Bernard Gert (; October 16, 1934 – December 24, 2011) was a moral philosopher known primarily for his work in normative ethics, as well as in medical ethics, especially pertaining to psychology.
His work has been called "among the clearest and most comprehensive on the contemporary scene", "far more detailed and more concretely worked out" and "systematic" than competing comprehensive ethical theories. Because it avoids pitfalls associated with other dominant ethical theoretical approaches (such as deontology, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and virtue ethics), Gert's moral theory "provides what many people are looking for".
A source of notoriety among his contemporaries was that his family became a family of philosophers: his two children, Joshua and Heather, both became philosophers, and both married two other philosophers.
Metaethics
Definition of morality
Gert advocates the following definition of morality:
: Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and includes what are commonly known as the moral rules, ideals, and virtues and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal.
Morality as known to all
According to Gert, his theory counts as a natural law theory because he holds that all moral agents must be able to understand morality in order to count as moral agents. In other words, "moral judgments can only be made about those who know what kind of behavior morality prohibits, requires, discourages, encourages, and allows."
Harm as the central moral concept
According to Gert, harm (or "evil") is the central moral concept. Gert believes harm is what all rational creatures seek to avoid. He advances the following five-concept account of harm:
- death
- pain
- disability
- loss of freedom
- loss of pleasure.
He maintains that commonsense morality is far more concerned with prohibiting (and discouraging) evil than with requiring (or encouraging) people to enhance goods or benefits. For example, it is not irrational to set a trap for someone who is wearing an Armani suit so that they fall into a swimming pool in front of a video camera, since the pleasure one can get out of watching the video constitutes an adequate reason for harming the other person. It would also be rational for a sadist to torture other people for fun provided the sadist could get away with it.
There are five sorts of irrational desire according to Gert: seeking death, pain, disability, loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure. To determine whether a moral rule applies in a certain case or whether there is an exception, Gert advises people to follow what he calls the "two step procedure." He writes, "I think that my view is best characterized as a natural law theory . . . in the tradition of Hobbes". He also writes, "my view has been characterized as Kant with consequences, as Mill with publicity, and as Ross with a theory." Gert replied that "there may be no point in denying that I am some form of consequentialist".
Bibliography
- The Morality Monographs
- The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality, Harper and Row, 1970.
- Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Common Morality: Deciding What to Do, Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Bioethics: A Systematic Approach, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2006
- Hobbes: Prince of Peace, Polity Press, 2010.
References
Further reading
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds., Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
External links
- Gert's homepage at Dartmouth
- Gert, B. (1989). Morality versus Slogans Paper Presented to the Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, 3(2), Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan
- Gert, B. (2005). The Definition of Morality, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
