The Malayan Emergency, also known as the Anti–British National Liberation War, was a guerrilla war fought in Malaya between communist pro-independence fighters of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and the military forces of the Federation of Malaya and the Commonwealth (British Empire). The communists fought to win independence for Malaya from the British Empire and to establish a communist state, while the Malayan Federation and Commonwealth forces fought to protect British economic and colonial interests and combat communism. The term "Emergency" was used by the British to characterise the conflict in order to avoid referring to it as a war, because London-based insurers would not pay out in instances of civil wars.

The war began on 17 June 1948. British forces had killed a number of left-wing activists in Malaya, and following several retaliatory attacks on plantations the British declared a state of emergency. The leader of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Chin Peng, along with his allies, fled into the jungle and formed the MNLA to wage a war for national liberation against British colonial rule. Many MNLA fighters were veterans of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), a communist guerrilla army previously trained, armed and funded by the British to fight against Japan during World War II. The communists gained support from many civilians, mainly those from the Chinese community. The communists' belief in class consciousness, ethnic equality, and gender equality inspired many women and indigenous people to join both the MNLA and its undercover supply network, the Min Yuen. Additionally, hundreds of former Japanese soldiers joined the MNLA. After establishing a series of jungle bases, the MNLA began raiding British colonial police and military installations.

The British attempted to starve the MNLA using scorched earth policies, including food rationing, killing livestock, and aerial spraying of the herbicide Agent Orange.MNLA guerrillas had numerous advantages over Commonwealth forces since they lived in closer proximity to villagers, they sometimes had relatives or close friends in the village. British forces faced a dual threat: the MNLA guerrillas and the silent network in villages who supported them. British troops often described the terror of jungle patrols. In addition to watching out for MNLA guerrillas, they had to navigate difficult terrain and avoid dangerous animals and insects. Many patrols would stay in the jungle for days, even weeks, without encountering the MNLA guerrillas. That strategy led to the infamous Batang Kali massacre in which 24 unarmed villagers were executed by British troops. Jet bombers came with the English Electric Canberra in 1955. The Casualty Evacuation Flight was formed in early 1953 to bring the wounded out of the jungles; it used early helicopters such as the Westland Dragonfly, landing in small clearings. The RAF progressed to using Westland Whirlwind helicopters to deploy troops in the jungle.

The MNLA was vastly outnumbered by the British forces and their Commonwealth and colonial allies in terms of regular full-time soldiers. Siding with the British occupation were a maximum of 40,000 British and other Commonwealth troops, 250,000 Home Guard members, and 66,000 police agents. Supporting the communists were 7,000+ communist guerrillas (1951 peak), an estimated 1,000,000 sympathisers, and an unknown number of civilian Min Yuen supporters and Orang Asli sympathisers.

Psychological warfare

British officials set up a Chinese newspaper and distributed leaflets to villages to distribute the government's messages and persuade insurgents to surrender. Radio broadcasts were also used to disseminate government propaganda.

Australia and Pacific Commonwealth forces

Australian ground forces first joined the Malayan Emergency in 1955 with the deployment of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR). The 2 RAR was later replaced by 3 RAR, which in turn was replaced by 1 RAR. The Royal Australian Air Force contributed No. 1 Squadron (Avro Lincoln bombers) and No. 38 Squadron (C-47 transports). In 1955, the RAAF extended Butterworth air base, from which Canberra bombers of No. 2 Squadron (replacing No. 1 Squadron) and CAC Sabres of No. 78 Wing carried out ground attack missions against the guerrillas. The Royal Australian Navy destroyers and joined the force in June 1955. Between 1956 and 1960, the aircraft carriers and and destroyers , , , , , , , and were attached to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve forces for three to nine months at a time. Several of the destroyers fired on communist positions in Johor.

New Zealand's first contribution came in 1949, when Douglas C-47 Dakotas of RNZAF No. 41 Squadron were attached to the Royal Air Force's Far East Air Force. New Zealand became more directly involved in the conflict in 1955; from May, RNZAF de Havilland Vampires and Venoms began to fly strike missions. In November 1955 133 soldiers of what was to become the Special Air Service of New Zealand arrived from Singapore, for training in-country with the British SAS, beginning operations by April 1956. The Royal New Zealand Air Force continued to carry out strike missions with Venoms of No. 14 Squadron and later No. 75 Squadron English Electric Canberras bombers, as well as supply-dropping operations in support of anti-guerrilla forces, using the Bristol Freighter. A total of 1,300 New Zealanders were stationed in Malaya between 1948 and 1964, and fifteen lost their lives. Approximately 1,600 Fijian troops were involved in the Malayan Emergency from 1952 to 1956. The experience was captured in the documentary, Back to Batu Pahat.

African Commonwealth forces

thumb|upright=1.35|[[Rhodesian Special Air Service|"C" Squadron, the all-Southern Rhodesian unit of the Special Air Service (SAS), in Malaya in 1953|alt=A formative black-and-white photograph of military personnel. The men wear khaki shirts and shorts with long, dark-coloured socks. They all wear dark berets.]]

Southern Rhodesia and its successor, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, contributed two units to Malaya. Between 1951 and 1953, white Southern Rhodesian volunteers formed "C" Squadron of the Special Air Service. The Rhodesian African Rifles, comprising black soldiers and warrant officers led by white officers, were stationed in Johor between 1956 and 1958. The King's African Rifles from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya were also deployed to Malaya.

Iban mercenaries

The British Empire hired thousands of mercenaries hailing from the Iban people (a subgroup of the Dayak people) of Borneo to fight against the Malayan National Liberation Army. During their service they were widely praised for their jungle and bushcraft skills, though their military effectiveness and behaviour during the war has been brought into question.

Their deployment received a large amount of both positive and negative attention in British media. They were also responsible for a number of atrocities, most notably the decapitation and scalping of suspected MNLA guerrillas. Photographs of this practice were leaked in 1952, sparking the British Malayan headhunting scandal. In 1953 most Ibans in Malaya joined the reformed Sarawak Rangers, transitioning them from mercenaries into regular soldiers.

According to a former member of the Sarawak Rangers, Ibans served with at least 42 separate battalions in the Malayan Emergency belonging to either British or Commonwealth militaries.

Iban mercenaries were first deployed to British Malaya by the British Empire to fight in the Malayan Emergency on the 8 August where they served Ferret Force. Many were motivated to fight with the hope that they could collect the heads and scalps of their enemies.

Their deployment was supported by the British politician Arthur Creech Jones, then serving as the Secretary of State for the Colonies who agreed to deploy Ibans to the Malayan Emergency for three months. Amid rumours that the Iban mercenaries they deployed were practiced headhunters, all Ibans serving with the British were removed from British Malaya and quietly redeployed in 1949 and served for the entirety of the war until its end in 1960.

Some historians have argued that the British military's use of Ibans stemmed from stereotypes that "primitive" people enjoyed a closer relationship with nature than Europeans. Others have argued that the British army's deployment and treatment of the Ibans during the Malayan Emergency reflected the British military's history regarding what they perceived as 'martial races'.

The deployment of Iban mercenaries recruited to fight in the Malayan Emergency was a widely publicised topic in the British press. Many newspapers articles contained titles referring to the Iban cultural practice of headhunting and contained articles portraying Ibans as violent and primitive while being friendly towards white Europeans. While many newspaper articles incorrectly argued that Ibans deployed to Malaya were no longer headhunters, others put forward arguments that Ibans in Malaya should be allowed to openly decapitate and scalp members of the MNLA.

The Iban mercenaries deployed to Malaya were widely praised for their jungle bushcraft skills, although some British and Commonwealth officers found that Ibans were outperformed in this role by recruits from Africa and certain parts of the Commonwealth. The behaviour of Iban mercenaries serving in Malaya was also the subject of criticism, as some Iban recruits were found to have looted corpses and others had threatened their commanding officers with weapons. Due to fears of racial tensions with ethnic Malays the Iban mercenaries that Britain deployed to Malaya were denied access to automatic weapons.

There were also communication difficulties, for virtually all the Iban recruits in Malaya were illiterate and most British troops serving alongside them had no prior experience with Asian languages. Some Iban mercenaries refused to go on patrol after receiving bad omens in their dreams. Iban society had no social classes making it difficult for them to adhere to military ranks. Some Royal Marines complained that their Iban allies were inaccurate with firearms, and Ibans were both the victims and perpetrators of an unusual amount of friendly-fire incidents. The first Iban casualty of the war was a man called Jaweng ak Jugah who was shot dead after being mistaken for a "communist terrorist". The October Resolution involved a change of tactics by the MNLA by reducing attacks on economic targets and civilian collaborators, redirecting their efforts towards political organisation and subversion, and bolstering the supply network from the Min Yuen as well as jungle farming and was a response to the Briggs Plan.

thumb|Headline on page 1 of [[The Straits Times of 1952. Chin Peng: Public Enemy No.1]]

Amnesty declaration

On 8 September 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the communists. The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time. Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Chief Minister, offered amnesty but rejected negotiations with the MNLA. The amnesty read that:

  • Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offence connected with the Emergency, which you have committed under Communist direction, either before this date or in ignorance of this declaration.
  • You may surrender now and to whom you like including to members of the public.
  • There will be no general "ceasefire" but the security forces will be on alert to help those who wish to accept this offer and for this purpose local "ceasefire" will be arranged.
  • The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they are genuinely intent to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be reunited with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go to China, their request will be given due consideration.

Following this amnesty declaration, an intensive publicity campaign was launched by the government. Alliance ministers in the Federal Government travelled extensively across Malaya exhorting civilians to call upon communist forces to surrender their weapons and accept the amnesty. Despite the campaign, few Communist guerrillas chose to surrender. Some political activists criticised the amnesty for being too restrictive and for being a rewording of earlier well established surrender offers. These critics advocated for direct negotiations with the communist guerrillas of the MNLA and MCP to work on a peace settlement. Leading officials of the Labour Party had, as part of the settlement, not excluded the possibility of recognition of the MCP as a political organisation. Within the Alliance itself, influential elements in both the MCA and UMNO were endeavouring to persuade the Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to hold negotiations with the MCP.

Following the failure of the Baling Talks, the MCP made various efforts to resume peace negotiations with the Malayan government, all without success. Meanwhile, discussions began in the new Emergency Operations Council to intensify the "People's War" against the guerrillas. In July 1957, a few weeks before independence, the MCP made another attempt at peace talks, suggesting the following conditions for a negotiated peace:

  • its members should be given privileges enjoyed by citizens
  • a guarantee that political as well as armed members of the MCP would not be punished

The failure of the talks affected MCP policy. The strength of the MNLA and 'Min Yuen' declined to 1830 members in August 1957. Those who remained faced exile, or death in the jungle. However, Tunku Abdul Rahman did not respond to the MCP's proposals. Following the declaration of Malaya's independence in August 1957, the MNLA lost its rationale as a force of colonial liberation.

The last serious resistance from MNLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the Telok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining MNLA forces fled to the Thai border and further east. On 31 July 1960 the Malayan government declared the state of emergency to be over, and Chin Peng left south Thailand for Beijing where he was accommodated by the Chinese authorities in the International Liaison Bureau, where many other Southeast Asian Communist Party leaders were housed.

Casualties

During the conflict, security forces killed 6,710 MNLA guerrillas and captured 1,287, while 2,702 guerrillas surrendered during the conflict, and approximately 500 more did so at its conclusion. A total of 226 guerrillas were executed. 1,346 Malayan troops and police were killed during the fighting. 1,443 British personnel died, in what remains the largest loss of life among UK armed forces since the Second World War. 2,478 civilians were killed, with another 810 recorded as missing.<!-- No page numbers?

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Atrocities

thumb|British ex-soldiers mount a protest at [[Dunlop Rubber|Dunlop Rubber's annual shareholder meeting against Britain's involvement in the Malayan Emergency]]

Commonwealth

Torture

During the Malayan conflict, in operations to find MNLA guerrillas British troops detained and tortured villagers who were suspected of aiding the MNLA. British forces routinely beat up Chinese squatters when they refused, or possibly were unable, to give information about the MNLA. Soon afterwards the British colonial government staged a coverup of British military abuses which served to obfuscate the exact details of the massacre.

The massacre later became the focus of decades of legal battles between the UK government and the families of the civilians executed by British troops. According to Christi Silver, Batang Kali was notable in that it was the only incident of mass killings by Commonwealth forces during the war, which Silver attributes to the unique subculture of the Scots Guards and poor enforcement of discipline by junior officers.

Concentration camps

As part of the Briggs Plan devised by British General Sir Harold Briggs, one million civilians (roughly ten percent of Malaya's population) were forced from their homes by British forces. Tens of thousands of homes were destroyed, and many people were imprisoned in British concentration camps referred to with the euphemism "new villages". During the Malayan Emergency, 600 of these concentration camps were created.

Collective punishment

A key British war measure was inflicting collective punishments on villages whose population were deemed to be aiding MNLA guerrillas. At Tanjong Malim in March 1952, Templer imposed a twenty-two-hour house curfew, banned everyone from leaving the village, closed the schools, stopped bus services, and reduced the rice rations for 20,000 people. The last measure prompted the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to write to the Colonial Office to note that the "chronically undernourished Malayan" might not be able to survive as a result. "This measure is bound to result in an increase, not only of sickness but also of deaths, particularly amongst the mothers and very young children". Some people were fined for leaving their homes to use external latrines. In another collective punishment, at Sengei Pelek the following month, measures included a house curfew, a reduction of 40 percent in the rice ration and the construction of a chain-link fence 22 yards outside the existing barbed wire fence around the town. Officials explained that the measures were being imposed upon the 4,000 villagers "for their continually supplying food" to the MNLA and "because they did not give information to the authorities".

Deportations

Over the course of the war, some 30,000 mostly ethnic Chinese were deported by the British authorities to mainland China. This would have been a war crime under Article 17 (2) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which states: "Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict."

A notable victim of these public corpse displays was MNLA guerrilla leader Liew Kon Kim, whose corpse was publicly displayed in locations around British Malaya. At least two instances of public corpse displays by British forces in Malaya gained notable media attention in Britain, and were later dubbed "The Telok Anson Tragedy" and "The Kulim Tragedy".

Headhunting and scalping

thumb|A [[Morning Star (British newspaper)|Daily Worker article exposing newly uncovered images of British atrocities involving headhunting during the Malayan Emergency]]

During the war British and Commonwealth forces hired over 1,000 Iban (Dyak) mercenaries from Borneo to act as jungle trackers. With a tradition of headhunting, they decapitated suspected MNLA members; the authorities held that taking the heads was the only means of later identification. Iban headhunters were permitted by British military leaders to keep the scalps of corpses as trophies. Privately, the Colonial Office noted that "there is no doubt that under international law a similar case in wartime would be a war crime". By republishing these images the British communists had hoped to turn public opinion against the war. Initially, British government spokespersons belonging to the Admiralty and the Colonial Office claimed the photograph was fake. In response to the accusations that their headhunting photograph was fake, the Daily Worker released another photograph taken in Malaya showing British soldiers posing with a severed head. The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, later confirmed to parliament that the Daily Worker headhunting photographs were indeed genuine. In response to the Daily Worker articles exposing the decapitation of MNLA suspects, the practice was banned by Winston Churchill who feared that such photographs resulting from headhunting would expose the British for their brutality. However, Churchill's order to discontinue the decapitations was widely ignored by Iban trackers who continued to behead suspected guerrillas.

Despite the shocking imagery of the photographs of soldiers posing with severed heads in Malaya, the Daily Worker was the only newspaper to publish them and the photographs were virtually ignored by the mainstream British press.

Differences

thumb|upright=0.8|Jungle service dress of the [[Somerset Light Infantry|1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry used in the emergency]]

This conflict and the Vietnam War (following the First Indochina War) have often been compared. Cuba and the People's Republic of China (PRC) provided military hardware, logistical support, personnel and training to North Vietnam, whereas the MNLA received no material support, weapons or training from any foreign government.

  • North Vietnam's shared border with its ally China (PRC) allowed for continuous assistance and provided a safe haven for communist forces, but Malaya's only land border is with non-communist Thailand.
  • Britain did not approach the Emergency as a conventional conflict and quickly implemented an effective intelligence strategy, led by the Malayan Police Special Branch, and a systematic hearts and minds operation, both of which proved effective against the largely political aims of the guerrilla movement.
  • The British military recognised that in a low-intensity war, individual soldiers' skill and endurance were of far greater importance than overwhelming firepower (artillery, air support, etc.). Even though many British soldiers were conscripted National Servicemen, the necessary skills and attitudes were taught at a Jungle Warfare School, which also developed the optimum tactics based on experience gained in the field.
  • Vietnam was less ethnically fragmented than Malaya. During the Emergency, most MNLA members were ethnically Chinese and drew support from sections of the Chinese community. However, most of the more numerous indigenous Malays, many of whom were animated by anti-Chinese sentiments, largely remained loyal to the government and enlisted in high numbers into the security services.

Similarities

The United States in Vietnam were highly influenced by Britain's military strategies during the Malayan Emergency and the two wars shared many similarities. Some examples are listed below.

  • Both countries used Agent Orange. Britain pioneered the use of Agent Orange as a weapon of war during the Malayan Emergency. This fact was used by the United States as a justification to use Agent Orange in Vietnam.
  • Both the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force used widespread saturation bombing.
  • Both countries frequently used concentration camps. In Malaya, camps referred to with the euphemism "new villages" were built by the British colonial occupation to imprison approximately one million rural peasants. The British government agreed to investigate in 2009. In 2012, lawyers representing victims and their families received official documents relating to the massacre.

Following the end of the Malayan Emergency in 1960, the predominantly ethnic Chinese Malayan National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the MCP, retreated to the Malaysia–Thailand border where it regrouped and retrained for future offensives against the Malaysian government. A new phase of communist insurgency began in 1968. It was triggered when the MCP ambushed security forces in Kroh–Betong, in the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia, on 17 June 1968. The new conflict coincided with renewed tensions between ethnic Malays and Chinese following the 13 May incident of 1969, and the ongoing Vietnam War.

Communist leader Chin Peng spent much of the 1990s and early 2000s working to promote his perspective of the Emergency. In a collaboration with Australian academics, he met with historians and former Commonwealth military personnel at a series of meetings which led to the publication of Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party. Peng also travelled to England and teamed up with conservative journalist Ian Ward and his wife Norma Miraflor to write his autobiography Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History.

List of battles/incidents during the Malayan Emergency

  • Assassination of Sir Henry Gurney
  • Batang Kali massacre
  • Battle of Semur River
  • Bukit Kepong incident
  • Labis incident
  • Operation Termite
  • Penang ambush
  • Sungai Siput incident

In popular Malaysian culture, the Emergency has frequently been portrayed as a primarily Malay struggle against the communists. This perception has been criticised by some, such as Information Minister Zainuddin Maidin, for not recognising Chinese and Indian efforts.

A number of films have been set during the Emergency, including:

  • The Planter's Wife (1952)
  • Windom's Way (1957)
  • The 7th Dawn (1964)
  • The Virgin Soldiers (1969)
  • Stand Up, Virgin Soldiers (1977)
  • Bukit Kepong (1981)
  • The Garden of Evening Mists (2019)

Other media:

  • Mona Brand's stage production Strangers in the Land (1952) was created as political commentary to criticise the occupation, depicting plantation owners as burning down villages and collecting the heads of murdered Malayans as trophies. The play was only performed in the UK at the tiny activist-run Unity Theatre because the British government had banned the play from commercial stages.