thumb|[[American flag crossed with the Iranian opposition flag]]
Relations between Iran and the United States in the modern day are unsettled and have a troubled history. They began in the mid-to-late 19th century, when Iran was known to the Western world as Qajar Persia. Persia was very wary of British and Russian colonial interests during the Great Game. By contrast, the United States was seen as a more trustworthy foreign power, and the Americans Arthur Millspaugh and Morgan Shuster were even appointed treasurers-general by the Shahs of the time. During World War II, Iran was invaded by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, both U.S. allies, but relations continued to be positive after the war until the later years of the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was overthrown by a coup organized by the Central Intelligence Agency and aided by MI6. This was followed by an era of close alliance between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's authoritarian regime and the U.S. government, which was in turn followed by a dramatic reversal and disagreement between the two countries after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
The two nations have had no formal diplomatic relations since April 7, 1980. Instead, Pakistan serves as Iran's protecting power in the United States, while Switzerland serves as the United States' protecting power in Iran. Contacts are carried out through the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. In August 2018, the former Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei banned direct talks with the United States. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Iran has since attempted to assassinate U.S. officials and dissidents, including U.S. president Donald Trump.
Iranian explanations for the animosity with the United States include "the natural and unavoidable conflict between the Islamic system" and "such an oppressive power as the United States, which is trying to establish a global dictatorship and further its own interests by dominating other nations and trampling on their rights", as well as the United States' support for Israel ("the Zionist entity"). In the West, however, various explanations have been considered, The United States attributes the worsening of relations to the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis,
Since 1995, the United States has had an embargo on trade with Iran. Relations tend to improve when the two countries have overlapping goals, such as repelling Sunni militants during the Iraq War and the intervention against the Islamic State in the region. In 2015, the United States led successful negotiations for a nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) intended to place substantial limits on Iran's nuclear program, including IAEA inspections and limitations on enrichment levels. In 2016, most sanctions against Iran were lifted. The Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal and re-imposed sanctions in 2018, initiating what became known as the "maximum pressure campaign" against Iran. In response, Iran gradually reduced its commitments under the nuclear deal and eventually exceeded pre-JCPOA enrichment levels. The Biden administration did not relax the economic sanctions against Iran, and instead implemented more measures. The second Trump administration reimposed the "maximum pressure" approach on Iran. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent labelled the collapse of the Iranian currency in December 2025 as the "grand culmination" of this strategy.
On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched a joint attack on various sites in Iran, beginning a war between the three countries. The operation, codenamed Roaring Lion by Israel and Operation Epic Fury by the United States Department of Defense, targeted key officials, military commanders, facilities and was aimed at regime change. The attack included the assassination of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei.
History
Early relations
American newspapers in the 1720s were uniformly pro-Iranian, especially during the revolt of Afghan emir Mahmud Hotak () against the Safavid dynasty.
Political relations between Qajar Persia and the United States began when the Shah of Iran, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Iran's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan, to Washington, D.C. in 1856. In 1883, Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran; however, ambassadorial relations were not established until 1944.
During the Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1909, American Howard Baskerville died in Tabriz while fighting with a militia in a battle against royalist forces. After the Iranian parliament appointed United States financier Morgan Shuster as Treasurer General of Iran in 1911, an American was killed in Tehran by gunmen thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more active in supporting the Constitutional Revolution of Iran financially.
Arthur Millspaugh, an American economic adviser, was sent to Persia in 1923 as a private citizen to help reform its inefficient administration. His presence was seen by Persians as a means to attract foreign investment and counterbalance European influence. The mission ended in 1928 after Millspaugh fell out of favor with the shah.
Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the U.S. as a "third force" in their struggle to expel British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Iran's drive to modernize its economy and to expel British and Russian influence from the country.
Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's Cossack Brigade, came to power after leading a British-backed coup in 1921 that overthrew the Qajar dynasty. He later declared himself shah (king) and took the name Reza Pahlavi.
thumb|right|The [[Allies of World War II|Allied "Big Three" at the 1943 Tehran Conference]]
After a dispute over German influence during World War II, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1941 and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. At the 1943 Tehran Conference, the Allied "Big Three"—Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill—issued the Tehran Declaration to guarantee the post-war independence and boundaries of Iran. In 1949, the Constituent Assembly of Iran gave the shah the power to dissolve the parliament. When the Cold War began, the United States was alarmed by the attempt by the Soviet Union to set up separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as well as its demand for military rights to the Dardanelles in 1946. This fear was enhanced by the loss of China to communism, the uncovering of Soviet spy rings, and the start of the Korean War.
Prime minister Mossadeq
In 1951, Iran nationalised its oil industry, effectively seizing the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). On April 28, 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected as Prime Minister by the Parliament of Iran.
The British planned to retaliate by attacking Iran, but U.S. President Harry S. Truman pressed Britain to moderate its position in the negotiations and to not invade Iran. American policies fostered a sense in Iran that the United States supported Mossadeq, along with optimism that the oil dispute would soon be resolved through "a series of innovative proposals" that would provide Iran with "significant amounts of economic aid." Mossadeq visited Washington, and the American government made "frequent statements expressing support for him."
At the same time, the United States honored the British embargo and, without Truman's knowledge, the Central Intelligence Agency station in Tehran had been "carrying out covert activities" against Mosaddeq and the National Front "at least since the summer of 1952".
The coup d'état
thumb|150px|The Shah with [[Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959]]
In 1953, the U.S. and Britain orchestrated a coup to overthrow Iran's prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, fearing communist influence and economic instability after Iran nationalized its oil industry. The coup, led by the CIA and MI6, the Shah's brutal secret police, to maintain his rule. Many liberal Iranians believe that the coup and the subsequent U.S. support for the shah enabled the Shah's arbitrary rule, contributing to the "deeply anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution later.
After the coup, the United States played a central role in reorganizing Iran's oil sector. Under U.S. pressure, BP joined a consortium of Western companies to resume Iranian oil exports. The consortium operated on behalf of the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which retained formal ownership of Iran's oil and infrastructure. However, the consortium maintained operational control, barred Iranian oversight of its financial records, and excluded Iranians from its board. The agreement was part of a wider transition from British to American dominance in the region and worldwide.
While initially seen as a Cold War success, the coup later became a source of deep resentment, with critics calling it a blow to democracy and a lasting stain on U.S.-Iran relations.
U.S.–Shah alliance
thumb|200px|The Shah with [[John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara in 1961]]
Nuclear cooperation
In 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower launched Iran's nuclear program as part of Atoms for Peace program. In 1967, the U.S. helped Iran create its nuclear program by providing the Tehran Research Reactor, the nation's first nuclear reactor, as well as 5.58 kg of enriched uranium. Iran is one of the 51 original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968, and its Parliament ratified the treaty in February 1970.
Strategic alliance and geopolitical importance
thumb|President Lyndon Johnson welcoming the Shah at the White House while Iranians protest, 1967
Iran's border with the Soviet Union, and its position as the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, made Iran a "pillar" of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1960, Iran joined Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to form the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), aiming to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies and reclaim control over national oil resources. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably. Beginning in the mid-1960s, this development "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" while strengthening the Iranian state's power over its own population. By the 1970s, surging OPEC profits gave the group substantial leverage over Western economies and elevated Iran's strategic value as a U.S. ally.
Military cooperation and arms sales
Lee Driscoll and other historians have said that between 1969 and 1974 U.S. President Richard Nixon actively recruited the Shah as an American puppet and proxy. However, Richard Alvandi argues that it worked the other way around, with the Shah taking the initiative. President Nixon, who had first met the Shah in 1953, regarded him as a westernizing anticommunist statesman who deserved American support now that the British were withdrawing from the region. They met again in 1972 and the Shah agreed to buy large quantities of American military hardware, and took responsibility for ensuring political stability and fighting off Soviet subversion throughout the region. Permitting Iran to purchase U.S. arms served Cold War objectives by securing the Shah's alignment with Washington after Iran had briefly explored Soviet alternatives in the 1960s, while also benefiting the American economy. However, because of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo against the United States, oil prices became very high. This enabled the shah to buy more advanced weaponry than U.S. officials had expected, which caused concern in Washington.
Cultural and academic relations
thumb|150px|The Shah with [[Richard Nixon in 1969]]
Cultural relations between the two countries remained cordial until 1979. Pahlavi University, Sharif University of Technology, and Isfahan University of Technology, three of Iran's top academic universities, were directly modeled on private American institutions such as the University of Chicago, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania. The Shah was generous in awarding American universities with financial gifts. For example, the University of Southern California received an endowed chair of petroleum engineering, and a million-dollar donation was given to the George Washington University to create an Iranian Studies program. Negotiations over American nuclear exports to Iran faltered as Ford insisted on additional safeguards beyond those required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the Shah rejected as an infringement on Iran's sovereignty.
In 1975, President Ford approved a plan allowing Iran to process U.S. nuclear materials and purchase a plutonium reprocessing facility. Henry Kissinger later described it as a commercial deal with an ally, with no discussion of weapons concerns. In 1976, the U.S. covertly supported Saudi Arabia's move to drive down oil prices, undercutting Iran's revenues. By 1977, Iran had garnered unfavorable publicity in the international community for its bad human rights record. That year, the Shah responded to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the Shah's regime.
Carter angered anti-Shah Iranians with a New Year's Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he said:
<blockquote>Under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more.</blockquote>
Observers disagree over the nature of United States policy toward Iran under Carter as the Shah's regime crumbled. According to historian Nikki Keddie, the Carter administration followed "no clear policy" on Iran. The U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully". At the same time, officials in the State Department believed the revolution was unstoppable. After visiting the Shah in 1978, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse. Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in assurances that the Shah would receive military support.
Sociologist Charles Kurzman argues that the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'état".
Iranian Revolution
The Iranian/Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) ousted the Shah and replaced him with the anti-American Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The United States government State Department and intelligence services "consistently underestimated the magnitude and long-term implications of this unrest". Six months before the revolution culminated, the CIA had produced a report stating that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation."
Revolutionary students feared the power of the United States, particularly the CIA, to overthrow a new Iranian government. One source of this concern was a book by CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt Jr. titled Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. Many students had read excerpts from the book and thought that the CIA would attempt to implement this countercoup strategy.
Khomeini referred to America as the "Great Satan" and instantly got rid of the Shah's prime minister, replacing him with politician Mehdi Bazargan. Until this point, the Carter administration was still hoping for normal relationships with Iran, sending its National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The Islamic revolutionaries wished to extradite and execute the ousted Shah, and Carter refused to give him any further support or help return him to power. The Shah, suffering from terminal cancer, requested entry into the United States for treatment. The American embassy in Tehran opposed the request, as they were intent on stabilizing relations between the new interim revolutionary government of Iran and the United States. followed by his Executive Order 12170 froze about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. They were the first of a number of international sanctions against Iran.
thumb|right|Families wait for the former hostages to disembark the plane
The crisis ended with the Algiers Accords in January 1981. Under the terms of the agreement and Iran's compliance, the hostaged diplomats were allowed to leave Iran. One of the chief provisions of the Accords was that the United States would lift the freeze on Iranian assets and remove trade sanctions. The agreement also established the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague to handle claims brought by Americans against Iran, as well as claims by Iran against Americans and the former shah. In search for a new set or order in this region, Washington adopted a policy designed to contain both sides economically and militarily. During the second half of the Iran–Iraq War, the Reagan administration pursued several sanction bills against Iran; on the other hand, it established full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist government in Iraq by removing it from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984.<!-- back-up: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1230-04.htm --> The Iran–Iraq War ended with both agreeing to a ceasefire in 1988.
1983: Hezbollah bombings
Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shi'ite Islamist group, has carried out multiple anti-American attacks, including the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut (killing 63, including 17 Americans), the Beirut barracks bombing (killing 241 U.S. Marines), and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. U.S. courts have ruled Iran responsible for these attacks, with evidence showing Hezbollah operated under Iran's direction and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized the Khobar Towers bombing.
1983: Anti-communist purge
According to the Tower Commission report:
<blockquote>In 1983, the U.S. helped bring to the attention of Tehran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or pro-Soviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, that virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran.</blockquote>
Iran–Contra Affair
To evade congressional rules regarding an arms embargo, officials in President Ronald Reagan's administration arranged in the mid-1980s to sell arms to Iran in an attempt to improve relations and obtain their influence in the release of hostages held in Lebanon. Oliver North of the National Security Council diverted proceeds from the arms sale to fund anti-Marxist Contra rebels in Nicaragua. In November 1986, Reagan issued a statement denying the arms sales. One week later, he confirmed that weapons had been transferred to Iran, but denied that they were part of an exchange for hostages. The revelation that profits from the arms sales had been illegally funneled to the Contras created a major political scandal for Reagan.
Relevant background events during the first year of Bush's administration include the ending of the Iran–Iraq War and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. The next year, the American Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act, designed to prevent other countries from making large investments in Iranian energy. The act was denounced by the European CC as invalid.
Khatami and Iranian reformers
In January 1998, newly elected Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States. In the interview, Khatami invoked Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to explain similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded positively. This brought free travel between the countries as well as an end to the American embargo of Persian carpets and pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and support for terrorism.
Four members of the United States Congress: Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, Representative Gary Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in New York City with several Iranian leaders in August 2000. The Iranians included Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament); Maurice Motamed, a Jewish member of the Majlis; and three other Iranian parliamentarians.
George W. Bush administration 2001–2009
Iran–United States relations during the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) were marked by heightened tensions, mutual distrust, and periodic attempts at limited engagement. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Iran initially was sympathetic with the United States.
Relations deteriorated sharply after President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002, accusing the country of pursuing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the U.S. In 2003, Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann relayed an unofficial proposal to the U.S. outlining a possible "grand bargain" with Iran. He claimed it was developed in cooperation with Iran, but it lacked formal Iranian endorsement, and the Bush administration did not pursue the offer.
Between 2003 and 2008, Iran accused the United States of repeatedly violating its territorial sovereignty through drone incursions, covert operations, and support for opposition groups. In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. During his presidency, attempts at dialogue, including a personal letter to President Bush, were dismissed by U.S. officials, while public tensions grew over Iran's nuclear program, U.S. foreign policy, and Ahmadinejad's controversial remarks at international forums. The United States intensified covert operations against Iran, including alleged support for militant groups such as PEJAK and Jundullah, cross-border activities, and expanded CIA and Special Forces missions. Iran was repeatedly accused by the U.S. of arming and training Iraqi insurgents, including Shiite militias and groups linked to Hezbollah, with American officials citing captured weapons, satellite images, and detainee testimonies. During this period, additional flashpoints included the U.S. raid on Iran's consulate in Erbil, sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, a naval dispute in the Strait of Hormuz, and the public disclosure of covert action plans against Iran.
Obama administration 2009–2017
thumb|U.S. Secretary of State [[John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Lausanne, Switzerland to discuss the Iranian nuclear program, March 16, 2015]]
thumb|Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at the UN Headquarters in New York on April 19, 2016
Iran–United States relations during the Obama administration (2009–2017) were defined by a shift from confrontation to cautious engagement, culminating in the landmark nuclear agreement of 2015.
At the start of Obama's presidency, both sides exchanged public messages signaling a possible thaw, with Iran voicing long-standing grievances and the United States calling for mutual respect and responsibility. However, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election in 2009, which sparked mass protests and allegations of fraud, the United States responded with skepticism and concern. In late 2011 and early 2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and warned a U.S. aircraft carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. rejected the warning and maintained its naval presence, while experts doubted Iran's ability to sustain a blockade.
The 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, seen as a moderate, marked a shift in tone, with his outreach at the UN and a historic phone call with Obama signaling renewed diplomatic engagement. While high-level contact resumed and symbolic gestures were exchanged, conservative backlash in Iran highlighted internal divisions over rapprochement. In 2015, the United States and other world powers reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The agreement marked a major diplomatic achievement for the Obama administration, though it faced skepticism in Congress and mixed public support in the U.S.
Despite the JCPOA, tensions between the United States and Iran persisted over ballistic missile tests, continued U.S. sanctions, and European business hesitancy due to fear of U.S. penalties. The administration also faced criticism for its handling of these issues, both from Iran and from political opponents.
First Trump administration 2017–2021
Iran–United States relations during the first Trump administration (2017–2021) were marked by a sharp policy shift from Obama's engagement-oriented approach. Trump began with a travel ban affecting Iranian citizens, and withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). A broader maximum pressure campaign followed, with over 1,500 sanctions targeting Iran's financial, oil, and shipping sectors, as well as foreign firms doing business with Iran, severely damaging its economy. The effort aimed to isolate Iran but met with strong resistance—even from U.S. allies—and often left Washington diplomatically isolated.
Iran responded by threatening to resume unrestricted uranium enrichment; rejecting negotiations with the Trump administration, and intensified rhetoric. Tensions escalated in 2019 with U.S. intelligence reports of Iranian threats, attacks on oil tankers, the downing of a U.S. drone by Iran, and suspected Iranian strikes on Saudi oil facilities. President Trump called off retaliatory strikes, opting for cyberattacks and additional sanctions instead.
thumb|Iranians protest Donald Trump's [[United States recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel|Jerusalem declaration in Tehran, December 11, 2017]]
A major escalation followed a December 2019 rocket attack on the K-1 Air Base in Iraq, which led to American airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias and a retaliatory attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. On January 3, 2020, the U.S. assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in a drone strike, prompting Iranian missile attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and heightened fears of war. The crisis deepened with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane by Iranian forces and continued through early 2020 with retaliatory strikes and threats.
Later in 2020, Iran blamed U.S. sanctions for limiting its COVID-19 response. They launched a military satellite, and were later accused of interfering in the U.S. presidential election and proxy attacks. Relations ended under Trump with continued hostility and unresolved disputes.
Biden administration 2021–2025
Iran–United States relations during the Biden administration (2021–2025) were shaped by efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement alongside ongoing regional tensions, sanctions, cyberattacks, and proxy conflicts. Early in Joe Biden's presidency, U.S. officials expressed interest in returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but negotiations in Vienna eventually stalled. Iran increased uranium enrichment and imposed retaliatory sanctions, while the U.S. imposed new sanctions over missile programs, oil exports, and human rights abuses. which intensified following the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023, and by subsequent American retaliatory strikes. The period also saw disputes over the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, and military escalations across the Gulf region. In 2023, a breakthrough occurred with a U.S.–Iran prisoner swap and the release of frozen Iranian funds, though indirect diplomacy remained fragile. Iran was later accused of interfering in the 2024 U.S. presidential election through cyber operations and AI disinformation. Alleged assassination plots targeting Donald Trump and dissidents on U.S. soil further strained relations.
He signed the return of the Maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian government.
Trump called for talks for a nuclear peace agreement.
In the Friday prayer of February 7, Khamenei dismissed negotiations and stated that the Iranian government should not make a deal with the U.S. February 9, Trump said that he would rather make a deal with Iranians than let them be bombed by Israel.
In March 2025, Khamenei stated that he did not intend to negotiate with Trump. IRGC General Salami threatened United States military with devastation. Trump threatened he would hold Iranian regime to blame for any shots fired by Houthis.
Putin and Trump reached an agreement that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.
In April, Ali Larijani, advisor to Khamenei, threatened Trump that Iran would make nuclear weapons. Islamic Republic military allegedly had recommended a preemptively strike on U.S. military bases.
In April, Trump stated that Iranians want direct negotiations. Iran–United States negotiations began on April 12, 2025.
In April 2025, U.S. congressmen Joe Wilson and Jimmy Panetta introduced a 'Free Iraq from Iran' bill. The legislation mandates the development of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to irreversibly dismantle Iran-backed militias, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and calls for the suspension of U.S. assistance to Iraq until these militias are fully removed. The bill also imposes sanctions on Iraqi political and military figures aligned with Iran, and provides support for Iraqi citizens and independent media to expose abuses committed by these militias. Its primary objective is to restore Iraq's sovereignty and reduce Iranian dominance without resorting to direct military intervention.
In his speech during his May 2025 trip to Middle East, Trump called out the Iranians as the most destructive force and denounced the Iran leaders for having managed to be turning green fertile farmland and rolling blackouts calling on it to make a choice between war and violence and making a deal.
On June 7, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 individuals and 27 entities, including Iranian nationals and firms based in the UAE and Hong Kong. These targets include the Zarringhalam brothers, accused of laundering billions via shell companies tied to the IRGC and the Central Bank of Iran. The funds reportedly supported Iran's nuclear and missile programs, oil sales, and militant proxies.
Relations further worsened after Iranian authorities threatened to attack U.S. and allied bases in the Middle East if the former were to involve itself in the Iran–Israel war, after which the U.S. intervened in the Israeli attacks and bombed key Iranian nuclear sites.
On June 21, 2025, the U.S., under the orders of Trump, bombed three Iranian nuclear enrichment sites (Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan), briefly joining the Iran–Israel war. Following the attacks, Iran pulled out and suspended nuclear talks indefinitely.
thumb|US bases in the Middle East
During the 2025–2026 Iranian protests, Trump repeatedly stated to the Iranian authorities that the U.S. would "intervene" if the Iranian government did not halt its crackdown on protesters.
In January 2026, during the widespread and increasingly violent crackdown on nationwide protests in Iran, Trump stated that the U.S. was seriously considering a range of responses, including potential military options, if Iranian government actions crossed established "red lines". Trump said that the U.S. military was evaluating "very strong options" and that senior advisers were scheduled to discuss possible actions, while also noting that Iranian leaders had reached out for negotiations. Iranian officials stated that Iranian forces would retaliate against U.S. forces and allied interests in the region if U.S. forces attacked.
On January 16, 2026, Trump announced that the Iranian leadership had reportedly canceled over 800 planned executions. On January 27, 2026, following the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln to the region the day before, a multi-day U.S. aerial military drill in the region was announced.
On the same day Trump said: "There is another beautiful war fleet sailing toward Iran right now." In addition, The Pentagon ordered U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles that were deployed at Royal Air Force Lakenheath in Britain to move forward to American air bases in Jordan.
During the talks, the United States reportedly sought to address Iran's missile program and regional activities, whereas Iran emphasized that negotiations should remain limited to nuclear issues and sanctions relief. Both sides expressed commitment to continuing diplomatic engagement, though no immediate agreement was announced. Reports showed that Iran may have unbelievable flexibility towards further discussions in averting war.
The renewed dialogue was widely interpreted as an effort by both sides to prevent further escalation following the January tensions, amid concerns that miscalculation could lead to a broader regional confrontation.
2026 Iran war
thumb|Rescuers and residents searching through the rubble of the [[2026 Minab school attack|Minab girls' elementary school, destroyed by the United States]]
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale joint military operation against Iran, codenamed Operation Epic Fury by the U.S. and Operation Roaring Lion by Israel. Trump announced the operation in a video statement, stating the objectives were to destroy Iran's ballistic missile program, prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and ultimately bring about regime change in Iran. The Israeli Defense Forces stated that approximately 200 fighter jets struck around 500 targets across Iran, including air defense systems, missile launchers, and command-and-control facilities. Strikes were reported in at least 14 Iranian cities, including Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, and Kermanshah. An Iranian Red Crescent spokesperson reported that 24 of Iran's 31 provinces were affected, with at least 201 people killed, including Ali Khamenei, and 747 injured as of that evening.
On April 3, 2026, it was reported in Axios that the U.S. expelled Iran's deputy ambassador to the UN, in December 2025. The issue remained silenced as it concerned national security. The report said that deputy ambassador Saadat Aghajani was asked to leave the U.S. under "section 13 procedures", rather than declaring him persona non grata. On April 7, Katie Miller said that the U.S. was planning to revoke up to 4,000 visas of people with connections to the Iranian government.
Following Donald Trump's March 2026 assertion that it was not "appropriate" for Iran to participate in the 2026 World Cup due to safety concerns amid military conflict, the Iran national team issued a statement arguing that no one could exclude them and that the United States should instead be removed as host for failing to ensure the safety of participating teams.
In April 2026, U.S. special envoy Paolo Zampolli proposed that Italy replace Iran at the 2026 FIFA World Cup, prompting swift rejection from Italian officials who called the idea "not appropriate" and "shameful." Italian Sports Minister Andrea Abodi stated that qualification "must be earned on the pitch," while FIFA president Gianni Infantino reiterated that Iran would participate as scheduled.
On April 8, 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a provisional two-week ceasefire ahead of planned negotiations in Pakistan. As part of the agreement, Tehran stated it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic. Following the announcement of the conditional ceasefire, global oil prices experienced a sharp decline.
In April 2026, the Iranian-flagged container ship MV Touska was intercepted en route from Malaysia to Iran. According to Iranian sources and state media, the vessel was operating near the Gulf of Oman when it was targeted by United States naval forces as part of what they described as enforcement of a maritime blockade. Iranian reports stated that the ship was struck by the USS Spruance, which allegedly disabled its propulsion by firing on the engine room, after which U.S. Marines boarded and took control of the vessel. Iranian officials and media characterized the incident as an attack on a civilian commercial vessel and a violation of an existing ceasefire agreement.
According to statements from U.S. officials, the operation was conducted after warnings were issued to the vessel, which was alleged to be violating sanctions and attempting to breach a naval blockade. The U.S. administration stated that the ship was declared subject to sanctions and that its seizure was part of enforcement actions in the region. Iranian authorities further claimed that the incident triggered retaliatory actions in the region and cited it as evidence of a breakdown of the ceasefire arrangements.
According to data from Brown University's Iran War Energy Cost Tracker, as reported by Anadolu Agency on May 12, 2026, the war had cost American consumers more than $37.3 billion in additional energy prices since February 28, 2026.
According to a classified United States intelligence assessment from early May 2026, Iran has regained operational access to most of its missile sites. This includes 30 out of the 33 missile sites located along the Strait of Hormuz.
Economic relations
Trade between Iran and the United States reached $623 million in 2008. According to the United States Census Bureau, American exports to Iran reached $93 million in 2007 and $537 million in 2008. American imports from Iran decreased from $148 million in 2007 to $86 million in 2008. This data does not include trade conducted through third countries to circumvent the trade embargo. It has been reported that the United States Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 special licenses to American companies over the past decade to conduct business with Iran.
US exports to Iran include cigarettes (US$73 million); corn (US$68 million); chemical wood pulp, soda or sulfate (US$64 million); soybeans (US$43 million); medical equipment (US$27 million); vitamins (US$18 million); and vegetable seeds (US$12 million). In June 2013, the Obama administration expanded its sanctions against Iran, targeting its auto industry and, for the first time, its currency.
thumb|Fourth match between Iran and the U.S. during the [[2015 FIVB Volleyball World League]]
According to a 2014 study by the National Iranian American Council, sanctions cost the U.S. over $175 billion in lost trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities.
According to Business Monitor International:
On April 22, 2019, under the Trump administration, the U.S. demanded that buyers of Iranian oil stop purchases or face economic penalties, announcing that the six-month sanction exemptions for China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey instated a year prior would not be renewed and would end by May 1. The move was seen as an attempt to completely stifle Iran's oil exports. Iran insisted the sanctions were illegal and that it had attached "no value or credibility" to the waivers. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said President Trump's decision not to renew the waivers showed his administration was "dramatically accelerating our pressure campaign in a calibrated way that meets our national security objectives while maintaining well supplied global oil markets". On April 30, Iran stated it would continue to export oil despite U.S. pressure.
On May 8, 2019, exactly one year after the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the U.S. imposed a new layer of duplicate sanctions on Iran, targeting its metal exports, a sector that generates 10 percent of its export revenue. The move came amid escalating tension in the region and just hours after Iran threatened to start enriching more uranium if it did not get relief from U.S. measures that are crippling its economy. The Trump administration has said the sanctions will only be lifted if Iran fundamentally changes its behavior and character.
On June 24, 2019, following continued escalations in the Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump announced new targeted sanctions against Iranian and IRGC leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his office. IRGC targets included Naval commander Alireza Tangsiri, Aerospace commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and Ground commander Mohammad Pakpour, and others. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the sanctions will block "billions" in assets.
The U.S. Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network imposed a measure that further prohibits the U.S. banking system from use by an Iranian bank, thereby requiring U.S. banks to step up due diligence on the accounts in their custody.
The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blacklisted four Iranian metal sector organizations along with their foreign subsidiaries, on July 23, 2020. One German subsidiary and three in the United Arab Emirates—owned and controlled by Iran's biggest steel manufacturer, Mobarakeh Steel Company—were also blacklisted by Washington for yielding millions of dollars for Iran's aluminum, steel, iron, and copper sectors. The sanctions froze all U.S. assets controlled by the companies in question and further prohibited Americans from associating with them.
On October 8, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department placed sanctions on 18 Iranian banks. Any American connection to these banks is to be blocked and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and, 45 days after the sanctions take effect, anyone transacting with these banks may "be subject to an enforcement action." Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the goal was to pressure Iran to end nuclear activities and terrorist funding.
On October 30, 2020, it was revealed that the U.S. had "seized Iranian missiles shipped to Yemen", and it had "sold 1.1 million barrels of previously seized Iranian oil that was bound for Venezuela" in two shipments: the Liberia-flagged Euroforce and Singapore-flagged Maersk Progress, and sanctioned 11 new Iranian entities.
In February 2026, Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing tariffs of up to 25 percent on nations engaged in trade with Iran. The policy focuses on Iran's commercial partners rather than the country itself and aims to reduce international transactions with Iran, even as diplomatic talks continued.
Public opinion
Iranians
Research has shown that most Iranians hold a positive attitude about the American people, though not the U.S. government.
According to a 2019 survey by IranPoll, 13% of Iranians have a favorable view of the United States, with 86% expressing an unfavourable view, the most unfavorable perception of the United States in the world.
According to the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy report Iranian Public Opinion in the Early Days of the Pezeshkian Administration released in May 2025, public opinion in Iran toward the United States has shifted significantly over time. According to survey data, the perception of America as a dangerous country increased from 46% in 2005 to 66% in 2019, before slightly declining to 64% in March 2024. Conversely, views of the United States as a model country for its values and freedoms declined sharply, from 37% in 2005 to 12% in 2019 and further to 9% in 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who considered America to be no better or worse than other countries rose steadily, from 14% in 2005 to 20% in 2019 and 25% in March 2024, indicating a gradual normalization alongside persistent negative perceptions.
Americans
In NORC polling conducted in 1952 ahead of the coup d'état the following year, 35% of Americans said that it would matter a "great deal" if communists took control of Iran. Public concern about Iran was generally limited before the 1979 Iran hostage crisis. After the September 11 attacks made much of the public fearful of future acts of terrorism, concerns about Iran intensified. In 2004, 58% of Americans said that they felt that Iran posed a long-term threat to the United States. Many Americans at the time viewed Iran unfavorably and thought it posed a threat to the United States and other countries.
According to a 2013 BBC World Service poll, 5% of Americans view Iranian influence positively, with 87% expressing a negative view, the most unfavorable perception of Iran in the world.
According to a 2026 Gallup poll, only 13% of Americans have favorable opinions of Iran, while 79% have an unfavorable opinion. This was the second most negative ranking Americans gave out of the 21 foreign countries surveyed.
See also
- Foreign relations of Iran
- Foreign relations of the United States
- Embassy of Iran, Washington, D.C.
- Embassy of the United States, Tehran
- Ambassadors of Iran to the United States
- Ambassadors of the United States to Iran
- 2026 United States F-15E rescue operation in Iran
References
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Further reading
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- Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. and Abbas Maleki, Iran's Foreign Policy After September 11. Booksurge, 2008.
- Aliyev, Tural. "The Evaluation of the Nuclear Weapon Agreement with Iran in the Perspective of the Difference Between Obama and Trump's Administration." R&S-Research Studies Anatolia Journal 4.1: 30–40. online
- Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2016).
- Blight, James G. and Janet M. Lang, et al. Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).
- Chitsazian, Mohammad Reza, and Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi. "An Iranian Perspective on Iran–US Relations: Idealists Versus Materialists." Strategic Analysis 43.1 (2019): 28–41. online
- Clinton, Hillary Rodham. Hard Choices (2014) under Obama; pp 416–446.
- Collier, David R. Democracy and the nature of American influence in Iran, 1941-1979 (Syracuse University Press, 2017.)
- Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 2011, .
- Cordesman, Anthony H. "Iran and US Strategy: Looking beyond the JCPOA." (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021). online
- Cottam, Richard W. "Human rights in Iran under the Shah." Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 12 (1980): 121+ online.
- Cottam, Richard W. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (1988) on the fall of the Shah
- Crist, David. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, Penguin Press, 2012.
- Cronin, Stephanie. The making of modern Iran: state and society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941 (Routledge, 2003).
- Emery, Christian. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. "U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat in Iran during the Mossadegh Era." Journal of Cold War Studies 21.3 (2019): 185–221. online
- Ghazvinian, John. America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present (2021), a major scholarly history excerpt
- Harris, David. The Crisis: the President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam, (2004).
- Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein. Iran: The Untold Story: An Insider's Account of America's Iranian Adventure and Its Consequences for the Future. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
- Johns, Andrew L. "The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of US-Iranian Relations, 1965–1967: 'Tired of Being Treated like a Schoolboy'." Journal of Cold War Studies 9.2 (2007): 64–94. online
- Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh (2023). Heroes to Hostages: America and Iran, 1800–1988. Cambridge University Press.
- Katzman, Kenneth. Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy. (2017).
- Kinch, Penelope. "The Iranian Crisis and the Dynamics of Advice and Intelligence in the Carter Administration." Journal of Intelligence History 6.2 (2006): 75–87.
- Ledeen, Michael A., and William H. Lewis. "Carter and the fall of the Shah: The inside story." Washington Quarterly 3.2 (1980): 3–40.
- Leverett, Flynt: Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic (Picador, 2013)
- Mabon, Simon. "Muting the trumpets of sabotage: Saudi Arabia, the US and the quest to securitize Iran." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 45.5 (2018): 742–759. online
- Moens, Alexander. "President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah." Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (1991): 211–237. online
- Offiler, Ben. US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah (Springer, 2015).
- Offiler, Ben. ""A spectacular irritant": US–Iranian relations during the 1960s and the World's Best Dressed Man." The Historian (2021): 1-23, about Khaibar Khan Gudarzian. online
- Rostam-Kolayi, Jasamin. "The New Frontier Meets the White Revolution: The Peace Corps in Iran, 1962‒76." Iranian Studies 51.4 (2018): 587–612.
- Saikal, Amin. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (2019)
- Shannon, Michael K. "American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era," Diplomatic History 39 (Sept. 2015), 661–88.
- Shannon, Michael K. Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War (2017) excerpt
- Summitt, April R. "For a white revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran." Middle East Journal 58.4 (2004): 560–575. online
- Torbat, Akbar E. "A Glance at US Policies toward Iran: Past A_GLANCE_AT_US_POLICIES_TOWARD_IRAN and Present," Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 2004), pp. 85–94.
- Waehlisch, Martin. "The Iran-United States Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 37 (Spring 2012), pp. 23–34.
- Wise, Harold Lee. Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).
- Wright, Steven. The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror. (Ithaca Press, 2007).
Historiography
- Schayegh, Cyrus. "'Seeing Like a State': An Essay on the Historiography of Modern Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42#1 (2010): 37–61.
- Shannon, Kelly J. "Approaching the Islamic World". Diplomatic History 44.3 (2020): 387–408, historical focus on US views of Iran.
- Shannon, Matthew K. "Reading Iran: American academics and the last shah." Iranian Studies 51.2 (2018): 289–316. online
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External links
- Timeline – The New York Times
- Virtual Embassy of the United States in Iran
- Articles and debates about Iran by Council on Foreign Relations
- US-Iran Relations by parstimes.com
- United States Policy toward Iran: a Dossier
;Videos
- On The Same Page: America's Middle East Allies and Regional Threats – Foundation for Defense of Democracies – January 15, 2021
