Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (; born Jarnail Singh Brar; After Operation Bluestar, he posthumously became the leading figure for the Khalistan movement, although he did not personally advocate for a separate Sikh nation. An advocate of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, There was dissatisfaction in some sections of the Sikh community with prevailing economic, social, and political conditions. Over time Bhindranwale grew to be a leader of Sikh militancy.
In 1982, Bhindranwale and his group moved to the Golden Temple complex and made it his headquarters. Bhindranwale would establish what amounted to a "parallel government" in Punjab, which resulted in hundreds to thousands of deaths according to various reports, including that of Bhindranwale.
Bhindranwale has remained a controversial figure in Indian history. While the Sikhs' highest temporal authority Akal Takht describe him a 'Martyr', with immense appeal among rural sections of the Sikh population, many Indians saw him as spearheading a "revivalist, extremist and terrorist movement", which remains a point of contention. as Jarnail Singh Brar to a Jat Sikh family, in the village of Rode, in Moga District (then a part of Ferozepur district), The grandson of Sardar Harnam Singh Brar, his father, Joginder Singh Brar was a farmer and a local Sikh leader, and his mother was Nihal Kaur. He was put into a school in 1953 at the age of 6 but he dropped out of school five years later to work with his father on the farm.
Marriage
He married Pritam Kaur, the daughter of Sucha Singh of Bilaspur at the age of nineteen. The couple had two sons, Ishar Singh and Inderjit Singh, in 1971 and 1975, respectively. After the death of Bhindranwale, Pritam Kaur moved along with her sons to Bilaspur village in Moga district and stayed with her brother.
Damdami Taksal
Early years
In 1965, he was enrolled by his father at the Damdami Taksal also known as Bhindran Taksal, a religious school near Moga, Punjab, named after the village of Bhindran Kalan where its leader Gurbachan Singh Bhindranwale lived. and attained the religious title of "Sant".
Politics
It is generally believed that in the late 1970s, Indira Gandhi's Congress party attempted to co-opt Bhindranwale in a bid to split Sikh votes and weaken the Akali Dal, its chief rival in Punjab. Congress supported the candidates backed by Bhindranwale in the 1978 SGPC elections. The theory of Congress involvement has been contested on grounds including that Gandhi's imposition of President's rule in 1980 had essentially disbanded all Punjab political powers regardless, with no assistance required to take control, and has been challenged by scholarship. According to the New York Times, Sanjay Gandhi had approached Bhindranwale, then the newly appointed head of the Damdami Taksal, after Indira Gandhi lost the 1977 Indian general election, but after Congress resumed power in 1980, would find out that he could not be controlled or directed. amid attempts to cater to and capitalize on the surge in Sikh religious revivalism in Punjab. A year later, Bhindranwale used Zail Singh's patronage to put up candidates in three constituencies' during the general elections, winning a significant number of seats from Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur districts. after they had failed to support the Sikhs during the 1978 Sikh-Nirankari clashes due to pressure from their coalition partners. Described as having "unflinching zeal and firm convictions," Bhindranwale did "not succumb to the pressure of big-wigs in the Akali Party nor could he be manipulated by the authorities to serve their ends." According to Gurdarshan Singh, "Those who tried to mend him or bend him to suit their designs underestimated his tremendous will and ultimately lost their own ground. He never became their tool. People who promoted his cause or helped him to rise to prominence were disillusioned, when he refused to play the second fiddle to them and declined to tread the path laid down for him. Paradoxical though it may seem, they became his unwilling tools. Thousands listened to him with rapt attention at the Manji Sahib gatherings. He had tremendous power to mobilise the masses. His charisma and eloquence overshadowed other leaders."
In order to overcome the hegemony of the Akali Dal, rather than being used, Bhindranwale would exploit the Congress and then the Akali Dal itself. The Akali Dal had begun to neglect Sikh needs in favor of maintaining political alliances necessary to keep power, resulting in their electoral loss in 1972, and the resulting Anandpur Sahib Resolution, meant to win back Sikh support, remained neglected while the party focused on reversing the overcentralization of political power that had taken place during the Emergency. Described as "a rational actor with his own goals," his first concern was to rejuvenate Sikhism as a leader of the community.
Further, the Damdami Taksal already had a history of openly opposing and criticizing Congress government policies before, as Kartar Singh Khalsa Bhindranwale, the leader of the institution prior to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, had been a severe critic of the excesses of Indira Gandhi's Emergency rule, even in her presence as far back as 1975. Kartar Singh had also gotten a resolution passed by the SGPC on 18 November 1973, condemning the various anti-Sikh activities of the Sant Nirankaris, which were based in Delhi. Both Kartar Singh Bhindranwale and the Damdami Taksal had commanded such a level of respect in Sikh religious life that the Akali ministry had given him a state funeral upon his death on 20 August 1977. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale would also mention the Sikhs facing the government with 37 major protests against Emergency rule under Congress during this era as fighting against tyranny. Emergency rule had initially been utilized to avert criminal charges on Gandhi, who was linked to misuse of government property during the upcoming election, which would have invalidated her campaign, and endowed the central government with powers including preemptive arrests, as well as the arrest of many political opponents.
On Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale becoming leader of the Damdami Taksal, another of the Taksal students explained, “[Nothing changed] in political terms. It was just the same way. The Indian government thought that maybe although they could not stop Sant Kartar Singh [Bhindranwale], maybe Sant Jarnail Singh [Bhindranwale] would be weaker. That was not the case.”
Clash with Sant Nirankaris
On 13 April 1978, the anniversary of the founding of the Khalsa, a Sant Nirankari convention was organized in Amritsar, with permission from the Akali state government. The practices of the "Sant Nirankaris" subsect of Nirankaris was considered as heretics by the orthodox Sikhism expounded by Bhindranwale, though the conflict between the Sikhs and the Sant Nirankaris preceded Bhindranwale; the Sant Nirankaris had been declared by the priests of the Golden Temple as enemies of the Sikhs in 1973, and the Damdami Taksal had opposed them since the 1960s, the sect's leader proclaiming himself as a guru in its place and calling himself the baja-wala (a reference to Guru Gobind Singh), and because of their undermining of the Sikh structure Bhindranwale delivered a stirring sermon, where he announced he would not allow the Nirankari convention to take place. According to Tully and Jacob, Bhindranwale declared "We are going to march there and cut them to pieces!" After the speech a large contingent of about two hundred Sikhs led by Bhindranwale and Fauja Singh, the head of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha, left the Golden Temple and proceeded to the Nirankari Convention with the intention of stopping its proceedings. The contingent cut off the arm of a Hindu sweetmeats on the way to the Nirankari Convention. subsequently resulting in an armed clash between the two groups. Bhindranwale fled as the clash began. In the ensuing violence, several people were killed: two of Bhindranwale's followers, eleven members of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and three members of the Sant Nirankari sect. This event brought Bhindranwale to the limelight in the media, and brought him into the political arena. The case of the Nirankaris received widespread support in the Hindi media in Punjab and from Congress, which upon returning to central power also dismissed the Akali government in Punjab, where fresh elections were held and a Congress government installed; The Babbar Khalsa activists took up residence in the Golden Temple, where they would retreat to, after committing "acts of punishment" on people against the orthodox Sikh tenets. On 24 April 1980, The Nirankari head, Gurbachan was murdered. The First Information Report named twenty people for the murder, including several known associates of Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale, who was also charged with conspiracy to murder. Bhindranwale took residence in Golden Temple to allegedly escape arrest when he was accused of the assassination of Nirankari Gurbachan Singh. Bhindranwale remained in hiding until the Home Minister of India, Zail Singh announced to Parliament that Bhindranwale had nothing to do with the murder. Shortly after, Bhindranwale announced that the killer of the Nirankari chief deserved to be honored by the high priest of Akal Takht, and that he would weigh the killers in gold if they came to him. It would turn out that a member of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha, Ranjit Singh, surrendered and admitted to the assassination three years later, and was sentenced to serve thirteen years at the Tihar Jail in Delhi.
The AISSF
Bhindranwale's message was enthusiastically received by an emerging underclass of educated rural Sikhs,
whose suffered from the unequal distribution of benefits from the Green Revolution. Punjab had enjoyed the second-highest percentage of children in school after Kerala at the time, along with high college enrollment, at the same time with unemployment rates among college graduates far above the national average. Unemployment was caused by distortions caused by the disparity between agricultural growth and a stunted industrial sector; marginal and poor peasants could not reap the benefits of the land nor find employment in the industrial sector. By the late 1970s the educations of rural Sikhs, many from the Majha area, did not reap financial benefit, many found the urban college environment alienating, and the Akali Dal was engaged in political activities that bore little relation to the demands of educated but unemployed rural Sikhs youth. Bhindranwale's message increasingly appealed to them, and their support grew with police excesses, and as Bhindranwale expressed concern over the many breaches of civil rights, and those killed during and after 1978 in protests. The class dimension was described by India Today in 1986 as follows:
The All-India Sikh Students Federation, or AISSF, founded in 1943 to attract educated Sikh youth to the Akali movement, had traditionally followed the direction of the Akali Dal and fought for more political power for the Sikhs, fighting for an independent Sikh state before Partition, and afterwards taking up the Punjabi Suba cause. After the establishment of Punjab state, the AISSF had fallen into disarray by the 1970s, and during this period of increasing economic pressures on the state, student politics were dominated by rural Communist organizations. Amrik Singh was elected president in July 1978, and his organizational skills and Bhindranwale's legitimacy as the head of a respected religious institution restored the Federation as a powerful political force, and the AISSF and Bhindranwale were further united in being anti-Communist. With a well-educated leadership, many with advanced degrees, membership exploded from 10,000 to well over 100,000, and under Amrik Singh, the AISSF's first concern was the Sikh identity.
AISSF secretary-general Harminder Singh Sandhu ascribed the preceding period of youth politics as resulting from the passivity of the Akali leadership in relation to the central government, seen as betraying Sikh interests, which caused resentment among the AISSF. By 1980 they felt ready to redefine Punjab's relationship with the center, and the revival of the AISSF and the presence of Bhindranwale put enormous pressure on the Akali Dal.
Bhindranwale was suspicious of Sikh elites, describing them as a class possessing the ability for multiple allegiances, and therefore, could not be relied upon by a mass movement based upon religious foundations which justified protest against discrimination and abuses of power and repression. As such he was often opposed particularly by some Sikh members of the class with business and land interests outside of Punjab, and those occupying high administrative positions. As part of a preaching tradition, he saw the lives of such Sikhs, described as sycophants of Indira Gandhi for power, as a departure threatening the distinct identity of the Sikhs. He saw that path as having to be corrected, along with deviationist and Communist trends, of Sikh officers whose loyalty lay with the state over the Sikh panth tradition, emphasizing unification of the community and pushing those officers in government service to work for such unity.
Anti-tobacco march
In May 1981, the AISSF led a protest against tobacco and other intoxicants, prohibited in Sikhism, in the Sikh religious city of Amritsar, and to have it declared a holy city. Cities elsewhere in the country like Haridwar, Kurukshetra and Varanasi already had similar bans in place, including on the sale of meat and eggs, on Hindu religious grounds. The AISSF had wanted 408 cigarette sellers to relocate or find other business by 15 May, offering compensation and alternative locations, and on that day a procession was planned for 31 May in pursuit of these demands.
The On 29 May members of the Arya Samaj, R.S.S., and other Hindu organizations took out a "right to smoke" procession, with 10,000 participants brandishing swords and lit cigarettes, in which anti-Sikh slogans were released as well as the slogan, "bidi piyenge, shaan se jiyenge" ("we will smoke cigarettes living with pride"), despite smoking not being a Hindu religious tenet,
Incident at Chando Kalan
On 9 September 1981, Lala Jagat Narain, the founder editor of the newspaper Punjab Kesari, was murdered. He was viewed as a supporter of the Nirankari sect and had written several editorials that had condemned Bhindranwale.
Punjab Police issued a warrant for Bhindranwale's arrest in the editor's murder, For negotiating Bhindranwale's surrender, the senior officers went inside the gurdwara. Bhindranwale agreed to surrender for arrest at 1:00 p.m. on 20 September 1981, but added a condition that will do so only after addressing the religious congregation. This condition was accepted by the police. At the agreed time he emerged address a large crowd of his followers who armed with spears, swords and several firearms. Several prominent Akali leaders such as Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Harchand Singh Longowal and the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee's Jathedar Santokh Singh were present. Bhindranwale delivered a sermon proclaiming his innocence and against the state government trying to have him arrested,
Several violent incidents happened in Punjab during the next 25 days after the arrest. The Akali Dal leadership was in the process of reestablishing its Sikh credentials after its secular administration during its protests against the Emergency, and under Longowal decided to publicly support Bhindranwale, the most popular Sikh religious leader in Punjab at that point. Bhindranwale also got support from the President of the SGPC, Tohra and the Jathedar of the Akal Takht, Gurdial Singh Ajnoha. volunteer protesters. Over 100,000 protesters would be arrested over the course of the morcha.
Though Akali demands were largely for the developmental welfare of the state of Punjab as a whole, with demands only made to the government and not in regards to other communities, police killings, including extrajudicial actions of fatal torture and mutilations of detainees, with some subsequently declared as escapees, as well as unprovoked attacks on innocent individual Sikhs, were carried out by mobs of the Hindi Suraksha Samiti, mobilized by the Arya Samaj. These incidents sparked off retributory attacks against them by Sikh youths. After the launch of the Dharam Yudh Morcha, and subsequent governmental inaction in regards to police brutality, Sikh activists began committing retaliatory acts of political violence. An assassination attempt was made on Chief Minister of Punjab Darbara Singh and two Indian Airlines flights were hijacked.
Following protester deaths, Swaran Singh restarted negotiations on behalf of Gandhi with the Akalis after releasing all arrested Akali volunteers, reaching agreements on Chandigarh, river waters, Centre-State relations, and the Amritsar broadcast, which were approved by a cabinet subcommittee. While Swaran Singh relayed the government's approval of the agreement, Gandhi had changed it significantly before submitting it to Parliament. The talks would collapse after this action, and Longowal would announce in November 1982 the continuation of the protests in Delhi during the 1982 Asian Games. Another round of talks between the Akalis and Congress MP Amrinder Singh was successful, but was sabotaged by Bhajan Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana, who stated that protests, which were largely stifled, would not be allowed in Haryana during the event, and ensured that Sikhs allowed to pass through, regardless of social position, whether retired military, politician, or ordinary citizen, were subjected to various procedures including invasive friskings and removal of turbans; Sikhs travelling from Punjab to Delhi or back were indiscriminately stopped, searched, and humiliated,
In early 1982, he addressed in a speech at a college in Karnal, Haryana, about his perception on the constant distortions by the press::
Bhindranwale also referenced the double standards of the media in the failure to register cases against prominent Hindu politicians for making threatening statements against Sikhs, including Swami Adityavesh, an Arya Samaji Congress MLA, who demanded that Sikhs be expelled from Haryana to Punjab, Kewal Krishan, a Congress MLA in Punjab, who threatened to destroy all Sikh organizations, and Harbans Lal Khanna, a BJP MLA in Punjab, who stated publicly in Amritsar on 30 May 1981, "Dukki tikki khehan nahin deni, sir te pagri rehan nahin deni; kachh, kara, kirpaan; ehnoon bhejo Pakistan." ('We are not going to let any second or third group exist, we are not going to let a turban remain on any head; the shorts, the iron bangle, the sword, send these to Pakistan’), and had a model of the Golden Temple desecrated by a mob, Baldev Prakash, also a BJP MLA, who had posters of such slogans printed. and extremist president of the Hindi Suraksha Samiti in Patiala, Pawan Kumar Sharma, backed by the Arya Samaj press and furtively by the Congress party, with links to Bhajan Lal, who in a raid had been discovered with large stocks of arms, explosives, and hand grenades. Amrik Singh would also allude to the double standard of the government's soft behavior towards Dhirendra Brahmachari, who had smuggled 500 guns through Jammu from Spain, in contrast with the government's concern with the Sikhs; Amrik Singh would also state that "Delhi likes Sikhs like Zail Singh and Buta Singh who pay court to the Government. All other Sikhs are called extremists. We don't want secession but seek status of first-class citizens."
Incidents
Regarding incidents of bus passengers shooting in the state in October 1983 and other crimes, the discovery of discarded turbans often used as handties, alcohol, pistols, and cartridges found at certain crime scenes, which would come to be regarded as telltale signs of staging, prompted open Akali allegations that killings were being done by professionals under the orders of the Third Agency, an intelligence wing formed by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, looking for a pretext to impose President's rule in Punjab, which she did on 6 October, allowing no time for investigation into the unclaimed act. Longowal himself repeatedly challenged the Government that he would prove that the Dhilwan shootings were not done by any Sikh or Akali if a judicial enquiry was conducted.
In addition to President's rule, Punjab would also come under the AFSPA in 1983, granting the army unrestrained powers, including to shoot on suspicion with immunity from prosecution.
According to former Punjab DGP Kirpal Dhillon, the incident was characterized by several unusual circumstances: the perpetrators had never been seriously tracked, the bus had not been a scheduled service and had deviated from its usual route, and the victims did not belong to sects and castes typical of the area, noting the possibility of it being authorized by Congress ministers and managed through the police and central agency. Darbara Singh was finally dismissed by Zail Singh after the incident, the first of its kind. The entire spectrum of Sikh groups condemned the incident "in the strongest possible terms," though a section of the Jalandhar media nevertheless persisted in making "fairly explicit insinuations" of Sikh militant involvement.
After another such incident at Khabi Rajputan with 4 deaths on 18 November, "The government of India, as well as a "major section of the so-called mainstream media," promptly held the Akalis, Bhindranwale, and the Sikh extremist elements responsible for the two incidents. Several Sikh leaders, including Longowal and Bhindranwale, had also "severely deplored" a 21 October train derailment, "allegedly due to sabotage," resulting in the death of 19 passengers.
Bhindranwale, as well as all militant groups, would "squarely and unequivocally" condemn the two bus shootings, the 21 October train derailment, and such episodes of violence, demanding a judicial inquiry into the spate of events during the month. Even radical Sikh groups, which normally did not shy away from claiming responsibility for violence, denied any role in bus killings or desecrations and condemned them "in no uncertain terms," with the Babbar Khalsa denouncing the "killing of any Hindus, robberies, or any religiously provocative acts." According to them, their targets were only either Sant Nirankaris involved in 1978, of whom they had claimed 35 by that time, or police officers who were deemed guilty of "torturing and humiliating" detained Sikh youth and harassing their "women, relatives and friends." Nevertheless, the media apparatus would "[run] amuck, declaring that "Bhindranwale's Sikhs" had opened hostilities against all Hindus;" despite the incidents never being solved, the media and subsequent public opinion would be convinced of this narrative. Bhindranwale would state, "It suits the government to publicize me as an extremist, thus making an excuse to frustrate the just cause and the legitimate demands of the entire Sikh community and Punjab state." and advocated for a political settlement with the militants up until Operation Blue Star.
Press disinformation
B. G. Verghese and K. C. Kulish, senior journalists deputed by the Editors Guild of India, filed a report after visiting Punjab in February 1984 denouncing the tendency to reflexively attribute any uptick in even normal crime to whichever special category of outlaws operated at the time, writing, "Objection is taken in Punjab to the tendency to ascribe all crime to Sikh extremists. The press must be wary of such stereotypes. Many crimes, robberies and murders have little to do with the current political scene."
There would be significant government interference in information released to the media itself. The Congress government strove significantly to manipulate raw material; its disseminations would serve to form two parallel, diametrically opposed perceptions in Punjab. The Indian establishment also sought to mould popular perceptions about the developments in Punjab to correspond to its own, done through media management by plenty of operators in the ruling party itself. According to sociology professor Birinder Pal Singh, "Besides projecting the Punjab problem as communal, the media, official and non-official, branded the Sikhs as "communal," "terrorists," "separatists," and disintegrationists," as "those who want "expulsion of the Hindus from Punjab" and "want India's dismemberment at the hands of its enemy Pakistan," etc. to name a few. Such projections was not just the work of certain communal organizations but was a goal of the state itself, to legitimize the use of force and state repression to settle the "Punjab problem." By the time of Operation Blue Star, almost the entire mainstream media and political establishment had come to largely accept the government position and Hindu political outfits on the Punjab situation, forming a "national consensus."
It was noted that during the era of the 1970s and 1980s, indiscriminate anti-Sikh bias in reporting, without distinction made between the whole community or Sikh political factions, "of a number of newspaper owners, editors and journalists," including "[e]ven senior editors and columnists," also contributed to "Sikh disenchantment." Along with national attitudes in the Hindi-speaking region "hardening along communal lines" because of government manipulation, the national newspapers reported on the Sikhs "in the exciting sport of bringing the communal cauldron to a boil through sensational comment," with The Times of India and The Hindustan Times "doing more to incite hostility between Hindus and Sikhs than perhaps any other English-language newspaper."
In an 26 July 1982 editorial piece of the Spokesman Weekly, it was noted that, "when a Hindu, for his misdeeds, is killed on the road side, his co-religionist, without ascertaining identity of the culprit, gang up and go and set fire to the Dailies run by the Sikhs; if some one places a cow's head in front of a mandir, they instead of pushing it away, immediately rush to stone the Darbar Sahib or throw biris in the gurdwaras," while "[on] the other hand, when a large number of Sikhs are killed as it happened at Amritsar, Chowk Mehta, Delhi, Kanpur, etc., no one is worried — the Press becomes dumb, and the Government (of the people) behaves in a manner as if nothing has happened."
According to Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "The clearly distorted account of the event released to the media does not speak well for India's vaunted freedom of press. Stories of prostitutes and drugs at the Akal Takht were printed on front pages one week, that recanted in back pages the next. A story suggesting that Bhindranwale had committed suicide was followed by one describing his body as riddled with bullets from head to toe. There is no doubt that an entire apparatus of fear dissemination worked to convince India that the Sikhs were to be distrusted. And by and large, it succeeded," adding that "Compromises with press freedom were accompanied by draconian legislation that was a target of criticism from human rights communities around the world." Such fabrications would continue to be peddled as fact long after.
According to a journalist traveling with Bhindranwale during 1982, the Central intelligence department, or CID, which had taped every public speech listening for "seditious" remarks, had heard none by April 1982, and Darbara Singh, despite being ready to "act" against Bhindranwale, had found no grounds to do so. On 19 July 1982, Bhindranwale took residence with approximately 200 armed followers in the Guru Nanak Niwas guest house, on the precincts of the Golden Temple. Bhindranwale developed a reputation as a man of principle who could settle people's problems about land, property or any other matter without needless formality or delay, more expediently than the legal system. The judgement would be accepted by both parties and carried out. This added to his popularity. Bhindranwale led the campaign in Punjab from the complex guest house, the burning of a gurdwara at Churu, Rajasthan by the Jai Hindu Sangh on 26 November increased the violence, and on 14 February the Hindi Suraksha Samiti vandalized a train station by destroying a model of the Golden Temple and pictures of the Sikh gurus. Anti-Sikh mob violence in Haryana from 15 to 20 February 1984, mobilized by CM Bhajan Lal at the behest of leaders in Delhi, and the killing of eight Sikhs in Panipat on 19 February in view of the police station, provoked retaliations.
As the days went by the law and order situation further deteriorated and violence escalated. While the Akalis pressed on with their two-pronged strategy of negotiations and massive campaigns of civil disobedience directed at the Central Government, others were not so enamoured of nonviolence. Communists known as "Naxalites", and armed Sikh groups – the "Babbar Khalsa" and "Dal Khalsa", both of which opposed Bhindranwale, sometimes worked hand in hand and clashed with the police. A covert government group known as the Third Agency was also engaged in dividing and destabilising the Sikh movement through the use of undercover officers, paid informants and agents provocateurs. Bhindranwale himself always kept a revolver and wore a cartridge belt and encouraged his followers to be armed. However, a Chandigarh officer in an interview with the December 1983 issue of India Today explained that the worst offense Bhindranwale could be accused of was "harsh speech rhetoric." Tohra then convinced the high priest to allow Bhindranwale to reside in Akal Takht. On 15 December 1983, Bhindranwale and his supporters moved to the Akal Takht complex and began fortifying the complex with sand bags and light weaponry. Longowal attempted to block the move by persuading Giani Kirpal Singh, then Jathedar (head priest) of the Akal Takht, to use his authority and issue a Hukamnama (edict) disallowing Bhindranwale from relocating to the complex. The temple high priest protested this move as a sacrilege since no Guru or leader ever resided in Akal Takht that too on the floor above Granth Sahib but Tohra agreed to prevent Bhindranwale's arrest, In the end, while Giani Kirpal Singh did protest the move, Bhindranwale's was permitted to relocate. as Bhindranwale believed that the Morcha leader Longowal was negotiating with the government for his arrest. By December 1983, Bhindranwale and his followers, now joined by senior ex-military personnel like Major general Shabeg Singh, retired Major General J.S. Bhullar, retired Brigadier Mohinder Singh, and others, had made the Golden Temple complex an armoury and headquarters, fortifying it with sandbags in preparation for a siege. However, Bhindranwale presented himself, along with over 50 of his supporters, at the Deputy Commissioner's residence on the day he moved to the Darbar Sahib complex, revealing his purpose in moving there was not to hide from the law, as the District Magistrate at Amritsar, until shortly before the invasion, was on record as having assured the Governor of the state that he could arrest anyone in Darbar Sahib at any time, though not seeing a need to. Lala's paper had had a "shrill tone when reporting on Sikh issues," and "was widely dubbed pro-Hindu," with its "tone" changing only subsequently.
The Babbar Khalsa were opposed to Bhindranwale and his initial strategy of opting to join the Akalis' protest movement for Punjab's rights instead of immediately pursuing more militant means; it was more focused on propagating its view of Sikh religious life than on politics and states' rights, and contested with Bhindranwale for dominance of the movement. The rivalry intensified in April and May 1984, with the two groups blaming each other for several assassinations. Bhindranwale would subsequently be regarded as the head of the movement.
Hitlist claims
Stories of a "hitlist" had begun to circulate after Atwal's death, much of which was "exaggerated." While admitting the absence of evidence of such from either themselves or "anyone [they had] talked to," Tully and Jacob asserted its existence. Tavleen Singh surmised the existence of the "hitlist" when Bichu Ram, a police officer who had hacked off the beard of a Sikh named Lehar Singh and sent him to Bhindranwale as a challenge, was killed six months later.
According to police records, up until Blue Star, the number of people killed or injured in "terrorist violence" exceeded just "fifty persons." This included both police agents and informants as well as Hindus; among them were Arya Samaj communalist editor Lala Jagat Narain, his son and successor, managing editor Ramesh Chander, and BJP MLA Harbans Lal Khanna. Police assassinations included Deputy Superintendent of Police Bachan Singh, who along with A.S. Atwal had harassed Amrik Singh when he went to complain to the Punjab governor in Amritsar about the detainment of Bhindranwale's associates. After the governor expressed annoyance at the local officers, Bachan Singh had put Amrik Singh in custody and mistreated him in retaliation, trying to frame him for the Nirankari Gurbachan Singh murder. A third police official involved, D.R. Bhatti, narrowly escaped assassination. Earlier, two of Bhindranwale's men, Kulwant and Gurmit, had been killed in encounters.
Other assassinations included Bua Das on 7 February 1983, a Central Interrogation Agency inspector at Gurdaspur who was held responsible for harassing Sikhs in Gurdaspur and breaking the limbs of a number of Sikh youth in custody, as well as Inderpal Gupta, president of the Hindu Suraksha Samiti communalist group, killed in clashes on 17 April 1984.
While authorities blamed the Akalis and militants for the "deteriorating law and order," despite police ruthlessness against it, the Centre refused all inquiries or reports on the situation demanded by the Akalis and opposition parties. When opposition leaders, agitated over news reports, demanded action against Bhindranwale, union home minister P.C. Sethi produced a list of 45 suspects in GT complex in the House on 17 November 1983. When asked by an MP why Bhindranwale's name was not included, Sethi replied that such proclamations were made by the courts, independents of government whims, remaining silent when asked if the Centre had approached any court for such a proclamation.
The government itself, in order to justify starting Operation Blue Star on such a high-capacity religious day, would make such claims of intercepting communications that Bhindranwale and Shabeg Singh had instructed their followers to start killing Hindus in villages, all Punjabi MPs and members of the State Assembly "en masse" on 5 June 1984, allegations that the government would never give any hard evidence for.
On 14 April 1984 Surinder Singh Sodhi was killed while drinking tea in a shop in Amritsar by Surinder Singh Shinda and Baljit Kaur. Baljit Kaur had attempted to assassinate Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale on April 13, but backed out. Baljit Kaur, would go to the Golden Temple after the killing and confessed to the murder. Baljit Kaur would be interrogated by Bhidnranwale. She would allegedly admit to the other killer being her boyfriend Surinder Singh Shinda and to being paid 200,000 rupees by Gurcharan Singh, the general secretary of Akali Dal led by Harchand Singh Longowal, to do the killing. She also implicated others. Bhindranwale in a speech would say, "They (Akali Dal) killed our young men. They severed my right arm... I know what role that... played in seeking vergency for the martyrs". Longowal feared that he would be killed and managed to have Babbar Khalsa side with him. 130 Akali leaders and 40 SGPC members revolted against Longowal and sided with Bhindranwale. With this Akali Dal under Longowal and Indira Gandhi agreed they had to 'neutralize' Bhindranwale. running sand-model exercises for the attack on a Golden Temple replica in the Doon Valley over 18 months prior, Bhindranwale's military advisor, viewed the request as "very strange" and advised against the use of military force considering the sanctity of the complex and potential repercussions. The Sikhs would ultimately withdraw, believing they had seen a commando unit move into the city. On 26 May, Tohra informed the government that Bhindranwale, who was convinced of the need to fight for Sikh rights, was beyond political maneuverings and in talks with state governor B. D. Pande, agreed to Bhindranwale's arrest, provided that the Darbar Sahib was not entered. though likely having not comprehended the severity of the impending attack. As Gandhi had no intention of implementing the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and feared the loss of Hindu electoral support, and as the Akali Dal also feared losing power, as over 40 SGPC members and 130 Akali leaders, including former legislators, had revolted against Longowal's leadership in favor of Bhindranwale, Akali Dal and central government interests had finally converged. Faced with imminent army action and with Longowal abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it".
Chandan Mitra wrote after observing the insurgency:
Negotiations
- Amarinder Singh, who had a close relationship with Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi, met with Bhindranwale on behalf of the government in 1982, serving as an MP in the Lok Sabha at the time. After abortive attempts to set up meetings between Bhindranwale and Indira Gandhi in Punjab and Delhi, as neither was willing to leave their territories, Amarinder Singh, on Bhindranwale's request, was able to arrange a meeting between Bhindranwale and Rajiv Gandhi in Punjab, also a Congress MP at the time who agreed to meet. Two meetings were planned, though neither took place as Rajiv failed to appear both times; both Amarinder and Rajiv had been summoned back by Indira each time as they were about to embark from Safdarjung Airport in Delhi. Amarinder believes that intelligence agencies induced Indira to interfere in the occurrence of both meetings.
Amarinder nevertheless continued efforts to keep negotiations with other parties going, often flying from Delhi to Punjab in a series of what the government called "secret talks" to continue to meet Bhindranwale and Longowal on various occasions, right up until the army operation. His 2017 autobiography states that:
On Bhindranwale's objectives, Amarinder states,
- During the days before the assault, government representatives, led by Ambassador Daljit Singh Pannun, met with Bhindranwale in a last-ditch effort to avert the army operation, which Bhindranwale had agreed to initiate dialogue toward. The documentation of the reports sent to the central government before Operation Blue Star reads, “We ended this meeting in utmost cordiality and understanding and were happy at the outcome. In fact, I found there was nothing that would frighten the government of India, nor anyone else.” Puri had personally met Bhindranwale, approached by fellow journalist Jatindra Tuli on behalf of Rajiv Gandhi for help in achieving a settlement with Bhindranwale, describing this as "not a new disclosure" but one that had been subsequently ignored. Puri met Rajiv Gandhi in the residence of Romi Chopra and consented to help, and through his brother General Prikshat Puri, contacted Bhindranwale's elder brother Captain Harcharan Singh Rode, decorated for valour in the 1965 war, who served under General Puri.
Agreeing to cooperate, Rode escorted Rajinder Puri from Rode's post in Jalandhar to Amritsar to meet Bhindranwale, where Bhindranwale was assured through Rode that Puri spoke for the government. During the course of the hour-long conversation, Bhindranwale agreed to abide with the terms of a settlement to be discussed between Puri and Longowal, also housed in the temple complex, and asked Bhindranwale to confine himself to Sikh spiritual and religious matters, which Bhindranwale also agreed to.
- Indian politician Subramanian Swamy met Bhindranwale multiple times, stayed with him for several days, and closely observed the developments in Punjab during the 1990s. He has remained adamant that Bhindranwale had never demanded Khalistan, and that the USSR was the main force behind the disinformation campaign that would lead to Operation Blue Star, aided by state politicians like Harkishan Singh Surjeet of the CPI, who according to Swamy had conveyed a message to the USSR warning that increased Sikh religiosity in Punjab would cause the decline of Communist politics in the state. Swamy contends that the USSR sought to make India more dependent on them against Pakistan as it expanded southward from its position in Afghanistan at the time. Later disclosures from declassified Soviet documents would confirm the role that the Soviets had played in feeding Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, her perceived successor, misinformation about a secessionist movement supposedly being fomented by foreign entities:
The forged document was presented to Gandhi on 13 May 1982. Later that year Yuri Andropov, shortly after becoming the leader of the USSR, approved a proposal by KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov to fabricate further Pakistani intelligence documents detailing ISI plans to foment religious disturbances in Punjab and promote the creation of Khalistan as an independent Sikh state, to be passed to the Indian ambassador in Pakistan. The KGB appeared by now "supremely confident that it could continue to deceive her indefinitely with fabricated reports of CIA and Pakistani conspiracies against her," and would go on to successfully persuade Rajiv Gandhi, presumed to be Indira Gandhi's successor by 1983, of CIA subversion in Punjab, as the Dharam Yudh Morcha continued, and the USSR, like the CPI, "quickly expressed full understanding of the steps taken by the Indian government to curb terrorism" when she ordered Operation Blue Star, and "once again, Mrs. Gandhi took seriously Soviet claims of secret CIA support for the Sikhs." Calling Bhindranwale a friend, and referring to his frequent press conferences and open meetings with dignitaries, he has controversially always refused to term him a terrorist, saying that "only declassification of files can uncover the truth." although he often emphasized the separate identity of the Sikhs. Bhindranwale stated his position on Khalistan, a movement which was first introduced in concept during the 1946 independence negotiations. During interviews with domestic and foreign journalists and public speeches through his phrase that "Sikh ik vakhri qaum hai" (or, "Sikhism is a distinct nation"), using the word 'Qaum' (nation, people, or also religion) when referring to the Sikh population of Punjab, though others have argued that "national" is a mistranslation of 'qaum,' as India was a nation of various races and 'qaums.' In a speech given by Bhindranwale on 27 March 1983:
While Bhindranwale never explicitly supported Khalistan, adding that the Sikhs would opt for a separate state only if they were discriminated against and were not respected in India, or if their distinct Sikh identity was in any way threatened. In regards to the idea of the Indian government attacking the Darbar Sahib, he stated, "if the Indian Government invaded the Darbar Sahib complex, the foundation for an independent Sikh state will have been laid."
In his final interview to Subhash Kirpekar, Bhindranwale stated that "Sikhs can neither live in India nor with India. If treated as equals it may be possible. But frankly speaking I don't think that is possible." Kuldip Brar, who would later head Operation Blue Star, would subsequently put forth that per the Indian intelligence sources in early June 1984, there was a "strong feeling" and "some sort of information" among the government that Bhindranwale was supposedly planning to declare Khalistan an independent country any moment with support from Pakistan, that Khalistani currency had allegedly already been distributed, and that this declaration would have increased chances of Punjab Police and security personnel siding with Bhindranwale.
In later disclosures from former R&AW special secretary G.B.S. Sidhu, R&AW itself helped "build the Khalistan legend," actively participated in the planning of Operation Blue Star. While posted in Ottawa, Canada in 1976 to look into the "Khalistan problem" among the Sikh diaspora, Sidhu found "nothing amiss" during the three years he was there, stating that "Delhi was unnecessarily making a mountain of a molehill where none existed," that the agency created seven posts in West Europe and North America in 1981 to counter non-existent Khalistan activities, and that the deployed officers were "not always familiar with the Sikhs or the Punjab issue."
Khushwant Singh had written that "considerable Khalistan sentiment seems to have arisen since the raid on the temple, which many Sikhs, if not most, have taken as a deep offense to their religion and their sensibilities," referring to the drastic change in community sentiments after the army attack. Bhindranwale was killed in the operation. Army officers and soldiers commented on 'the courage and commitment' of the followers of Bhindranwale who died in action; General J. S. Aurora, who had been the commanding officer of two of the operation's commanding officers, would admit that the militants had "taken every advantage of their defensive positions, and fought valiantly and skillfully." Bhindranwale had been wounded in his abdomen and the right-side of his face.
Army action in the Punjab, which had been discussed as early as December 1983 to consolidate Hindu votes for Congress, began on 3 June, the day of Longowal's planned morcha. Punjab's borders were sealed off and intrastate movement was disabled by the troop presence, with the water and electricity supply to the Golden Temple cut off. Exploratory fire was attempted on 4 June, with army commandos and CS gas proving ineffective on 5 June. The use of tanks on the complex began on 6 June, with tanks, helicopters, and other means used to deter the thousands of upset villagers attempting to gather in Amritsar, along with any other attempted gathering at over 125 other gurdwaras which had been taken over preemptively by the state. The main action was concluded by 6 June, in which a large number of pilgrims, including women and children, had been killed, and young men shot, by incensed troops who had entered the complex, with their hands tied back with their own turbans, with others dying of suffocation in the guest rooms set up as detainment camps. The operation resulted in 700 army casualties and 5,000 civilian deaths.
According to Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar, who commanded the operation, the body of Bhindranwale was identified by a number of agencies, including the police, the Intelligence Bureau and militants in the Army's custody.
In 2016, The Week quoted former members of the confidential Special Group (SG) of India's Research and Analysis Wing as stating that SG had killed Bhindranwale using AK-47 rifles during Operation Blue Star, despite the Para SF claiming responsibility for it.
Legacy
Cynthia Keppley Mahmood wrote in Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants that Bhindranwale never learned English but mastered Punjabi. He was adept at television, radio and press interviews. Keppley further stated that "those who knew him personally uniformly report his general likability and ready humour as well his dedication to Sikhism". The author further states that "Largely responsible for launching Sikh militancy, he is valorized by militants and demonised by enemies and the accounts from the two divergent sources seem to refer to two completely different persons."
Though journalist Khushwant Singh was opposed to Bhindranwale, he allowed that the Sikh preacher-become-activist genuinely made no distinction between higher and lower castes, and that he had restored thousands of drunken or doped Sikh men, inured to pornographic films, to their families, and that Operation Blue Star had given the movement for Khalistan its first martyr in Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In 2003, at a function arranged by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, at Akal Takht Amritsar under the vision of president SGPC Prof. Kirpal Singh Badungar and Singh Sahib Giani Joginder Singh Vedanti, former jathedar of the Akal Takht made a formal declaration that Bhindranwale was a "martyr" and awarded his son, Ishar Singh, a robe of honour. Harbans Singh's The Encyclopedia of Sikhism describes Bhindranwale as "a phenomenal figure of modern Sikhism".
In popular culture
A movie named Dharam Yudh Morcha, released in 2016, was based on Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, mostly depicting the Sikhs' struggle for preserving Punjabi language and the Anandpur Sahib resolution. Though the movie was banned to avoid controversy, it is available on online platforms.
See also
- Amrik Singh
- Shabeg Singh
- 1984 Sikh Massacre
Notes
References
Bibliography
- Dilgeer, Harjinder Singh (2011) Sikh History in 10 volumes (vol. 7, 9), Waremme, Sikh University Press
- Singh, Sangat (1999) The Sikhs in History, New Delhi, Uncommon Books
External links
- June 6, 1984 BBC broadcast of Indian troops raiding the Golden Temple
- "Oh, That Other Hindu Riot of Passage – an article by Khushwant Singh
