The Hwasong-7 () is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles. US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile, as well as the Iranian Ghadr-110.

Description

thumb|Estimated maximum range of some [[Korean People's Army Strategic Force|North Korean missiles, including Hwasong-7]]

Hwasong-7 is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of and a length of . The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial.

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere. Unlike modern missiles, Hwasong-7 can only be fueled when vertical, meaning it cannot be fueled before transport. With a warhead, its range is estimated to be .

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of , but it can be reduced to between and with GPS guidance. North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM),

Naming

The "Hwasong-7" is the North Korean internal designation for the missile. The missile is also known by external designations from Western analysts, including Rodong-1, No Dong-1, Rodong, Nodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-D and Nodong-A.

Variant for reconnaissance satellite testing

Hwasong-7 has a variant with white livery for reconnaissance satellite cameras testing. On 18 December 2022, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles from Sohae Satellite Launching Station, flying with an apogee of . According to North Korea, the test was organized by the National Aerospace Development Administration to evaluate reconnaissance satellite components, including camera and data transmission system. Released images included an photo indicating the missiles appeared to be a derivation from Hwasong-7 or Scud missile. A test launch happened at the same time, but likely failed, since burn marks were captured by photographs at the launch site. Later, low-rate production started in January 1991 and North Korea conducted another test-fire of Hwasong-7 in May 1993. Also, between 1993 and 1994, North Korea had produced a sufficient number of Hwasong-7 missiles to be considered operational, and five years later, Hwasong-7 became deployed.

North Korea test-fired Hwasong-7 missiles in 2006, 2009,

Although it has an estimated range of , launches in March 2014 flew only , as the missiles flew to an altitude of because of lofted trajectory. The missiles achieved a maximum speed of . U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to .

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles into the Sea of Japan, these missiles achieved about range. Initially, these missiles were believed to be Hwasong-7, however, it was later revealed that the missiles used for this launch were Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER). The United States strongly condemned the launch.

  • − Hatf 5 Ghauri used by the Army Strategic Forces Command.

Unconfirmed

  • − Reportedly was interested in buying Nodong missiles, but photographic evidence only shows Scud-Bs or possibly Scud-Cs in use.
  • − Developed a localized version of the Nodong missile. Reportedly received 50 missiles and seven TELs from North Korea in 2000. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian Arab Army doesn't operate MRBMs as of 2024.

Failed bids

  • − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles.

See also

  • Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea)
  • North Korean missile tests
  • North Korean defense industry
  • Military of North Korea

References

Bibliography

  • CSIS Missile Threat - No-Dong 1
  • CNS report North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities 2006
  • Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program
  • National Threat Initiative, Nodong: Overview and Technical Assessment