The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene. The accord was expected to resolve the Sri Lankan Civil War by enabling the thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka and the Provincial Councils Act of 1987. Under the terms of the agreement, Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms.

Notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (which at the time was one of the strongest Tamil forces), had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further complicating the return to peace, a Marxist insurgency began in the south of the island in response to public discontent to the IPKF.

Background

right|thumb|Location of [[Sri Lanka]]

Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly violent ethnic strife. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the independence of the island from Britain in 1948. At the time, a Sinhala majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were deemed discriminatory against the substantial Tamil minority population. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started agitation for a separate state of Tamil Eelam within the system in a federal structure in the north and eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, the enactment of the sixth amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional, effectively rendering the TULF ineffective. According to Laskar, this threat came in two ways: On the one hand external powers could take advantage of the situation to establish their base in Sri Lanka thus posing a threat to India, on the other hand, the LTTE's dream of a sovereign Tamil Eelam comprising all the Tamil-inhabited areas (of Sri Lanka and India) posed a threat to India's territorial integrity. and later under Rajiv Gandhi, provided support to Tamil interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas in Tamil Nadu of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in South India, as well as India's regional security and interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United States, Pakistan, and China. In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up and in 1987,Operation Liberation was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as ground attack aircraft. As civilian casualties grew, calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports of the use of aerial attacks against rebel positions in predominantly civilian areas. but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.

Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna and the rebel occupied Jaffna Fort. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force under cover of heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation. It was also indicated to the ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a symbolic act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve Rajiv Gandhi's credibility.

Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary population at home, the Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. that brought a temporary truce.

Peace accord

Among the salient points of the agreement, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included

Reaction

On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by Leading Rate Vijitha Rohana at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north and defeated the LTTE at cost of thousands of Tamil civilian casualties. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.

The validity of the Indo-Lanka Accord has been questioned by Sri Lankan politicians citing various reasons. In 2020 Minister of Public Security Sarath Weerasekara claimed as India failed to disarm the LTTE the agreement is no longer valid and Sri Lanka is not bound to uphold the agreement on provincial councils.

Books

  • Ramakrishnan, T. (2018), Ore Inapirachinayum Ore Oppandhamum, The Hindu Publishing Group (in Tamil)

See also

  • India–Sri Lanka relations
  • Vijitha Rohana
  • Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka

References

  • Full Text of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
  • Text of all peace accords for Sri Lanka
  • Muslims have a Case in Sri Lanka
  • Indo-Sri Lanka trade: Hype and reality
  • Sri Lanka: The Untold Story – Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord, Asia Times
  • PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA --- WITH AND WITHOUT MEDIATION
  • ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A SURVEY
  • Dr. PC Alexander, former Principal Secretary of Rajiv Gandhi – bares it all on the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987
  • "Peace for all with equal rights"Minister
  • Wickremesinghe Apprises I K Gujral of Stalled Peace Process in Sri Lanka
  • Tiger Rebels are either black or white but not both
  • PEACE PROCESS IN SRI-LANKA
  • TIGERS, 'MODERATES' AND PANDORA'S PACKAGE
  • The road ahead
  • LTTE to take Indo-Lankan accord in peace bid
  • [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/indo-lanka-accord-is-a-sound-framework-say-experts/article22433003.ece]