Berberism

thumb|The [[Berber flag adopted by the World Amazigh Congress in 1998]]

thumb|Demonstration of [[Kabyle people|Kabyles in Paris, April 2016]]

Berberism, also known as the Berber Cultural Movement, is a Berber cultural and political movement that advocates for the recognition of Berber (Amazigh) identity, language, and cultural rights in North Africa. It emerged in Algeria and Morocco as a response to state-led cultural Arabization policies, pan-Arabism, and the marginalization of Berber communities. While focused on cultural and linguistic rights, some Berberist movements, particularly among the diaspora (such as the MAK), also advocate for separatism. Opposition to Berberism has sometimes drawn on anti-Amazigh rhetoric, including claims that Berber identity was a French colonial invention. Scholars have also noted racialized tropes portraying Berbers as 'sons of the White Fathers'.

Algeria

thumb|Road sign in Algeria, showing evidence of dispute over whether names should be written in Arabic, Berber, or French

A sense of historical belonging

Kabyle identity, like that of other Berber-speaking groups, did not suddenly emerge in the 20th century. It can be found in popular poetry of resistance to French colonization (19th century), which refers to a Kabyle entity. On another level, it recognizes the Muslim community. Berber identity has ancient historical roots and is not a creation of colonialism, contrary to the postulate put forward by Arab-Muslim ideology, even if the French conquest did have an impact on the ground.

Impact of the French conquest

The Berber presence was not ignored by European scholars before the conquest of 1830. But in the eyes of the French, Algeria was populated by "Moors" and "Turks" before the conquest. This view changed with the capture of Algiers, and the inhabitants were increasingly referred to as "Arabs." Given Kabylia's proximity, contact with Berber-speaking populations, who were not inclined towards colonization, quickly followed: the presence of "two races" or "two languages" was then discovered.

As part of the "Berber policy" of the French colonial empire, designed to "pacify" Kabylia, French colonialists promoted the idea that Kabyle people were more predisposed than Arabs to assimilate into "French civilization." This was known as the Kabyle myth. Yves Lacoste explained that "turning the Arabs into invaders was one way of legitimizing the French presence". The Berbers were elevated above the Arabs through the narrative that Berber ancestral heritage stemmed from Europe. Consequently, Arabs were associated with backwardness, which the Berbers profited from, as it granted them a higher status within the colonial system.

During the period of French colonization, Arabic and Berber were declared foreign languages in Algeria with the aim to replace them with French. The French in particular sought to promote the French language Berbers, particularly in Kabyle.

These attempts to win over the Berber population saw mixed success. Berbers were on the forefront of the Independence movement with several key leaders of National Liberation Front (FLN), including Hocine Aït Ahmed, Abane Ramdane, and Krim Belkacem. The Berber regions of Aurès and Kabylia were geographically remotene and there was widespread local support for independence and the FLN. The Soummam conference, often cited as the founding act of the Algerian state, took place in Kabylia. Due to Berber regions serving as hotbeds for FLN guerillas, these regions were labelled major targets in French counter-insurgency operations.

Following Algerian Independence, Berber leaders increasingly opposed the central government, in particular its Arabist policies and lack of political pluralism. Two years of armed conflict in Kabylia followed, leaving more than 400 dead and most FLN leaders from Kabylia exiled or executed.

1940 to 1950 Berberist crisis

The developments of 1940 to 1950 constituted a period of social unrest in Algerian politics which would set the framework for the coming years. The emergence of the Algerian Arabism-Islamism Nationalist framework meant to combat colonialism was accompanied by the emergence of Berberism, to combat this Arabism-Islamism. The Berbers demanded for the redefinition of the society they were historically a part of (linguistically and culturally): they wanted an 'Algerian Algeria' to represent all the ethnic and cultural minorities of the nation. The Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) continued to impose the Arabism-Islamism framework and were denounced as anti-democratic by Berber activists.

The MTLD refused to acknowledge these minorities because it would have hindered their advancement in the provincial elections. This led to the beginning of open conflict between Berber partisans and "Arab unity" advocates: the outbreak of the Berber crisis. At this stage, the Algerian People's Party (PPA) and MTLD, both headquartered in Paris, had merged to advance the Berber platform. They wanted to replace the single-party state system with democracy. This 'Algerian Algeria' would include the contributions, histories and cultures of all the ethnic populations. The platform as stated by Rachid Ali revolved around the fact that the Berbers should break the status quo that they have no place in society, as Algeria does not belong to the Arab world but was instead a nation for all its citizens. With the adoption of this platform, the Berber activists were seen as a threat to unity and independence by the Arabists-Islamists, on the account that "the Berbers wished to impose the Western agenda on Algeria".

The Berberist crisis of 1949 led to the formation of the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB). Its agenda was to challenge Arabism and Islamism, and oppose Arabization because of its "de-frenchifying" objectives and its alleged opposition to democratic and secular ideals. Berberists called for a Western-style socio-political system with the French language and French culture as its vectors. This was criticized by Arab Nationalists for being too assimilationist.

Effects of 1962 constitution and Arabization

The 1962 Constitution declared that Islam was the state religion and Arabic was the national language. These two aspects of identity became mutually exclusive to be Algerian. In turn, linguistic and cultural diversity was interpreted as a threat to national unity. Rapid Arabization measures were implemented after independence in 1962 which sought to spread the Arabic language throughout the country. This was largely in an attempt to reclaim and reconstruct the Algerian identity which was lost during French colonial rule.

The rise in Arabic speakers and education institutions was accompanied by the decline in the Berber speakers. Linguistic ability was a large factor in Berber identification meaning its decline was a threat to the survival of the Berber identity. The Berber narrative stated that the rapid Arab-Islamic conquest was rising at the expense of the Berber identity. The Berber struggle was seen as an uphill battle. The later 1980s saw a rise in Berber associations, political parties and cultural movements. Article 56 of the 1976 constitution stated that preliminary certification was needed in order to establish associations, over which the administration had discretionary power. The MCB mobilized large groups of people and coordinated multiple protests to advance Berber culture, language, and position in civil society. However, the MCB had major limits on the account that the MCB was unable to resist the partisan tensions between the FFS and the RCD.

Morocco

French Berber policy and historical construction of ethnic divides

thumb|20th century map depicting [[Pre-colonial Makhzen|Bled el-Makhzen (white) and Bled es-Siba (highlighted)]]

The Berber policy in Morocco had roots before the beginning of the French protectorate in Morocco in 1912. For example, the Mission Scientifique au Maroc was started in 1903 to collect social, economic, ecological, ethnographic, political, and cultural information about Morocco first led by French orientalist Edmond Doutté then by French orientalist . It also was influenced by the Kabyle myth. One of the purposes of the Berber policy was it being a means of control. One official said, for example, "The Berber race is a useful instrument for counteracting the Arab race... and the Makhzan itself". Another was forging a new Berber identity under French influence rather than conserving the traditional Berber identity.

Beginning from the 1920, the French administration also created Franco-Berber schools () that were set up by Resident-General Hubert Lyautey and restricted to the Berber population. These schools included the Collège d'Azrou which led to the formation of a new Francophone rural Berber elite. In these schools, French was the primary language followed by Berber. The curriculum of these schools excluded religious courses, Lyautey on the Franco-Berber schools said:

The Berber Dahir was a dhahir (decree) created by the French protectorate in Morocco on 16 May 1930. This dhahir changed the legal system in parts of Morocco, it replaced the pre-colonial Islamic Sharia system in Berber areas with old pre-Islamic Berber laws, which many Moroccan nationalists saw as an attempt by the French to weaken the authority of the Makhzen and strengthen the autonomy of Berber tribes, causing public demonstrations and protests against the French in all Moroccan cities. The new legal system in Berber communities would ostensibly be based on local Berber laws and customs rather than the authority of the sultan. The legal system in the rest of the country remained the way it had been before the French invasion. Lebanese prince Shakib Arslan took this as evidence of an attempt to de-Islamize Morocco.

The Berber Dahir reinforced a dichotomy in popular Moroccan historiography: the division of the country into Bled el-Makhzen—areas under the direct control of the Sultan and the Makhzen, or the state, (especially urban areas such as Fes and Rabat)—and Bled es-Siba—typically geographically isolated areas beyond the direct control of the state, where Berber languages are primarily spoken and where Islamic Sharia was not applied. The former was described as Arab and the latter as Berber. Despite being dominated by Berbers, it did not explicitly identify itself as a Berber party. Officially, it represented the rural populations, but became associated with the Berber movement since Berbers dominated rural areas. In the parliament the MP was used by Hassan II to counterbalance the opposition, especially the Istiqlal Party. The King in turn shared royal patronage with the party leaders. The King further cultivated the relationship by doing the same with other Berber notables. This formed a strong bond between the leaders of the community and the monarchy. One of the results was that many Berbers were in the military and until 1972 many held the rank of officer. The change in 1972 was caused by two attempted coups led by Berber officers. As another result of the alliance Hassan II allowed the community small forms of cultural expression as long as it wasn't deemed political (this also concerned the program of the MP). Despite this, the MP failed to do anything to advance any "Berberization" and were the major party in the ruling coalition that enacted Arabization in 1965.

In the parliament the parties with Berber supporters and the Islamists opposed each other. The problem originated from the Islamists and their support of further Arabization of society. Arabization went against the adoption of Tamazight in society which was supported by parties dependent on Berber supporters.

The Foundation of NGOs in the 1960s

The 1960s were important for Berbers because of the founding of a number of NGOs. In 1965 the "Moroccan Amazigh Cultural Movement" (MACM) was founded. The organization is a confederation of multiple (smaller) NGOs which banded together in order to better coordinate their actions. Another important organization is the "Association Marocaine de Recherche d’Échange Culture" (AMREC) which was founded in 1967. The foundation of AMREC inspired many other associations to be formed. The NGOs were responsible for organizing a wide variety of events in Morocco. They range from Berber festivals, handicraft workshops, folklore expressions to musical events. The monarchy allowed these on one condition: the activities were not allowed to be political and could only be cultural expressions. The government subsidized some of the events as long as they adhered to the rules.

The effects of the Berber Spring

In 1980 the "Berber Spring" broke out in Algeria. The government of Hassan II saw the public disorder in Algeria and changed its course in order to avoid a similar event in Morocco. The result was that the years of 1980-1982 were characterized by an opening in political liberties for Berber expression. The activists were motivated by the new climate and formed many new cultural associations. The king also appointed two important Berber figures in high positions to show his new attitude. Mahjoubi Aherdane was named the head of a newly formed cultural organization, the "Commission Nationale pour la Sauvegarde des Arts Populaires". Whereas Mohamed Chafik was similarly appointed as the head of the prestigious “Le Académie Royal”. Furthermore, the king approved the release of a Berber journal. In 1982 most of the freedoms granted were retracted and the Years of Lead continued.

Events of the 1990's

The "Agadir Charter" of 1991

The Moroccan government adopted a change in direction from the Years of Lead in the 1990s. The regime introduced greater civil liberties, reduced human rights abuses and increased freedom of association. Although repression was still present in these years. The increase in civil liberties resulted in the foundation of many new Berber associations. In the year 1991 multiple NGO's came together and released a document called the "Agadir Charter". The document is important because it publicly showed the unity of the different NGO's. But it also became important since the government did not answer with any forms of repression. It motivated many Berber to feel more confident to publicly express their culture or support Berber activism.

The Concessions of 1994

The year 1994 was an important year for Berber activists. In May, seven members of the Berber association Tilelli (freedom) were arrested while protesting for cultural rights. They were all convicted and 3 of them received prison sentences while the rest received fines. While the group was in jail they were physically abused. This information quickly spread to the public and massive national outcry followed. The human rights abuse even gained international attention. The negative attention convinced the state to release the members that were still in jail and reduce the sentences of the entire group. Afterwards the state increased the funding of regional radio programs on Berber culture, such as Radio Agadir. The concessions reached a symbolic height in August during a speech. In the speech Hassan II recognized the Berber culture as part of the Moroccan national identity. The speech of 1994 caused many activists to seek out the state in the hope of realizing their demands. In 1995 the king announced the intent to incorporate Tamazight in education, however when Hassan II died the program had still not been implemented. It showed that the government still did not fully embrace the ethnic group. Another important sign that showed this was that in 1996 a law was passed to ban Berber names for children.

On 17 October 2001, in the presence of his advisors, the members of the government, the leaders of the political parties and unions, and Berber activists, King Mohammed VI announced the royal decree (dahir) that established the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (L'Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe, IRCAM). He defined Moroccan national identity as a composition of different cultural elements, underlined that the Berber language constituted a principal element of the national culture, and added that its promotion was a national responsibility. The Royal Institute was charged with the promotion of Berber culture in education and media. While redefining Moroccan identity so as to incorporate Berberness. The institute has not been without criticism. The more radical activists see it as an attempts to buy off the movement and to control its actions. Meanwhile, the more moderate camp sees it as a chance to advance their cause from within the state.

The establishment of IRCAM represented the first substantial change in the state's attitude towards its Berber population from a policy of subtle neglect to explicit recognition and support. It then tried to be legally reestablished under a new denomination (Izegzawen) to promote Berber identity, political secularism, and Berber cultural rights, without success.

One other important achievement is the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in 2011 by King Mohamed the VI. The recognition came after the demonstrations of the Arab Spring and the February 20th movement (which contained many Berbers).

Canary Islands

thumb|140px|[[MPAIAC flag]]

Beginning with Antonio Cubillo's Canary Islands Independence Movement in the early 1970s, some Canarian nationalist organizations have supported Berberism to emphasize native Guanche cultural difference with Spanish culture and highlight

Spanish colonialism.

Although the movements attracted sympathies among local Canarians, the violent terror actions that were used initially by Cubillo's movement brought about a general rejection. Thus, even after Cubillo publicly renounced the armed struggle in August 1979, he failed to inspire much popular support.

Currently some political organizations in the Canary Islands such as the National Congress of the Canaries (CNC), the Popular Front of the Canary Islands (FREPIC-AWAÑAK), Alternativa Popular Canaria, Canarian Nationalist Party (PNC), Nueva Canarias (NC), Alternativa Popular Canaria (APC), Alternativa Nacionalista Canaria (ANC), Unidad del Pueblo (UP), Inekaren and Azarug espouse the pro-Berber cause in a higher or lower degree. Some of the symbols and colors of the flags of the Canarian pro-independence organizations, as well as the use of the word 'Taknara' (rejected by Cubillo himself) to refer to the archipelago, are seeking to represent Berber cultural roots.