Operation Blue Star

Operation Blue Star was a military operation by the Indian Armed Forces conducted between 1 and 10 June 1984, with the stated objective of removing Damdami Taksal leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and militants from the buildings of the Golden Temple, the holiest site of Sikhism, in Amritsar. The Akali Dal political party and other Sikh factions had been based there during the course of the Dharam Yudh Morcha. The operation would mark the beginning of the Insurgency in Punjab, India.

A long-standing movement advocating for greater political rights for the Sikh community had previously existed in the Indian state of Punjab, and in 1973, Sikh activists presented the Indian government with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, a list of demands for greater autonomy for Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. In July 1982, Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of the Sikh political party Shiromani Akali Dal, invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in the Golden Temple. On 1 June 1984, after abortive negotiations with the Akalis, the prime minister of India Indira Gandhi ordered the army to launch Operation Blue Star, attacking the Golden Temple and scores of other Sikh temples and sites across Punjab.

Underestimating the firepower possessed by the Sikh militants, Indian forces unsuccessfully assaulted the Temple using light weaponry but quickly resorted to using heavy arms, including tanks, helicopters and artillery to dislodge the well-fortified Sikh militants. Combat devolved into protracted urban warfare, with the Indian forces committing significant forces to slowly gain ground. Eventually, the Sikh militants ran out of most of their ammunition on 6 June, and by 10 June fighting had largely ceased, with the Indian forces in control of the complex. Many civilians were subject to extrajudicial killings by the military during the operation.

The military action in the temple complex was criticized by Sikhs worldwide, who interpreted it as an assault on the Sikh religion and the entire Sikh community, as well as the root cause for the subsequent insurgency, which would gain further impetus during Operation Woodrose. Five months after the operation, on 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated in an act of revenge by two Sikh bodyguards.

Despite accomplishing its stated objectives, the operation has been described as "disastrous" for the Indian military and state. It greatly exacerbated tensions between the Indian government and the Sikh community, turning a series of police operations into widespread sectarian violence. The brutality of the operation and high civilian casualties spawned an insurgency in Punjab, which would be waged by Sikh militants for over a decade. The operation has been used as a case study highlighting the importance of respecting religious and cultural sensitivity prior to launching military operations.

The complex would later be raided twice more as part of Operation Black Thunder I and II, with both operations having little to no civilian casualties or damage to the Temple despite larger amounts of militants than Operation Blue Star. Meanwhile, a rapid increase in higher education opportunities without adequate rise in jobs resulted in an increase in unemployment among educated youth. The resulting unemployed young Sikhs were drawn to militant groups, which formed the backbone of increasing militancy.

In the 1950s, the Akali Dal party launched the Punjabi Suba movement, demanding a new state within India with a majority of Punjabi speaking people, out of undivided East Punjab under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh. This movement resulted in fraught relations with the union government, and the Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, was raided in 1955, and many of the movement's leaders were arrested. In 1966, after negotiations, the present Punjab state with a Sikh majority was formed. The Akali Dal came to power in the new Punjab state in March 1967, but early governments didn't last long due to internal conflicts and power struggles within the party. Later, the party strengthened and party governments completed their full term and eventually came to play a major role in the developments to come.

After being routed in the 1972 Punjab election, the Akali Dal put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 to demand more autonomy to Punjab. The resolution was rejected by the Indian government. Activist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale then joined the Akali Dal, and launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha movement in 1982, in a bid to urge the Indian government to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

Prelude

thumb|Golden Temple with Akal Takht on the right, photographed in 2006

Following the events of the 1978 Sikh-Nirankari clashes and the Dharam Yudh Morcha, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had risen to prominence in Sikh political circles with his policy of getting the Anandpur Resolution passed, failing which he wanted to declare a separate country of Khalistan as a homeland for Sikhs. The resolution declared its goals within the context of remaining within the federal union of India, and leaving the powers of foreign relations, defence, currency, and general communications subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian central government. Harchand Singh Longwal, the leader of the Akali Dal, stated "[let] us make it clear once and for all that the Sikhs have no designs to get away from India in any manner. What they simply want is that they should be allowed to live within India as Sikhs, free from all direct and indirect interference and tampering with their religious way of life. Undoubtedly, the Sikhs have the same nationality as other Indians." Nonetheless, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, viewed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as a secessionist document.

India was also aware of Pakistani influence and armament operations among the Sikh militants. According to anthropologist Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Kashmiri fighters were present in the Golden Temple complex in 1984; both the Punjab and Kashmir insurgencies shared links with the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence whose aegis provided arms and training.

Guru Nanak Niwas

Following the 1978 clashes, Bhindranwale's followers had begun keeping firearms and fortified the gurdwara that served as the headquarters of the Damdami Taksal religious center.

In July 1982, Harchand Singh Longowal invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in the Golden Temple complex. He called Bhindranwale "our stave to beat the government" for the Dharam Yudh Morcha. within the precincts of the Golden Temple complex. Bhindranwale had effectively made the complex his headquarters.

For some months the Akali, Babbar, and Bhindranwale factions lived on the eastern end of the complex, close to the serais next to the offices of the SGPC, whose president Gurbachan Singh Tohra was charged with maintaining peace and minimizing the friction between the factions.

A.S. Atwal

On 25 April 1983, Punjab Police Deputy Inspector General A. S. Atwal was shot on the steps of the Darbar Sahib complex at point-blank range, then turned over by the assassins to ensure death, even as security guards stood just about 100 feet away. The assassination was never solved. The government promptly blamed militant groups, though all militant factions, as well as the Akalis, Bhindranwale, and the AISSF, all immediately and vehemently denied all accusations and unequivocally condemned the incident.

Bhindranwale described it as being "the handiwork of the Government to malign Sikhs" and a pretext to raid the Golden Temple complex.

As the Morcha continued, Akali protesters continued to fill jails as Sikhs faced increased surveillance and clashes throughout North India, and continued Akali-Congress talks failed to yield results, media reportage against Bhindranwale intensified, fueling demands from Parliament members of both houses for action against him. Despite this, Bhindranwale accused the media and the government of maligning him, the Inspector General of Punjab, P.S. Bhindar, personally selected by Indira Gandhi, issued a statement that there were no criminals hiding in the complex, and Rajiv Gandhi referred to Bhindranwale as simply a spiritual leader, with no arrest warrant of legal case against him, in March 1984. Bhindranwale and his men lived publicly in the open complex, granting interviews and attending rooftop sermons.

Relations between Bhindranwale and Longowal began to weaken in April 1984, following the assassination of one of his gunmen, the responsibility of which the AISSF (which had been banned by the government in March in the course of the Morcha) laid firmly at the feet of Longowal, despite his denials. Longowal by now feared for his own safety. and headquarters, Niranjan Singh, the Granthi of Gurudwara Toot Sahib, Granthi Jarnail Singh of Valtoha and Granthi Surat Singh of Majauli.

The militants were able to claim safe haven in the complex due to the whole or partial support received by them from key Sikh religious leaders and institutions such as the SGPC, AISSF and Jathedar (head) of the Akal Takht. The support was either voluntary or forced by using violence or threat of violence.

Negotiations

In January 1984, India's secret service Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) prepared a covert plan codenamed Operation Sundown involving special forces to abduct Bhindranwale from the Golden Temple complex. A RAW unit was formed to rehearse Operation Sundown in the Sarsawa Air Force Base in Uttar Pradesh, but the operation never materialized due to Indira Gandhi's rejection.

The government sent a team led by Narasimha Rao to try to convince Bhindranwale to back out but he was adamant. The negotiations failed and the law and order situation in Punjab continued to deteriorate. On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that he had failed to get Bhindranwale to agree to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and that Bhindranwale was no longer under anyone's control.

Indira Gandhi then gave her permission to initiate Operation Blue Star on the recommendation of Army Chief Arun Shridhar Vaidya. She was apparently led to believe and had assumed that the operation would not involve any civilian casualties. The assumption was that when confronted Bhindranwale would surrender to the army.

Preparations

Fortification of Golden Temple

An arsenal had been created within the Akal Takht over a period of several months. It was reported that trucks engaged for kar seva (religious service) and bringing in supplies for the daily langar were smuggling in guns and ammunition. The police never attempted to check these vehicles entering the Golden Temple, on instructions from superiors. During a random check one such truck was stopped and many Sten guns and ammunition were found. The Indian government White Paper alleged that after Operation Blue Star it was found that the militants had set up a grenade manufacturing facility, and a workshop for the fabrication of Sten guns inside the Temple Complex. However, the allegations of the militants being in possession of weapon workshops was never made prior to Operation Blue Star, and only after, with only the Army making these statements. The statements of multiple civilian eyewitnesses instead were consistent that the militants were a small number of men and had limited arms that were used sparingly.

The Third Agency

A cover story in Surya magazine, published soon after the Army operation, quoted "highly placed and highly disillusioned sources in the Research and Analysis Wing," claiming that most of the arms inside the complex had been smuggled in under the supervision of the Third Agency, created out of the outfit and controlled directly by the director of the Prime Minister's secretariat, to justify an assault. One week before the operation, the Punjab Police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the Batala sub-division of Gurdaspur district. But the Third Agency officer in charge of Amritsar persuaded the director general of police (DGP) to release them and ensure their passage to the Darbar Sahib complex.

I.G. Bhinder, a personal friend of the Gandhi family, had informed the central government upon discovering that weapons being transferred into the complex, publicly confirming that the government had full knowledge of the weapons. According to former IPS and IAS officer Gurtej Singh, the weapons had been smuggled by Indira Gandhi's own Third Agency to be deposited into the complex; he himself had been approached by the government agency to be a possible smuggler in the summer of 1983. A brigadier posing as a Sikh, accompanied by a mutual acquaintance, had feigned concern that potentially facing an imminent army operation, Bhindranwale had no weapons, and had offered Gurtej Singh a truckload of weapons to take to the complex in a kar-sewa truck, which Gurtej Singh declined. Singh would later learn that the weapons were deposited by the acquaintance himself.

JS Aurora

When Lieutenant General J S Aurora had visited the Golden Temple with his wife in December 1983, while Bhindranwale was living in the Guru Nanak Niwas, and looked at various areas of the complex, he had noticed no defensive preparations anywhere. Visiting again on 24 February 1984, while Bhindranwale resided at the Akal Takht building, he only saw sandbags on the langar complex which "did not appear very formidable", which he was told was placed for protection after the CRPF had fired on the complex that month. He would visit again a month after the operation, attributing the professional defenses that had been built between March and June to Shabeg Singh who had served under him.

After Blue Star, Aurora would debunk reports of large amounts of sophisticated weapons stockpiled in the complex, commenting on the lack of sophisticated weapons, mentioning a number of light machine guns and two rocket launchers, but the lack of medium machine guns or mortars, with the only weapons bearing foreign markings being 60 self-loading rifles. He would ascribe most of the weaponry to either simply having been picked up from misplaced weapons drops during border wars, issued by the government to people living close to the border for security purposes, government gun-running, or from Punjab's long-established rural trade of unaccounted guns, used in family feuds, property disputes, dacoit bands and the like. Describing the weaponry seized after the operation, he stated, "Quite a lot, yes, but the impression that has been built up in the public mind of foreign governments deliberately arming the terrorists with a view to overthrowing the government is grossly overdone."

The Harmandir Sahib compound and some of the surrounding houses were fortified under the guidance of Major General Shabeg Singh, who had joined Bhindranwale's group after dismissal from the army. During their occupation of Akal Takht, Bhindranwale's group had begun fortifying the building. The Statesman reported that light machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound, and strategically placed to defend against an armed assault on the complex. Amidst claims of foreign involvement and the heavier weapons having Pakistani or Chinese markings on them, according to Aurora only 60 self-loading riles were foreign made. The rest were Indian. He also said that there were no medium machine guns and only two RPGs. Arora says that the arsenal was not truly sophisticated. A Lt. Colonel part of the Operation later revealed that militants only had 4 light machine gun magazines. According to him a single light machine gun carries 12 magazines. He revealed that the main gun that was kept and used by militants was AK-47s.

Presence of troops

According to Congress claims, holes were smashed through the marble walls of Akal takht to create gun positions. Walls were broken to allow entry points to the tiled courtyards. Secure machine gun nests were created. All of these positions were protected by sandbags and newly made brick walls. The windows and arches of Akal Takht were blocked with bricks and sandbags. Sandbags were placed on the turrets. Every strategically significant building of the temple complex, apart from the Harmandir Sahib in the center, had been fortified in a similar manner and allegedly defaced. The fortifications also included seventeen private houses in the residential area near the Temple. All the high rise buildings and towers near the temple complex were occupied. The militants manning these vantage points were in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh in Akal Takht.

During this period police and security forces stationed around the temple complex were allowed only within 200 yards. This was to avoid the 'desecration' of the temple by their presence. The security forces were prevented by the politicians from taking action in enforcing the law. Even self-defence from the militants was made difficult. On 14 February 1984, a police post near the entrance of the Temple was attacked by a group of militants. Six fully armed policemen were captured and taken inside. After twenty four hours the police responded and sent in a senior police officer for negotiation. He asked Bhindranwale to release his men, along with their weapons. Bhindranwale agreed and delivered the dead body of one of the hostages who had been killed. Later the remaining five policemen were released alive, but their weapons were kept.

The fortifications of the temple denied the army the possibility of commando operations. The buildings were close together and had labyrinthine passages all under the control of the militants. Militants in the temple premises had access to langars, food supplies, and water from the Sarovar (temple pond). Militants were well stocked with weapons and ammunition. Any siege under these circumstances would have been long and difficult. The option of laying down a long siege was ruled out by the army due to the "fear of uprisings in the countryside".

Intensification

Police methods normally used on common criminals were used on protesters during the Dharam Yudh Morcha, creating state repression affecting a very large segment of Punjab's population. This resulted in retaliatory violence from a section of the Sikh population and the widening the scope of the conflict, creating fresh motives for Sikh youth to turn to insurgency. The concept of Khalistan was still vague even while the complex was fortified under the influence of former Sikh army officials alienated by government actions who now advised Bhindranwale, Major General Shabeg Singh and retired Major General and Brigadier Mohinder Singh, and at that point the concept was still not directly connected with the movement he headed. In other parts of Punjab, a "state of chaos and repressive police methods" combined to create "a mood of overwhelming anger and resentment in the Sikh masses against the authorities," making Bhindranwale even more popular, and demands of independence gain currency, even amongst moderates and Sikh intellectuals.

On 12 May 1984, Ramesh Chander, son of Lala Jagat Narain and editor of media house Hind Samachar group, was murdered by pro-Bhindranwale militants. In addition, seven editors and seven news hawkers and newsagents were killed in a planned attack on the freedom of media house, to cripple it financially. Punjab Police had to provide protection for the entire distribution staff.

Violent incidents including arson, bombings, and shootings increased over the following months. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent incidents and riots, and 1,180 people were injured.

On 30 May 1984, soon after Longowal had announced the Grain Roko Morcha to stop tax revenue and grain from leaving Punjab in protest, set for 3 June, Indira Gandhi had Zail Singh authorize military rule in Punjab. While he had reportedly remained unaware of the planned attack on the Darbar Sahib, some Akali leaders had known of the plan through secret communications with New Delhi. Tohra would inform G.S. Grewal, "I've come from meeting the Governor, I've told him it's not within our capacity to control Jarnail Singh now, if you want to do it, do it," though he and the other Akalis likely did not comprehend the nature and scale of the attack, as they barricaded themselves to save their lives in the complex for days during the operation.

Government claims

According to government figures released after the operation in the White Paper, the combined figure of Sant Nirankaris and Hindu deaths before the operation was 165. According to police records, over "fifty persons lost their lives or received serious injuries" in the period before the army action in Amritsar, including police informers and Hindus including Arya Samaj news editor Lala Jagat Narain, his son and successor Ramesh Chander, and BJP MLA Harbans Lal Khanna, There were claims of "killer squads", which had originated when the media had sensationalized Bhindranwale's calls for youth self-defense against the police during the Dharam Yudh Morcha.

Almost all the murders remained unsolved, and the incidents were regularly denounced by "all segments of the Sikh religio-political spectrum." The government never provided evidence of the supposedly planned massacre of Hindus, which had been "the government's explanation for starting the operation," alleged by a single MP, that triggered Operation Blue Star, although the pace of attacks was increasing. Congress member of parliament Amarjit Kaur, who referred to the Akali Dal as "the enemy within" and who had opposed the creation of the Punjabi Suba, alleged that Bhindranwale wanted to start a civil war between the Hindus and Sikhs.

Militants had already started the movement to drive Hindus out of certain areas to make way for Sikhs coming in from other states. Due to the increased incidents of religious violence, exchange of population had already started in Punjab. New Khalistani currency was being printed and distributed.

Army preparations

According to the then-Vice Chief of the Army Staff, S. K. Sinha the army had begun preparations for an attack on the Golden Temple 18 months prior. Two months prior to the Operation the Air Force had helicopters flying above the temple taking photographs. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had surrounded the temple two months prior to the Operation. The facetious nature of the naming of the operation was revealed to Kirpal Dhillon, who would be appointed director general of police three weeks after the operation, by a semiretired major general who had held a key position in the army headquarters at the time, who had been discussing rumors of an army action (which had become common by early 1984) and its name with a junior deputy while passing by an advertisement for Blue Star air conditioners.

Operation

thumb|350px|right|Map of the Harmandir Sahib Complex

Operation Blue Star was launched to remove Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers who had sought cover in the Amritsar Harmandir Sahib Complex.

On 3 June, a 36-hour curfew was imposed on the state of Punjab with all methods of communication and public travel suspended.

Generals

The armed Sikhs within the Harmandir Sahib were led by Bhindranwale, former Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh, and Amrik Singh, the President of the All India Sikh Students Federation from Damdami Taksal.

General Arun Shridhar Vaidya was the Chief of the Indian Army. Lt. Gen. Krishaswamy Sundarji, GOC Western Command, planned and coordinated Operation Blue Star. From the Indian Army Maj. Gen. Kuldip Singh Brar had command of the operation. On 31 May he had been summoned from Meerut and asked to lead the operation to remove the militants from the temple. Brar was a Jat Sikh, the same caste as Bhindranwale, and was also acquainted with Shabeg Singh, having been his student at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun.

The army operation was further subdivided along two subcategories:

1 June

On 1 June 1984 the Indian security forces began the operation by firing into various buildings with the goal of assessing the training of the militants. Eyewitness testimony of pilgrims inside the temple complex state that the Harmandir Sahib was fired on initially by security forces on 1 June and not 5 June as reported by the army. The firing began at about 12:40 p.m. and went until about 8:40 p.m. It was by the C.R.P.F and they used M.M.G., L.M.G. and rifles. It resulted in the main shrine of the Harmandir Sahib sustaining 34 bullet marks. Mark Tully noted, "The C.R.P.F. firing took place four days before the army actually entered the Temple". There were no warnings to civilians nor plans to evacuate them to limit casualties; rather, shoot-on-sight commands had been given to the army, whose quarantine would stop all rail, road, and foot traffic in Punjab by the next day.

3 June

According to an All Sikhs Student Federation member, 10,000 people had come from outside, including many women, with 4,000 of them young people. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee estimates that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 pilgrims had come from Punjab's cities and villages to attend the Gurpurab.

However, no one opted out and that included many "Sikh officers, junior commissioned officers and other ranks". The army helicopters spotted the massive movements, and General Krishnaswamy Sundarji sent tanks and APCs to meet them.

Duggal states that the army attack started at 4:00 am with a 25-pounder that fell in the ramparts of the Deori to the left of the Akal Takht Sahib. Duggal further states that during the assault he saw a number of dead bodies of children and women in the Parikrama. The army's assault had prevented Duggal from leaving the room in which he had taken shelter as he believed it would have resulted in his death. Another eyewitness, Bhan Singh the Secretary of the SGPC, states that the army provided no warning of the start of the attack which prevented pilgrims and those who came as a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha from exiting. A female survivor recalled that it was not until the army began using explosives on the temple that they were aware that it had commenced its assault. She further stated that within the Harmandir Sahib, there were some granthis (priests), ragis (singers), sevadars (service volunteers) and yatris (pilgrims) but no armed militants. Prithpal Singh, the sevadar on duty at the Akal rest house which housed pilgrims, stated that it was shelled by the military. As of May 1985 during the recording of Prithpal's account, the Akal Rest house still bore the bullet marks caused by the Indian Army.

Lack of civilian forewarning

On 4 June no warning was provided to the pilgrims to evacuate and the pilgrims were deterred of leaving as the Indian army would arrest anyone who left the temple complex. Although officially the army stated that it made announcements, the eyewitness testimony of pilgrims who were arrested after the assault was used as the basis of a decision in the Amritsar district court in April 2017 which held that the army made no such announcements. Judge Gurbir Singh wrote in his ruling, "There is no evidence that army made any announcements asking ordinary civilians to leave Golden Temple complex before launching the operation in 1984...There is no written record of any public announcement by the civil authorities requesting the people to come out of the complex. No log of vehicle used for making such announcements is there...The event underlines the human rights violations by troops during the operation. The lack of evidence of any warning to vacate the temple complex was the basis of a compensatory award of ₹400,000 rupees (approximately $6,150 in 2017 currency) given to 40 Sikhs in 2017, 33 years later, who had been illegally detained by the Indian military in Jodhpur, Rajasthan for four to five years, even after their discharge had been ordered by courts. The 9th division launched a frontal attack on the Akal Takht, although it was unable to secure the building. The Golden Temple complex had honeycombed tunnel structures.

7:00 pm

The BSF and CRPF attacked Hotel Temple View and Brahm Boota Akhara, respectively, on the southwest fringes of the complex. By 10:00 pm both the structures were under their control.]]

The heavy artillery, reinforcements, and chemical weapons had not yet finished off the approximately 200 militants by 6 June; small groups of fighters, armed with mostly World War II-era guns, would continue to emerge from under the Akal Takht and engage with the army until death. Tanks would be driven onto the complex for the final assault.

According to Maj. Gen. J. S. Jamwal, who commanded the 15th Infantry Division, as the assault got bogged down in the early hours, Brar began to panic, revealed in his voice when on the radio to the 10th Guards, "what should I do...get something done." He had apparently having "forgotten" of his reserves, two companies of the 9 Garhwal Rifles. When reminded of them, he then ordered them in, only then managing to reach an advantageous position.

Afterwards, the Indian military detained surviving pilgrims on the grounds that they were affiliated with the militants and subjected them to interrogations, beatings and executions.

7–10 June

The battle ended at around 1 a.m. on 7 June. Few surviving snipers who had managed to hold off the army for 3 days were killed.

The army entered the Akal Takht. Dead bodies of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, Shabeg Singh and Amrik Singh were discovered in the building, and taken by the army. Photographs smuggled out that year would include one of Shabeg Singh's body showing signs of likely post-capture torture, with a gouged eye and battered body.

According to Giani Puran Singh a Granthi of the Golden Temple on June 7 at Ramgharia Bunga 4 Sikh held out at a trench they had dug. Giani Puran Singh was told by soldier to negotiate with them, but they pledged to die there. They killed multiple soldiers. The army failed to fight the Sikh so they attempted bombing them, but the Sikh still held out. They were eventually drawn out with chemical gas and were killed on June 10.

President Zail Singh visited the temple premises after the operation, while making the round, he was shot at by a sniper from one of the buildings that the army had not yet cleared. The bullet hit the arm of an army colonel who led a Commando battalion. He was accompanying the president. On June 8, he was shot by the Sikh held out in Ramgharia Bunga.

The Sikh held out were Major Singh Nagoke, Dalbir Singh, Swaran Singh Rode, Ram Singh Sultanpuri, and Nand Singh Patti.

Sikh Reference Library

Around noon on 7 June, the army burned down the Sikh Reference Library. The library contained numerous artifacts and hundreds of original manuscripts, including letters signed by the Sikh gurus. It had been intact on the night of 6 June, when Devinder Singh Duggal, its director, had left; he would be arrested a week later for refusing to sign a receipt relinquishing the building to the army. According to library staff, at least 13,000 books had vanished before the library was later set alight; the SGPC had corresponded with the central government for their return, as they were believed to be in possession of the Army, who was believed to have stuffed the books in more than 150 gunny bags and kept in Meerut. Much the remaining artifacts and racks bore bullet holes, and many paintings were incinerated or damaged beyond repair.

Jamwal had ordered an anti-tank shell fired into the Akal Takht, which would instead be "misdirected" and hit the Sikh Reference Library, causing the fire. The shell would be one of 20 shells fired at the Akal Takht, some of which would miss and land behind the complex, hitting the army's own positions. Cases of spontaneous mutinies by Sikh soldiers, mostly raw recruits, were reported from different places. From eight army cantonments far from Punjab, approximately 4,000 young men, generally without a plan had set upon main roads to apparently reach Amritsar, and were intercepted and mostly arrested, with some casualties. Most had not used the weapons that they had been well-trained with, though the mutinies would still create some panic in Delhi.

On 7 June, six hundred soldiers of the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, almost the entire other ranks' strength, mutinied in Sri Ganganagar. The largest mutiny took place in Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh in Bihar where recruits for the Sikh Regiment are trained. There, 1,461 soldiers—1,050 of them raw recruits, stormed the armoury, killing one officer and injuring two before they set out for Amritsar. The leaders of the mutiny divided the troops into two groups just outside of Banaras to avoid a rumoured roadblock. One half was engaged by army artillery at Shakteshgarh railway station; those who managed to escape were rounded up by 21st Mechanised Infantry Regiment. The other half engaged with the artillery and troops of 20th Infantry Brigade, during which 35 soldiers (both sides) were killed.

The captured mutineers were court-martialed, despite efforts by various groups including retired Sikh officers to get them reinstated. and 83 killed (4 officers, 79 soldiers) and 236 wounded among government forces. Kuldip Nayar cites Rajiv Gandhi as allegedly admitting that nearly 700 soldiers were killed. This number was allegedly disclosed by Gandhi in September 1984 as he was addressing the National Student Union of India session in Nagpur. Per Ved Marwah the army suffered 35% casualties.

Despite government efforts to control the narrative, offering supervised tours to journalists after a hasty cleanup, Brahma Chellaney, the Associated Press's South Asia correspondent, was the only foreign reporter who managed to stay on in Amritsar despite the media blackout. His dispatches, filed by telex, provided the first non-governmental news reports on the bloody operation in Amritsar. His first dispatch, front-paged by The New York Times, The Times of London and The Guardian, reported a death toll of at least 1200 from the complex alone, about twice of what authorities had admitted. According to the dispatch, about 780 militants and civilians and 400 troops had perished in fierce gun-battles. Chellaney reported that about "eight to ten" men suspected Sikh militants had been shot with their hands tied, In reaction to the dispatch, the Indian government charged Chellaney with violating Punjab press censorship, two counts of fanning sectarian hatred and trouble, and later with sedition, The government issued a warrant for his arrest, which the New York Times protesting vociferously, stating that Chellaney had been "doing his job too well". The Supreme Court of India ordered Chellaney to cooperate with Amritsar police, who interrogated him concerning his report and sources. Chellaney declined to reveal his source, citing journalistic ethics and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. In September 1985 charges against Chellaney were dropped. The Associated Press stood by the accuracy of the reports and figures, which were "supported by Indian and other press accounts".

According to a close associate of Bhindranwale only 35 militants were killed, with the rest leaving in the early days of the Operation. They left because of a plan devised in which they would launch a revolution against the state to form Khalistan so the movement may live on. The belief of the militants was that it is better for some to live to fight another day. According to the associate all who left would go on to die in the Punjab Insurgency.

Independent estimates

Independent casualty figures were much higher. The Indian government that the high civilian casualties was due to militants in the Golden Temple using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields, The Indian military had created a situation where civilians were allowed to collect inside of the temple complex. On 3 June the Indian military allowed pilgrims to enter the temple complex. The Indian military also allowed thousands of protestors whom were a part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha to enter the temple complex. These protestors included women and children. There was no warning provided to the pilgrims who entered on 3 June that a curfew was put in place by the military. These pilgrims were prevented from leaving after the curfew had been placed by the army at approximately 10:00 pm.

Sikhs residing in homes around the complex had also been victimized, as homes were looted and confiscated, with several residents bound by their own turbans and killed. Pilgrims and visitors to dozens of other gurdwaras across Punjab had also been trapped and killed as the operations radiated out from Amritsar. According to Inderjit Singh Jaijee, about 300 Hindu visitors to the complex from outside the state were also killed in the complex in volley fire.

Disposal of bodies

While fast, onsite mass cremations were impractical due to the number of dead, thick black clouds were witnessed near the Guru Nanak Niwas on 7 June. Bodies of the dead and dying were taken away often in municipal garbage vans, and mass-cremated surreptitiously. The government bribed and threatened local Dalit sweepers into handling the corpses, promising them possession of anything of value found on them.

Aftermath

Release of the White Paper

Gandhi summoned small groups of high-profile Sikh intellectuals to assess reactions to June 1984. In efforts to manage potential personal and political fallout, the government released its official White Paper on 10 July 1984. Called "Operation Whitewash" by the press, an in some circles " White Paper on black deeds," it fully pushed the government's version of events, with a "welter of platitudes and unsubstantiated innuendo":

Reconstruction controversy

The Akal Takht, the holiest of the five Sikh takhts, was razed to the ground during the operation, and many holy relics destroyed. An old rallying point and symbol of resistance by armed force, and where the sixth Sikh guru had first raised an army to fight the Mughals, it had last been razed in 1764 by Ahmad Shah Abdali. The sanctum sanctorum of the Golden Temple had also received numerous bullet marks.

The government's unilateral appointment of the Buddha Dal nihang faction, which was not on good terms with the mainstream Sikh priesthood, to oversee the repair of the Akal Takht, instead of leaving it to the SGPC, further aroused ire and resentment of the Sikh masses. Its leader, Buta Singh, was seen as complicit by accepting tainted external funding and patronage by the central government for the repair, rather than relying on community self-funding and kar seva favored by Sikh tradition. He had discouraged participation at a conference of the Golden Temple's granthis, who had strongly opposed him and would instead hold it at another historic gurdwara in Amritsar, as they were barred by the government from doing so at the Golden Temple. The government would attempt to downplay the success of this World Sikh Conference, while asking the media to inflate the attendance of Buta Singh's own 11 August 1984 convention, which would censure the SGPC and the Akalis. The reconstructed Akal Takht was torn down and rebuilt by the community and its donations, under the supervision of the Damdami Taksal and Thakar Singh Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh's successor. Some Sikhs wanted to leave the Akal Takht in ruins, as a testament to the government's actions.

Operation Woodrose

In the wake of Operation Blue Star, Punjab had become the target of another operation, Operation Woodrose, this time targeting the countryside, which was swarmed with soldiers ordered to approach identifiable Sikhs as enemies and conduct cordon operations, mass arrests, torture, sexual harassment and assaults, and disappearances, traumatizing and antagonizing tens of thousands.

Assassinations

The operation also led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984 by two of her Sikh bodyguards as an act of vengeance, triggering the 1984 Sikh massacre. The widespread killing of Sikhs, principally in the national capital Delhi but also in other major cities in North India, led to major divisions between the Sikh community and the Indian Government. The army withdrew from Harmandir Sahib later in 1984 under pressure from Sikh demands. The 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 is thought to have been a revenge action.

General Arun Shridhar Vaidya, the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation Blue Star, was assassinated in 1986 in Pune by two Sikhs, Harjinder Singh Jinda and Sukhdev Singh Sukha. Both were sentenced to death, and hanged on 7 October 1992.

In March 1986, Sikh militants again occupied and continued to use the temple compound which necessitated another police action known as Operation Black Thunder on 1 May 1986, Indian paramilitary police entered the temple and arrested 200 militants that had occupied Harmandir Sahib for more than three months. On 2 May 1986 the paramilitary police undertook a 12-hour operation to take control of Harmandir Sahib at Amritsar from several hundred militants, but almost all the major radical leaders managed to escape. In June 1990, the Indian government ordered the area surrounding the temple to be vacated by local residents in order to prevent militants activity around the temple.

Long term effects

thumb|Aerial view of the Galliara park around the complex

The long-term results of the operation included:

Intended to end the insurgency, the operation had the opposite effect, with attacks escalating. The operation would "prove a disaster" on multiple fronts, and the execution and Blue Star and the subsequent Operation Woodrose would generate a chain of events that would fundamentally change the nature of the relationship between the Sikh community and the Indian government by undermining their faith in government institutions and their ability to assure justice and dignity within the polity.
Outraging Sikhs all over India, with most finding it unacceptable that the armed forces had desecrated the Golden Temple, thousands of young men joined the Khalistan movement, and feelings of betrayal and alienation; this community consternation that would majorly intensify the militancy. Bhindranwale's views regarding the government acquired significant credibility in the community afterwards, and as the operation's only ostensible achievement was the deaths of Bhindranwale and a few associated figures, his absence, the detainment of the Akalis, and troop conduct would channel Sikh anger and leave the field "wide open" for entry into militancy, as well as the formation of panthic committees to steer it.
The operation inflamed tensions in Punjab, though independence would only be declared by a Sarbat Khalsa in 1986, as 500,000 deployed Indian troops operated violently in Punjab, causing thousands of Sikh deaths between 1984 and 1992.

Following the operation the central government demolished hundreds of houses and created a corridor around the compound called "Galliara" (also spelled Galiara or Galyara) for security reasons, intended to remove the narrow lanes and bazaars that had been a major hindrance for the army during the operation. This was made into a public park and opened in June 1988. Describing the operation as "hardly worth the game", as the bulk of militants escaped through the many lanes and by-lanes around the complex, remaining unsecured due to poor reconnaissance.

Criticisms

The operation has been criticized on several grounds including: its motivations, the government's choice of timing for the attack, the heavy casualties, the loss of property, and human rights violations.

According to G. K. C. Reddy,

According to Joyce Pettigrew,

Timing

According to human rights lawyer Ram Narayan Kumar,