood as a complete success. In actuality, the law and order situation deteriorated with time, particularly after September of the same year when the population turned increasingly against the army as well as the government".

Creation of Mukti Bahini

The initial resistance, which started on 26 March, functioned without any central command structure. Senior Bengali army officers met at Teliapara in Sylhet on 10 April, and selected Col. (ret) M. A. G. Osmani as commander of Bengali armed forces. On 11 April Osmani designated four sector commanders: Major Zia for the Chittagong area, Major Khaled Mussarraf for Comilla, Major Shafiullah for Sylhet and Major Abu Osman Chowdhury for Jessore area.

The Bangladesh government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on 17 April at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. Osmani as commander of Mukti Bahini (regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad. Bangladesh Forces Headquarters were set up in Kolkata (Calcutta) with Col. MAG Osmani as commander in chief, Lt. Col. MA Rab as Chief of Staff (based in Agartala, Tripura), and Group Captain AR Khandker as deputy Chief of Staff. The Bengali resistance, after being driven out of Bangladesh, began reorganising to focus on irregular warfare.

Bengali refugees in India

A few thousand people sought refuge during April and May, mostly the resistance. However, as Pakistani army operations spread throughout the province, refugees fleeing to India increased. Ultimately approximately 10 million people would leave East Pakistan, and about 6.7 million were housed in 825 refugee camps.

An estimated 7.3 million were in West Bengal, and 1.5 million in Tripura. The rest were mainly in Assam and Bihar. The temporary presence of this large foreign population created economic (the cost of feeding, housing and medical care), social (tensions between locals and refugees) and national security (arms falling in the hands of Mizo and Naga rebels) concerns for India.

India's role

The main reason Generals Farman and Yakub had opposed any military action against civilians in East Pakistan was the fear of an Indian attack, which the Pakistan army was woefully unprepared to meet in March 1971. After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmad met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April 1971 and asked for all possible aid, by which time the Indian government had already opened East Pakistan border and the BSF was offering limited aid to the Bengali resistance. The issue of direct military intervention was discussed between the Indian military and political leadership in April 1971. The case for intervention was based on the following:

  • Until 10 April, most of Bangladesh was outside Pakistani control, and the troops were bottled up in a few cities and were facing fierce resistance. It is likely the Indian Army, with proper air support, could have quickly taken control of most of the province by aiding the Mukti Bahini.
  • Indian Eastern Naval contingent (1 aircraft carrier and several warships) could have imposed a blockade of the province and cut off supplies from the sea, as the Pakistan Naval arm in the east only contained 1 destroyer and 4 gunboats.
  • Pakistani forces were flying in crucial reinforcements from West Pakistan during 26 March – 2 May and were dependent of the supply depots located in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Narayanganj for fuel and ammunitions. Most Pakistani garrisons were cut off from each other and reliant on supplies through airlifts. The Indian Air Force, vastly outnumbering the Pakistan Air Force Eastern contingent, could have cut off the air-links and destroyed the supply depots (as it did in December 1971).

Against this, the military leadership had to consider the following:

  • Indian army did not have a suitable force available for action in April 1971, and would have to assemble one from forces deployed in other areas for such an operation. Could an adequate force be put in place without jeopardising the security of the northern and western borders of India in time to make a difference in East Pakistan?
  • Could a logistical network be established around East Pakistan to support the combat force operation before Pakistani army took over the province?
  • Should the Indians fail to gain a quick victory, was the army and the government ready (logistically, politically, diplomatically and otherwise) for a longer war, especially during the monsoon season in Bangladesh which would favour the defenders?
  • Intervening in East Pakistan would make India the aggressor in International circles. Was India ready to diplomatically meet the international reaction and had India ensured the co-operation of a superpower as a diplomatic ally and arms supplier, crucial for running a long war?

Although some of the Bengali leadership hoped for and expected an Indian military operation at the earliest, and as many as 3,000,000 as claimed by Bangladesh (from 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions

that at least three million died). Biharis and non-Bengalis had also suffered in the initial stages of the conflict – houses were looted and some died in Bengali hands.

Christian Gerlach concluded that overall deaths due to the war in East Pakistan slightly exceeded half a million and could not have exceeded 1 million,

The genocide also included killing of serving Bengali senior army officers of the rank of Lt. Colonel and above in East Pakistan within the first few days of Operation Searchlight. The deaths included Col. Badiul Alam, Lt. Col. MA Qadir, Lt. Col. S. A. Hai, Lt. Col. M. R. Choudhury, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Abul Fazal Ziaur Rahman, Lt. Col. N. A. M. Jahangir and another dozens of senior majors who were executed by April 1971. Also, around a hundred junior officers and thousands of unfortunate captured Bengali soldiers, including members of the East Pakistan Rifles and Police, serving in East Pakistan were executed. After the defeat of the Pakistan Army, there was a call to try nearly 200 Pakistani POWs for war crimes, but no trials took place.

Evaluation and importance

  • The Pakistani army maintained operational security, for the most part, before the operation commenced. They also airlifted 2 infantry divisions (the 9th and the 16th) to Bangladesh in a span of 4 weeks after 26 March, despite a ban on flights over India.
  • The disorganised initial resistance of Bengali units was crushed by mid June, and the country was under Pakistani control. As insurgent activity slacked off in July, civilians returned to work and trade resumed, and Pakistanis could claim the country was almost "normal". On the surface, Operation Searchlight had achieved most of its goals. Pakistani military leadership were satisfied with the results, even General Gul Hasan, no admirer of the Pakistani operation in East Pakistan in General and of Gen. Niazi in particular, praised the efforts of Pakistani troops and their achievements in April 1971.
  • The capture of Sheikh Mujib might have been a big blow for the resistance had Tajuddin Ahmad failed to rally support for his leadership from the other Awami League senior members and create the Bangladesh government in exile. The Pakistanis failed to capture the Awami League political leaders during the operation, which was a crucial part of the plan. Out of the 167 elected Members of National Assembly and 299 members of Provincial Assembly from Awami League, Pakistinis managed to kill 4, 4 surrendered themselves while 2 were captured. The rest moved to India, and using their networks and popular support in Bangladesh, effectively organised the insurgency and joined the Bangladesh government in Exile in various capacity.
  • The survival of the Awami League political apparatus permitted India to channel aid through a structured organisation, rather than dealing with various resistance groups competing for their support. The Awami League included elected members of parliament who claimed to be legitimate representatives of the people, thus enhancing the credibility of the organisation in international circles. Bengali army officers worked under civilian leaders, so there was no serious struggle for power in the resistance. While civilian leadership ran the administration and coordinated logistics, army personnel fought the war and trained freedom fighters.
  • Pakistani planners assumed that if the political leadership was captured, the Bengali armed units disarmed, and the civilians sufficiently terrorised, after a month no organised resistance would remain in East Pakistan. Their assumptions were proven wrong in the long run. The political leadership escaped to organise the resistance and lobby for international support, Bengali soldiers formed the core of the armed resistance, and civilians, despite the terror campaign, supported the insurgency with logistics, intelligence and volunteers for the irregular warfare.
  • Operation Searchlight included no follow-up plan. Anticipating a relatively quick success, Pakistani planners did not plan for a long irregular war or the eventual involvement of India. Pakistan had no regular troops to spare after stationing 4 divisions in Bangladesh by November 1971 since they needed to maintain parity with the Indian army in the west. With the EPR and police defecting, a large number of paramilitary units were needed to police the country. Siddique Salik estimated that Pakistan needed at least 250,000 to 300,000 troops, but even after organising the Razakars (estimated strength 40,000), Pakistan could field only 150,000 (45,000 regular army, rest paramilitary units) soldiers in Bangladesh.

The eventual strain of combating the insurgency caused Pakistan to attack India on 3 December 1971, with the objective to stop Indian support for the Mukti Bahini. This attack initiated the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which concluded with the unconditional surrender of Pakistan forces on 16 December.

See also

  • Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War
  • Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War
  • Mitro Bahini order of battle
  • Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971
  • Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan
  • 1971 Bangladesh genocide
  • Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts
  • Operation Azm-e-Istehkam

Notes

References

Citations

Bibliography

  • Bengali Translation: 'Pakistan Jokhon Bhanglo' University Press Ltd. 1996

Further reading

  • Chowdhury, Debasish Roy; Indians are bastards anyway in the Asia Times Online 23 June 2005. Mentions Operation Searchlight in paragraph eight.
  • Hasan, Khalid; Indian scholar sifts 1971 fact from fiction in the Daily Times 18 December 2005.
  • Lamb, Scott; Genocide since 1945: Never Again? in Der Spiegel online 26 January 2005. See the section "Bangladesh, 1971".
  • The 1971 Genocide in Pakistan – A Realist Perspective – How realpolitik considerations of the states involved explain why genocide was carried out with impunity, why it was permitted by international players, why it was halted by the Indian intervention and why the perpetrators were never punished.
  • Extracts from Brigadier Zahir Alam Khan – The Way It Was; Dynavis Pvt. Ltd, Karachi, September 1998. .
  • Bangladesh Genocide Archive (archived)
  • Operation Search Light: Paki Blue Print for Bangalee Massacre (archived)
  • PAKISTAN: Dacca, City of the Dead by Dan Coggin, Correspondent, Time, 3 May 1971 (archived)