The fall of Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Mexica, was an important event in the Spanish conquest of the Mexica. It occurred in 1521 following extensive negotiations between local factions and Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés. He was aided by La Malinche, his interpreter and companion, and by thousands of indigenous allies, especially Tlaxcaltec warriors.
Although numerous battles were fought between the Mexica and the Spanish-led coalition, which was composed mainly of Tlaxcaltec men, it was the siege of Tenochtitlan that directly led to the fall of the Aztec civilization and the ensuing sacking and violence against the survivors. The indigenous population at the time was devastated due to a smallpox epidemic, which killed much of its leadership. Because smallpox had been endemic in Spain for centuries, the Spanish had developed an acquired immunity and were affected relatively little in the epidemic.
The conquest of the Mexica was a critical stage in the Spanish colonization of the Americas.
Early events
Cortés goes to Tenochtitlan
In April 1519, Hernán Cortés, a nobleman recently landed in present-day Cuba and the leader of the third Spanish expedition to the coast of what is now known as Mexico, landed at San Juan de Ulúa, a high-quality harbour on Mexico's east coast, with 508 soldiers, 100 sailors, and 14 small cannons. (Survivors of the previous two expeditions directed him to this harbour.) Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar, the Governor of Cuba, called for Cortés to lead an expedition into Mexico after favourable reports from two previous expeditions to Yucatán caught the interest of the Spanish in Cuba. Under pressure by his relatives, who had a different leader in mind, Velázquez revoked Cortés's mandate to lead the expedition before the man left Cuba. Thus Cortés had to struggle to persist as expedition leader while still in Cuba; twice messengers from Velázquez arrived to depose him, and twice they were dissuaded from executing their mission. After Cortés sailed, Velázquez sent an army led by Pánfilo de Narváez to take him into custody.
But after reaching Mexico, Cortés used the same legal tactic as had been used by Governor Velázquez when he invaded Cuba years before: he created a local government and had himself elected as the magistrate. He was thus theoretically responsible only to the King of Spain. Cortés followed this tactic when he and his men established the city of Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz, also known as Veracruz, seven miles from the harbour of San Juan de Ulúa on the east coast of the area. An inquiry into Cortés' action was conducted in Spain in 1529 and no action was taken against him.
Cortés happened to land at the borders of Cempoala, a vassal state to the Aztecs that had many grievances against them. As he encountered several polities who resented Aztec rule, Cortés told them he had arrived on orders of his Emperor to improve conditions, abolish human sacrifices, teach the locals the true faith, and "stop them from robbing each other". He was successful in enforcing excellent behaviour by his army when among potential allies. Cortés clashed with some of these polities, among them the Totonac and Tlaxcalan. The latter gave him two battles during the day and one at night, and kept up a strong defence, holding off his army on a hilltop for two weeks. His numerically inferior force finally triumphed when the Tlaxcalan began to consider his ceaseless offers of peace. Notably Xicotencatl the Elder wanted to form an alliance with the Spaniards against the Aztecs, which was the goal of Cortés as well.
It once was widely believed that the Aztecs first thought Cortés was Quetzalcoatl, a mythical god prophesied to return to Mexico—coincidentally in the same year Cortés landed and from the same direction he came. This is now believed to have been a myth of the conquerors, and perhaps of natives who wished to rationalize the actions of the Aztec tlatoani, Moctezuma II. Most scholars agree that the Aztecs, especially the inner circle around Moctezuma, did not believe that Cortés was a god in any shape or form. Messages between Cortés and Moctezuma, however, frequently allude to the legend, which was widely known across the Aztec dominions to both Aztecs and their subjects. It strongly influenced them, as Bernal Díaz del Castillo repeatedly attests.
Moctezuma sent a group of noblemen and other emissaries to meet Cortés at Quauhtechcac. These emissaries brought golden jewellery as a gift, which greatly pleased the Spaniards. According to the Florentine Codex, Lib. 12, f.6r., Moctezuma also ordered his messengers to carry the highly symbolic penacho (headdress) of Quetzalcoatl de Tula to Cortés and place it on him. As news about the strangers reached the capital city, Moctezuma became increasingly fearful and considered fleeing the city. He reportedly resigned himself to what he considered to be the fate of his people.
Cortés continued on his march toward Tenochtitlan. Before entering the city, on November 8, 1519, Cortés and his troops prepared for battle by armoring themselves and their horses, and arranging into military rank with four leading horsemen followed by five contingents of foot soldiers. The contingents had iron swords and wooden or leather shields; horsemen in cuirasses, armed with iron lances, swords, and wooden shields; crossbowmen; more horsemen; soldiers armed with arquebus guns; and lastly, indigenous soldiers from Tlaxcalan, Tliliuhquitepec, and Huexotzinco armed with cotton armor and shields and crossbows, many of whom carried provisions in baskets or bundles or escorted the cannons on wooden carts.
Cortés's army entered the city on the flower-covered causeway from Iztapalapa, associated with the god Quetzalcoatl. Cortés was amicably received by Moctezuma. The captive woman Malinalli Tenépal, also known as Doña Marina, translated from Nahuatl to Chontal Maya; the Spaniard Gerónimo de Aguilar translated from Chontal Maya to Spanish.
There were numerous instances of miscommunication, specifically regarding the first interaction between Cortes and Moctezuma. There were also variations in the different accounts of this first contact specifically between the accounts of Cortes and Bernal Díaz. As there was a difference in the accounts regarding whether or not Cortes was able to touch Moctezuma when they first met. Doña Marina also was not always accurate in her translation, as her primary objectives were to avoid war, and also obtain gold, which was promised to her by Cortes. This led to Marina and Jeronimo De Aguilar having numerous instances of miscommunication, which led to numerous different accounts of the interaction between the Spaniards and the Aztecs in Tenochtitlan.
The Spanish soon took Moctezuma hostage on November 14, 1519, as a safety measure because they were so outnumbered by the Aztec. Secondly they learned that Moctezuma had heard from a messenger, a few days before Cortes, that at least eight hundred more Spaniards in thirteen great ships had arrived on the coast. Cortés had been communicating to the Crown that he already had control of the territory and was practically running the city of Tenochtitlan. He was at risk of having his commission revoked, because the vast new Spanish forces were sent by his enemy Diego Velázquez. If they competed for power, they could have ended his campaign in Mexico and might have doomed the try for a lightning conquest.
Cortés attempted to take Moctezuma hostage in an effort to ensure his cooperation. According to all eyewitness accounts, Moctezuma initially refused to leave his palace but after a series of threats from and debates with the Spanish captains, and assurances from Doña Marina, he agreed to move with his retinue to the Axayáctal palace. The first captain assigned to guard him was Pedro de Alvarado. Other Aztec lords were also detained by the Spanish, when they started questioning the authority of their captive tlatoani.
Tensions mount between Aztecs and Spaniards
It is uncertain why Moctezuma cooperated with the Spaniards. It is possible he feared losing his life or political power; however, one of the effective threats wielded by Cortés was the destruction of the city in the case of fighting between Spaniards and Aztecs (which ultimately came to pass). This Moctezuma at all costs wanted to avoid, vacillating and deferring the rupture until this policy claimed his life. From the perspective of the tlatoani, the Spaniards might have been assigned some decisive role by fate. It could also have been a tactical move: Moctezuma may have wanted to gather more information on the Spaniards, or to wait for the end of the agricultural season and strike at the beginning of the war season. However, he did not carry out either of these actions even though high-ranking military leaders such as his brother Cuitlahuac and nephew Cacamatzin urged him to do so.
With Moctezuma as his captive, Cortés did not need to worry about being cut off from supplies or being attacked, although some of his captains had such concerns. He also assumed that he could control the Aztecs through Moctezuma. However, Cortés had little knowledge of the ruling system of the Aztecs; Moctezuma was not all-powerful as Cortés imagined. Being appointed to and maintaining the position of tlatoani was based on the ability to rule decisively; he could be replaced by another noble if he failed to do so. At any sign of weakness, Aztec nobles within Tenochtitlan and in other Aztec tributaries were liable to rebel. As Moctezuma complied with orders issued by Cortés, such as commanding tribute to be gathered and given to the Spaniards, his authority was slipping, and quickly his people began to turn against him.
After Cortés became aware of their arrival, he left Pedro de Alvarado in charge in Tenochtitlan with 80 soldiers, and brought all his forces (about two hundred and forty men) by quick marches to Narváez's camp in Cempohuallan on May 27. Several negotiations between the two Spaniards took place on the way, in which Cortés was able to persuade many persons of weight in Narváez's camp to incline to his side. Cortés attacked Narváez's camp late at night; his men, much superior in experience and organization, wounded Narváez in the eye and took him as a hostage quickly; also taken were his principal adherents, de Salvatierra and Diego Velasquez (the nephew of the Governor of Cuba). Evidence suggests that the two were in the midst of negotiations at the time, and Narváez was not expecting an attack. Cortés then completed winning over Narváez's captains with promises of the vast wealth in Tenochtitlan, inducing them to follow him back to the Aztec capital. Narváez was imprisoned in Vera Cruz, and his army was integrated into Cortés's forces.
At this time, the Mexica (Aztecs) began to prepare for the annual festival of Toxcatl in early May, in honor of Tezcatlipoca, otherwise known as the Smoking Mirror or the Omnipotent Power. They honored this god during the onset of the dry season so that the god would fill dry streambeds and cause rain to fall on crops. Moctezuma secured the consent of Cortés to hold the festival, and again confirmed permission with Alvarado.
Alvarado was commissioned by Cortés to take over his post and to foresee everything related to interactions among Spaniards and the Mexica, right at the time when the Toxcatl festival was to occur. Cortés expressly instructed Alvarado to not perform any military action, during his absence. Alvarado however had an unstable temperament and engaged in inquiring where the gold of the nobility was stored.
He tortured priests and nobles and discovered that the Aztecs were planning a revolt. Unable to assert control over events, he sequestered Moctezuma and increased the guards around the tlatoani.
By the day of the festival, twenty days after Cortés' departure, the Aztecs had gathered on the Patio of Dances. Alvarado had sixty of his men as well as many of his Tlaxcalan allies stationed in positions around the patio. The Aztecs initiated the Serpent Dance. The euphoric dancing as well as the accompanying flute and drum playing disturbed Alvarado about the potential for revolt. He ordered the gates closed and initiated the killing of many thousands of Aztec nobles, warriors and priests.
Alvarado, the conquistadors and the Tlaxcalans retreated to their base in the Palace of Axayacatl and secured the entrances. Alvarado ordered his men to shoot their cannons, crossbows, and arquebuses into the gathering crowd. The result either preempted or triggered the Aztec revolt, which was, however, inevitable from the moment of Moctezuma's capture and was accelerated by the split of the Spanish forces. Alvarado forced Moctezuma to appeal to the crowd outside the Palace and this appeal temporarily calmed them.
The massacre had the result of resolutely turning all the Aztecs against the Spanish and completely undermining Moctezuma's authority.
Aztec revolt
Alvarado sent word to Cortés of the events, and Cortés hurried back to Tenochtitlan on June 24 with 1,300 soldiers, 96 horses, 80 crossbowmen, and 80 arquebusiers. Cortés also came with 2,000 Tlaxcalan warriors on the journey. A few days after the great forces of Cortés got into Tenochtitlan, the roads were shut and the causeway bridges were raised. The Aztecs halted any Spanish attacks or attempts to leave the palace. Every Spanish soldier that was not killed was wounded. The Aztecs later claimed that Moctezuma had been murdered by the Spanish. Moctezuma's younger brother Cuitláhuac, who had been ruler of Ixtlapalapan until then, was chosen as the Tlatoani. Cortés named one of Cacamatzin's brothers as new tlatoani. He was Ixtlilxóchitl II, who had disagreed with his brother and always proved friendly to the Spanish. Later, Cortés also occupied the city as base for the construction of brigantines. However, one faction of Tetzcocan warriors remained loyal to the Aztecs.
Cortés had to put down internal struggles among the Spanish troops as well. The remaining Spanish soldiers were somewhat divided; many wanted nothing more than to go home, or at the very least to return to Vera Cruz and wait for reinforcements. Cortés hurriedly quashed this faction, determined to finish what he had started. Not only had he staked everything he had or could borrow on this enterprise, he had completely compromised himself by defying his superior Velázquez. He knew that in defeat he would be considered a traitor to Spain, but that in success he would be its hero. So he argued, cajoled, bullied, and coerced his troops, and they began preparing for the siege of Mexico. In this Cortés showed skill at exploiting the divisions within and between the Aztec states while hiding those of his own troops.
Cuitlahuac contracted the disease and died after ruling for eighty days. The disease also affected the Spanish-aligned forces, killing the Tlaxcalan chieftain Maxixcatl, but it had more dire consequences on the side of the Aztecs, enclosed in the cramped Tenochtitlan.
Firsthand accounts were recorded in the Florentine Codex concerning the adverse effects of the smallpox epidemic of the Aztecs, which stated, "many died from this plague, and many others died of hunger. They could not get up and search for food, and everyone else was too sick to care for them, so they starved to death in their beds. By the time the danger was recognized, the plague was well established that nothing could halt it". Diseases like smallpox could travel great distances and spread throughout large populations, which was the case with the Aztecs having lost approximately 50% of its population from smallpox and other diseases. The disease killed an estimated forty percent of the native population in the area within a year. The Aztecs codices give ample depictions of the disease's progression. It was known to them as the huey ahuizotl (great rash).
Aztecs regroup
It is often debated why the Aztecs took little action against the Spanish and their allies after they fled the city. One reason was that Tenochtitlan was certainly in a state of disorder: the smallpox disease ravaged the population, killing still more important leaders and nobles, and a new king, Cuauhtémoc, son of King Ahuitzotl, was placed on the throne in February 1521. The people were in the process of mourning the dead and rebuilding their damaged city. It is possible that the Aztecs truly believed that the Spanish were gone for good. In addition, Cortés astutely directed his forces in multiple directions in preparing his encirclement of the Aztec capital, and knew how to use the military initiative that he gained after the battle of Otumba.
Cortés then decided to move his army to Texcoco, where he could assemble and launch the sloops in the creeks flowing into Lake Texcoco. With his main headquarters in Texcoco, he could stop his forces from being spread too thin around the lake, and there he could contact them where they needed. Xicotencatl the Elder provided Cortés with over ten thousand Tlaxcalan warriors under the command of Chichimecatecuhtli. Cortés departed Tlaxcala on the day after Christmas 1520. When his force arrived at the outskirts of Texcoco, he was met by seven chieftains stating their leader Coanacotzin begs "for your friendship". Cortés quickly replaced that leader with Ixtlilxochitl II, the son of Nezahualpilli, baptized as Don Hernán Cortés.
Cuauhtemoc then attacked all three Spanish camps simultaneously with his entire army on the feast day of St. John. On the Tacuba Causeway across Lake Texcoco connecting Tenochtitlan to the mainland along a street now known as Puente de Alvarado (Alvarado's Bridge) in Mexico City, Pedro de Alvarado made a mad cavalry charge across a gap in the Causeway. At the end of each day, the Spanish gave a prayer: "Oh, thanks be to God that they did not carry me off today to be sacrificed." This was the first tornado seen by Europeans in the Americas.
After several failed peace overtures to Cuauhtémoc, Cortés ordered Sandoval to attack that part of the city in which Cuauhtémoc had retreated. As hundreds of canoes filled the lake fleeing the doomed city, Cortés sent his brigantines out to intercept them. This was part of a merciless campaign against the Aztecs who had long oppressed them, as for a hundred years the Tlaxcalans had been forced to hand over an annual quota of young men and women to be sacrificed and eaten at the Great Pyramid of Tenochtitlan, and now the Tlaxcalans saw their chance for revenge. American historian Charles Robinson wrote: "Centuries of hate and the basic viciousness of Mesoamerican warfare combined in violence that appalled Cortés himself". John C. Cox, and Norman Naimark Cortés' lieutenant Bernal Díaz del Castillo especially credited La Malinche with their victory.