Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world." If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, non-cognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.
See also
- Amoralism
- Expressivism
- Theological noncognitivism
- Moral realism
- Moral skepticism
- Rudolf Carnap
- Richard Rorty
- Transcognition
References
External links
- Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry by Mark van Roojen.
de:Metaethik#Nonkognitivismus