Operation Bodenplatte (; "Baseplate"), launched on 1 January 1945, was an attempt by the German Luftwaffe to cripple Allied air forces in the Low Countries during the Second World War. The goal of Bodenplatte was to gain air superiority during the stagnant stage of the Battle of the Bulge so that the German Army and Waffen-SS forces could resume their advance. The operation was planned for 16 December 1944, but was delayed repeatedly due to bad weather until New Year's Day, the first day that happened to be suitable. It resulted in the destruction of almost 500 Allied airplanes.
Secrecy for the operation was so tight that not all German ground and naval forces had been informed of the operation and some units suffered casualties from friendly fire. British signals intelligence recorded the movement and buildup of German air forces in the region, but did not realise that an operation was imminent.
The operation achieved some surprise and tactical success, but was ultimately a failure. A great many Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground but replaced within a week. Allied aircrew casualties were quite small, since the majority of Allied losses were grounded aircraft. The Germans, however, lost many pilots who could not be readily replaced.
Post-battle analysis suggests only 11 of the Luftwaffe's 34 air combat Gruppen (groups) made attacks on time and with surprise. The operation failed to achieve air superiority, even temporarily, while the German ground forces continued to be exposed to Allied air attack. Bodenplatte was the last large-scale strategic offensive operation mounted by the Luftwaffe during the war.
Background
thumb|Focke-Wulf Fw 190A shot down by a fighter of the USAAF XXIX Tactical Air Command in 1944 or 1945. German losses were very heavy by late 1944.|alt=Gunsight view: In the bottom left, a fighter aircraft is seen from the rear, its tail plane is separated and above it, a cluster of bright tracer can be seen picture center-right.<!-- alt=Plane in flight with bits coming off. -->
The armies of the Western Allies were supported by the Allied Air Forces as they advanced across Western Europe in 1944. The Royal Air Force (RAF) and its Second Tactical Air Force—under the command of Air Marshal Arthur Coningham—moved No. 2 Group RAF, No. 83 Group RAF, No. 84 Group RAF and No. 85 Group RAF to continental Europe in order to provide constant close air support. The RAF harassed the German air, sea and ground forces by hitting strong points and interdicting their supply lines while reconnaissance units apprised the Allies of German movements. With Allied air superiority, the German Army could not operate effectively. The Luftwaffe, equally, found it difficult to provide effective air cover for the German Army. Although German aircraft production peaked in 1944 the Luftwaffe was critically short of pilots and fuel, and lacked experienced combat leaders.
The land battles moved towards the River Rhine, to the east of which lay the German heartland. Most of France had been liberated, as had the Belgian cities Brussels and Antwerp. Although Operation Market Garden had failed in 1944, by 1945 the Allies had overrun most of the southern Netherlands and the Scheldt Estuary. As the ground forces moved across Europe, the Allied tactical air forces moved into new bases on the continent, to continue providing close support. The only limiting factor for the Allies was the weather. As winter came, rain and mud turned airfields into quagmires, so large-scale air and land operations came to a halt.
The situation might well have continued until the spring thaw had the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) not launched the Battle of the Bulge on 16 December 1944. This land offensive was intended to improve the German military position by capturing Antwerp and separating the British Army from United States Army forces. Part of the planning for the German land operation required the attack to be conducted under the cover of bad winter weather, which kept the main Allied asset, the Tactical Air Forces, on the ground. It initially succeeded, but the weather also grounded the Luftwaffe for the most part. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe did manage to put 500 aircraft into the air on 16 December, more than had been achieved for a long time. This first day had been the originally planned date for the strike against Allied airfields, named Operation Bodenplatte. However, the weather proved particularly bad and operations were shut down.
The offensive achieved surprise and much initial success. To counter the attack from the air, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) handed operational control of its XXIX Tactical Air Command and part of its Ninth Air Force, under the command of Major General Hoyt Vandenberg, to the RAF and Arthur Coningham. On 23 December, the RAF Second Tactical Air Force provided the American forces with much needed support, and helped prevent a German capture of Malmedy and Bastogne. This left the Germans with only the logistical bottleneck of St. Vith to support their operations. The German attack faltered.
The Luftwaffe had been far from absent over the front in December. It flew several thousand sorties over the theatre. Its encounters with the RAF and USAAF had meant heavy losses in matériel and pilots. On the eight days of operations between 17 and 27 December 1944, 644 fighters were lost and 227 damaged. This resulted in 322 pilots killed, 23 captured and 133 wounded. On the three days of operations 23–25 December, 363 fighters were destroyed. None of the Geschwaderkommodoren expected any large-scale air operations by the end of the month.
Plan
In September 1944, Adolf Hitler resolved to recover Germany's deteriorating fortunes by launching an offensive in the West. On 16 September, Hitler directed Generalleutnant Werner Kreipe—Chief of the Luftwaffe's General Staff—to prepare the necessary aircraft for the offensive. On 21 October, Kreipe ordered the air fleet defending the Greater German Reich (Luftflotte Reich) to hand over seven Jagdgeschwader and Schlachtgeschwader to Air Command West (Luftwaffenkommando West) for a future offensive.
On 14 November, Hermann Göring—Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe—ordered the 2. Jagddivision and the 3. Jagddivision to prepare their units for a large-scale ground attack operation in the Ardennes. Preparations were to be complete by 27 November. The attack was to be carried out on the first day of the offensive.
Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz was to plan the operation having been appointed C-in-C of II. Fliegerkorps on 8 December. Luftwaffenkommando West had ordered all units—except Jagdgeschwader 300 and 301—to attend the main planning meeting in Flammersfeld on 5 December. On 14 December, Peltz officially initiated plans for a major blow against the Allies in northwest Europe. Peltz was not a fighter pilot; his combat record was as a dive bomber pilot, flying the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. His experiences in Poland, in France, and during the early campaigns on the Eastern Front had moulded him into an outstanding ground attack specialist, making him an ideal candidate for planning Bodenplatte.
On 15 December, this plan was worked out with the help of the Luftwaffe's Jagd-Geschwaderkommodore, among them Gotthard Handrick (Jagdabschnittsführer Mittelrhein; Fighter Sector Leader Middle Rhine), Walter Grabmann and Karl Hentschel, commanders of 3. and 5. Jagddivision respectively. It was originally scheduled to support the Battle of the Bulge, the German Army's offensive, which began 16 December 1944. However, the same bad weather that prevented the RAF and USAAF from supporting their own ground forces also prevented the Luftwaffe from carrying out the operation. It was therefore not launched until 1 January 1945. By this time, the German Army had lost momentum owing to Allied resistance and clearing weather, which allowed Allied Air Forces to operate. The German Army attempted to restart the attack by launching Operation Northwind (Unternehmen Nordwind). The Luftwaffe was to support this offensive through Bodenplatte.
The plan of Bodenplatte called for a surprise attack against 17 Allied air bases in Belgium, the Netherlands and France. The object was to destroy or cripple as many Allied aircraft, hangars and airstrips as possible. Every fighter and fighter-bomber Geschwader (Wing) currently occupied with air defence along the Western Front was redeployed. Additional night-fighter units (Nachtjagdgeschwader) and medium bomber units (Kampfgeschwader) acted as pathfinders. The strike formations themselves were mostly single-engine Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters.
However, in a blunder, the planners had set flight paths that took many units over some of the most heavily defended areas on the continent, namely the V2 launch sites around The Hague. These sites were protected by large numbers of German anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) units. At the turn of 1944/45 Air Command West had 267 heavy and 277 medium or light AAA batteries, and in addition to this there were 100 Kriegsmarine AAA batteries along the Dutch coast. Most of these lay in the sector of the 16th AAA Division, with its control station at Doetinchem, northeast of Arnhem. Some of the AAA units had been warned about the air operation but were not kept up to date with developments about changing timetables and the flight plan of German formations. As a result, one quarter of the German fighter units lost aircraft to friendly fire before the attacks could be initiated.
After five years of war and heavy attrition many of the Luftwaffe's pilots were inexperienced and poorly trained, deficient in marksmanship and flight skills. There was a shortage of experienced instructors, and many of the training units were forced to fly front-line operations in order to bolster the front-line Jagdgeschwader. Aviation fuel supplies were also at a premium, limiting the duration of training. Long-range Allied fighters exacerbated this situation by shooting down many training aircraft. By late 1944 there were no safe areas in which pilots could be trained without the possibility of air attack. The result was a "vicious circle": poorly trained pilots were quickly lost in combat or accidents, and the need to replace them put more pressure on the training system. Allied personnel who witnessed the attacks remarked on the poor aim of the strafing aircraft, and many of the Luftwaffe aircraft shot down by Allied anti-aircraft fire were caught because they were flying too slowly and too high.
The plan called for strict radio silence and secrecy in order to maintain surprise. Maps were also only half complete, identified only enemy installations, and left out flight paths, lest the document fall into Allied hands enabling them to trace the whereabouts of German fighter bases. Most commanders were also refused permission to brief their pilots until moments before take-off. This created operational confusion. Commanders got across only the bare essentials of the plan. When the operation got under way, many German pilots still did not understand what the operation was about, or what exactly was required of them. They were convinced it was just a reconnaissance in force over the front, and were happy to follow their flight leaders on this basis.
Targets and order of battle
It is unclear whether all of the following were deliberately targeted. Evidence suggests that Grimbergen, Knocke and Ophoven were targeted in error, as was Heesch. In all, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) deployed 1,035 aircraft from several Jagdgeschwader (JG—fighter wings) Kampfgeschwader (KG—bomber wings), Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG—night fighter wings) and Schlachtgeschwader (SG—ground attack wings); of these, 38.5% were Bf 109s, 38.5% Fw 190As, and 23% Fw 190Ds.
Below is the German target list:
{|class="wikitable"
!Target !! Target Code (Allied) !! Allied Air Force !! Main aircraft type(s) targeted !! Luftwaffe<br />combat wing
|-
| Antwerpen—Deurne
| B.70
| RAF
| Hawker Typhoon/Supermarine Spitfire/North American Mustang
| JG 77 "Herz As" <br />Bf 109G-14 and K-4
|-
| Asch
| Y-29
| USAAF
| Republic P-47D Thunderbolt/P-51D Mustang
| JG 11 <br />Fw 190A-8
|-
| Brussels—Evere
| B.56
| USAAF / RAF
| Supermarine Spitfire Mk.V and Mk.IX LF
| JG 26 "Schlageter" <br />Fw 190D-9, Bf 109G-14, Bf 109K-4
|-
| Grimbergen
| B.60
| USAAF / RAF Regiment At least five Spitfires from No. 16 Squadron RAF were destroyed. No. 271 Squadron RAF lost at least seven Harrow transports "out of action". A further 15 other aircraft were destroyed. 139 Wing reported five B-25s destroyed and five damaged. Some 15 to 20 USAAF bombers were also destroyed. Another source states that 13 Wellingtons were destroyed, as were five Mosquitoes, four Auster and five Avro Ansons from the Tactical Air Forces 2nd Communications Squadron. Three Spitfires were also lost and two damaged. At least one RAF Transport Command Douglas Dakota was destroyed.
The pilots of JG 27 and JG 54 claimed 85 victories and 40 damaged. German reconnaissance was able to confirm 49. JG 27 suffered unacceptable losses; 17 Bf 109s, 11 pilots killed, one wounded and three captured. IV./JG 54 lost two killed and one captured. Three Fw 190s were lost and one damaged.
Gilze-Rijen and Eindhoven
{|class="wikitable" style = "float:right; margin-left:15px; text-align:center; width:220px; margin-right:0px"
| Units
| Stab. I., III., IV./JG 3 and KG 51
|-
| Aircraft
| 81
|-
| Aircraft lost
| 15–16
|-
| Damaged
| Unknown
|-
| Pilots killed or captured
| 15–16
|}
Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3) and Kampfgeschwader 51 (KG 51) were tasked with eliminating the Allied units at the Eindhoven base and Gilze-Rijen airfield. The field contained three RCAF reconnaissance squadrons operating a mix of Spitfires and Mustangs and eight Typhoon squadrons of the RAF and RCAF. Some 22 Bf 109s of I./JG 3 took off, along with four from Stab./JG 3, 15 from III./JG 3 and 19 Fw 190s from IV./JG 3. KG 51 contributed some 21 of their 30 Messerschmitt Me 262 jets to the action. Some histories mistakenly include Kampfgeschwader 76 (KG 76) on the order of battle, but KG 76 did not take part in the mission.
Each Staffel was expected to make at least three firing passes. I./JG 3 took off and joined the lead Gruppe, IV. (Sturm)/JG 3, with III./JG 3 following in the rear. The Bf 109s and Fw 190s of the Geschwader reached the area at about 09:20. Geschwaderkommodore Heinrich Bär led the attack. Some pilots made four passes, destroying AAA emplacements, fuel storage stations and vehicles. Nearly 300 aircraft were on the field, along with huge stores of equipment and fuel. The attack caused fires all over the airfield.
JG 3 claimed 53 single-engine and 11 twin-engine aircraft destroyed. Five fighters and one four-engine bomber were also claimed damaged. Four Typhoons, three Spitfires, one Tempest and another unidentified aircraft were claimed shot down. All in all, JG 3 destroyed 43 aircraft according to British records, and damaged a further 60, some seriously. The Geschwader believed it had destroyed 116. JG 3 did not come away unscathed. I./JG 3 lost nine of its aircraft and pilots, a 50% loss rate. Damage to the returning Gruppe aircraft meant the entire unit was unserviceable. RAF AAA were credited with shooting down five. JG 3 lost, altogether, 15 of the 60 fighters sent, a 25% loss rate. Some 15 pilots were missing; nine were killed and five captured, and another pilot was posting as missing in action and his fate remains unknown. Another source says 16 pilots; ten killed or missing and six captured.
The damage done to Eindhoven was significant and can be considered a victory for JG 3. It was also assisted by elements of JG 6 which had misidentified Eindhoven as one of their targets. The greatest losses were amongst the Recce squadrons of the Canadian 39 Wing, which suffered 24 aircraft destroyed or damaged. The visiting 124 Wing RAF lost 30 aircraft destroyed or damaged. No. 143 Wing RCAF lost 29 damaged or destroyed. It is likely that I./JG 3 was responsible for about 2/3 of the damage. Another source gives 47 aircraft destroyed and 43 damaged.
Possible V-2 missile launch attempts
At least one V-2 missile on a mobile Meillerwagen launch trailer was observed being elevated to launch position by a USAAF 4th Fighter Group pilot over the northern German attack route near the town of Lochem on 1 January 1945. Possibly on account of the launch crew sighting the American fighter, the rocket was quickly lowered from a near launch-ready 85° elevation to 30°.
Results of raid
The results of the raid are difficult to judge given the confusion over loss records. It is likely more aircraft were destroyed than listed. The Americans failed to keep a proper record of their losses and it appears the U.S. 8th Air Force losses were not included in loss totals. When these estimates and figures are added to the losses listed in the table below, it is likely that the correct figures are 232 destroyed (143 single-engine, 74 twin-engine and 15 four-engine) and 156 damaged (139 single-engine, 12 twin-engine and five four-engine). Researching individual squadron records confirms the destruction of even more USAAF aircraft. This suggests at least a further 16 B-17s, 14 B-24s, eight P-51s, and at least two P-47s were destroyed on top of that total. A total of 290 destroyed and 180 damaged seems a more realistic summation than the conservative figures given by the USAAF, RAF, and RCAF. Including the 15 Allied aircraft shot down and 10 damaged in aerial combat, 305 destroyed and 190 damaged is the sum total of the attack.
The results of the attacks are listed:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"
|--
!Target !! Target Code (Allied) !! Luftwaffe unit (wing) !! Allied forces !! Effect on Allied Squadrons<br />(according to official figures)
|-
| style="background:#FDFD96; text-align:centre;" | Antwerp—Deurne
| B-70
| JG 77
| No. 146 Wing RAF, No. 145 Wing RAF and USAAF Bomb Group also present
| One aircraft confirmed destroyed, around 15 damaged, including three possibly destroyed.
|-
| style="background:#FDFD96; text-align:centre;" | Asch
| Y-29
| JG 11
| USAAF 366th Fighter Group, 352nd Fighter Group.
| One abandoned B-17 destroyed, three damaged.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Brussels—Evere
| B-56
| JG 26
| No. 127 Wing RCAF, Second Tactical Air Force Communication Squadron, and visiting units No. 147 Squadron RAF and No. 271 Squadron RAF. USAAF 361st Fighter Group and 358th Fighter Group elements also present.
| 34 destroyed, 29 damaged.
|-
| style="background:#FFB347; text-align:centre;" | Brussels—Grimbergen
| B-60
| JG 26 and JG 54
| Only six aircraft were present
| All six aircraft destroyed.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Brussels—Melsbroek
| B-58
| JG 27, JG 54 and JG 4
| No. 34 Wing RAF, No. 139 Wing RAF, 2nd Tactical Air Force Communication Squadron RAF and No. 85 Group Communication Squadron RAF.
| 35 destroyed, 9 severely damaged.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Eindhoven
| B-78
| JG 3
| No. 124 Wing RAF, No. 143 Wing RCAF and No. 39 Wing RCAF.
| 124 and 143 Wings lost 26 Typhoons destroyed, plus around 30 damaged. 39 Wing lost a further 11 reconnaissance Spitfires destroyed, one of which was destroyed via a collision with a shot down Fw 190, and 5 Mustangs Mk.I destroyed.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:centre;" | Ghent/Sint-Denijs-Westrem
| B-61
| JG 1
| No. 131 (Polish) Wing RAF
| 16 destroyed, several damaged.
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Gilze—Rijen
| B-77
| JG 3 and KG 51
| No. 35 Recce Wing RAF
| One destroyed and one damaged.
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Heesch
| B-88
| JG 6
| No. 401 Squadron RCAF, No. 402 Squadron RCAF, No. 411 Squadron RCAF, No. 412 Squadron RCAF, No. 442 Squadron RCAF.
| No losses
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Le Culot
| A-89
| JG 4
| USAAF 36th Fighter Group, 373d Fighter Group, 363rd TRG
| No damage
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Maldegem
| B-65
| JG 1
| No. 485 Squadron RNZAF and No. 349 (Belgian) Squadron RAF
| 13 destroyed, two damaged beyond repair.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Metz—Frescaty
| A-90
| JG 53
| USAAF. IX Tactical Air Force; 354th Fighter Group, 362nd Fighter Group, 40th Fighter Group, 406th Fighter Group, 425th Fighter Group, 367th Fighter Group, 368th Fighter Group, 361st Fighter Group. XII Tactical Air Force's 64th Fighter Wing; 1 ere, Escadre of the French Air Force, 50th Fighter Group, 358th Fighter Group
| 22 destroyed, 11 damaged (all Republic P-47 Thunderbolts).
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Ophoven
| Y-32
| JG 4
| No. 130 Squadron RAF, No. 350 (Belgian) Squadron RAF
| One destroyed, about six damaged.
|-
| style="background:#FF6961; text-align:left;" | Sint—Truiden
| A-92
| JG 2, JG 4 and SG 4
| USAAF 48th Fighter Group and 404th Fighter Group
| 10 destroyed, 31 damaged.
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Volkel
| B-80
| JG 6
| No. 56 Squadron RAF, No. 486 Squadron RNZAF
| One aircraft destroyed.
|-
| style="background:#77DD77; text-align:centre;" | Woensdrecht
| B-79
| JG 77
| No. 132 Wing RAF
| No effect
|-
| style="background:#FDFD96; text-align:centre;" | Ursel
| B-67
| JG 1
| USAAF 486th Bomb Group and No. 61 Squadron RAF
| Three aircraft destroyed.
|}
Aftermath and casualties
The operation achieved tactical surprise, but it was undone by poor execution due to low pilot skill resulting from poor training. The operation failed to achieve its aim and that failure was very costly to German air power. Some of the units of the RAF, RCAF and USAAF on the receiving end of Bodenplatte had been badly hit, others not so badly, but most had sustained some losses. The Germans, however, launched Bodenplatte under a set of conditions, such as poor planning and low pilot skill, which clearly indicated any advantage gained would be outweighed by possible losses. Bodenplatte weakened the Jagdwaffe past any hope of rebuilding. General of the Luftwaffe Adolf Galland said, "We sacrificed our last substance."
The Luftwaffe lost 143 pilots killed and missing, while 70 were captured and 21 wounded including three Geschwaderkommodore, five Gruppenkommandeure, and 14 Staffelkapitäne—the largest single-day loss for the Luftwaffe. Many of the formation leaders lost were experienced veterans, which placed even more pressure on those who were left. Thus, Bodenplatte was a very short-term success but a long-term failure. Allied losses were soon made up, while lost Luftwaffe aircraft and especially pilots were irreplaceable. German historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that it left the Germans "weaker than ever and incapable of mounting any major attack again."
In the remaining 17 weeks of war the Jagdwaffe struggled to recover sufficiently from the 1 January operation to remain an effective force. In strategic terms, German historian Werner Girbig wrote, "Operation Bodenplatte amounted to a total defeat". The exhausted German units were no longer able to mount an effective defence of German airspace during Operation Plunder and Operation Varsity, the Allied crossing of the Rhine River, or the overall Western Allied invasion of Germany. Subsequent operations were insignificant as a whole, and could not challenge Allied air supremacy. The only service in the Luftwaffe capable of profitable sorties was the night fighter force. In the last six weeks of the war the Luftwaffe was to lose another 200 pilots killed. Girbig wrote, "it was not until the autumn of 1944 that the German fighter forces set foot down the sacrificial path; and it was the controversial Operation Bodenplatte that dealt this force a mortal blow and sealed its fate. What happened from then on was no more than a dying flicker."
Notes
References
Citations
Bibliography
Further reading
- Forsythe, Robert. JV 44; The Galland Circus. Burgess Hill, West Sussex, UK: Classic Publications, 1996.
- Forsythe, Robert & Laurier, Jagdverband 44: Squadron of Experten. Osprey. Oxford. 2008.
- Girbig, Werner. Start im Morgengrauen. Germany: Pietsch-Verlag Paul Pietsch Verlage GmbH + Co, 1997.
- Weal, John. Bf 109 Defence of the Reich Aces. Osprey, Oxford. 2006.
External links
- 439 Squadron Log 1 January 1945
- Operation Strength of JG 1 at the time of Unternehmen Bodenplatte
- To win the Winter Sky by Danny S. Parker