thumb|right|Destiny, painting by [[Thomas Cooper Gotch|T. C. Gotch (1885–1886), Adelaide, Art Gallery of South Australia]]

Fatalism is a belief and philosophical doctrine which considers the entire universe as a deterministic system and stresses the subjugation of all events, actions, and behaviors to fate or destiny, which is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable and outside of human control.

More specifically:

  • Theological fatalism, according to which free will is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient God who has foreknowledge of all future events. This is very similar to theological determinism.
  • Logical fatalism, according to which propositions about the future which we take to currently be either true or false can only be true or false if future events are already determined. where he makes no distinction between the terms "fate" and "fatalism". Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena. Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra. Jainists believe in a sort of compatibilism, in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

Fatalism, or "fatalismo," is a cultural phenomenon among Latinos related to their religious belief in "divine will." Latinos who believe in fatalism may understand their experiences of misfortune to be connected to God's divine plan for their life, creating a sense that there will be no reprieve from negative life experiences. Fatalismo is researched to be a risk factor contributing to depression and suicide within the Latino population, specifically among Latinos with mental illness .

Ājīvika

In ancient India, the Ājīvika school of philosophy founded by Makkhali Gosāla (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in Western scholarship, upheld the Niyati ("Fate") doctrine of absolute fatalism or determinism, which negates the existence of free will and karma, and is therefore considered one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy.

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in the early Buddhist texts, which states that all phenomena (dharma) are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be dependent on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence and therefore are impermanent. In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra); all thoughts and actions exert a karmic force that attaches to the individual's consciousness, which will manifest through reincarnation and results in future lives. The early Buddhist texts and later Tibetan Buddhist scriptures associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-self (anattā). The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "monist" and "pluralist" ontologies or materialist and dualist views of mind-body relation). In the Kaccānagotta Sutta of the Pāli Canon (SN 12.15, parallel at SA 301), the historical Buddha stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of free will and moral responsibility.

In contemporary philosophical pessimism, writers have continued to use these Buddhist frameworks to examine the boundaries of the human will. In The Electric Will (2026), J. R. Sommer builds upon this distinction between illusory desire and ultimate liberation. Sommer critiques traditional moralism and the cycle of saṃsāra as extensions of an inescapable cosmic "want and will," arguing that true enlightenment requires practicing detachment not to secure a favorable rebirth or destiny, but to transcend the concept of destiny entirely.

Determinism and predeterminism

While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predeterminism are distinct, as each emphasizes a different aspect of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.

Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality.

Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is an idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.

Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free. The early Islamic philosopher, Al Farabi, makes the case that if God does in fact know all human actions and choices, then Aristotle's original solution to this dilemma stands.

Idle argument

One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called Idle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by Origen and Cicero and it went like this:

  • If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
  • Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so whether you call a doctor or not.
  • But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness, or it is fated that you will not recover.
  • Therefore, it is futile to consult a doctor.

The Idle Argument was anticipated by Aristotle in chapter 9 of his De Interpretatione. The Stoics considered it to be a sophism and the Stoic Chrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be co-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other.

Logical fatalism and the argument from bivalence

Arguments for logical fatalism go back to antiquity. The argument from bivalence depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on logical truths and metaphysical necessity. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by Aristotle and Richard Clyde Taylor. The first response is concerned with logical fatalism's reliance on the principle of bivalence, which says that a proposition is necessarily either true or false. If one wants to reject logical fatalism, one move to take is to reject that this principle applies to future describing propositions. Aristotle is famously attributed as making this move, though there are views that he does not. This response works well with an A-theory of time, which says that time is fundamentally tensed, and events can be classified as past, present, and perhaps, future. A-theory supports views of time that say that the future does not yet exist, like presentism. Relating to logical fatalism, If the future is considered to be undetermined, meaning that the truth value of a statement can only be determined once the event occurs, then the principle of bivalence can be rejected. However, the B-theory of time sees the past and future as being just as real as the present. On a B-theory of time, future facts do exist, and therefore the solution to reject the principle of bivalence on the grounds of undetermined future propositions does not work. This response, essentially, challenges the idea that we cannot affect the past truth of future describing propositions. The all-false view says that all future contingents are false. Wallace did not reject fatalism per se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."