Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the metaethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality does not exist.

Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism, which allows for actions to be wrong relative to a particular culture or individual. It is also distinct from expressivism, which asserts that moral claims are expressions of emotions, desires, and intents.

Moral nihilism today broadly tends to take the form of an error theory: the view developed originally by J. L. Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, although prefigured by Axel Hägerström in 1911. Error theory and nihilism broadly take the form of a negative claim about the existence of objective values or properties. Under traditional views, some moral properties or methods hold objectively in some sense beyond our contingent interests, which morally obligate us to act. For Mackie and the Error Theorists, such properties do not exist in the world, and therefore, morality conceived of by reference to objective facts must also not exist. Therefore, morality in the traditional sense does not exist.

However, holding nihilism does not necessarily imply that one should give up using moral or ethical language; some nihilists contend that it remains a useful tool. In fact Mackie and other contemporary defenders of error theory, such as Richard Joyce, defend the use of moral or ethical talk and action even in knowledge of their fundamental falsity. The legitimacy of this activity is a subject of debate in philosophy.

Forms of nihilism

Moral nihilists agree that all claims, such as "murder is morally wrong" are not true. But different nihilistic views differ in two ways.

Some may say that such claims are neither true nor false; others say that they are all false.

Nihilists differ in the scope of their theories. Error theorists typically claim that it is only distinctively moral claims which are false; practical nihilists claim that there are no reasons for action of any kind; some nihilists extend this claim to include reasons for belief.

Ethical language: false versus not truth-apt

J. L. Mackie argues that moral assertions are only true if there are moral properties, but because there are none, all such claims are false. Under such a view, moral propositions that express beliefs are then systematically in error. For Mackie's view, if there are to be moral properties, they must be objective and therefore not amenable to differences in subjective desires and preferences. Moreover, Mackie claims that these moral properties, if they did exist, would need to be intrinsically motivating by being in some primitive relation to our consciousness. They must be able to guide us morally just by the fact of being in some clear awareness of their truth.

Other versions of the theory claim that moral assertions are not true because they are neither true nor false. This form of moral nihilism claims that moral beliefs and assertions presuppose the existence of moral facts that do not exist. Consider, for example, the claim that the present king of France is bald. Some argue that this claim is neither true nor false because it presupposes that there is currently a king of France, but there is not. The claim suffers from "presupposition failure". Richard Joyce argues for this form of moral nihilism under the name "fictionalism".

The scope question

Error theory is built on three principles:

  1. There are no moral features in this world; nothing is right or wrong.
  2. Therefore, no moral judgments are true.
  3. However, our sincere moral judgments try, but always fail, to describe the moral features of things.

Thus, we always lapse into error when thinking in moral terms. We are trying to state the truth when we make moral judgments. But since there is no moral truth, all of our moral claims are mistaken. Hence the error. These three principles lead to the conclusion that there is no moral knowledge. Knowledge requires truth. If there is no moral truth, there can be no moral knowledge. Thus, moral values are purely chimerical.

Applied ethics

A pressing question is how one might apply the belief that there are no objective morals. Perhaps the most common response, and the position which Mackie adopts, is to view moralizing as an inherently useful practice, and that everyone is better off behaving in a moralistic manner.

On the other hand, Richard Garner advocated for the idea of "moral abolitionism". He argues that, if one were to believe that there are no objective morals, then to engage in moralism is a deceptive behavior. It is wrong because it harms one's epistemological integrity. Furthermore, by refusing to make moral judgements generally, people would be more likely to engage with others in a more genuine fashion. The social benefit is that "we will find that there will be less to argue about, and that our conflicts and disagreements with others, at last seen for what they are, can be addressed and resolved".

Argument from explanatory impotence

Gilbert Harman argued that we do not need to posit the existence of objective values in order to explain our "moral observations".

See also

Citations

Bibliography

Further reading

  • Garner, Richard T.; Bernard Rosen (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics, New York: Macmillan.
  • Garner, Richard T.; (1994). Beyond Morality. Temple University Press.
  • Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003). Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?, Oxford University Press.
  • Shafer-Landau, Russ & Terence Cuneo (eds.) (2007). Foundations of Ethics, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
  • Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006a). "Moral Skepticism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link)
  • Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006b). Moral Skepticisms, Oxford University Press.
  • van Roojen, Mark (2004). "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link)

About the queerness argument

  • Brink, David O. (1984). "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62(2): 111–125.
  • Garner, Richard T. (1990). "On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68(2): 137–46.
  • Mackie, J. L. (1946). "A Refutation of Morals", Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 24: 77–90.
  • Rosati, Connie S. (2006). "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  • Shepski, Lee (2008). "The Vanishing Argument from Queerness", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(3): 371–87.