Cavalry in the American Civil War

thumb|right|300px|Sheridan leads the charge at [[Battle of Five Forks|Five Forks (Frederick Phisterer, 1912)]]

The American Civil War saw extensive use of horse-mounted soldiers on both sides of the conflict. They were vital to both the Union Army and Confederate Army for conducting reconnaissance missions to locate the enemy and determine their strength and movement, and for screening friendly units from being discovered by the enemy's reconnaissance efforts. Other missions carried out by cavalry included raiding behind enemy lines, escorting senior officers, and carrying messages.

In the first half of the war, the Confederates enjoyed the advantage in cavalry, not least because most of the experienced cavalry officers from the Regular Army had chosen to side with the Confederacy. Notable Confederate cavalry leaders included J. E. B. Stuart, famed for literally riding rings around the Union's Army of the Potomac, and Nathan Bedford Forrest, who caused havoc with Union supply lines.

The Battle of Brandy Station in 1863 is considered the point by which Union cavalry proved itself equal to the Confederates, and onward through the second half of the war they continued to improve. This was exemplified by Benjamin Grierson's brilliant deception tactics in the Mississippi valley, and Philip Sheridan's aggressive movements while in command of the Army of the Shenandoah at the end of the war in Virginia.

Cavalry units proved highly expensive to maintain, and unscrupulous agents would often exploit shortages by supplying defective animals at exorbitant prices. The Union benefited from the creation of tighter regulations and a centralized acquisition and distribution system which ensured its forces remained mounted throughout the war. Conversely, the Confederacy's system of each soldier supplying their own horses resulted in the degradation of its cavalry units as horses became harder to obtain.

Types of mounted forces

thumb|Cavalry Soldier with Sword on Horseback ([[Winslow Homer, 1863)]]

There were a variety of mounted forces prevalent in the Civil War, although for the sake of brevity they are often referred to under the catchall term "cavalry". Some units named themselves after European cavalry such as hussars and lancers, but these names were considered obsolete and used out of tradition rather than as an accurate description. Approximately fourteen percent of the Union Army consisted of cavalry, while in the Confederate States Army about twenty percent of soldiers were mounted.

Cavalry were forces that fought principally on horseback, armed with pistols and sabers. Historically there had been two types of cavalry: heavy cavalry (such as carabiniers and cuirassiers), whose primary role was on the battlefield conducting a cavalry charge, and light cavalry (such as chasseurs à cheval and chevau-léger), which were more suited to screening, raiding, and reconnaissance. The United States did not have a strong cavalry tradition and Congress was unwilling to fund the creation of expensive heavy cavalry; only light cavalry were formed before and during the Civil War.
Mounted infantry were forces that moved on horseback but dismounted for fighting on foot, armed principally with rifles, pistols, and bayonets.
Irregular cavalry (such as partisans and guerrillas) were generally mounted forces. A concept particularly employed by the Confederates, due in part to the Partisan Ranger Act, which was meant to aide the recruitment of irregulars into service with the Confederate Army. Many of the partisan cavalry units were considered excellent horsemen and operated both within and outside of Southern territory.

Roles

thumb|Cavalry orderly, Rappahannock Station, Va. ([[Edwin Forbes, 1864)]]

thumb|An advance of the cavalry skirmish line (Edwin Forbes, 1876).

At the time of the American Civil War, the cavalry had six major roles to play:

Reconnaissance
Screening
Flank security
Attacking the enemy
Headquarters duties
Raiding/Interdiction

Of these missions, reconnaissance was the most important role. Their inherent nature made cavalry ideally suited to be the "eyes and ears" of an army's commander and keep him informed of the enemy's position and movements. Cavalry had the agility and firepower to probe the enemy for weak points, set ambushes for isolated groups, and flee before the main force could overwhelm them. The widespread availability of field glasses only increased their information-gathering capabilities.

Reconnaissance and screening were crucial components in the Gettysburg campaign, where cavalry under Union General Alfred Pleasonton attempted to find the wide-ranging Army of Northern Virginia on its invasion of the North, and Confederate cavalry under J.E.B. Stuart effectively employed counter-reconnaissance to screen passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and hide Robert E. Lee's movements from the Army of the Potomac. However, when Stuart was "cut loose" to conduct another raid around the Army of the Potomac, he deprived Lee of adequate reconnaissance at the beginning of the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the principal reasons for the Confederate defeat there.

The use and evolution of cavalry for offensive action in the Civil War is a subject of contention. The conventional view is that cavalry's traditional role on the battlefield - charging into enemy infantry with lances and sabers to break up their formations - had been appropriate in previous generations when the infantry's primary weapon was the smoothbore musket with an effective range of up to . However, during the Civil War, the rifled musket was the primary infantry firearm, and against a weapon with an effective range of up to these mounted shock tactics were rendered ineffective and disastrous on the battlefield. Instead, cavalry had to learn to fight dismounted, in effect becoming mounted infantry who used their horses only for mobility and fought on foot as regular infantry. Furthermore, the terrain was also blamed for being less conducive to large cavalry maneuvers, particularly in the Eastern Theater which was broken up with an abundance of woodlands and farmlands.

Historian Earl J. Hess disputes the impact the rifle had on cavalry tactics in the Civil War, noting that even in the era of smoothbore muskets infantry had always been able to defend itself against cavalry attacks; a cavalry charge against infantry in formation and ready to meet it had almost always ended in failure. Stephen Z. Starr found no proof that cavalry in the Civil War made a conscious choice to change their tactics in response to the rifle. While there was a shift towards more dragoon-based tactics overall, he cites a number of other factors for this evolution, principal among them being the quality of the mounts available and the lack of appropriate training for both horse and rider.

Tactics

thumb|Capt. James S. West, C.S.A. (Cavalry)

Cavalry typically traveled in a column of fours, allowing for easy travel down roads and around obstacles. About to either side were parallel files of horsemen to protect the flanks. A vanguard and rearguard was also deployed out ahead and behind the column, which themselves deployed vedettes further ahead and behind to provide advanced warning. With a troop of 96 horsemen in a column of fours taking up of road, a cavalry force on the march could stretch for many miles: Sheridan's massive force of ten thousand troopers and six artillery batteries en route to Yellow Tavern measured thirteen miles long.

A cavalry force on picket duty would set up an outpost with about half of its total strength stationed there as a "grand guard." The rest would set up pickets out to the sides and in front of the outpost at a distance of . Each picket would also deploy solitary vedettes in a semicircle a further out. Constant patrols were maintained between the outpost and the pickets, and additional patrols were set out ahead of the vendettes to distances of two or more miles. Picket duty was fatiguing for both soldiers and horses, and many cavalry leaders believed this type of work was better suited to infantry.

Organization

thumb|U.S. Army cavalry sergeant, 1866

thumb|Confederate Cavalryman, by William L. Sheppard

The United States Army (known also as the Regular Army) before the Civil War utilized the regiment as the principal unit of maneuver and training for its cavalry forces. There were five regiments of mounted soldier: the 1st and 2nd Dragoon regiments, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry regiments. They were similarly organized with ten companies (later renamed troops), each company commanded by a captain with a number of other commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for around a hundred soldiers each. Two troops were further combined to form a squadron for five total. A regiment was commanded by a colonel (assisted by a lieutenant colonel and three majors) and included a staff which operated as part of the regimental headquarters. Although permanent battalions were removed, Union forces continued to operate in the field as squadrons and battalions.

The Confederates organized their cavalry regiments along the same principles as the old Regular Army regiments with ten companies. In November 1861, each company was to have at minimum sixty privates, later increased to eighty in October 1862, also commanded by a captain with a number of other officers and NCOs. Each regiment was commanded by a colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel and a major, with its own regimental staff. The fate of most regiments once they were reduced to a certain size was either disbandment or consolidation with other units, much to the chagrin of the veteran troopers. The states were mostly responsible for recruitment and many governors were more inclined to create brand new units as a form of political patronage rather than return an existing unit to full strength. Nevertheless, the Confederates did a better job than the Union at funneling replacements to existing regiments.

{|class="wikitable" style="display: inline-table;"

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| Divisions per corps

| 2

| 3

| 2.43

| 2

| Brigades per division

| 2

| 7

| 2.81

| 2

| Regiments per brigade

| 2

| 8

| 4.21

| 4

{|class="wikitable" style="display: inline-table;"

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|+Union Army

In both armies, the cavalry was accompanied by batteries or battalions of horse artillery where possible. They also had their own train of supply wagons and traveling forges.

Equipment

Horses

thumb|right|Cavalry Horse (Edwin Forbes, 1863)

The principal item of equipment for a cavalryman was the horse and one of the reasons both North and South initially hesitated in forming mounted units was because of financial considerations; each cavalry regiment cost $300,000 for initial organization with annual upkeep expenses tallying over $100,000. Both cavalries originally required recruits or local communities to provide horses, a policy that lasted briefly in the North, while the South maintained it throughout the war even though Richmond leaders recognized its serious drawbacks. While Confederate troopers bore the monetary cost of keeping themselves mounted, Union cavalrymen rode quartermaster-issued animals obtained through public contracts (although officers had to reimburse the cost of their mounts to the government). While open to fraud early in the war, once tightened regulations and stringent inspections were enforced, the contract system yielded an estimated 650,000 horses for Union armies during the war exclusive of an additional 75,000 confiscated in Confederate territory.

Union army guidelines for cavalry horse selection mandated animals be at least 15 hands () high, weighing on average around , and aged between 4 and 10 years old, and be well-broken to bridle and saddle. Animals were to be dark colors and free from defects such as shallow breathing, deformed hooves, bone and bog spavin, or ringbone. Geldings were preferred for cavalry horses with the purchase of mares strictly prohibited outside absolute military emergency, while stallions' volatility and aggressiveness made them generally unsuitable for service. In the Confederacy, limited horse numbers did not permit such selectivity in trying to keep their armies horsed.

Cavalry horse prices varied throughout the war; in 1861 the maximum government price for cavalry horses was $119. However, relentless military demand caused prices to continually increase and by 1865 prices hovered near $190 per head. In the Confederacy horse prices rapidly spiraled upward due to animal scarcity and inflation costing over $3,000 by war's end. The daily feed ration for Union cavalry horses was ten pounds of hay and fourteen pounds of grain which were ample and fulfilled the animals' nutritional needs if of good quality, however, the vagaries of the army supply system did not always insure prescribed forage amounts were delivered where most needed.

On both sides volunteer officers often proved notably lax in promoting strict animal welfare, a shortcoming exacerbated by the absence of a trained and organized veterinary corps which allowed serious maladies like strangles, grease heel, and glanders to spread among army stock. The U.S. Congress finally created the rank of veterinary sergeant in March 1863, but the meager pay and rank held no inducement for qualified candidates to join the army. Repeated calls to establish a professional military veterinary service failed, and widespread waste, suffering, and destruction among army horses resulted; not until 1916 was an official U.S. army veterinary corps founded.

Horses gave the cavalry forces significant mobility: during an eight-hour day a distance of could be covered without fatiguing horse or rider. In some operations, forces were pushed to the limit: Jeb Stuart's raid on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in 1862, saw his troopers march in 27 hours, while during Morgan's Raid his forces averaged twenty-one hours in the saddle on some days (and once covered in thirty-five hours). Such excesses were extremely damaging to the readiness of the units and extensive recovery periods were required.

Commanders often tried to procure specific breeds for their men, with the Morgan being a particular favorite within the Army of the Potomac. Famous Morgan cavalry mounts from the Civil War included Sheridan's "Rienzi" and Stonewall Jackson's "Little Sorrel".

Weaponry

thumb|right|Union cavalryman A.J. Blue armed with three pistols and a sword.

A wide variety of weaponry was carried by mounted forces during the Civil War. While it is commonly held that Northern cavalry were better equipped than their Southern counterparts, this was not always the case, particularly at the beginning of the war. By the start of 1862, most had been issued a saber and pistols, but many regiments had no more than ten to twelve carbines per company. In these cases, instead of spreading out their firepower, some regiments instead organized their troopers by weaponry: the 2nd Michigan formed two "dragoon battalions" (armed with carbines) and one "saber battalion."

It was not until 1863 when every Union trooper was guaranteed a carbine in addition to his revolvers and saber. However, up through to the end of the war many regiments were armed with multiple models of carbines, making resupply difficult. Confederate soldiers meanwhile might carry anything from the latest carbines imported from Europe to flintlock muskets and Bowie knives, although the primary source for their weapons was whatever could be captured from defeated Union forces. Rifles were considered too unwieldy to be used from horseback though. When James H. Wilson was made chief of the Cavalry Bureau in January 1864, he adopted the Spencer as the standard Union cavalry firearm; while many regiments were fully rearmed with these repeaters, some were still armed with other weapons by the war's end. Confederate forces could use captured breechloaders like the Sharps and produce copies of these since their linen cartridges were duplicable. The metallic cartridges needed by other carbines like the Burnside and Spencer were too advanced for the Confederates to copy and so were not used for lack of ammunition.

Handguns, carried by both Northern and Southern cavalry, were usually six-shot revolvers, in .36- or .44-caliber, from Colt or Remington. They were useful only in close fighting since they had little accuracy. It was common for cavalrymen to carry two revolvers for extra firepower, and John S. Mosby's Rangers often carried four each: a pair in their holsters and another pair in their saddlebag.

thumb|right|Saber duel between Union and Confederate cavalrymen ([[William B. T. Trego, 1887)]]

Sabers were used by cavalrymen on both sides, the most common models being the Model 1860 Light Cavalry Saber and Model 1840 Cavalry Saber, although their utility was questioned even at the time. On average Northern troopers made greater use of sabers while Southern troopers preferred other weapons. Conversely, Confederate cavalry commanded by General Wade Hampton III were said to like nothing so well as a chance to use their sabers in combat. In an October 1864 report, Jubal Early complained that Confederate cavalry armed only with rifles were at a severe disadvantage in open country against Union cavalry who could fight on horseback with sabers.

Confederate cavalry

thumb|300px|Sketch of [[1st Virginia Cavalry]]

thumb|Sgt. John Richard Whitehead, Company G, 6th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, [[Pittsylvania County, Virginia]]

A Southerner was, on average, considered a superior horseman to his Northerner counterpart, especially early in the war. The common explanations for this stereotype were the poor road conditions in the rural South, requiring a greater reliance on horses for individual transportation, combined with a pervasive cavalier culture within the Southern aristocracy which emphasized equestrianism. Historian Gregory J. W. Urwin has referred to such a broad generalization as a part of a "tired, overly-familiar myth" which explains away the South's defeat due to the North's industrial might. Paddy Griffith also argues that, with each trooper having to supply their own horse, "[o]ne does not need to invoke any theory of 'Southern Cavaliers' or 'innate equestrian skills' to see that a soldier will do better if he rides his own cherished four-legged friend than if he is astride an anonymous item of government property."

The Union cavalry was disadvantaged at the start of the war because Northern soldiers allegedly had less comparative equestrian experience than their Southern counterparts, and the Union army did not institute an examination in basic horsemanship before a recruit was mustered into service until August 1862. In addition, over half (104 out of 176) of the experienced U.S. Army cavalry officers were Southerners, and the majority resigned their commissions to fight for the Confederacy. This included four of the five regimental colonels. With West Point's graduating class of 1861 unable to make up the deficiency, many officer positions were filled by green appointees from the civilian sector.

One advantage the Union horseman had over his opponent was the centralized horse procurement organization of the army, relieving him of any responsibility for replacing an injured horse. This responsibility was first taken over by the government on August 31, 1861, with the Quartermaster Department in charge of supplying horses for the entire army. Then in July 1863 the Cavalry Bureau was established specifically with supplying horses and equipment to Union cavalry forces. There were six large remount depots created where horses were purchased, sick and injured horses allowed to recuperate, and cavalry units gathered to drill and train. The primary depot, located at Giesboro Point along the Potomac River, was 625 acres in size and could handle 30,000 horses.

In 1864, Philip Sheridan was given command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and he deployed his horsemen in a more effective, strategic way than his predecessors. Despite the reluctance of his superior, Major General George G. Meade, Sheridan convinced General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant to allow him to deploy the cavalry in long-range raids, the first of which, at Yellow Tavern, resulted in the death of Confederate commander Jeb Stuart. He later employed his cavalry force effectively in the Valley Campaigns of 1864 and the Appomattox Campaign, in pursuit of Robert E. Lee.

In the Western Theater, two effective cavalry generals have not achieved the fame of their Eastern counterparts: Benjamin Grierson's dramatic raid through Mississippi was an integral part of Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign; James H. Wilson was invaluable in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign and in his 1865 Alabama raid.

Significant cavalry battles and raids

The following are Civil War battles, campaigns, or separate raids in which cavalry forces played a significant role.

Battle of Brandy Station — 20,500 combatants, in 1863, Pleasanton leads the largest predominantly cavalry battle of the war
Battle of Chancellorsville — ambitious plan for raid in the Confederate rear foiled by George Stoneman's inaction
Battle of Gaines's Mill — the first large cavalry engagement of the war
Battle of Gettysburg, Third Day cavalry battles — East Cavalry Field and Farnsworth's Charge
Battle of Franklin — James H. Wilson's repulse of Forrest probably saved the Union army
Battle of Mine Creek — 9,600 cavalry, in 1864, Pleasanton leads the largest cavalry battle west of the Mississippi
Battle of Sailor's Creek — masterful cavalry maneuvers brought Confederates close to surrender in the Appomattox Campaign.
Battle of Selma — James H. Wilson's massive raid into Alabama in 1865
Battle of Trevilian Station — 16,048 cavalry, in 1864, Sheridan leads largest all-cavalry battle of the war
Battle of Yellow Tavern — J.E.B. Stuart killed in action by Philip Sheridan's cavalry
Dahlgren's Raid — unsuccessful Union raid against Richmond
Gettysburg campaign — numerous cavalry actions in Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania
Grierson's Raid — long-range raid through Mississippi in conjunction with Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign
Maryland Campaign — J.E.B. Stuart's second ride around the Union army
Peninsula Campaign — Stuart's first ride around the Union army
Price's Raid — Sterling Price's 1864 raid in the Trans-Mississippi Theater
Streight's Raid — 1863 raid across Alabama in which Col. Abel Streight surrendered 1,500 men to Forrest's 400
Third Battle of Winchester — 9,300 cavalry, Sheridan battled Early in 1864, in the Shenandoah valley
Wilson's Raid — James H. Wilson's 1865 raid through Alabama and Georgia
Morgan's Raid — John H. Morgan's 1863 raid through Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.

thumb|center|700px|[[Battle of Yellow Tavern|Cavalry fight at Yellow Tavern, by Edwin Forbes.]]

Notable cavalry leaders and partisan rangers

Turner Ashby
William W. Averell
John Buford
Louis Henry Carpenter
Philip St. George Cooke
George Armstrong Custer
Ulric Dahlgren
Elon J. Farnsworth
Nathan Bedford Forrest
Lot Smith
David McM. Gregg
Benjamin Grierson
Wade Hampton
John D. Imboden
Jesse James
Frank James
Albert G. Jenkins
William E. "Grumble" Jones
Judson Kilpatrick
Fitzhugh Lee
W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee
Lot Smith
John S. Marmaduke
Wesley Merritt
John Hunt Morgan
John S. Mosby
John Pelham
Alfred Pleasonton
William Quantrill
Beverly Robertson
Thomas L. Rosser
Joseph O. "Jo" Shelby
Philip Sheridan
David S. Stanley
George Stoneman
J.E.B. Stuart
Alfred Thomas Torbert
Earl Van Dorn
John A. Wharton
Joseph Wheeler
James H. Wilson
Cole Younger

References

External links

Maps: Battle of Brandy Station
Brandy Station: The Action on Fleetwood Hill
1st Maine Cavalry Federal Cavalry living history organization
10th Illinois Volunteer Cavalry living history organization