The , also known as the GEACPS, was a pan-Asian union that the Empire of Japan tried to establish. Initially, it covered Japan (including annexed Korea), Manchukuo, and China, but as the Pacific War progressed, it also included territories in Southeast Asia and parts of India. The term was first coined by Minister for Foreign Affairs Hachirō Arita on June 29, 1940.
The proposed objectives of this union were to ensure economic self-sufficiency and cooperation among the member states, along with resisting the influence of Western imperialism and Soviet communism. In reality, militarists and nationalists saw it as an effective propaganda tool to enforce Japanese hegemony. Japanese spokesmen openly described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a device for the "development of the Japanese race." When World War II ended, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became a source of criticism and scorn for the Allies.
Development of the concept
thumb|upright=0.9|1935 propaganda poster of [[Manchukuo promoting harmony between Japanese, Chinese, and Manchu. The caption from right to left says: "With the help of Japan, China, and Manchukuo, the world can be in peace." The flags shown are, right to left: the "Five Races Under One Union" flag of China, the flag of Japan, and the flag of Manchukuo.]]
The concept of a unified Asia under Japanese leadership had its roots dating back to the 16th century. For example, Toyotomi Hideyoshi proposed to make China, Korea, and Japan into "one". Moreover, Hideyoshi had further plans to expand into India, the Philippines, and other islands in the Pacific.
Monroe Doctrine for Japan
In Autumn 1872, United States minister to Japan Charles DeLong explained to U.S. General Charles LeGendre that he had been urging the Government of Japan to occupy Taiwan and "civilize" the Taiwanese indigenous people just as the U.S. had taken over the land of the Native Americans and "civilized" them. General LeGendre, the first non-Japanese person hired as a foreign policy expert by the Japanese government, encouraged the Japanese to declare a Japanese "sphere of influence" modeled on the Monroe Doctrine that the U.S. had declared for the exclusion of other powers from the Western Hemisphere. Such a Japanese sphere of influence would be the first time a non-White state would adopt such a policy . The stated aim of such a sphere of influence would be to civilize the barbarian peoples of Asia. "Pacify and civilize them if possible, and if not...exterminate them or otherwise deal with them as the United States and England have dealt with the barbarians," LeGendre had explained to the Japanese. Japan began invading Taiwan in 1874 and fought the Russian Empire for control of Manchuria starting in 1904.
Continuing this American policy, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt also secretly reiterated to Japan that, just as the U.S. through the Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary declared the Western Hemisphere as part of its sphere of influence, Japan should create its own sphere of influence in the Pacific Rim. Teddy Roosevelt was encouraged by Japan embarking on Western ways and developing a modern military in the wake of the forced "Opening of Japan" by the United States that had begun with the Perry Expedition. Roosevelt envisioned demarcating respective United States and Japanese zones of military and economic dominance in the Pacific Rim. Roosevelt told the Japanese that they are more racially similar to Americans than Russians are, even though Russians are a White race, and that Japan should take its place among the great Western powers to dominate, among other areas, Korea and Manchuria, but that Japan must not encroach on U.S. possession of the Philippines. In much the same way that Europeans used the "backwardness" of African and Asian nations as a reason for why they had to conquer them, for the Japanese elite the "backwardness" of China and Korea was proof of the inferiority of those nations, thus giving the Japanese the "right" to conquer them. This mutual recognition of the U.S. and the Japanese zones of control in the Pacific would be secretly articulated in the Taft–Katsura Agreement of July 1905, essentially partitioning the Western Pacific Rim between the two powers.
In an interview with the New York Times days later, Katsura explained that Japan's "policy in the Far East will be in exact accord with that of England and the United States." Japan will soon force "upon Korea and China the same benefits of modern development that have been in the past forced on us.... We intend to begin a campaign of education in [Korea and China] such as we ourselves have experienced [and to develop] Asiatic commercial interests that will benefit us all. China and Korea are both atrociously mis-governed...These conditions we will endeavor to correct at the earliest possible date--by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary. And in this, as in all things, we expect to act in exact concurrence with the ideas and desires of England and the United States."
During the proceedings of the Lansing–Ishii Agreement, Japan explained to Western observers that their expansionism in Asia was analogous to the United States' Monroe Doctrine.|Tōa Shin Chitsujo, which was limited to Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo. They believed that the union had 6 purposes: would continue and be "perfected". This entailed the conquest of Southeast Asian territories to extract their natural resources. If territories were unprofitable, the Japanese would encourage their subjects, including those in mainland Japan, to endure "economic suffering" and prevent outflow of material to the enemy. Nonetheless, they preached the moral superiority of cultivating a "spiritual essence" instead of prioritising material gain like Western powers. Without steel and oil imports, Japan's military could not fight for long.
As part of its war drive in the Pacific, Japanese propaganda included phrases like "Asia for the Asiatics" and talked about the need to "liberate" Asian colonies from the control of Western powers. They also planned to change the Chinese hegemony in the agricultural market in Southeast Asia with Japanese immigrants to boost its economic value, with the former being despised by Southeast Asian natives. Although invading Japanese forces sometimes received rapturous welcomes throughout recently captured Asian territories due to anti-Western and occasionally, anti-Chinese sentiment, For example, according to estimates, under Japanese occupation, about 100,000 Burmese and Malay Indian labourers died while constructing the Burma-Siam Railway. The Japanese sometimes spared ethnic groups, such as Chinese immigrants, if they supported the war effort, whether sincerely or not. The booklet Read This and the War is Won—for the Japanese Army—presented colonialism as an oppressive group of colonists living in luxury by burdening Asians. According to Japan, since racial ties of blood connected other Asians to the Japanese, and Asians had been weakened by colonialism, it was Japan's self-appointed role to "make men of them again" and liberate them from their Western oppressors.
According to Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō (in office 1941–1942 and 1945), should Japan be successful in creating this sphere, it would emerge as the leader of Eastern Asia, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would be synonymous with the Japanese Empire.
Greater East Asia Conference
upright=1.6|thumb|Attendees of the Greater East Asia Conference<br>: Japan and colonies<br>: Japanese allies and occupied territory <br>: Territories disputed and claimed by Japan and its allies
thumb|upright=1.4|The [[Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943. Participants left to right: Ba Maw, Zhang Jinghui, Wang Jingwei, Hideki Tojo, Wan Waithayakon, José P. Laurel, and Subhas Chandra Bose]]
upright=1.4|thumb|Fragment of a Japanese propaganda booklet published by the Tokyo Conference (1943), depicting scenes of situations in Greater East Asia, from the top, left to right: the [[Japanese occupation of Malaya, Thailand under Plaek Phibunsongkram gaining the territories of Saharat Thai Doem, the Republic of China under Wang Jingwei allied with Japan, Subhas Chandra Bose forming the Provisional Government of Free India, the State of Burma gaining independence under Ba Maw, the Declaration of the Second Philippine Republic, and people of Manchukuo]]
The took place in Tokyo on 5–6 November 1943: Japan hosted the heads of state of various component members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The conference was also referred to as the Tokyo Conference. The common language used by the delegates during the conference was English. The conference was mainly used as propaganda.
At the conference, Tojo greeted them with a speech praising the "spiritual essence" of Asia instead of the "materialistic civilisation" of the West. Their meeting was characterised by the praise of solidarity and condemnation of Western colonialism but without practical plans for either economic development or integration. Because of a lack of military representatives at the conference, the conference served little military value.
The following dignitaries attended:
- Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of the Empire of Japan
- Zhang Jinghui, Prime Minister of the Empire of Manchuria
- Wang Jingwei, President of the Republic of China
- Ba Maw, Head of State of the State of Burma
- Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of State of the Provisional Government of Free India
- José P. Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines
- Prince Wan Waithayakon, envoy from the Kingdom of Thailand
Imperial rule
The ideology of the Japanese colonial empire, as it expanded dramatically during the war, contained two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, it preached the unity of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a coalition of Asian races directed by Japan against Western imperialism in Asia. This approach celebrated the spiritual values of the East in opposition to the "crass materialism" of the West. In practice, however, the Japanese installed organisationally-minded bureaucrats and engineers to run their new empire, and they believed in ideals of efficiency, modernisation, and engineering solutions to social problems. Japanese was the official language of the bureaucracy in all of the areas and was taught at schools as a national language.
Japan set up puppet regimes in Manchuria and China; they vanished at the war's end. The Imperial Army operated ruthless administrations in most conquered areas but paid more favourable attention to the Dutch East Indies. The main goal was to obtain oil but the Dutch colonial government destroyed the oil wells. However, the Japanese could repair and reopen them within a few months of their conquest. However, most tankers transporting oil to Japan were sunk by U.S. Navy submarines, so Japan's oil shortage became increasingly acute. Japan also sponsored an Indonesian nationalist movement under Sukarno. Sukarno finally came to power in the late 1940s after several years of fighting the Dutch.
Philippines
To build up the economic base of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese Army envisioned using the Philippine islands as a source of agricultural products needed by its industry. For example, Japan had a surplus of sugar from Taiwan, and a severe shortage of cotton, so they tried to grow cotton on sugar lands with disastrous results; they lacked the seeds, pesticides, and technical skills to grow cotton. Jobless farm workers flocked to the cities, where there was minimal relief and few jobs. The Japanese Army also tried using cane sugar for fuel, castor beans and copra for oil, Derris for quinine, cotton for uniforms, and abacá for rope. The plans were difficult to implement due to limited skills, collapsed international markets, bad weather, and transportation shortages. The program failed, giving very little help to Japanese industry and diverting resources needed for food production. As Stanley Karnow writes, Filipinos "rapidly learned as well that 'co-prosperity' meant servitude to Japan's economic requirements".
A Taglish joke said it should be named , as is a pronoun meaning "mine".
Living conditions were poor throughout the Philippines during the war. Transportation between the islands was difficult because of a lack of fuel. Food was in short supply, with sporadic famines and epidemic diseases that killed hundreds of thousands of people. In October 1943, Japan declared the Philippines an independent republic. The Japanese-sponsored Second Philippine Republic, headed by President José P. Laurel, proved to be ineffective and unpopular as Japan maintained very tight control.
Failure
The Co-Prosperity Sphere collapsed with Japan's surrender to the Allies in September 1945. Ba Maw, wartime President of Burma under the Japanese, blamed the Japanese military for the failure of the Co-Prosperity Sphere:
In other words, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere operated not for the betterment of all the Asian countries but for Japan's interests, and thus the Japanese failed to gather support in other Asian countries. Nationalist movements did appear in these Asian countries during this period, and these nationalists cooperated with the Japanese to some extent. However, Willard Elsbree, professor emeritus of political science at Ohio University, claims that the Japanese government and these nationalist leaders never developed "a real unity of interests between the two parties, [and] there was no overwhelming despair on the part of the Asians at Japan's defeat".
thumb|upright=1.4|The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at its greatest extent
The failure of Japan to understand the goals and interests of the other countries involved in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led to a weak association of countries bound to Japan only in theory and not in spirit. Ba Maw argued that Japan should've acted according to the declared aims of "Asia for the Asiatics". He claimed that if Japan had proclaimed this maxim at the beginning of the war and acted on that idea, they could have engineered a very different outcome.
Propaganda efforts
Pamphlets were dropped by airplane on the Philippines, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, and Indonesia, urging them to join the movement. Mutual cultural societies were founded in all conquered lands to ingratiate with the natives and try to supplant English with Japanese as the commonly used language. Multi-lingual pamphlets depicted many Asians marching or working together in happy unity, with the flags of all the states and a map depicting the intended sphere. Others proclaimed that they had given independent governments to the countries they occupied, a claim undermined by the lack of power given to these puppet governments.
In Thailand, a street was built to demonstrate it, to be filled with modern buildings and shops, but of it consisted of false fronts. A network of Japanese-sponsored film production, distribution, and exhibition companies extended across the Japanese Empire and was collectively referred to as the Greater East Asian Film Sphere. These film centers mass-produced shorts, newsreels, and feature films to encourage Japanese language acquisition as well as cooperation with Japanese colonial authorities.
Projected territorial extent
thumb|A Japanese [[10 sen coin|10 sen stamp from 1942 depicting the approximate extension of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]]
Prior to the escalation of World War II to the Pacific and East Asia, Japanese planners regarded it as self-evident that the conquests secured in Japan's earlier wars with Russia (South Sakhalin and Kwantung), Germany (South Seas Mandate), and China (Manchuria) would be retained, as well as Korea (Chōsen), Taiwan (Formosa), the recently seized additional portions of China, and occupied French Indochina.
Land Disposal Plan
A reasonably accurate indication as to the geographic dimensions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere are elaborated on in a Japanese wartime document prepared in December 1941 by the Research Department of the Ministry of War. it was put together with the consent of and according to the directions of the Minister of War (later Prime Minister) Hideki Tōjō. It assumed that the already established puppet governments of Manchukuo, Mengjiang, and the Wang Jingwei regime in Japanese-occupied China would continue to function in these areas. When Tōjō spoke on the plan to the House of Peers he was vague about the long-term prospects, but insinuated that the Philippines and Burma might be allowed independence, although vital territories such as Hong Kong would remain under Japanese rule. The plan of the Third Reich for fortifying its own Lebensraum territory's eastern limits, beyond which the Co-Prosperity Sphere's northwestern frontier areas would exist in East Asia, involved the creation of a "living wall" of Wehrbauer "soldier-peasant" communities defending it. However, it is unknown if the Axis powers ever formally negotiated a possible, complementary second demarcation line that would have divided the Western Hemisphere.
Japanese-governed
- Government-General of Formosa
:Hong Kong, the Philippines, Portuguese Macau (to be purchased from Portugal or taken by force), the Paracel Islands, and Hainan Island (to be purchased from the Chinese puppet regime). Contrary to its name it was not intended to include the island of Formosa (Taiwan) Those favouring annexation of Hawaii (on the model of Karafuto) intended to use the local Japanese community, which had constituted 43% (c. 160,000) of Hawaii's population in the 1920s, as a leverage. No decision was ever reached regarding whether Hawaii would be annexed to Japan, become a puppet state, or be used as a bargaining chip for leverage against the U.S. The State of Burma did not become a kingdom.
Political parties and movements with Japanese support
- Azad Hind (Indian nationalist movement in South Asia)
- Indian Independence League (Indian nationalist movement in Southeast Asia)
- Indonesian National Party (Indonesian nationalist movement)
- Kapisanan ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (Philippine nationalist ruling party of the Second Philippine Republic)
- Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Malayan nationalist movement)
- Freedom Bloc (Dobama-Sinyetha Asiayone) (Burmese nationalist association)
- Đại Việt National Socialist Party (Vietnamese nationalist movement)
- Concordia Association of Manchukuo (Manchurian nationalist movement)
See also
Administration
- Collaboration with Imperial Japan
- East Asia Development Board
- Imperial Rule Assistance Association
- List of East Asian leaders in the Japanese sphere of influence (1931–1945)
- Ministry of Greater East Asia
People
- Hachirō Arita: an army thinker who thought up the Greater East Asian concept
- Ikki Kita: a Japanese nationalist who developed a similar pan-Asian concept
- Satō Nobuhiro: the alleged developer of the Greater East Asia concept
Related topics
- Flying geese paradigm
- Japanese war crimes
- Kantokuen
- Political extremism in Japan
- Tanaka Memorial (Tanaka Jōsōbun) – an alleged Japanese strategic planning document from 1927 in which Prime Minister Baron Tanaka Giichi, who laid out a strategy to take over the world for Emperor Hirohito
Others
- Balkan Federation
- Civilizing mission
- Eurasianism
- Greater Germanic Reich
- Greater Serbia
- Latin Bloc (proposed alliance)
- Międzymorze
- Monroe Doctrine
- New Order (Nazism)
- Pan-Slavism
- Russkiy mir
- Scramble for Africa
- White man's burden
References
Citations
Further reading
- Dower, John W. (1986). War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon Books. ;
- Fisher, Charles A. (1950) "The Expansion of Japan: A Study in Oriental Geopolitics: Part II. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Geographical Journal (1950): 179–193.
- Iriye, Akira. (1999). Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays. Boston: St. Martin's Press. ;
- Lebra, Joyce C. (ed.) (1975). Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ;
- Levine, Alan J. (1995). The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, )
- Myers, Ramon Hawley and Mark R. Peattie. (1984) The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Peattie, Mark R. (1988). "The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945," in The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century (editor, Peter Duus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swan, William L. (1996) "Japan's Intentions for Its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as Indicated in Its Policy Plans for Thailand" Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27#1 (1996) pp. 139–149
- Ugaki, Matome. (1991). Fading Victory: The Diary of Ugaki Matome, 1941–1945. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Vande Walle, Willy et al. The 'Money Doctors' from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1894–1937 (abstract). FRIS/Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2007–2010.
- Yellen, Jeremy A. (2019). The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
External links
- Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at Britannica
- Foreign Office Files for Japan and the Far East
- WW2DB: Greater East Asia Conference
