North African campaign

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The North African campaign of World War II took place in North Africa from 11 June 1940 to 13 May 1943, fought between the Allies and the Axis powers. It included campaigns in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts (Western Desert campaign, Desert War), in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch), and in Tunisia (Tunisia campaign). The Allied war effort was dominated by the British Commonwealth and exiles from German-occupied Europe. The United States entered the war in December 1941 and began direct military assistance in North Africa on 11 May 1942.

Fighting in North Africa started with the British raids on Italian Libya on 11 June 1940 after Italy's entry into the Second World War on the German side. On 14 June, the British 11th Hussars and part of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment, (1st RTR) crossed the border from Egypt into Libya and captured Fort Capuzzo. This was followed by an Italian counter-offensive into Egypt and the capture of Sidi Barrani in September. The British recaptured Sidi Barrani in December during Operation Compass. The Italian 10th Army was destroyed and the German Afrika Korps was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941 in Operation Sonnenblume to reinforce the Italians and prevent an Axis defeat.

Battles for control of Libya and Egypt followed, with advances and retreats until the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942 when the Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery) defeated the German–Italian and forced its remnants into Tunisia. After Operation Torch, the Anglo-American landings in North-West Africa in November 1942 and fighting against Vichy France forces (which then changed sides), the Allies trapped about 250,000 German and Italian personnel in northern Tunisia, forcing their surrender in May 1943.

Information gleaned via British Ultra code-breaking was important in the Allied victory in North Africa. The Italian campaign followed, culminating in the downfall of the Fascist government in Italy and the elimination of Germany's main European ally. German and Italian forces committed atrocities against prisoners of war and Maghrebi Jews, Berbers and Arabs.

Western Desert campaign

On 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht started the Battle of France (or Westfeldzug). Six weeks later, France surrendered. The Armistice at Compiègne took place on 22 June 1940 leaving the Vichy government in control of French territory not occupied by Germany. This included all of French North Africa. On 10 June, Italy aligned itself with Nazi Germany and declared war upon France and the United Kingdom. Italian leader Benito Mussolini explicitly outlined in his declaration of war that this did not involve the war against Kingdom of Egypt, saying "Italy does not intend to drag into the conflict other peoples bordering her on land or on sea". British forces (along with Indian and Rhodesian troops) based in Egypt were initially ordered to take defensive measures, but to avoid provocation as much as possible. However, on 11 June the British started launching a series of raids against Italian positions in Libya. Following the defeat of France on 25 June, Italian forces in Tripolitania – facing French troops based in Tunisia – redeployed to Cyrenaica to reinforce the Italian Tenth Army. This, coupled with the steadily degrading equipment of the British forces, led General Archibald Wavell to order an end to the raids and place the defence of the Egyptian border with a small screening force.

By 8 August, Mussolini ordered the Tenth Army to invade Egypt. Two days later, no invasion having been launched, Mussolini ordered Marshal Graziani that, the moment German forces launched Operation Sea Lion to invade Great Britain, he was to attack. After German defeat in the Battle of Britain, the invasion never took place. On 8 September, the Italians – despite being hampered by a lack of transport, low levels of training among officers, and the state of its supporting equipment – were ordered to invade Egypt the following day. The plan was to advance along the coastal road while limited armoured forces operated on the desert flank. To counter the Italian advance, Wavell ordered his screening forces to harass the Italians and then fall back towards Mersa Matruh, where the main British infantry force was based. Positioned on the desert flank was the 7th Armoured Division, which would strike at the flank of the Italian force.

thumb|Italian troops charging in the desert.

By 16 September, the Italian force had advanced to Maktila, around west of Mersa Matruh, where they halted due to supply problems. Despite Mussolini urging them to carry on, Graziani ordered his men to dig in around Sidi Barrani, and fortified camps were established in forward locations; additional troops were also positioned behind the main force. In response to the dispersed Italian camps, the British planned a limited five-day attack, Operation Compass, to strike at these fortified camps one by one. The British Commonwealth force, totalling 36,000 men, attacked the forward elements of the 10-division-strong Italian army on 9 December. Following their initial success, the forces of Operation Compass pursued the retreating Italian forces. In January, the small port at Bardia was taken, soon followed by the seizure of the fortified port of Tobruk.

Some 40,000 Italians were captured in and around the two ports, with the remainder of the Tenth Army retreating along the coast road back to El Agheila. Richard O'Connor sent the 7th Armoured Division across the desert with a small reconnaissance group. It reached Beda Fomm some ninety minutes before the Italians, cutting off their retreat. Although they tried desperately to overcome the British force at the Battle of Beda Fomm, the Italians were unable to break through, and the remnants of the retreating army surrendered. Over ten weeks Allied forces had destroyed the Italian Tenth Army and reached El Agheila, taking 130,000 prisoners of war in the process.

Mussolini requested help from his German allies, while the Italian Comando Supremo ("high command") speedily sent several large motorized and armoured forces to protect their colonies in North Africa. This greatly expanded reinforcement included the soon-to-be-renowned Ariete Armoured division under General Ettore Baldassarre. Meanwhile, the Germans hastily assembled a motorized force, whose lead elements arrived in Tripoli in February. This relatively small expeditionary force, termed the Afrika Korps by Adolf Hitler, was placed under the command of Erwin Rommel. His orders were to reinforce the Italians and block Allied attempts to drive them out of the region. However, the initial commitment of only one panzer division and subsequently, no more than two panzer and one motorized divisions, indicated the limited extent of German involvement and commitment to this theatre of operations. The bulk of the reinforcements were Italian and therefore it was up to the Italians to do the bulk of the fighting. The forward Allied force – now named XIII Corps – adopted a defensive posture and over the coming months was built up, before most of its veteran forces were redeployed to Greece to counter the German invasion there. In addition, the 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn to the Nile delta. The veteran forces were replaced by inexperienced newcomers, ill-equipped to face German armour.

thumb|German Panzer III during [[Operation Sonnenblume, April 1941.]]

Although Rommel had been ordered to simply hold the line, an armoured reconnaissance soon became a full-fledged offensive from El Agheila in March.]]

By mid-November, the Allies were able to advance into Tunisia, but only in single division strength. By early December, the Eastern Task Force – which had been redesignated as the British First Army under Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson – was composed of the British 78th Infantry Division, British 6th Armoured Division, 1st Parachute Brigade, No. 6 Commando and elements of US 1st Armored Division. But by this time, one German and five Italian divisions had been shipped from Europe and the remoteness of Allied airfields from the front line gave the Axis clear air superiority over the battlefield. The Allies were halted and pushed back having advanced eastwards to within of Tunis.

In early December, the Allies were met with the reality that they would not be successful in capturing the key cities of Tunis and Bizerta. The air campaigns by the Axis forces proved to be a difficult challenge for the British forces. However, the Allies were left with the advantage of having secured the island of Malta, enabling the Allies to carry out future aerial operations. Additionally, on land, allied British and American forces were able to hold onto their possessions. On 4 December 1942 the Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa reported that military operations were ongoing in the Tebourba area. The Axis powers attempted a second counter-attack in the neighborhood of Tebourba, following their failed attempt on 1 December. The attack was successfully repulsed by the Allied powers, and the enemy sustained significant damage to their weaponry. During the winter, there followed a period of stalemate during which time both sides continued to build up their forces. By the new year, the British First Army had one British, one US and one French Corps (a second British Corps headquarters was activated in April). In the second half of February, in eastern Tunisia, the Axis had some successes against the mainly inexperienced French and US troops, most notably in routing the US II Corps commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall at the Battle of Kasserine Pass.

By the beginning of March, the British Eighth Army – advancing westward along the North African coast – had reached the Tunisian border. Rommel and von Arnim found themselves in an Allied "two army" pincer. They were outflanked, outmanned and outgunned. Rommel went back to Germany for health reasons and was substituted by the Italian general Messe.

The British Eighth Army bypassed the Axis defence on the Mareth Line in late March after harsh fighting and First Army in central Tunisia launched their main offensive in mid-April to squeeze the Axis forces until their resistance in Africa collapsed. The Axis forces surrendered on 13 May 1943 yielding over 275,000 prisoners of war. The last Axis force to surrender in North Africa was the 1st Italian Army of General Messe. This huge loss of experienced troops greatly reduced the military capacity of the Axis powers, although some Axis troops escaped Tunisia. This defeat in Africa led to all Italian colonies in Africa being captured.

Intelligence

Axis

thumb|A German Signals reception unit in the desert

The Axis had considerable success in intelligence gathering through radio communication intercepts and monitoring unit radio traffic. The most important success came through intercepting the reports of Fellers, the US military attaché in Egypt. He had been tasked by Marshall with providing detailed reports on the military situation in Africa. Fellers talked with British military and civilian headquarters personnel, read documents and visited the battlefront. Known to the Germans as "die gute Quelle" (the good source) or more jokingly as 'the little fellow', he transmitted his reports back to Washington using the "Black Code" of the US State Department. However, in September 1941, the Italians had stolen a code book containing the Black Code, photographed it and returned it to the US embassy in Rome. The Italians shared parts of their intercepts with their German allies. In addition the "Chiffrierabteilung" (German military cipher branch) were soon able to break the code. Fellers' reports were very detailed and played a significant role in informing the Germans of allied strength and intentions between January and June 1942

In addition, the Italian Servizio Informazioni Segrete or SIS code-breakers were able to successfully intercept much radio encrypted signals intelligence (SIGINT) from British aircraft traffic as well as first-class ciphers from British vessels and land bases, providing Supermarina (Regia Marina) with timely warnings of Allied intentions in the Mediterranean. Indeed, so successful was the Italian SIS in handling the bulk of Axis naval intelligence in the Mediterranean, that "Britain's offensive use of SIGINT was largely negated by Italy's defensive SIGINT."

The Afrika Korps had the intelligence services of the 621st Signals Battalion mobile monitoring element which arrived in North Africa in late April 1941, commanded by Hauptmann Alfred Seeböhm. The 621st Signals Battalion monitored radio communications among British units. Unfortunately for the Allies, the British not only failed to change their codes with any frequency, they were also prone to poor radio discipline in combat. Their officers made frequent open, uncoded transmissions to their commands, allowing the Germans to more easily identify British units and deployments. However, this claim is strongly disputed by the authors Vincent P. O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi (2013) who claim that historians like F.H. Hinsley have greatly exaggerated the effects of Ultra. For example, they claim that intelligence provided by Ultra had little impact in stopping Italian convoys reaching North Africa. Of the 2.67 million tons of materiel, fuel, and munitions shipped to Africa – nearly all in Italian vessels and under Italian escort – 2.24 million tons managed to arrive despite the best efforts of Ultra and the British Navy to prevent it. In effect, "Ultra did not deny the Axis armies the supplies they needed to reach the Nile."

Heavy losses of German paratroopers during the Battle of Crete, made possible by Ultra warnings of the drop times and locations, meant that Hitler hesitated in attacking Malta, which aided the British in gaining control of the Mediterranean, as did the losses of the Italian Navy at the Battle of Cape Matapan. To conceal the fact that German coded messages were being read, a fact critical to the overall Allied war effort, British command required a flyover mission be carried out before a convoy could be attacked in order to give the appearance that a reconnaissance flight had discovered the target.

Atrocities

The North African campaign was often labeled a "war without hate", a pure military clash in the desert without the partisan murders and ethnic cleansing that was occurring across Europe. This view has been challenged by recent historians, given that there were indeed many civilians who lived in the region and the campaign was marked by numerous atrocities and abuses by both Italian and German forces towards Allied prisoners of war and local Jewish, Berber, and Arab populations.

Aftermath

thumb|upright|Wehrmacht fuel barrel in Tunisia, 2010

After victory by the Allies in the North African campaign, the stage was set for the Italian campaign to begin. The invasion of Sicily followed two months later. Nearly 400,000 Axis and Allied troops were lost, injured or died of disease by the end of the North African campaign.

Notes

Footnotes

Citations

References

Custermen (2023). Marine Infantry Battalion of Pacific WW2 Custermen (2023, July 20). Marine Infantry Battalion of Pacific WW2. World Militaria Forum. https://www.worldmilitariaforum.com/forums/index.php?%2Ftopic%2F318521-marine-infantry-battalion-of-pacific-ww2%2F

External links

German Federal Archives: Der Afrikafeldzug

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The Jews of North Africa and the Holocaust an e-Newsletter for Holocaust educators by Yad Vashem
BBC's flash video of the North African campaign
Timeline of the North African campaign
Canadian World War 2 Online Newspaper Archives – The North African Campaigns, 1940–1943
North African Campaign Desert War.net