thumb|[[Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the founder of Hindutva.]]

Hindutva is a Hindu nationalist political ideology encompassing the belief in establishing Hindu hegemony within India. The political ideology was formulated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1922. It is used by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and other organisations, collectively called the Sangh Parivar.

Borrowing ideas and concepts from European fascism, the Hindutva movement was affiliated with Italian fascism and Nazism during the interwar period and the Second World War. and as "almost fascist in the classical sense", adhering to a concept of homogenised majority and cultural hegemony. Some scholars have described it as a separatist ideology. Some analysts dispute the identification of Hindutva with fascism and suggest that Hindutva is an extreme form of conservatism or ethnic nationalism.

Etymology

According to Julius J. Lipner, a scholar of Hinduism, Hindutva is a Sanskrit word, which connotes "Hinduness", and the term first gained usage among Bengali Indian intellectuals during the British colonial era. The term took roots in light of the description of Indic religions and the "western preconceptions about the nature of religion", which the Indian intellectuals disagreed with. This attempt to articulate what Hinduism is, coupled with emerging political and cultural beliefs, has evolved and contributed to the various meanings of the term.

The word Hindutva was used in the late 1890s by Chandranath Basu, to merely portray a traditional Hindu cultural view. The term was given a wider meaning in the later political ideology of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar.

Definitions of the term

Savarkar

For Savarkar, in Essentials of Hindutva, Hindutva is an inclusive term of everything Indic. The three essentials of Hindutva in Savarkar's definition were the common nation (rashtra), common race (jati), and common culture or civilisation (sanskriti). Savarkar used the words "Hindu" and "Sindhu" interchangeably. Those terms were at the foundation of his Hindutva, as geographic, cultural and ethnic concepts, and "religion did not figure in his ensemble", states Sharma.

In summary, Savarkar's Hinduism is a concept beyond the practice of religion. It encompasses India's cultural, historical, and national identity rooted in Hindu traditions and values. Hindutva is to build a strong Hindu nation, and this is the principle that holds together the customs and culture of this land.

According to Christophe Jaffrelot, a political scientist specialising in South Asia, Savarkar – declaring himself as an atheist – "minimises the importance of religion in his definition of Hindu", and instead emphasises an ethnic group with a shared culture and cherished geography. To Savarkar, states Jaffrelot, a Hindu is "first and foremost someone who lives in the area beyond the Indus river, between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean." He describes Hindutva, states Bhatt, as "one of the most comprehensive and bewildering synthetic concepts known to the human tongue" and "Hindutva is not a word but a history; not only the spiritual or religious history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being confounded with the other cognate term Hinduism, but a history in full."

Savarkar's notion of Hindutva formed the foundation for his Hindu nationalism. The court adopted Radhakrishnan's submission that Hinduism is complex and "the theist and atheist, the sceptic and agnostic, may all be Hindus if they accept the Hindu system of culture and life."

The 1966 decision has significantly influenced the judicial interpretation of the term Hindutva in subsequent cases, particularly in the seven rulings delivered by the Supreme Court during the 1990s, collectively referred to as the "Hindutva judgments." These judgments broadly characterised Hindutva as a "way of life" or a "state of mind," rather than as a political ideology or a religious doctrine. These judgements have faced widespread criticism. The Indian lawyer A. G. Noorani states that the Supreme Court in its 1995 ruling gave "Hindutva a benign meaning, calling Hindutva the same as Indianisation, etc." and these were unnecessary digressions from the facts of the case, and in doing so, "the court may have brought down the wall separating religion and politics." Mukul Kesavan, a historian and writer, argues that the judgments lend legitimacy to a sectarian vision of India and undermine the secular pluralism enshrined in the constitution. According to Kesavan, the judgements effectively sanitised the ideological project of the Sangh Parivar and enabled political actors to invoke majoritarian themes without transgressing the legal boundaries of religious appeals under electoral law.

Since Savarkar's time, the "Hindu identity" and the associated Hindutva ideology has been built upon the perceived vulnerability of Indian religions, culture, and heritage from those who, through "orientalist construction," have vilified them as inferior to a non-Indian religion, culture, and heritage. In its nationalistic response, Hindutva has been conceived "primarily as an ethnic community" concept, states Jaffrelot, then presented as cultural nationalism, where Hinduism along with other Indian religions are but a part.

According to Arvind Sharma, a scholar of Hinduism, Hindutva has not been a "static and monolithic concept", rather its meaning and "context, text and subtext has changed over time." The struggles of the colonial era and the formulation of neo-Hinduism by the early 20th century added a sense of "ethnicity" to the original "Hinduness" meaning of Hindutva. Its early formulation incorporated the racism and nationalism concepts prevalent in Europe during the first half of the 20th century, and culture was in part rationalised as a result of "shared blood and race." Savarkar and his Hindutva colleagues adopted the social Darwinism theories prevalent by the 1930s. In the post-independence period, states Sharma, the concept has suffered from ambiguity and its understanding aligned on "two different axes," one of religion versus culture, another of nation versus state. In general, the Hindutva thought among many Indians has "tried to align itself with the culture and nation" axes.

Upper casteism

When Prime Minister V. P. Singh launched the Mandal Commission to broaden reservations in government and public university jobs to a significant portion of the Shudras who were officially branded the Other Backward Classes (OBC), the mouthpiece of the Hindutva organisation RSS, Organiser magazine, wrote of "an urgent need to build up moral and spiritual forces to counter any fallout from an expected Shudra revolution."

According to social scientist and economist Jean Drèze, the Mandal Commission angered the upper castes and threatened to distance the OBCs, but the Babri Masjid's destruction and ensuing events helped to reduce this challenge and reunified Hindus on an anti-Muslim stance. He further claims "The Hindutva project is a lifeboat for the upper castes in so far as it promises to restore the Brahminical social order" and the potential enemies of this ideology is anybody whose acts might hinder the process of restoring the Brahminic social order. Drèze further claims that although Hindutva is known as a majoritarian movement, it can be best expressed as an oppressive minority movement.

According to Jaffrelot, the Sangh Parivar organisations with their Hindutva ideology have strived to impose the belief structure of the upper caste Hindus.

According to sociologist Amritorupa Sen, the privileges of the upper caste and especially Brahmins have become invisible. There has been a cultural norm that Brahmins take care of the lower castes out of a moral responsibility but also out of human kindness.

Separatism

The Hindutva ideology has also been described as a separatist ideology. Siddharth Varadarajan writes that Hindutva separatism seeks to depart from the "philosophical, cultural and civilisation mores of the country, including Hinduism itself".

Pseudohistory

According to Jaffrelot, the Hindutva ideology has roots in an era where the fiction in ancient Indian mythology and Vedic antiquity was presumed to be valid. This fiction was used to "give sustenance to Hindu ethnic consciousness." Hindutva organisations have been criticised for their belief in statements or practices that they claim to be both scientific and factual but are incompatible with the scientific method.

According to Anthony Parel, a historian and political scientist, Savarkar's Hindutva, Who is a Hindu? published in 1923 is a fundamental text of Hindutva ideology. It asserts, states Parel, India of the past to be "the creation of a racially superior people, the Aryans. They came to be known to the outside world as Hindus, the people beyond the Indus River. Their identity was created by their race (Jati) and their culture (Sanskriti). All Hindus claim to have in their veins the blood of the mighty race incorporated with and descended from the Vedic fathers. They created a culture—an ensemble of mythologies, legends, epic stories, philosophy, art and architecture, laws and rites, feasts and festivals. They have a special relationship to India: India is to them both a fatherland and a holy land." Savarkar's text presents the "Hindu culture as a self-sufficient culture, not needing any input from other cultures," which is "an unhistorical, narcissistic and false account of India's past," states Parel.

The premises of early Hindu nationalist thought, states Chetan Bhatt, reflected the colonial era European scholarship and Orientalism of its times.

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, a Fellow of the British Academy and a scholar of Politics and Philosophy of Religion, states that Hindutva is a form of nationalism that is expounded differently by its opponents and its proponents. Hindutva, according to Savarkar, is a "geography, race, and culture" based concept. However, the "geography" is not strictly territorial but is an "ancestral homeland of a people", and the "race" is not biogenetic but described as the historic descendants of the intermarriage of Aryans, native Dravidian peoples, and "different peoples" who arrived over time.

Hostility towards academic freedom

Hindutva has been associated with threats and intimidation directed at academics and students, both within India and in the United States. A notable instance occurred in 2011, when Hindutva activists successfully campaigned for the removal of an essay discussing the multiple narrative traditions of the Ramayana, an ancient Sanskrit epic, from the history syllabus at the Delhi University, one of India's most prestigious institutions of higher education. Romila Thapar, one of India's most eminent historians, has faced sustained criticism and attacks from Hindutva-affiliated groups. The Hindu right has also been implicated in efforts to discredit and obstruct scholars of South Asian studies and Hinduism based in North America. Notable figures such as Wendy Doniger and Sheldon Pollock have been targets of such campaigns. Doniger's book ceased publication in India following a legal settlement in which the publisher agreed to withdraw the title over claims that it defamed Hinduism. Pollock, similarly, was accused of misrepresenting the country's cultural heritage and of allegedly showing "disrespect for the unity and integrity of India." Under the leadership of the BJP, the Indian state has faced allegations of monitoring academics and restricting access to research resources for scholars. Audrey Truschke, an American historian of South Asia, remains a frequent target of threats and harassment by those aligned with Hindutva.

In 2021, a collective of scholars of South Asia based in North America published the Hindutva Harassment Field Manual in response to what they characterised as threats to their academic freedom emanating from Hindutva adherents. The Association for Asian Studies described Hindutva as a "majoritarian ideological doctrine" distinct from Hinduism and condemned the increasing attacks on scholars, artists, and journalists who engage critically with its political tenets. Several academics and conference participants withdrew from scholarly events due to threats received from ultranationalists and Hindutva-affiliated actors.

Fascism

The Hindutva ideology has significantly borrowed ideas and concepts from European fascism. Parallels between Hindutva and European fascism are observed in concepts such as repeated mobilisations, appeals to a mythic past, anti-communism, its purist racial elements, among others.

After the 1940s and 1950s, a number of scholars have labelled or compared Hindutva to fascism. Many scholars have pointed out that early Hindutva ideologues were inspired by fascist movements in early 20th-century Italy and Germany. Marzia Casolari is one such scholar who has linked the association and the borrowing of pre-World War II European fascist ideas by early leaders of Hindutva ideology. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, the term Hindutva has "fascist undertones."

The Indian Marxist economist and political commentator Prabhat Patnaik calls Hindutva "almost fascist in the classical sense." He states that the Hindutva movement is based on "class support, methods and programme." According to Patnaik, Hindutva has the following fascist ingredients: "an attempt to create a unified homogeneous majority under the concept of "the Hindus"; a sense of grievance against past injustice; a sense of cultural superiority; an interpretation of history according to this grievance and superiority; a rejection of rational arguments against this interpretation; and an appeal to the majority based on race and masculinity." According to Achin Vanaik, several authors have labelled Hindutva as fascist, but such a label requires "establishing a fascist minimum." Hindu nationalism, states Vanaik, is "a specific Indian manifestation of a generic phenomenon [of nationalism] but not one that belongs to the genus of fascism."

Sociologists Chetan Bhatt and Parita Mukta have described difficulties in identifying Hindutva with fascism or Nazism, because of Hindutva's embrace of cultural rather than racial nationalism, its "distinctively Indian" character, and "the RSS's disavowal of the seizure of state power in preference for long-term cultural labour in civil society." They describe Hindutva as a form of "revolutionary conservatism" or "ethnic absolutism." According to Thomas Hansen, Hindutva represents a "conservative revolution" in postcolonial India, and its proponents have been combining "paternalistic and xenophobic discourses" with "democratic and universalist discourses on rights and entitlements" based on "desires, anxieties and fractured subjectivities" in India.

Hindutva and Nazism

An editorial published on 4 February 1948 in the National Herald, the mouthpiece of the Indian National Congress party, stated that "it [RSS] seems to embody Hinduism in a Nazi form" with the recommendation that it must be ended. Similarly, in 1956, another Congress party leader compared the Bharatiya Jana Sangh to the Nazis in Germany.

Savarkar criticised Jawaharlal Nehru for condemning Germany and Italy, asserting that "crores of Hindu Sanghatanists in India [...] cherish no ill-will towards Germany or Italy or Japan." In 1938, Savarkar publicly expressed support for the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Although, at the outbreak of the Second World War, Savarkar and the Hindu Mahasabha initially advocated a stance of neutrality, his rhetoric became increasingly strident over time. He characterised German Jews as a communal force and endorsed the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Moreover, he drew a parallel between German Jews and Indian Muslims, stating, "The Indian Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next door, like Jews in Germany." As late as 1961, he spoke favourably of Nazi Germany and contrasted it with Nehru's "cowardly democracy."

History

Origins

According to Prabhu Bapu, a historian and scholar of Oriental Studies, the term and the contextual meaning of Hindutva emerged from the Indian experience in the colonial era, memories of its religious wars as the Mughal Empire decayed, an era of Muslim and Christian proselytisation, a feeling that their traditions and cultures were being insulted, whereby the Hindu intellectuals formulated Hindutva as a "Hindu identity" as a prelude to a national resurgence and a unified Indian nation against the "foreign invaders." The development of "religious nationalism" and the demand by the Muslim leaders on the Indian subcontinent for the partition of British India into Muslim and non-Muslim nations (Pakistan and Bangladesh being Muslim-majority, and India being Hindu-majority) during the middle of the 20th century, confirmed its narrative of geographical and cultural nationalism based on Indian culture and religions. According to Prabhu, such ideas and rationale fuelled the Hindutva narrative for a radical exclusivist Hindu nation, and became "the apologia for the two-nation theory of the 1940s." Professor Muqtedar Khan has argued that Hindu nationalism further grew because of the religious divisions between Hindus and Muslims that were fomented by post-1947 Pakistani terrorist attacks in and military conflicts with India.

According to Chetan Bhatt, the various forms of Hindu nationalism including the recent "cultural nationalist" form of Hindutva, have roots in the second half of the 19th century. These are a "dense cluster of ideologies" of primordialism, and they emerged from the colonial experiences of the Indian people in conjunction with ideas borrowed from European thinkers but thereafter debated, adapted and negotiated. These ideas included those of a nation, nationalism, race, Aryanism, Orientalism, Romanticism and others.