Democracy in China

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thumb|A large crowd of protesters, journalists, police and spectators gathered in front of a [[McDonald's restaurant in Wangfujing, Beijing as part of the 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests.]]

Debate over democracy in China has existed in Chinese politics since the 19th century. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is not a democracy, being an authoritarian one-party state. All political opposition is illegal. Currently, there are eight minor political parties in China other than the CCP that are legal, but all have to accept CCP primacy to exist. Freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are severely restricted by the government. Censorship in China is widespread and dissent is harshly punished in the country. Democracy movements in China have been repressed, most notably in the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

The state constitution and the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state that the PRC's form of government is "people's democratic dictatorship". Under Xi Jinping's general secretaryship, China is also termed a "whole-process people's democracy." The state constitution also holds that China is a one-party state that is governed by the CCP. This gives the CCP a total monopoly of political power.

Chinese scholars, thinkers, and policy-makers have debated about democracy, an idea which was first imported by Western colonial powers but which some argue also has connections to classic Chinese thinking. Starting in the mid-eighteenth century, many Chinese argued about how to deal with Western culture. Though Chinese Confucians were initially opposed to Western modes of thinking, it became clear that aspects of the West were appealing. Industrialization gave the West an economic and military advantage. The Qing dynasty's defeats in the Opium Wars compelled a segment of Chinese politicians and intellectuals to rethink their notion of cultural and political superiority.

Democracy entered the Chinese consciousness because it was the form of government used in the West, potentially responsible for its industrial, economic and military advancements. A segment of Chinese scholars and politicians became persuaded that democratization and industrialization were imperative for a competitive China. In response, a number of scholars resisted the idea, saying democracy and Westernization had no place in traditional Chinese culture. Liang Shuming's opinion was most popular, holding that democracy and traditional Chinese society were completely incompatible, hence China's only choice was either wholesale Westernization or complete rejection of the West. The debate centered on the philosophical compatibility of traditional Chinese Confucian beliefs and the technologies of the West.

Translation

The most common modern translation for the English words democracy and democratic in East Asian languages is . However, in classical Chinese, the compound could be interpreted as either a genitive noun phrase which would translate to "people's lord;" or a subject–verb phrase which would translate to "the people govern." The genitive-noun-phrase interpretation was well known in China as a way to refer to the reigning emperor, and was synonymous with another classical word, .

The first use of mínzhǔ that deviated from the two above interpretations was found in William Alexander Parsons Martin's seminal 1863 translated book, . In order to translate the phrase "whether monarchical or republican," Martin made use of the contrast between and . The genitive-noun-phrase interpretation would render such translation meaningless, therefore, it has been argued that the subject–verb interpretation was intended here. Furthermore, Martin also translated "democratic republic" as , meaning mínzhǔ actually encapsulated both "republic(an)" and "democratic." On the other hand, given that republicanism and democracy were completely foreign to the Chinese under monarchical Qing rule, authors often employed the "people's lord" meaning (genitive-noun-phrase interpretation) analogously. 19th-century newspapers in China (especially those published by Westerners) often equated America's head of state, the President, to China's head of state, the Emperor. An 1874 issue of the paper used the phrases , and . An 1896 issue of even used the specific phrase in reference to an American election. George Carter Stent reinforced this usage in the third edition of his dictionary Chinese and English Vocabulary in the Pekinese Dialect, with translated as "President of a Republic," and as "a Republic." At this point during the late 19th century, four meanings of mínzhǔ coexisted: "people's lord" (an East Asian hereditary monarch), "the people govern" (a Western democratic republic), "the people govern" (Western non-monarchical government, namely democracy and/or republicanism) and "people's lord" (a Western democratically elected leader). There was no distinction between democracy (majority rule) and republicanism (government for the public good). In his 1877 translation of Du contrat social entitled , Hattori Toku () used for the French word démocratie. Minshu came to be associated more with an ideology, institution or spirit (in such phrases as , , and ) rather than a specific form of government that had been linked to kyōka. In a 1916 issue of the magazine Chūō Kōron, the Taishō political scientist Sakuzō Yoshino distinguished the two senses of the English loanword : he associated with a legal form of government that did not (and still does not) exist in Japan, and his own coinage with a political ideology that could (and still can) be implemented as constitutional monarchy in Japan. In other words, some Taishō authors started to give minshu shugi the form-of-government meaning of kyōka, while pushing for minpon shugi with the ideology meaning. However, minpon shugi did not quite catch on, and minshu shugi was used for both meanings of democracy by subsequent bilingual dictionaries. This framing of democracy (minquanzhuyi) differs from the typical Western view, being based in Liang's interpretation of General will, which prioritizes the power of the group over individual freedoms.

During the 1920s, a common position among Chinese intellectuals from a broad range of cultural and ideological positions was that the people were not ready for democracy. Conservative intellectuals viewed the masses as too dangerous to participate in the political process. In the PRC definition, democracy has meant the Marxist–Leninist concepts of people's democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism. According to this viewpoint, the CCP acts as the representative of the Chinese public.

Early Chinese Communist Party views

At the 1929 Gutian Congress, the CCP addressed questions related to the politics of the Chinese Red Army. A resolution that followed the conference stated that the Red Army must be organized under the principle of democratic centralism. In the article The Democratic Movement within the Army<u>,</u> written during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong discussed the Red Army's political work and stated, "Through the democratic movement under centralized leadership, we were able to achieve a high degree of political unity, improve lives, and improve military technology and tactics, which are our three main purposes." written while the Yan'an Soviet was developing and expanding during the Second Sino-Japanese War. During this period, Mao was concerned about bureaucratization and sought to develop a culture of mass politics.This coalition of classes is symbolized by the four smaller stars on the flag of China: workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie. On September 29, 1949, the CPPCC unanimously adopted the Common Program as the basic political program for the country following the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Common Program defined China as a new democratic country which would practice a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on an alliance of workers and peasants which would unite all of China's democratic classes (defined as those opposing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and favoring an independent China). Prior to the Cultural Revolution, rural production team leaders were appointed by village leaders (who had themselves been appointed by commune leaders). Liu's view is that during the Cultural Revolution, China was "extremely democratic" while also being "extremely illiberal". A majority viewed the movement as part of a struggle between correct and incorrect notions of Marxism.

21st century

The CCP continues to operate on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. From 2007 to 2009, then-General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao promoted intra-party democracy (dangnei minzhu, 党内民主) in an effort to decrease the party's focus on top-down decision-making. However, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, said in 2011 that "we have made a solemn declaration that we will not employ a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation", having said similar remarks during his career. In December 2008, more than 350 intellectual and cultural leaders, including Liu Xiaobo, issued Charter 08. The Charter said China remains the only large world power to still retain an authoritarian system that so infringes on human rights, and "This situation must change! Political democratic reforms cannot be delayed any longer!"

The CCP's Core Socialist Values campaign introduced during its 18th National Congress in 2012, which lists democracy as one of its four national values. After Xi Jinping became CCP general secretary in 2012, Amnesty International said that human rights in China have become worse. Human rights abuses are rejected by the government, which insists the country is run according to law. Xi has strengthened the CCP's control over the government. In the first session of the 13th National People's Congress in 2018, term limits for the presidency were also abolished.

Xi Jinping rejects notions of liberal democracy for China. According to Xi's view of democracy, China "must not blindly copy the development models of other countries nor accept their dictation. The state system which is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class ... is under the leadership of the CPC ... and the principle of democratic centralism". During a visit to Europe in 2014, Xi Jinping said that a multi-party system would not work for China. He said China had experimented in the past with various political systems, including multi-party democracy, warning that copying foreign political or development models could be catastrophic because of its unique historical and social conditions. According to Xi, Chinese history after the fall of the Qing dynasty demonstrates that Western political systems do not fit China's national circumstances.

1. process democracy () and achievement democracy ()
2. procedural democracy () and substantive democracy ()
3. direct democracy () and indirect democracy ()
4. people's democracy () and will of the state ()

Under the concept of whole-process people's democracy, whether a country is democratic should not be measured by the electoral process but instead by the results it delivers to the people. By using the improvement of living standards and development as the measure of democratic success, this framing favors China, which has undergone major advances in development and living standards during the last four decades.

Consultative democracy

The general secretaryship of Xi Jinping promotes a view of consultative democracy (xieshang minzhu 协商民主) rather than intra-party democracy. The CPPCC is an institutional component of the CCP's people's democracy and united front strategy, which provides a "seat" for the eight small legally-permitted parties and independent nonparty "friends." Such institutional mechanisms for addressing the interests of new elites while also taking into account disadvantaged groups have been described by academics as "administrative absorption of society" or "democracy in governance."

Contemporary views

Chinese policymakers generally view liberal democratic political systems as hampered in their ability to pursue long-term development targets and long-term programs because of their focus on election campaigns and the frequent changes of government in such systems. In this view, policy under liberal democratic systems as largely restricted to ad hoc interventions which leaves social development vulnerable to blind market forces and the short-term policy interventions available under democratic systems are not equipped to address long-term issues such as environmental degradation, dysfunction in capital markets, or population change. The United States' response to the COVID-19 pandemic compounded the situation, increasing views among the Chinese public that the United States political system and economy were not world benchmarks.

Elections

The People's Republic of China conducts direct and indirect elections for its people's congresses, a practice that began in CCP-controlled revolutionary base areas during the Chinese Civil War. The operation of people's congresses were set out in the Electoral Law of 1953 and have been subsequently revised. However, nominations at all levels are controlled by the CCP, and CCP's leading position is enshrined in the state constitution, meaning that the elections have little way of influencing politics. Additionally, elections are not pluralistic as no opposition to the CCP is allowed.

Starting in the 1980s, in the reform and opening up period, the government organized village elections in which several candidates would run, changing the position of the village chairman from appointed by the CCP to being elected by villagers. In mid-2000s the autonomy of elected village officials gradually eroded.

Special Administrative Regions, 1997–present

As European colonies, Hong Kong and Macau were denied democratic governments until very late in the colonial period. Official memos from CCP leaders, threatening the British government if they were to hold elections in Hong Kong, were repeatedly sent from the 1950s onwards.

Hong Kong

Many dissenting political groups and political parties have reportedly chosen to disband under pressure from Beijing. In April 2025, Hong Kong's biggest pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party, voted to give its leadership the mandate to move toward a potential disbandment. Two veteran members stated that the League of Social Democrats began its dissolution process after receiving warnings from Chinese officials that the party must disband or face consequences ahead of upcoming elections. A Chinese official also warned a former lawmaker that "the party should not remain until the end of this year." In June 2025, the League of Social Democrats, one of Hong Kong's last pro-democracy parties, disbanded under political pressure.

Citizen surveys

According to the 2018 World Values Survey, Chinese people approve of democracy (83% of respondents) over strong leader rule (54%), military rule (53%), expert rule (52%), and religious rule (24%). Eighty-five percent of Chinese surveyed also agreed that it is very important to live in a democratic country. Zhengxu Wang of Fudan University in Shanghai wrote in a report in 2007: "It is clear that public support for democracy is high in China. Public opinion surveys show that more than 90% of Chinese citizens believe that having a democracy is good. But the majority is not yet ready for a major effort towards democratization because they still see economic growth and social stability as more important than freedom of speech, political participation, and other democratic rights." According to Chinese economist David Daokui Li, the general trend is that age cohorts born in the 1970s and later take a more critical view of United States-style democracy than other age cohorts.

Democracy dimensions

The general Chinese public has virtually no say on how the top leaders of the country are elected,

The PRC is considered internationally to be amongst the least democratic countries in the world. It has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an "authoritarian regime" by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, ranking at 156th out of 167 countries in 2022. According to 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices China is the third least electoral democratic country in the world and ranked second least electoral democratic country in Asia according to V-Dem Democracy indices in 2023. Hong Kong was ranked 14th least electoral democracy in Asia according to V-Dem Democracy indices in 2023.

Influence of traditions

Confucianism

Social harmony

A primary motivation within traditional Chinese philosophy is to preserve social harmony. It looks unfavorably upon anyone who attempts to disrupt this placidity. The election process that takes place in modern liberal democracy directly opposes this ideal. During election campaigns, the issues most frequently discussed are the ones that are highly charged emotionally and politically. In contemporary U.S. elections, controversial issues like abortion, gay marriage, military engagement in the Middle East are at the forefront of campaigns. Chinese Confucians consider these controversial issues to be cleavages within the fabric of social harmony. Western politicians rely on utilizing these social cleavages to garner support from voters. In Chinese culture it would be an impropriety for a politician to exploit these social cleavages to achieve the personal goal of getting elected. Consequently, many of the more traditionalist Chinese people consider the election process of the West and western-influenced democracies to be quite arguably inappropriate as per Chinese culture.

Serve the common good, not the majority

Another motivation in Chinese culture is to benefit the common good. Elected representatives serve the interests of their individual constituents. If they do not adequately represent the beliefs of their constituency they will not be re-elected. Academic Wei Pan claims that people of a traditionalist Chinese perspective tend to believe that the collective good of the people is under-represented in a democracy, which instead reflects majoritarianism.

Christian influences

As per some points of view, there is arguably a correlation between Christianity and democracy, perhaps, as per some Chinese perspectives, liberal democracy has its historical basis in Christian culture. As a result, most current forms contain philosophical remnants of those probable origins. One such trace of Christianity is the empowerment of the individual. Christian concepts consider each individual to be sacred in the eyes of God. The concept of liberal democracy rests on all this sense that the individual has inherent worth regardless of his place within social hierarchies.

Traditional Chinese culture makes no such claim. In fact, the philosophical significance of the individual is often identified as an area of incompatibility between democracy and Chinese culture. Confucian societies are centered on familial relationships; an individual had no authority to revolt against these societal ties. An individual disconnected from the family is widely considered an outcast and relegated to the bottom of the social ladder. Confucianism lacks a universal reverence for the individual; personal status in Confucian communities is inexorably linked to one's position within the social hierarchy. In this context, many individual rights cannot exist in the same way they do in the West. Naturally the right of the individual to partake in the direct appointment of a ruling official is an ideological inconsistency with traditional Confucian society.

Chinese pragmatism

Disassociation of democracy and well-being

A counterpoint to these examples is that as time has progressed, anti-democratic rhetoric has moved away from the philosophical and into the pragmatic. The boom of the Four Tigers and other growing Asian economies has severed the links between Western culture and material wealth in the eyes of many Chinese. In the early 1900s, scholars like Liang Qichao conflated democracy and power. For some Chinese, the economic success of Confucian and authoritarian societies challenges the idea that wholesale adoption of Western beliefs such as Democracy are requisite for economic success.

Optimism versus pessimism

At a fundamental philosophical level, Confucian tradition is contingent upon an idea articulated by Thomas Metzger as epistemological optimism. This expresses the belief that it is possible to understand the essence of high morality and design policies and laws that reflect that knowledge. Confucian society seeks to carry out all daily tasks and rituals in pursuit of fulfilling that universal morality. The modern conception of liberal democracy is grounded in the opposing principle of ideological pessimism. This denies that such knowledge is possible, thus the theory and practice of liberal democracy does not make rules in the pursuit of high morality.

See also

• Democracy in Hong Kong
• Protest and dissent in China
• Federalism in China

Notes

References

Further reading

• Edmund S. K. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Nationalist China, 1929–1949 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Cambridge Modern China Series). xviii, 407p.
• Hu, Shaohua. Explaining Chinese Democratization (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).
• Liu Jianfei (), Democracy and China (Beijing: New World Press, 2011). 178 p.
• Holbig, Heike, und Günter Schucher (2016), "He who says C must say D"—China's Attempt to Become the "World's Largest Democracy", GIGA Focus Asia, 02, June, 2016