Hafez al-Assad

Hafez al-Assad (6 October 193010 June 2000) was a Syrian politician and military officer who served as the president of Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. He was previously the prime minister from 1970 to 1971 as well as the regional secretary of the regional command of the Syrian regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and secretary general of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party from 1970 until his death. Assad was a key participant in the 1963 Syrian coup d'état, which brought the Syrian regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party to power in the country, a power that lasted until the fall of the regime in 2024, then led by his son Bashar.

After the 1963 coup, the new leadership appointed Assad as the commander of the Syrian Arab Air Force. In February 1966 Assad participated in a second coup, which toppled the traditional leaders of the Ba'ath Party. Assad was appointed defense minister by the new government. Four years later Assad initiated a third coup, which ousted the quasi-marxist regime of Salah Jadid, and appointed himself as leader of Syria. Assad imposed various changes to the Ba'athist foreign policy after seizing power, such as abandoning Salah Jadid's policy of exporting "socialist revolution" and strengthening Syria's foreign relations with countries that his predecessor had deemed "reactionary". Assad made an alliance with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War in return for support against Israel, while keeping ties with many Western European & Gulf Arabian countries. While he officially kept the pan-Arab concept of unifying the Arab world into one “Arab nation” as he termed it, such as being part of the Federation of Arab Republics, he sought to paint Syria as the defender of the Palestinians against Israel.

Assad quickly consolidated his power. Right after Gamal Abdel Nasser's death, he sought to reconciliate Syria with the other Arab countries, which had been harmed under Jadid’s rule. He also tried to form new ties with countries from both camps in the Cold War. As a result, he got economic support from OPEC members during the 1973 oil embargo, as a show of support to his war against Israel in 1973, the October War. While Syria remained a one-party system, Ba'athist decision-making authority that had previously been collegial was reduced in favour of empowering the president’s absolute control over the country. To maintain his personalistic rule, a cult of personality centred on Assad and his family was created by the president and the Ba'ath party. Assad ordered an Arabization campaign on Kurdish areas of Syria and started intervention in Lebanon in 1976, which resulted in the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. During his rule, his regime crushed an Islamist uprising led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood rebels through a series of crackdowns culminating in the Hama massacre, which led to two thirds of the city of Hama being destroyed. His regime was accused of numerous human rights violations, including opening prison death camps.

Assad's initial preferred successor as president was his brother Rifaat, but Rifaat attempted to seize power in 1983–1984 when Hafez had a health scare and he was subsequently exiled. Assad's next choice of successor was his eldest son, Bassel. However, Bassel died in a high-speed car crash in 1994, and Assad turned to his third choice—his younger son Bashar, who at that time was a medical student in the UK, with no political experience. The move to appoint a member of his own family as his successor was met with criticism in some quarters of the Syrian ruling class, but Assad persisted with his plan and demoted officials who opposed this succession. Assad died on June 10, 2000 and Bashar succeeded him as president, serving until his overthrow on December 8, 2024.

Early life, education and early career

Early life

Hafez al-Assad was born on 6 October 1930, in Qardaha, a town in the north-west of Syria. He was born into a poor Alawite peasant family belonging to the Kalbiyya tribe of Alawites. Later, Assad recalled at the congresses of the Peasants' General Union: "I had a passion for threshing the harvest... But I took part in all the phases of farming..., lived your emotions and understand what your life signifies. I still have mental pictures of the injustices of the time. No matter how far the past sinks away, it is necessary to keep these images alive in our minds, not to nurse hatred against anyone but to see into them, for what we endured forms an essential part of the way we view things and of the foundation on which we build the present and the future."

His paternal grandfather, Sulayman al-Wahhish, gained the nickname al-Wahhish (wild beast) for his strength. Hafez al-Assad's parents were Na'isa Shalish and Ali al-Assad. His father married twice and had eleven children. Hafez was his ninth son and the fourth from his second marriage.

By the 1920s, Ali was respected locally and was initially opposed to the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, a French-ruled League of Nations mandate officially established in 1923. Nevertheless, Ali Sulayman later cooperated with the French administration and was appointed to an official post. Local residents called him "al-Assad" (the lion) for his accomplishments and, in 1927, he made the nickname his surname.

Education and early political career

Alawites initially opposed a united Syrian state (since they thought their status as a religious minority would endanger them). After the French left Syria in 1946, many Syrians mistrusted the Alawites because of their alignment with France. Assad left his Alawite village, beginning his education at the age of nine in Sunni-dominated Latakia. He became the first in his family to attend high school, but in Latakia, Assad faced anti-Alawite bias from Sunnis. He was an excellent student, winning several prizes at around the age of 14. Assad lived in a poor, predominantly Alawite part of Latakia; he even had to interrupt his studies for a while, since his father did not have enough money to pay for it (but later he was able to return). He became the only ruler of Syria who came from a peasant family, which added to his initial popular support. In later years, Assad often cited his peasant origins as evidence of his closeness to the people, especially when he was attacked by his opponents. Jadid's security services were purged, some military criminal investigative powers were transferred to the police, and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed. Restrictions on travel to and trade with Lebanon were eased, and Assad encouraged growth in the private sector. While Assad supported most of Jadid's policies, he proved more pragmatic after he came to power.

Most of Jadid's supporters faced a choice: continue working for the Ba'ath government under Assad, or face repression. Assad made it clear from the beginning "that there would be no second chances". However, later in 1970, he recruited support from the Ba'athist old guard who had supported Aflaq's leadership during the 1963–1966 power struggle. An estimated 2,000 former Ba'athists rejoined the party after hearing Assad's appeal, among them party ideologist Georges Saddiqni and Shakir al-Fahham, a secretary of the founding, 1st National Congress of the Ba'ath Party in 1947. Assad ensured that they would not defect to the pro-Aflaqite Ba'ath Party in Iraq with the Treason Trials in 1971, in which he prosecuted Aflaq, Amin al-Hafiz and nearly 100 followers (most in absentia). The few who were convicted were not imprisoned long, and the trials were primarily symbolic.

At the 11th National Congress, Assad assured party members that his leadership was a radical change from that of Jadid, and he would implement a "corrective movement" to return Syria to the true "nationalist socialist line". Unlike Jadid, Assad emphasised "the advancement of which all resources and manpower [would be] mobilised [was to be] the liberation of the occupied territories". This would mark a major break with his predecessors and would, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, dictate "major alterations in the course of the Ba'thist state".

Institutionalization

thumb|alt=Large group of men sitting in rows|Assad's first inauguration as president in the People's Council, March 1971. L–R: Assad, [[Abdullah al-Ahmar, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Khleifawi, Assistant Regional Secretary Mohamad Jaber Bajbouj, Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam and People's Council Speaker Fihmi al-Yusufi. In the third civilian row are Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass (MP in the 1971 Parliament) and Air Force Commander Naji Jamil. Behind Tlass is Rifaat al-Assad, Assad's younger brother. On the far right in the fourth row is future vice president Zuhair Masharqa, and behind Abdullah al-Ahmar is Deputy Prime Minister Mohammad Haidar.]]

Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule. In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military Leninism; Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Assad's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."

Assad institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party. As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread. The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government.

While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues. None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed. General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the Islamist uprising. The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party. Joint sessions of these bodies resembled politburos in communist states. Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively. The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet. As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated. The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had de facto authority. The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the Comintern. It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's foreign policy and party ideology. The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad. In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker National Progressive Front.

Economy

thumb|left|alt=Satellite photo of lake and dam|Tabqa Dam (center), built-in 1974

Assad called his domestic reforms a Corrective Movement, and it achieved some results. He introduced Ta'addudiyya and Infiraj policies, aimed at limited economic and political liberalization, and tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake al-Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.

By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Assad's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) set ambitious goals but failed to achieve most of them, as well as Fifth (1981-1985) and Sixth (1986-1990) Plans. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.

thumb|Assad in 1978|309x309px

During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week.

The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Assad's government liberalized the Syrian economy in so-called Al-Ta`addudiyya Al-Iqtisadiyya campaign, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government did not privatize state-owned companies.

Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.

Assad's government tried to decrease population growth, but this was only marginally successful. One sign of economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on an agreement. The main cause of this failure was the country's difficulty in meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernised it would not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Assad's government gave civil servants a 20-percent pay raise on the anniversary of the corrective movement that brought him to power. Although the foreign press criticised Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy, Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system, permit private banks and open a stock exchange.

Sectarianism

thumbnail|alt=Four men in suits|Hafez in 1971 with Sunni members of the political elite: (L–R) Ahmad al-Khatib, Assad, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass

thumb|Assad greeting [[Richard Nixon on the latter's arrival at Damascus Airport, 15 July 1974]]

When Assad came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly. The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Assad "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes". The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections; Rifaat al-Assad controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's brother-in-law Adnan Makhlouf was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard. Other prominent figures were Ali Haydar (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head), Muhammad al-Khuli (head of Assad's Air Force Intelligence Directorate from 1970 to 1987) and Military Intelligence head Ali Duba. Assad controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals Shafiq Fayadh (commander of the 3rd Division), Ibrahim Safi (commander of the 1st Division) and Adnan Badr Hassan (commander of the 9th Division). During the 1990s, Assad further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General Hikmat al-Shihabi with General Ali Aslan as chief of staff. The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect. Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies. Anti-Sunni orientation of his Alawite regime also pushed Assad to pursue closer relations with Shia Iran.

During the early years of his rule, some of Assad's elite had appeared non-sectarian; prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were Abdul Halim Khaddam, Shihabi, Naji Jamil, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass. However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Assad. Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Assad's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Assad or the Alawite-dominated security system. When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence). After the failed Islamist uprising, Assad's reliance on his relatives intensified; before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy. A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast." Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad. However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers. Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.

Militarization

thumb|314x314px|Syrian soldiers in 1980

From the very beginning of his rule, Assad pursued an active policy of militarizing the Syrian state and its society - his goal was to build a strong traditional army (with the support of the USSR) to fight Israel. Assad gave a very high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union: Eventually, with the help of it, Assad built a large and professional military equipped with modern tanks, airplanes and long-range ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into most Israeli cities. The Syrian Arab Army, which was mainly a conscripted force, increased from 50,000 personnel in 1967 to 225,000 in 1973 and to over 500,000 in 1986, and its air and armored fleets were among the largest in the world. Already high military spending has steadily increased, burdening the Syrian economy.

The policy of general militarization also affected the civil sphere of the country: militaristic propaganda was very widespread, especially in schools and educational institutions (where students were taught military tactics and the use of weapons and go to military camps known as moaskar for 15 days, where they were further introduced to soldier's life and were under the command of military officers. Thus, taking into account only the soldiers of the Syrian army, Syria was already the 4th country in the world in terms of militarization per capita, despite the fact that even more people in the country knew how to own a weapon, from school days.

Arab Belt project

From 1973 to 1976, under Assad's orders, an Arabization campaign known as the "Arab Belt" was carried out in northeastern Syria. Assad government called campaign "Plan to establish model state farms in the Jazira region". The aim of the campaign was to change the ethnic composition of north-east Syria in favor of the Arabs and to the detriment of the local inhabitants, the Kurds. It involved the seizure of land which was then settled with Arabs displaced by the creation of Lake Assad. The programme was implemented in 1973; forcibly deporting around 140,000 Kurds from 332 villages and confiscating their lands around a 180-mile strip. Tens of thousands of Arab settlers coming from Raqqa were then granted these lands to establish settlements. The area of the project was a strip of land - almost 15 km in breadth - that extended over 375 km in length; across the north-eastern boundary-regions of Syria with Turkey and Iraq. Twelve were built each around Qamishli and Al-Malakiyah and sixteen around Ras al Ayn. The Kurdish village names of the area were replaced by Arabic names not necessarily related to the traditions and history of the region.

Later, Hindawi began to claim that everything was planned by Mossad, but most countries accepted the first version of events about Syria's involvement. After the court found Hindawi guilty, the then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher broke off diplomatic relations with Syria. Following this, the United States and Canada recalled their ambassadors from Syria. The European Community also imposed minor sanctions.

Gulf War

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Assad sided with Kuwait and considered Iraq's aggression as a serious threat to Syria's interests. Assad and Saddam had long detested each other, As a result, Syria joined the US-led coalition and sent up to 20,000 troops to defend Saudi Arabia.

Political assassinations

When Hafez al-Assad came to power, he did not limit his authority to purging Syrian institutions; in addition, his regime organized assassinations and political murders of his potential (and proven) enemies who did not support either Assad or his policies. Moreover, the assassination attempts organized by the Assad regime affected not only Syrians and not only those who live in Syria.

On his deathbed in May 2000, Assad said that Mahmoud Al-Zoubi had betrayed him. He did not say what the betrayal was but demanded that "an investigation be conducted and that he be held accountable." The next day, at an emergency meeting of the Ba'ath Party, Zoubi was expelled from the party. On May 25, the Damascus police chief came to him and allegedly shot him in his own apartment - the official version was that Zoubi committed suicide.

Salim Lawzi was a Lebanese journalist and founder of al Hawadeth magazine. His criticism of the Syrian role in Lebanese Civil War escalated leading to serious threats on his life. The Hawadeth main building was destroyed during the war. Fearing for his life due to the threats he was receiving, Lawzi chose self-exile in London, from where he continued editing his magazine. But After his mother died, he decided to return for her funeral. After landing in Beirut International Airport, he was kidnapped by gunmen on the Airport Road on 25 February 1980. His heavily bruised tortured body was found nine days later on 4 March 1980 in Aramoun, on the outskirts of Beirut. Forensic reports found heavy signs of torture, including a broken and dislocated right arm, maimed and disjointed writing hand, fingers burnt and blackened through use of acid and phosphoric substances, pens pierced into abdomen and intestines (obvious messages in mutilation for other critics of Syria) and an assassination-style bullet in the head. Alleged perpetrator was the Syrian intelligence agents.

Khalil Akkawi was the leader of the Islamic Unification Movement lived in Lebanese Tripoli. Syrian Military Intelligence killed Khalil Akkawi in February 9, 1986, because he refused to fight the Lebanese Forces. Three supporters of Akkawi's Islamic Tawheed, or Islamic Unification Movement, were slain in gunfights with Syrian troopers after his burial. In the 1980s, Syrian intelligence services were very active in assassination attempts (mostly successful) against their opponents in Lebanon.

Europe

Even earlier, Salah ad-Din al-Bitar had been sentenced to death in absentia by the new government, and had fled to Beirut. Later, in 1978, Assad pardoned him and allowed him to return to Syria. However, a quarrel and conflict soon broke out between them again,

Al-Tantawi was the wife of former Muslim Brotherhood director general Issam al-Attar and lived in Aachen, Germany. In March 1981, her father, Ali Al-Tantawi, called her, saying that she was in serious danger (in the form of assassins sent by Assad after her and her husband). An hour later, a neighbor knocked on her door at gunpoint - Tantawi, hearing a familiar voice, opened the door and was immediately killed by two men.

As a result, his ideas and methods of ruling the state became known as Assadism. Assadism is considered a later and more personalized version of radical neo-Ba'athism, which places Hafez al-Assad at the center as the founder and father of the modern Syrian nation. Assadism's policies were a strange mixture of Syrian-Arab nationalism, radical socialism (until the 1990s), secularism, militarism and a personality cult around Hafez and his family: Assadism exalted the person of Hafez and portrayed his wisdom as "beyond the comprehension of the average citizen". Unlike Jadid's neo-Ba'athism, Assadism did not promote atheism and relied on more traditional ideas, for example rejecting the doctrine of exporting socialist revolution and the Maoist strategy of "people's war". Assadism supported the formation of a strong standard army (rather than the support of proxy forces, as was the case under Jadid), and the formation of a coalition with non-Ba'athist organizations in Syria (which was also rejected by the Jadid regime), which eventually resulted in the formation of the National Progressive Front. Syrian state propaganda cast Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.

Autocracy, succession, and death

Assad's first choice of successor was his brother Rifaat al-Assad, an idea he broached as early as 1980, and his brother's coup attempt weakened the institutionalised power structure on which he based his rule. Instead of changing his policy, Assad tried to protect his power by honing his governmental model. He gave a larger role to his eldest son, Bassel al-Assad, who was rumored to be his father's planned successor; this kindled jealousy within the government.thumbnail|alt=Family portrait: parents seated in front, and five grown children (four sons and one daughter) standing behind|Assad and his wife, [[Anisa Makhlouf; back row, left to right: Maher, Bashar, Bassel, Majd and Bushra al-Assad, circa 1992-93|235x235px]]At a 1994 military meeting, Chief of Staff Shihabi said that since Assad wanted to normalize relations with Israel, the Syrian military had to withdraw its troops from the Golan Heights. Haydar replied angrily, "We have become nonentities. We were not even consulted." When he heard about Haydar's outburst, Assad replaced Haydar as Commander of Special Forces with the Alawite Major General Ali Habib. Haydar also reportedly opposed dynastic succession, keeping his views secret until after Bassel's death in 1994 (when Assad chose Bashar al-Assad to succeed him); he then openly criticised Assad's succession plans.

Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria's foreign minister from 1970 to 1984, opposed dynastic succession on the grounds that it was not socialist. Khaddam has said that Assad never discussed his intentions about succession with members of the Regional Command. By the 1990s, the Sunni faction of the leadership was aging; the Alawites, with Assad's help, had received new base. The Sunnis were at a disadvantage since many were opposed to any kind of dynastic succession.

After returning to Syria, Bashar al-Assad enrolled in the Homs Military Academy. He was quickly promoted to Brigadier Commander, and served for a time in the Republican Guard. He studied most military subjects, "including a tank battalion commander, command and staff" (the latter two of which were required for a senior command in the Syrian army). Bashar al-Assad was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1997, and to colonel in January 1999. Official sources ascribe Bashar's rapid promotion to his "overall excellence in the staff officers' course, and in the outstanding final project he submitted as part of the course for command and staff". With Bashar's training, Assad appointed a new generation of Alawite security officers to secure his succession plans. Shihabi's replacement by Aslan as Chief of Staff on 1 July 1998—Shihabi was considered a potential successor by the outside world—marked the end of the long security-apparatus overhaul. Skepticism of Assad's dynastic-succession plan was widespread within and outside the government, with critics noting that Syria was not a monarchy. By 1998 Bashar had made inroads into the Ba'ath Party, taking over Khaddam's Lebanon portfolio (a post he had held since the 1970s). By December 1998 Bashar al-Assad had replaced Rafic al-Hariri, Prime Minister of Lebanon and one of Khaddam's proteges, with Salim al-Huss. Several Assad proteges, who had served since 1970 or earlier, were dismissed from office between 1998 and 2000. They were sacked not because of disloyalty to Assad, but because Assad thought they would not fully support Bashar al-Assad's succession. "Retirees" included Muhammad al-Khuli, Nassir Khayr Bek and Ali Duba. Among the new appointees (Bashar loyalists) were Bahjat Sulayman, Major General Hassan Khalil and Major General Assef Shawkat (Assad's son-in-law).

By the late 1990s, Assad's health had deteriorated. American diplomats said Assad had difficulty staying focused and seemed tired during their meetings; he was seen as incapable of functioning for more than two hours a day. Because of his increasing seclusion from state affairs, the government became accustomed to working without his involvement in day-to-day affairs. Nearly all of his administrative tasks and even much of the important decision making was allegedly being delegated to his daughter, Bushra, who set up her own office next to her father in the Presidential Palace. Bushra, long believed to have been Assad's favorite child and, had it not been for her gender, preferred candidate for succession, had a negative view towards Bashar's ability to succeed Hafez and was allegedly mounting her own attempt at amassing power to succeed him. His spokesperson ignored the speculation, and Assad's official routine in 1999 was basically unchanged from the previous decade. Assad continued to conduct meetings, traveling abroad occasionally; he visited Moscow in July 1999.

On 26 March 2000, Assad embarked on another rare foreign trip to Geneva to meet with American president Bill Clinton. thumb|People praying during the funeral|leftOn 10 June 2000, at the age of 69, Hafez al-Assad died of a heart attack while on the telephone with Lebanese prime minister Salim al-Huss. A period of 40 days of mourning was declared in Syria and 7 days in Lebanon thereafter. Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, Libya, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Kuwait and Qatar announced three days of national mourning. His funeral was held three days later. The Israeli prime minister said that with the death of Assad, an era has ended in the Middle East.

Assad was buried in his hometown of Qardaha alongside his son Bassel, in what became known as the "Immortal Leader's Mausoleum". After Hafez al-Assad's death, power was transferred to his son Bashar al-Assad with the support of Ba'ath loyalists, making Syria the first Arab republic to establish a dynastic system.

On 11 December 2024, after the overthrow of his son Bashar following 13 years of civil war, rebels set fire and burned Hafez al-Assad's tomb inside the mausoleum. Videos of armed men burning Assad's grave and urinating on it were published online. On 28 April 2025, videos and photos on social media showed his grave being exhumed by unidentified individuals. His remains were reportedly transferred to an unknown location.

Legacy

Hafez al-Assad was one of the key figures in the Middle East, who exerted considerable influence on the politics of the entire region. However, opinions about him and his actions are mixed. As The New York Times put it, "No lasting peace could hold without him, but none could be negotiated with him either." Assad was able to build a stable state: his domestic policies of expanding infrastructure, medical and educational services, strengthening central authority, and intensive militarization of society, and foreign policy, which consisted of a consistent fight "against imperialism and Israel," have turned Syria into a closed regional power, whose views could not be ignored. His ability to get out of difficult situations, convince others and achieve favorable conditions for himself greatly impressed many diplomats who interacted with him. As The New York Times wrote, "Mr. Assad most sought to create a legacy, remaking Syria into a power among the Arabs rather than a political football". For example, SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Alois Brunner, who played a significant role in the implementation of the Holocaust as the right-hand man of Adolf Eichmann, assisted al-Assad in organizing the Ba'athist secret police and trained them on Nazi Germany's torture practices. A 1983 report published by Amnesty International revealed that Assad regime routinely committed mass-executions of alleged dissidents and engaged in the extensive torture of prisoners of conscience. Various torture methods in Syrian prisons include electrocutions, ablazing, sexual violence, castration, etc. Assad left behind a hereditary dictatorship that eventually sparked a civil war and a personality cult even more widespread than in Maoist China or Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia.

Foreign honours

40x40px Grand Star of the Decoration of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria, 1988
40x40px Collar of the Order of the White Lion, 9 August 1975
40x40px Grand Star of Peoples' Friendship, 1 October 1978
40x40px National Order of the Cedar
40x40px Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta, 1973
40x40px Order of the Star of the Romanian Socialist Republic, First Class, 1974
40x40px Order of the Yugoslav Star, 1974