General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough ( ; 12 August 1870 – 18 March 1963) was a senior officer in the British Army in the First World War. A controversial figure, he was a favourite of the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and the youngest of Haig's field army commanders.
Gough was educated at Eton and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, before commissioning into the 16th Lancers in 1889. His early career included notable service in the Second Boer War, and a more controversial role in the Curragh incident, in which he was one of the leading officers who threatened to accept dismissal rather than deploy into Protestant Ulster.
Gough experienced a meteoric rise during the First World War, from command of a cavalry brigade in August 1914, to division command at the First Battle of Ypres that autumn, to a corps at the Battle of Loos a year later. From mid-1916 he commanded the Reserve Army (later renamed the Fifth Army) during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and the Battle of Passchendaele in 1917. His tenure was marked by controversy around his leadership style, his perceived reputation as "a thruster", and the efficiency of the organisation of his army, especially relative to the reputation for caution and efficiency of General Sir Herbert Plumer's Second Army. Fifth Army bore the initial brunt of the German spring offensive in March 1918, but Gough was scapegoated and relieved of his command.
After the war, he briefly held a command in the Baltic until retirement in 1922, and stood unsuccessfully for Parliament. After a brief spell at farming, he made a new career for himself as a company director. Gough gradually re-emerged as an influential figure in military circles and public life, writing two volumes of memoirs. He was a senior commander in the London Home Guard in the Second World War and lived long enough to be interviewed on television in the early 1960s. Historians continue to study Gough's career as a case study of how the BEF coped with rapid expansion, with officers commanding forces far larger than during their peacetime experience, of the degree of initiative which should be granted to subordinates, and of the evolution of operational planning under stalemate conditions, from an initial emphasis on achieving breakthrough (with attrition regarded as preliminary "wearing out") to a stress on cautious advances under cover of massive, concentrated artillery fire.
Early life
Gough was born in London on 12 August 1870. He was born into an Anglo-Irish military family, the eldest son of General Charles John Stanley Gough As an infant, Gough went to India with his family late in 1870, but Gough and his brother Johnny were sent to a boarding school in England, and Gough did not meet his father, who was on active service in the Second Afghan War, again until he was sixteen.
Early career
thumb|upright|right|Gough as a junior officer
Gough was educated at Eton College then at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was gazetted into the 16th Lancers as a second lieutenant on 5 March 1889.
Gough was promoted to lieutenant on 23 July 1890, and set out for India that autumn. He was promoted captain on 22 December 1894 at the relatively early age of 24. He served with the Tirah Field Force 1897–98
Gough returned to England in June 1898, and sat the examination for entrance to the Staff College, Camberley. He married Margaret Louisa Nora Lewes (known as "Daisy") on 22 December 1898.
Boer War
Gough started at Staff College, Camberley, on 9 January 1899 but did not complete the course. He was deployed to Natal as instructor to one of the Rifle Associations (locally raised units of volunteer mounted infantry or light cavalry). Gough then served as ADC to Douglas Cochrane, 12th Earl of Dundonald, who was commanding mounted troops in Natal. In January 1900 he was promoted to brigade intelligence officer, a role which required a great deal of scouting.
thumb|left|The [[Relief of Ladysmith. Sir George White greets Lord Dundonald on 28 February 1900. Painting by John Henry Frederick Bacon.]]
On 1 February Gough was appointed, as a local unpaid major, CO of a Composite Regiment (a squadron of Imperial Light Horse, a squadron of Natal Carbineers and a company of 60th Rifles Mounted Infantry). He led his regiment to assist Buller's third attempt (5–7 February) to cross the Tugela River, and in the fourth attempt (14–27 February). He defied written orders from Dundonald to lead the first British troops into Ladysmith (28 February), meeting his brother Johnnie who had been besieged inside the town.
During the ensuing period of guerrilla warfare, Gough's Regiment was reinforced to a strength of 600 men. Along with Horace Smith-Dorrien and Edmund Allenby, he served under the overall command of Lieutenant-General John French. On 17 September 1901, after poor reconnaissance, he attacked near Blood River Poort, but was taken prisoner with his entire force by larger Boer forces which had been out of sight. He later escaped.
Edwardian era
Gough returned as a Regular Army captain in the 16th Lancers on 23 August 1902, but the following month was appointed brigade major of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot on 24 September 1902 with promotion to the substantive rank of major on 22 October 1902.
Gough was appointed an instructor at the Staff College on 1 January 1904 and served there until 1906 Gough was promoted brevet colonel on 11 June 1906 and substantive lieutenant colonel on 18 July 1906, continuing to serve at the Staff College. He was appointed commanding officer (CO) of the 16th (Queen's) Lancers on 15 December 1907.
After a fortnight on half-pay from 19 December 1910, Gough was promoted temporary brigadier general and appointed general officer commanding (GOC) of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh (1 January 1911).
Curragh incident
With Irish Home Rule due to become law in 1914, the Cabinet were contemplating some form of military action against the Ulster Volunteers who wanted no part of it. Gough was one of the leading officers who threatened to accept dismissal in the ensuing Curragh incident.
On the morning of Friday 20 March, Arthur Paget (Commander-in-Chief, Ireland) addressed senior officers at his headquarters in Dublin. By Gough's account (in his memoirs Soldiering On), he said that "active operations were to commence against Ulster", that officers who lived in Ulster would be permitted to "disappear" for the duration, but that other officers who refused to serve against Ulster would be dismissed rather than being permitted to resign, and that Gough – who had a family connection with Ulster but did not live there – could expect no mercy from his "old friend at the War Office" (Sir John French). French, Paget and Spencer Ewart had in fact (on 19 March) agreed to exclude officers with "direct family connections" to Ulster. In making an ultimatum, Paget was acting foolishly, as most might have obeyed a direct order. Paget ended the meeting by ordering his officers to speak to their subordinates and then report back. Gough also sent a telegram to his brother Johnnie, Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff at Aldershot. Gough did not attend the second meeting in the afternoon, at which Paget stated that the purpose of the move was to overawe Ulster rather than fight.
That evening Paget informed the War Office by telegram that 57 officers preferred to accept dismissal (it was actually 61 including Gough). Gough was suspended from duty and he and two of his three colonels were summoned to the War Office to explain themselves.
"The peccant paragraphs"
Gough sent a telegram to the elderly Field-Marshal Lord Roberts (who had been lobbying the King and arguing with John French (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) on the telephone), purporting to ask for advice, although possibly to goad him into further action. After being reassured by Roberts that the deployment into Ulster was purely precautionary, he confirmed to Spencer Ewart (on the morning of Sunday 22 March) that he would have obeyed a direct order.
In another meeting at the War Office (23 March), Gough, (possibly influenced by Major-General Henry Hughes Wilson), demanded a written guarantee from French and Ewart that the Army would not be used against Ulster. At another meeting Secretary of State for War John Seely accepted French's suggestion that a written document from the Army Council might help to convince Gough's officers. The Cabinet approved a text, stating that the Army Council were satisfied that the incident had been a misunderstanding, and that it was "the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands", to which Seely added two paragraphs, stating that the Government had the right to use the "forces of the Crown" in Ireland or elsewhere, but had no intention of using force "to crush opposition to the Home Rule Bill".
At another meeting after 4 pm Gough, on the advice of Henry Wilson (also present), demanded a further paragraph stating that the Army would not be used to enforce Home Rule on Ulster, with which French concurred in writing. When H. H. Asquith (Prime Minister) learned of this he demanded that Gough return the document, which he refused to do. Asquith publicly repudiated the "peccant paragraphs" (25 March). French and Seely both had to resign.
First World War
Early war
Cavalry brigade: Mons to the Marne
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, Gough took the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to France, under the command of Allenby (GOC Cavalry Division). On 22 August one of Gough's artillery batteries was the first British battery to open fire on the Germans. The brigade fought at the Battle of Mons (23 August). During the following days Gough detached himself from Allenby's command and linked up with Haig's I Corps on the BEF right. Allenby publicly laughed this off as "only Gough's little way" but was privately furious at French (Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)) and Haig's tolerance of Gough's behaviour; relations between Allenby and Gough were strained thereafter.
The brigade fought at the Battle of Le Cateau (26 August). By 1 September they were at Villers-Cotterêts, south of the Aisne, after a retreat of 180 miles (100 miles as the crow flies), assisting a rearguard of Irish Guards (part of I Corps) in the last major action of the retreat. On 5 September Gough linked up for the first time with British transport and supplies.
Cavalry division
thumb|upright|Gough (left) and King [[Albert I of Belgium]]
By the time of the Battle of the Marne 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had been formed into "Gough's Command", an ad hoc cavalry force separate from Allenby's Cavalry Division. On 15 September Gough's Command, with the addition of supporting troops, was formed into 2nd Cavalry Division and he was appointed GOC on 16 September.
2nd Cavalry Division was on the BEF western flank, and tried to turn the German west flank, but was ordered to halt by Allenby. On 14 October Gough linked up with Rawlinson's IV Corps moving down from the coast, removing the danger of being cut off. Gough advanced again but met new German forces trying to turn the British flank; Gough was promoted major-general on 26 October backdated to 15 September. From 30 October to the night of 31 October – 1 November Gough's small division, assisted by Indian and London Scottish Territorial troops, held Messines-Wytschaete Ridge against a strong attack from the south-east by Max von Fabeck.
thumb|upright|[[John French, 1st Earl of Ypres|Sir John French, Joseph Joffre and Sir Douglas Haig (left to right) visit the front line in 1915. Gough is on the extreme right, next to Sir Henry Wilson.]]
Gough's division returned to the front at Hooge, near Ypres, on 12 February 1915. On 13 February he was offered a command in the planned Salonika expedition (in the event these troops were sent to Gallipoli) but declined after consulting his brother and BEF Chief of Staff "Wully" Robertson. Johnnie Gough died of wounds later in February. Haig asked for Gough to be attached to his forces in case he "br[oke] the enemy line" at Neuve Chapelle (10–13 March); Gough's division was in GHQ Reserve for that battle.
Infantry division
Gough was appointed GOC of 7th Division on 18 April 1915, part of Rawlinson's IV Corps, itself part of Haig's First Army; Gough may have been appointed as a counterbalance to Rawlinson, with whom Haig had a wary relationship. 7th division was in reserve at Second Ypres (22 April).
Gough commanded 7th Division at the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May. It was in corps reserve on 9 May, and that night was ordered to relieve 8th Division in the line, ready to attack the next day. After protests from the brigadiers that the support trenches were full of men – alive, wounded and dead – Gough cancelled the relief on his own authority. He expected to be disciplined by Rawlinson, but instead his division was redeployed to the sector of Charles Monro's I Corps, where diversionary attacks were to be mounted to assist the French.
Monro gave Gough and his artillery officer "Curly" Birch great freedom. They bombarded for a few minutes, leaving a gap to tempt the Germans out of their shelters (repeated several times in preceding days), bringing some guns forward on muffled wheels for surprise. The assault began at 3:15 am on 16 May; the right of 7th Division was the only part of I Corps attack to succeed. The next day Gough made little further progress despite help from almost every First Army gun in range.
Corps commander: Loos
Planning
Gough was appointed GOC I Corps, still part of Haig's First Army, and promoted temporary lieutenant-general on 13 July 1915.
During the upcoming Battle of Loos Haig (13 August) had asked Gough to plan to take the Hohenzollern Redoubt (roughly north-east), while Rawlinson's IV Corps was to take Loos and possibly Hill 70 (roughly south-east) to open a gap for the reserves to push due east to take Hulluch. Gough (22 August) proposed that 9th (Scottish) Division should "rush" the German positions on his left (Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse 8) just before dawn (4 am) after a barrage and gas attack, while the following night 7th Division would push through the Quarries to Citie St Elie.
Gough's attacks
On 25 September chlorine gas was released to assist the British attack, despite unfavourable wind likely to blow it back over British troops. Although Captain Ernest Gold (meteorological officer) and Maj-Gen Henry Horne (GOC 2nd Division) were later blamed, Charles Foulkes (the gas officer) later hinted that "still higher authority" may have been responsible, and a gas officer Lt Sewill recorded being told that the order came from Gough. At 5:20 am Gough had advised Haig that it was too late to cancel the gas release. However, Nick Lloyd argues that the fault lay with Haig for agreeing to the plan.
On Gough's left 2nd Division met heavy losses. On Gough's right 7th Division captured the enemy first line with heavy loss. Gough was away from his HQ for two hours trying to discover why 28 Brigade (in his centre) were not making progress. Major-General George Thesiger, GOC 9th (Scottish) Division, "dissociated" himself from Gough's orders to attack again at noon. Orders reached the two forward battalions just before noon; they attacked hastily at heavy loss. The divisional history (1921) was scathing about this episode, of which Gough's memoirs later made little mention. Nick Lloyd argues that Gough displayed the impatient aggression for which he was later to become notorious. Gough later recorded in his memoirs that he himself had been under great pressure from Haig to attack and make progress.
Ousting of Sir John French
Gough began a corps-level inquiry into the lessons of the battle (10 October), which was followed by a First Army inquiry (20 October). Gough's inquiry found that attacks had been stymied by lack of grenades, but had come close to a breakthrough where the wind had carried British gas over the German lines.
Gough was one of the senior officers who criticised French's command of the BEF to Lord Haldane (9 October 1915) and King George V (24 October 1915). Haig succeeded French, who was forced to "resign" as C-in-C.
Military ideas
Gough later commented on the draft of the Official History (1926) that a limited attack at Loos would have been more sensible, as it could have been reinforced if Joseph Joffre's offensive succeeded, and was critical of Haig for – as so often – attempting to achieve decisive victory with insufficient means.
Notes from a conference held by Gough on 20 December 1915 show that he still thought in terms of the principles of warfare as taught at Staff College: he still expected an "advance guard" to move forward until, after two or three days, a plan had been decided on for deploying the bulk of British forces, whereas in reality, by 1917, the opening day would often prove the most effective. Like many British generals, he blamed the failures of 1915 on human error in applying the principles of warfare, rather than on the need to concentrate artillery, learn new tactics, and allow senior officers to gain experience.
The Somme 1916
Initial phases
Training cavalry and plans for exploitation
Haig told Gough, who in January 1916 was made KCB, to be prepared to take I Corps up to Flanders. Haig had not completely abandoned his hopes of a Flanders offensive at least as late as June.
Gough was appointed GOC Reserve Corps, which was to exploit any breakthrough achieved at the Somme, on 4 April 1916. Gough spent most of the next two months supervising the training of the cavalry divisions. Gough's staff had to liaise with XIII and XV Corps (on the right of General Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army) to draw up contingency plans in case "things went as we hoped for" and with Lieutenant General Claud Jacob, whose II Corps was also earmarked for the exploitation. By mid-June Gough was also training the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and 2nd Indian Cavalry Division. In May, after discussions with Rawlinson, Gough proposed to use a cavalry brigade in the north (the Ancre Valley) and another in the south (Montauban), to assist if the Germans collapsed. Haig, thinking the ground unsuitable, vetoed his suggestion that a further entire cavalry division should be used in the north to help roll up the enemy second line.
Reserve Corps was renamed Reserve Army on 22 May 1916, Haig told Gough (diary 27 June) he was "too inclined to aim at fighting a battle at Bapaume" but should instead aim to push on, before the Germans had a chance to attack him from the north. Haig would have preferred Gough to take command of the two left hand corps (VIII Corps and X Corps) prior to the attack but instead, that evening, approved Rawlinson's plan for Gough to set up HQ at Albert as soon as the Pozières Heights had fallen. By now Reserve Army had three infantry and three cavalry divisions. Research by Stephen Badsey among the surviving evidence suggests that the final plan was for Gough to exploit any breakthrough with the 25th Division, followed by two of the three cavalry divisions, then the II Corps (three divisions). Gough visited Rawlinson in the afternoon (the third time that day) but was told that there would be no breakthrough that day, so he ordered cavalry to return to billets. At 7 pm Rawlinson put Gough in command of X and VIII Corps (the northern sector of the Somme front), with orders to "push them on again". In the early hours of 3 July, Rawlinson ordered Gough to renew the attack, orders which Haig then countermanded.
Gough was ordered to attack towards Schwaben Redoubt to rescue British survivors of 1 July. Despite Haig and Rawlinson's preference for minor attacks, they allowed Gough to attack a salient south-east of Thiepval, with six battalions. Sheffield wrote that the attack was "a complete shambles", but Gough was not entirely to blame and that it typified the "chaos" of British operations at that stage. Gough later claimed to have regretted the attack. In the afternoon of 3 July, Reserve Army was formally made independent of Fourth Army.
Over the following months most of the shells and heavy artillery would be supporting Rawlinson's efforts, and although Gough was given extra guns later, he never had as many as Fourth Army. Haig's orders were to "sap" with small penetrations to open up he German lines to flanking attacks. Kiggell (BEF Chief of Staff) wrote Gough a memo (4 July) that his role was to assist Rawlinson by pinning down German reserves and that he was to keep within his allotted quantity of shells. In July Gough believed that frequent small narrow-front attacks would keep the Germans "off balance" with low British casualties, but they allowed the Germans to concentrate their fire, contributing to the massive British losses of that month.
Gough was promoted to temporary general on 7 July 1916, aged just 45. The Reserve Army took Ovillers on 16 July.
Summer
Pozières
The slaughter of 1 July had shown that the German positions on VIII Corps sector and much of X Corps sector were too strong to attack frontally. Until early September Gough attacked with two divisions of X Corps, later assisted by the newly arrived II Corps to assist Rawlinson's left flank, but on only two occasions before 3 September, were efforts coordinated with Fourth Army and one of those (22/23 July) by accident. This was the most important attack yet expected of Gough. Walker later wrote that he had to demand extra artillery, and only obtained permission to attack from the south east rather than the south west (the direction of previous unsuccessful attacks) as Gough wanted after taking Edward "Moses" Beddington, a staff officer whom Gough trusted, with him to reconnoitre the position. Gough later claimed (letter to Edmonds in 1939) he had given Walker no choice but had himself ordered the change in the direction of the attack.
The attack was delayed until 12:30 am on the night of 22/23 July and Pozières was taken, partly as a result of planning and partly as tired German troops were being relieved by fresh troops. The fall of Pozières on 22/23 July was the most successful part of a Big Push involving eight divisions, spread across five corps, from Pozières on the left to Guillemont on Rawlinson's right.
Clashes with subordinates
Gough used his corps as "postboxes", whereas Rawlinson was more tolerant of debate and discussion. Gough was reluctant to allow corps their normal role of control of artillery (which he centralised at Army level under Brigadier-General Tancred) and in planning operations. Neill Malcolm (Chief of Staff Reserve Army) recorded several instances in his diary (6 July, 13 July, 18 July) of corps commanders chafing at his "interference". Aylmer Hunter-Weston (GOC VIII Corps) wrote to his wife (3 August) that his staff were glad to be moving to the Second Army at Ypres, that Reserve Army staff had not run smoothly and that although he liked Gough and thought him "a good soldier ... he is hardly a big minded enough man to make a really good Army Commander".
Gough also clashed badly with Philip Howell, Chief of Staff of II Corps, who thought Gough "very loveable in many ways", if perhaps not quite sane, and "really quite a child & can be managed like one if treated as such & humoured". By late July and throughout August 1916 Howell complained repeatedly about Army-level micromanagement, with Reserve Army allegedly even taking direct control of four of 12th Division machine guns during an attack on 2 August. Howell claimed (29 August 1916) that Claud Jacob (II Corps), Edward Perceval (49th Division) and even Malcolm (!) were terrified of Gough. Gough thought Howell a "great thorn" who spent much time "trying to argue", avoiding fighting and disobeying orders. Howell was killed by shellfire in September.
Gough also clashed with Lord Cavan (XIV Corps) (3 August).
Mouquet Farm
Gough ordered further attacks to seize the German OG1 and OG2 trenches north of Pozières, and to take Mouquet Farm (which lies approximately between Pozières and Thiepval). The first attack, by tired troops in the dark, failed. 1st Australian Division were withdrawn on 25 July and replaced by 2nd Australian Division. Gary Sheffield & Daniel Todman argue that Gough's "direct operational control" of 2nd Australian Division on 29 July contributed to the failure of that attack, as Gough pressured Maj-Gen James Gordon Legge to attack before preparations were complete. The German positions were on a reverse slope, so wire and machine gun positions could not be destroyed by bombardment. Charles Bean blamed Legge for not standing up to Gough, and wrote that Brudenell White blamed himself for not doing so, although Sheffield argues that this is not entirely fair, as Legge, a "colonial", should have had more support from Corps level.
By the end of July it was clear that the Germans were not about to crumble as Haig had hoped, and on 2 August he ordered Reserve Army to conduct methodical attacks in the area from Pozières to Mouquet Farm and Ovillers, as economically with men and munitions as possible, so as to draw in German reserves and thus assist with Rawlinson's attacks on Gough's right flank. Haig recorded (diary 3 August) that Gough had demanded "reasons in writing" from Legge, after the failure of the Australian attack. Gough had written to William Birdwood (1 ANZAC Corps Commander) demanding an explanation and asking if the attack would have succeeded given "greater energy and foresight on the part of the higher commanders". Birdwood refused to pass this note on to Legge as he thought it was "essential to give (him) a fair trial". Legge's second attack on Mouquet Farm, was better planned and succeeded on 4 August.
Gough almost pushed Maj-Gen Robert Fanshawe (48th Division) (25 August) to the point of resignation. In over a month of fighting II Corps and I ANZAC Corps advanced towards Mouquet Farm and Thiepval. The BEF (not just ANZACs but also the 12th, 25th, 48th divisions and the Canadian Corps) suffered approximately 20,000 casualties in these attacks from 7 August to 12 September. The ANZACs had suffered 23,000 casualties in six weeks, a similar loss to what they had endured in eight months at Gallipoli.
Prior & Wilson criticised Gough for his responsibility for what they called "the Mouquet Farm fiasco", not least because at some point in September (documentary evidence of the exact date has not been found) Gough had changed his mind and decided to attack Thiepval solely from the front, rather than trying to outflank it via Mouquet Farm. In August, clearly still hopeful that decisive victory could be attained on the Somme, Gough wrote to one of his nephews: "We are breaking in bit by bit and we must not stop until we have made the gap. It would be terrible to ask our men to begin their attacks all over again on fresh defences next year."
Autumn
Initial attack on Thiepval
A conference was held on 23 August to plan the attack on Thiepval, and the V Corps Chief of Staff (Brig-Gen Gerald Boyd) later brushed aside the GOC 6th Division's objections that an afternoon attack was unwise. The next day detailed plans for each division's attack were issued not at corps level but by Reserve Army. V Corps, extending Reserve Army operations into the Ancre valley for the first time, attacked towards St Pierre Divion and Schwaben Redoubt (north of Thiepval) to attack Thiepval from the north. II Corps (48th and 25th Divisions, moved up in mid-August) attacked Thiepval. These attacks failed. 4th Australian Division gained part of Fabeck Graben Redoubt north of Mouquet Farm, which was then lost by the Canadian Corps when it relieved 1 ANZAC Corps in the line.
The attack by 39th and 49th divisions (part of II Corps) failed, with some battalions taking between 30% and 50% casualties. Gough attributed the failure to lack of "martial qualities", lack of "discipline and motivation", "ignorance on the part of the Commanding officers" and "poor spirit in the men", to which Claud Jacob, GOC II Corps, added "want of direction", "stage fright", and cowardice on the part of the brigadier, while also commenting adversely on the lack of casualties among the C.O.s. V Corps, at Reserve Army's insistence, sent a detailed critique of the operation to 39th Division.
Assisting Rawlinson's offensive
Gough had submitted (28 August) an ambitious plan for the capture of Courcelette on his right flank. This was rejected by Launcelot Kiggell, who told him that he was to continue to conduct limited operations to assist Rawlinson with the Battle of Flers–Courcelette the next Fourth Army attack, which, if successful, would enable Rawlinson to attack Thiepval (on Gough's front) from the rear. In the event Haig changed his mind at the last moment. II and V Corps were also to make feint attacks at Thiepval. The Canadian assault on Courcelette was a great success. Gough wrote (to his brother Johnnie's widow Dorothea, 23 September 1916) that many corps and division commanders were "incompetent" and that "considerable exercise of firmness" was needed to get them to obey orders.
Gough's plan was for 18th Division to capture Thiepval and Schwaben Redoubt, 11th Division to capture Mouquet Farm and Zollern and Stuff Redoubts (roughly north of Mouquet Farm) while on the right 1st and 2nd Canadian divisions were to attack from Courcelette to Regina Trench which lay just beyond the ridge line. Gough allocated all seven of his tanks (five of which broke down before reaching the lines) to the Canadians. This was the heaviest barrage yet fired by Reserve Army, assisted by an indirect machine gun barrage into the German rear areas. Gough had 570 field guns and 270 howitzers to attack along a front (roughly twice the concentration of 1 July, but only half that of the Battle of Bazentin Ridge on 14 July and much the same as that of the Battle of Flers–Courcelette on 15 September.
Allenby's Third Army was to co-operate with an attack on Gough's left flank (Haig diary 24 September 30 September).
In the event poor weather delayed the attacks until the early afternoon of 25 September. As Gough planned to use a few tanks to assist his attack, Haig ordered him to delay until the following morning when they could be concealed in the morning mist but in the event further delays, for which the reason is unclear, meant that Gough attacked at 12:35 pm on 26 September, exactly a day after Rawlinson and Foch. This fighting demonstrated that, either attacking German positions with proper artillery support, or in hand-to-hand fighting in which artillery support mattered little, British volunteer infantry could fight as well as the Germans. The same would prove true in November. Gough's capture of Thiepval (an original objective for 1 July) preserved his status with Commander-in-Chief.
He recommended aiming for deep advances into enemy positions, with troops attacking up to five consecutive preassigned objectives, with waves aiming for predetermined objectives in a conveyor-belt approach. Each brigade was to attack in up to eight "waves": two battalions, making up the first four waves, were to take the first objective and another two battalions, perhaps deployed in columns for speed of movement, would then take the second, with no battalions held in brigade-level reserve (the argument being that orders would never reach them in time). He recommended that each division attack with two brigades and hold a third brigade in reserve, ready to take the third objective, by which time the first two brigades would have been reorganised to take the fourth objective. The fifth objective would require fresh troops.
Gough agreed with Haig's suggestion (Haig diary 8 October) that "the deterioration of the Enemy's fighting qualities" meant that it was not necessary for British troops to be protected by a barrage once they had captured an enemy position, as this would hamper reserves from pushing on to the next objective. General Tom Bridges later wrote (in "Alarms and Excursions") that "With the true cavalry spirit, (Gough) was always for pushing on". Rawlinson (diary 9 October) recorded his concerns at Gough's "hourush tactics and no reserves, as they are not sound".
The fighting at Thiepval went on until November and was later criticised by the Official Historian for lack of co-ordination and excessive reliance on infantry elan. Haig issued orders (29 September) for further advances by Reserve and Fourth Armies. Gough was to attack Loupart Wood from the south and Beaumont-Hamel from the west. The plan was for Reserve Army to advance and capture more ground in one battle than in three months of campaigning.
On 8 October, the 1st and 3rd Canadian divisions, on Gough's right flank, assisted another of Rawlinson's offensives by attacking unsuccessfully towards Le Sars and Regina Trench, only to be held up by German wire. Speaking to Haig that afternoon, Gough blamed the 3rd Canadian Division, claiming that in some cases they had not even left their trenches. Stuff Redoubt fell (9 October) to a battalion of 25th Division. Schwaben Redoubt was attacked unsuccessfully (9 October) in a surprise night attack with no barrage, then successfully on 14 October after a two-day bombardment. These costly penny-packet attacks sometimes involved little more than a single battalion.
After two weeks of rain had rendered plans for exploitation unrealistic, Gough issued a new, more cautious plan (15 October), in which 45 tanks were to be used, although he was still under pressure from Haig to exploit to the north and north-east. Stuff and Regina Trenches (which ran approximately west–east north of a line from Thiepval to Courcelette) were then captured in a major attack by 35th, 25th, 18th and 4th Canadian divisions, completing the capture of the Ancre Heights. The battle testified to the revived German defence after their panic of September.
Wilson, whom Gough had disliked since the Curragh incident, commanded IV Corps first alongside then under Gough in 1916. Wilson commented in his diary (21 October) on reports of Gough micro-managing divisions and even brigades. That autumn Edward Loch, 2nd Baron Loch told Wilson "Goughie is the best hated & most useless & most dangerous General we have got".
After the success of 21 October, Gough once again presented more ambitious plans, with Haig offering (24 October) to place an extra two cavalry divisions (for three in total) at his disposal – this at a time when even quite minor infantry attacks on Fourth Army sector were having to be cancelled because of mud. Gough complained that Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe (chief of staff, Canadian Corps) "made unnecessary difficulties" (Haig Diary 30 October 1916). After continuous rain between 24 October and 3 November, Fifth Army was ordered (5 November) to conduct only a "limited" attack and authorised to wait until the weather was good enough.
Haig sent Launcelot Kiggell (Chief of Staff BEF) to Gough's HQ (8 November) to explain the motivation for the attack, although Kiggell stressed that Haig did not want the attack to proceed unless there were good prospects of success. The aim was to pin down German troops which might otherwise have been sent to Romania, to impress on the Russians that the BEF was still fighting, as well as strengthening Haig's hand in the inter-Allied conference due to start at Chantilly on 15 November, at which the possible transfer of Western Allied troops to Salonika was to be discussed. Gough later recorded that the first murmurings against Haig's leadership were beginning to be heard in London.
Gough then consulted his corps commanders (10 November): Claud Jacob (II Corps) was persuaded to try for deeper objectives as Edward Fanshawe (V Corps) and Walter Congreve (XIII Corps) wanted. The attack was agreed for 13 November. Staff officers and patrols inspected the ground and Gough (10–11 November) visited six divisional commanders and ten brigadiers, also seeing two battalion commanders at each brigade headquarters. He had asked his corps commanders to make similar inquiries. He found no consensus as to whether or not the ground was dry enough. The start time was set for 5:45 am after further consultations with Jacob, Fanshawe and divisional commanders.
Sheffield comments that this sequence of events indicates that Haig enjoyed warmer relations with Gough than with, say, Rawlinson, but also suggests that he felt the need to supervise him closely. He also comments that although Gough consulted his subordinates, it is unclear that he took their advice: Simon Robbins quotes evidence of warnings from some corps, division and brigade staffs that troops were exhausted and conditions too poor to attack.
Martin Kitchen takes a more critical view, pointing out that troops were initially under orders not to retire from the forward zone, that there were no adequate lines of communications between corps, and that Gough caused further trouble by issuing orders direct to lower formations, even down to brigade level. Gough "muddle(d) through ... to the limit of his very modest abilities".
Disgrace and after
Scapegoat
Lord Derby (Secretary of State for War) informed the War cabinet (4 April) that he was demanding a full report on the recent reverse suffered by Fifth Army.
Gough visited Derby (8 April) to ask about an inquiry – he recorded that Derby was "pleasant enough, almost genial", but appeared glad when the interview was over. In the House of Commons Lloyd George (9 April) refused to rule out a court martial for Gough, praised General George Glas Sandeman Carey for forming an ad hoc force to hold back the enemy in the Fifth Army sector, apparently unaware that the initiative had come from Gough when Carey was still on leave, and praised Byng (GOC Third Army) for only retreating when forced to do so by Fifth Army's retreat, apparently unaware of Byng's folly in clinging to the Flesquières Salient. Byng wrote to the editor of the Daily Express (19 April) that Gough was "talking too much and had better keep quiet".
Lloyd George told the War Cabinet (11 April) that the Liberal War Committee (a committee of backbench MPs) had made "very serious protests" to him that afternoon against the retention of "incompetent" officers like Gough and Richard Haking. A furious Gough wrote to a friend in June that none of the other Army Commanders would have had the resilience to handle such a massive German attack, and that he "never wanted to wear the uniform of England again". He resisted the temptation to breach King's Regulations by airing his views in public as Maurice had done or to brief Opposition MPs.
Haig in fact wrote to his wife (16 June) claiming that "some orders (Gough) issued and things he did were stupid" (it is unclear to what Haig was referring) and claiming that he would "stick up for him as I have hitherto done" although he had not in fact specifically done so in his report of 12 May, in which he had blamed the German crossing of the Oise on the fog and the low level of the water owing to the recent dry weather. Haig also (letter of 6 July, replying belatedly to a letter of Gough's of 21 June) claimed that he had defended Gough from political criticism throughout the winter of 1917–18 and advised him to keep quiet so that he could be restored to an active command when memories had faded. In August, stung by a letter from Lord Roberts' widow that he owed a duty to protect the reputation of the men of Fifth Army, Gough had an interview with Lord Milner, who blamed the events of March on poor defence, incompetent leadership and the reluctance of the troops to fight, and bluntly refused to help.
Rehabilitation
Press reports of the events of March 1918 appeared in the National Review and the Illustrated Sunday Herald in October 1918, while officers and men returning after the Armistice were able to challenge claims that the Fifth Army had been defeated because morale had been poor and the soldiers had lacked confidence in Gough's leadership (although in practice few front line soldiers would have known the name of their Army Commander). At a dinner on board his train in February 1919 Haig confessed to Edward Beddington that he agreed that Gough's treatment had been "harsh and undeserved" but that "public opinion at home, whether right or wrong, (had) demanded a scapegoat" and he had been "conceited enough to think that the Army could not spare" himself rather than Gough – Beddington agreed that this had been the correct decision at the time.
Beddington later complained to Haig that he had only given Gough "faint praise" in his Final Despatch, and that he had been "fobbed off" with a KCMG instead of being promoted to field marshal and being given a cash grant. Haig was angry, although he later invited Gough to his home at Bemersyde to repair their relations.
Gough was not in London for the peace ceremonies (he was on a business trip to Baku), and it is unclear whether he knew that he was one of the senior officers (including Robertson and Hamilton) whom Lloyd George deliberately did not invite.
Baltic Mission
He was appointed Chief of the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic on 19 May 1919.
Gough was a signatory to joint statement issued with other officers and advisors who had served in Russia, who on 23 February 1920 indicated their support of peace between the British and the Bolshevik Russia.
Gough retired from the Army as a full general on 26 October 1922, although owing to an administrative error he was initially told that he would receive the pension of a full colonel, his substantive rank as of August 1914.
Possible political career
As he had now become convinced of the merits of Home Rule he declined an offer to stand as an Ulster Unionist for a Belfast seat in the November 1918 General Election, despite an interview with Edward Carson whom he found more "broadminded" in private than the uncompromising speeches which he was delivering in public.
Gough's name was proposed to the Cabinet early in 1921 by William O'Brien as a potential Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (in succession to Lord French). Nothing came of this, but he stood unsuccessfully as an Asquith Liberal (i.e. opposed to Lloyd George's coalition government) in the 1922 Chertsey by-election. During the campaign he stressed his opposition to the policy of reprisals which had been employed in Ireland. Gough would later decline further attempts to persuade him to stand for Parliament in the 1922 General Election.
After the May 1929 General Election he recorded his dislike of the "fierce old women who support, and in large part constitute, the Tory Party" and of the "arrogant audacity" with which they appropriated the Union Jack as a party symbol. However, in March 1931 he declined another offer to stand for Parliament as a Liberal, not least because of his dislike of Lloyd George, who was now Liberal leader.
Later life
Farming and business career
Gough initially (August 1918) found that his recent "difficulties" in France would make it difficult for him to pick up company directorships. In 1925–26 he bought land in Kenya with a view to moving out there, but thought better of it, in part because so much of his time was taken up with the affairs of Fifth Army veterans, and also because his farm in Surrey was not succeeding as he had hoped. He sold Burrows Lea in 1927.
The reputation which Gough had won on his commercial trip to Baku in 1919 enabled him to obtain several directorships, including Siemens Brothers and Caxton Electrical Development Company. After the economic downturn, coupled with poor performance by junior managers, led to the bankruptcy of several smaller companies of which he was a director, he exercised a much more hands-on management than was normal for directors. His business interests included slate quarries in Wales and the supply of electrical equipment in Warsaw. He was also involved in the management and fundraising of King's College Hospital and St Mary's Hospital, London. As late as 1950, aged eighty, he was still chairman of Siemens Brothers, and a chairman or director of nine other companies.
Battle of the memoirs
The war correspondent Philip Gibbs, freed of the constraints of wartime censorship, wrote in Realities of War (1920) of the incompetence of British generals and of their staffs, the latter having "the brains of canaries and the manners of Potsdam". His main target was Gough's Fifth Army, although he wrote highly of Plumer and Harington's leadership of Second Army.
The Fifth Army in France in 1918 by Walter Shaw Sparrow (1921) gave some indication of the strain of the battle which Fifth Army had borne, although the book, written at the time of the Irish War of Independence, tended to denigrate the 16th (Irish) Division at the expense of the 36th (Ulster) Division. Gough thought Sparrow "a fine old fighter".
Part II of Churchill's World Crisis appeared in 1927, and praised Gough's role in March 1918. In March 1930 Gough was approached by Lord Birkenhead to assist with the writing of a chapter on the March 1918 crisis in his forthcoming book Turning Points in History. Over dinner Birkenhead discussed how Haig had "completely lost the confidence" of the British War Cabinet by the end of 1917, and how in Birkenhead's opinion – which Gough did not share – Pétain's alleged entreaties had been "lie(s) and bluff" by the "d-d French" which did not justify a continuation of the Third Ypres Offensive. The book was published in October 1930 (after Birkenhead's death) and the book's praise of Gough's handling of the March 1918 Offensive was widely quoted in newspaper reviews.
Gough's conduct of the Somme and Third Ypres was strongly criticised by the Australian Official Historian Charles Bean (1929 and 1933).
After the publication of Birkenhead's essay, and the news that his old colleague Maj-Gen Sir George Aston was earning good money as a newspaper correspondent, Gough wrote his own account The Fifth Army (1931). He approached the King's adviser Lord Stamfordham as to whether His Majesty would be willing to mark the anniversary of March 1918 with a public tribute to the Fifth Army, only to be brushed aside by another Royal adviser Clive Wigram with the news that the King would prefer Gough, like Haig, not to write his memoirs. In the end the book was a great success. Gough was dissuaded from sending a copy to the King, but sent a copy to the Prince of Wales, receiving a handwritten note in reply. The book was ghosted by the novelist Bernard Newman. He made no mention of his dispute with Walker on 18 July 1916, although he pointedly omitted him from a list praising officers commanding Australian formations. Gough claimed that he had often vetoed attacks by subordinates if he thought them under-prepared, on too narrow a front, or in inadequate strength – Sheffield & Todman argue that this was a deliberate answer to Bean's charges. Gough also claimed that the delay in launching Third Ypres (from 25 to 31 July 1917) wasted good weather and "was fatal to our hopes" – this is untrue.
In the mid-1930s the volume of Lloyd George's memoirs covering Third Ypres was published. During the ensuing newspaper correspondence Lloyd George quoted Gough's name in an attack on Haig, causing Gough to write to the newspapers in Haig's defence. Ahead of the publication of the 1918 volume, Gough dined twice with Lloyd George and his historical adviser B. H. Liddell Hart. Gough was initially impressed by the former Prime Minister's charisma, and was almost persuaded that he had had nothing to do with his sacking in April 1918, until he remembered that both Esher and Birkenhead had told him the truth years earlier. Lloyd George, who may well have been keen to appease a potential critic, eventually sent Gough a letter (described as "carefully worded" by Farrar-Hockley) claiming that new facts had come to his attention since that date, and admitting that Gough had been "let down" and that "no General could have won that battle".
In 1936 Gough complained to Liddell Hart that Haig had dominated his Army Commanders instead of taking them into his confidence and discussing matters, a view later made much of by the Canadian academic Tim Travers – Sheffield points out that this view not only needs to be treated with caution (Haig in fact held regular conferences) but sits ill with the evidence of Gough's own command habits. His GCB was seen as official rehabilitation.
In the summer of 1938 Gough was invited by Hitler to visit a Nuremberg Rally, but declined as the Foreign Office refused to give him formal approval and advice (General Ian Hamilton accepted a similar invitation while visiting Berlin on behalf of the British Legion). In 1939, prior to the outbreak of war, Gough was initially appointed a "conducting officer" to supervise the evacuation of women and children to Kent and Sussex, but was asked to resign after it was pointed out that to use a distinguished general in this role was a gift to German propaganda. He later rejoined the organisation as a "duty officer" (an administrative role in London) and also served as a member of an "emergency squad" standing by to give assistance in the event of air raids, while continuing to write newspaper articles. In March 1940 he visited the French Army, where he met General Maurice Gamelin and inspected part of the Maginot Line – he was unimpressed by the French troops he saw, and thought effort had been wasted on fortifications which could have been used on training.
In May 1940 Gough joined the LDV (Home Guard) and was put in command of the Chelsea Home Guard, which he organised from scratch. News of his efficient performance reached Churchill's ears, and in June 1940 he was soon promoted to Zone Commander Fulham & Chelsea, in command of parts of Fulham and Victoria, but declined further promotion as he wished to enjoy his last chance of hands-on leadership of a military unit. A blind eye was turned to Gough's age (the official upper age limit was 65) until August 1942, when he was at last asked to retire. By now he was suffering from arthritis, which would eventually see him walk with sticks and then become a wheelchair-user.
Third Ypres and the Official History
The volume of the Official History covering Third Ypres went through several drafts and did not appear until 1948, by which time the Official Historian James Edward Edmonds was in his late eighties. Gough, then in his mid-seventies, and remembering events of thirty years earlier with limited access to documents, lobbied hard to have himself shown in a better light, arguing that Haig had put verbal pressure on him to achieve a breakthrough towards Roulers.
Edmonds wrote to Wynne (17 February 1944), the author of the relevant volume, "Gough was out to fight and get forward. He had no idea how to conduct the action Haig required and would not take advice. I heard him complain that the troops had no "blood lust", the officers no "spirit of the offensive". In the same letter Edmonds repeated the story of how Gough had once come into the officers' mess at Fifth Army HQ and demanded that two officers be shot as an example. In this draft Wynne suggested Gough had been overly ambitious to break through over a wide front, despite Haig's orders at the Doullens Conference (7 May 1917) to "wear down the enemy and have an objective" (the objectives in this case being Passchendaele–Staden Ridge and then the coast) and Haig restrained him. Wynne agreed that Haig had originally intended a breakthrough, but wrote that he had learned from Davidson that Haig had changed his mind after his meeting with the politicians (25 June), after which he had issued renewed orders (30 June) for Gough to "wear down the enemy" but "have an objective". Wynne argued that Gough had placed too much emphasis on the "objective" rather than the "wearing down".
Gough objected to this claim and said that Haig had told him to aim for a breakthrough at the 28 June conference. He also pointed out that a sleeper roadway earmarked for exploiting cavalry had been prepared long before he had been appointed to command the offensive and that appointing him (a "thruster") was evidence of Haig's desire for ambitious objectives.
After seeing Wynne's draft Gough claimed that Haig had been responsible for too narrow and weak an initial thrust and that Haig's "personal explanations" at the time urged Gough "to capture the Passchendaele Ridge and advance as rapidly as possible on Roulers (if possible on the first day)", which lay behind the German front line [actually ] and thereafter on Ostend with the Fourth Army on the coast covering his left and "very definitely ... an attempt to break through and moreover Haig never altered this opinion until the attack was launched as far as I know. He confirmed this general idea on several occasions." Gough also scoffed at the implication that Haig had disapproved of his breakthrough attempt but had done nothing to stop it, and that even the corps commanders had warned of Gough's mistakes. Edmonds blamed the influence of Tavish Davidson on Wynne. Neill Malcolm, formerly Gough's chief of staff, called the 1943 draft "a farrago of malicious nonsense" (he objected particularly to Wynne's suggestion that Gough was allowed both to execute his attacks as he saw fit and to dictate to his corps commanders, without interference from Haig) and wrote that "Haig decided that he wanted a breakthrough and Charteris was always telling him that the Germans were on the verge of cracking. The breakthrough was the policy." He also accused Cavan of inventing a claim that he had begged Gough to let II Corps "bang through on the right" and a footnote to that effect was deleted from the History, although Cavan's claim is in fact confirmed by letters at the time; Percy Beddington, then GSO1 of a division, later chief of staff Fifth Army, later felt that Gough should have devoted a further two divisions to attacking the Gheluveld Plateau. Gough claimed that it was he who had realised the mistake.
Gough also criticised Haig for a poor choice of battlefield, "the worst possible for an offensive operation" – he said Haig should have attacked at Cambrai (Edmonds accepted that attacks of some kind were necessary and felt that Flanders was the best spot, contrary to Gough's opinion), for having a poor team around him (Charteris, Davidson, Lawrence, Kiggell) and for his top-down management style, claiming that Haig issued orders instead of gathering commanders and staff officers to thrash out the issues around a table. Gough also claimed that any entries in Haig's diary urging a step-by-step advance had been "written up after the event".
When told of Gough's criticisms Wynne wrote that "both Pilckem and Langemarck were thoroughly bad in their planning, and even the Official History should admit as much – and Gough must lump it. He should have been sacked for them without a pension." However, Wynne praised Gough's "gracious" admission that Haig had been wrong to select him to command the offensive, an admission which eventually appeared in the Official History. Another of the writing team, W. B. Wood, wrote (letter undated but probably in December 1944) that Gough "was at last getting his deserts" for having caused "disasters" by "adhering to his own plans for breaking the German lines over the whole of the Fifth Army front in preference to Haig's views".
There was then a further rewrite under the influence of Tavish Davidson, stressing Haig's involvement in the planning of the 31 July attacks. Edmonds ordered a further rewrite, at which point Norman Brook (future Cabinet Secretary) intervened and called a meeting as he felt Edmonds was exercising too much unfettered discretion over the tone of the History. Edmonds' "Reflections" blame Gough for "distant objectives" and ignoring Haig's advice to clear the Gheluveld Plateau first. The final version of the Official History suggests that Edmonds came to agree with Gough that Haig had been pushing for a breakthrough, rather than the limited offensive agreed by the War Cabinet. Edmonds repeatedly mentions how, throughout the Gough and Plumer periods, Haig hoped that the next major blow might cause the disintegration of the German opposition. Myrtle married Major Eric Adlhelm Torlogh Dutton, CMG, CBE, in 1936.
In common with many generals of the era, Gough was a man of strong religious faith.
As late as 5 March 1951 Gough was writing to Edmonds to blame Tavish Davidson and Herbert Lawrence for their lack of influence over Haig's decision-making and claiming that he should have requested an interview with Haig prior to the March 1918 attack, and demanded to hold the bulk of his forces back from the front line, although he doubted that Haig would have agreed to give up ground voluntarily. In March 1963, shortly before his death, Gough was interviewed on television (the Tonight programme), using the opportunity to criticise his old nemesis Wilson.
Death
Gough died in London on 18 March 1963 at the age of 92. He suffered from bronchial pneumonia for a month before his death occurred.
Assessments
Gough was a man of whom there were extreme opinions; he was the only senior general who regularly visited forward trenches. However, Captain Charles Carrington (Soldiers From the Wars Returning p. 104) recorded that Gough was very civil to him when he encountered him out riding.
Contemporary views
Boraston, in his strongly pro-Haig account (1922), wrote that Gough's performance on the Somme "amply justified the selection of this young but brilliant general" and wrote highly of Gough's performance during the semi-open warfare of early 1917, during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line.
Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, head of GHQ Training in 1917–18, argued that Gough "had greater qualities than any of the other Army Commanders" and had had the potential to be a great general, but was let down by a poor staff, and was too impatient to realise that infantry attacks needed "time to prepare". Farrar-Hockley also pointed out that not only did Gough not have enough artillery to succeed at Ypres in August 1917, but also argues that the limited advances advocated by "Tavish" Davidson were no cheaper in lives and did not stand any chance of achieving breakthrough or capturing German guns.
Simkins argues that Gough might have been more successful in the semi-open warfare of the Hundred Days. Gough was, in Philpott's view "probably the most discussed and vilified British Western Front general (after Haig at least) ... intelligent, quick witted and charming, a popular man in the army, both confident and courageous" although not popular with subordinates, and was "still learning his trade" in July 1916.
Prior & Wilson write of his command record on the Somme: "His grasp of the tactical situation ... seemed always limited, his dithering over the best way to capture Thiepval was disastrous for his troops, and his 'victory' at Beaumont Hamel much over-rated. His performance at the Somme should have seen him sink into a well-deserved obscurity. Perversely, in 1917, the opposite was to happen."
Historians tend to take an equally dim view of Gough's record at Third Ypres. Simpson writes that after the "more or less unsuccessful" operations on 10 and 16 August, Gough "in the end ... decided upon a more or less staggered approach, first one corps attacking and then another, which invited the sort of treatment the Germans had meted out to Fourth Army's piecemeal attacks the previous year. Throughout, though admittedly crippled by the weather, he failed to stick to the principles of careful preparation he had defined at the start of the planning for the offensive. While corps orders were as careful as before, the operations were doomed to fail".
Ian Beckett (1999), building on Tim Travers' (1987) concept of a "command vacuum", argues that Gough's failings can in part be attributed to structural failings in the BEF chain of command, as officers grappled with the problems of commanding large formations under stalemate conditions, and the degree of initiative which should be permitted to subordinates. Gary Sheffield does not agree, and argues that before 1918 Gough's "poor performance at Third Ypres" masked the "tactical and operational improvements" which were being made.
Sheffield argues that Gough's overbearing behaviour, especially in 1916, may well have been a need to overcompensate for having been promoted at such a young age, over the heads of jealous colleagues (Gough admitted (The Fifth Army p. 94) that his rapid promotion brought "special difficulties" at Loos), many of whom mistrusted him because of the Curragh incident. He also argues that Gough "demonstrated a good deal of skill during the March (1918) retreat" and might have come into his own during the advances of the Hundred Days but that his "military vices outweighed his virtues" and "he was not the right man to command an Army on the Somme," although he blames Haig to some extent for not supervising him properly. In Sheffield's view, Archibald Wavell's later observation that Western Front operations were often conducted as "open warfare at the halt" (i.e. seeking to commit reserves to "break the enemy line" as opposed to careful siege operations) certainly applied to Gough's command at the Somme. "Haig promoted and sustained (Gough) beyond his level of competence" although "arguably, while he deserved dismissal for his handling of the Somme, Bullecourt and Third Ypres, Gough was sacked for the one major battle in which he commanded Fifth Army with some competence".
Les Carlyon concurs that Gough was unfairly dealt with in 1918 but also regards his performance during the Great War in generally unflattering terms, citing documented and repeated failings in planning, preparation, comprehension of the battle space and a lack of empathy with the common soldier.
Execution of officer
Edmonds later wrote (to Wynne, 17 February 1944, during the period of the writing of the Third Ypres volume of the Official History) that he had heard Gough say that his men had "no blood lust" and that officers had "no spirit of the offensive", and that in 1918 he had once come into the mess demanding that two officers be shot pour encourager les autres, and despite being told by the APM (Assistant Provost Marshal) that there were no officers currently under arrest, "he got them". Nicholas Ridley comments that the suggestion that Gough effectively committed murder is, on the face of it, absurd and an example of the problems of relying on uncorroborated decades-old eyewitness testimony. However, it has been suggested that the story may have arisen from the execution of Sub-Lt Edwin Dyett in January 1917, for alleged desertion while serving with the Royal Naval Division at Beaucourt on 13 November 1916. Gough, overruling the Divisional Commander's recommendation for clemency, recommended that the execution proceed.
Fifth Army's "malaise"
Some put the blame for Fifth Army's performance on Gough's Chief of Staff Neill Malcolm, although his overbearing behaviour with Gough's subordinates may have been, even in the view of contemporaries, a variant on the "good-cop/bad-cop" routine. Edmonds also wrote in his memoirs (which are somewhat less reliable than the Official History) that Malcolm "accentuated and encouraged Gough's peculiarities, instead of softening them down" and claimed that in late 1917 William Peyton (Military Secretary) had warned Haig "three times that he was not only injuring himself but also injuring the cause by keeping Gough in command" but Haig was "perfectly infatuated with him". Watts of XIX Corps was the biggest victim of Malcolm. Farrar-Hockley argues that Gough was a popular figure until Bullecourt. Wilson's academic biographer Keith Jeffery describes Farrar-Hockley as "an unconvincing defence" of Gough.
Gough was notorious for his "encounters" with subordinates (Brigadier-General Sandilands to Edmonds, 1923).
Notes
References
Sources
- Callwell, C. E., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, His Life and Times, Vol. II, London: Cassell, 1927
- United Kingdom National Archives, Internet Site
Theses
Works
- Gough, Hubert, A Living Memorial to the Men of the Fifth Army, London: Fifth Army Memorial Fund, 1916
- Gough, Hubert, Bullying the Baltic States, Manchester: Hands-off Russia Committee, 1920
- Sparrow, Walter Shaw, & Hubert Gough, The Fifth Army in March 1918, London: Bodley Head, 1921
- Gough, Hubert, The Fifth Army, London: Hodder, 1931
- Gough, Hubert, The March Retreat, London: Cassell, 1934
- Gough, Hubert, Soldiering On: Being the memoirs of Sir Hubert Gough, New York: Speller, 1957
External links
- National Portrait Gallery
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