The Battle of Vimy Ridge (9–12 April 1917) was part of the Battle of Arras, in the Pas-de-Calais department of France, during the First World War. The main combatants were the four divisions of the Canadian Corps in the First Army, against three divisions of the German 6th Army. The battle began the Battle of Arras and was the first attack of the Nivelle Offensive. The objective was to draw German reserves away from the French forces, preparing for the French offensive along the Aisne and the Chemin des Dames ridge several days later.

The Canadian Corps was to capture Vimy Ridge, an escarpment on the northern flank of the Arras front. This would protect the First Army and the Third Army farther south from German enfilade fire. Supported by a creeping barrage, the Canadian Corps captured most of the ridge during the first day. The village of Thélus fell on the second day, as did the crest of the ridge, once the Canadian Corps overran a salient against considerable German resistance. The final objective, a fortified knoll outside the village of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, fell to the Canadians on 12 April. The 6th Army retreated to the Oppy–Méricourt line.

Historians attribute the success of the Canadian Corps to technical and tactical innovation, meticulous planning, powerful artillery support and extensive training and the inability of the 6th Army properly to apply the new German defensive doctrine. The battle was the first occasion when the four divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force fought together and it was made a symbol of Canadian national achievement and sacrifice. A portion of the battleground serves as a memorial park and site of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial.

Background

Vimy Ridge 1914–1916

Vimy Ridge is an escarpment northeast of Arras on the western edge of the Douai Plain. The ridge rises gradually on its western side and drops more quickly on the eastern side. At approximately in length and culminating at an elevation of or above the Douai Plains, the ridge provides a natural unobstructed view for tens of kilometres in all directions. The ridge fell under German control in October 1914 during the Race to the Sea as the Franco-British and German forces attempted to outflank each other through north-eastern France.

thumb|Location of the Battle of Vimy Ridge

The French Tenth Army tried to eject the Germans during the Second Battle of Artois in May 1915 by attacking at Vimy Ridge and Notre Dame de Lorette. The French 1st Moroccan Division managed to briefly capture the height of the ridge but was unable to hold it owing to a lack of reinforcements. The French tried again at the Third Battle of Artois in September 1915 but only captured the village of Souchez at the western base of the ridge. The Vimy sector calmed following the offensive with both sides taking a largely live and let live approach. The French suffered approximately 150,000 casualties in their attempts to gain control of the Vimy Ridge area.

1916–1917

The French Tenth Army was relieved in February 1916 by XVII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng) and transferred to join in the Battle of Verdun. The British soon discovered that German tunnelling companies had taken advantage of the relative calm on the surface to build an extensive network of tunnels and deep mines from which they would attack French positions by setting off explosive charges underneath their trenches. The Royal Engineers sent specialist tunnelling companies to the ridge to combat the German mining operations and German artillery and trench mortar fire intensified in early May 1916. On 21 May 1916, after shelling the British forward trenches and divisional artillery positions from eighty hidden batteries on the reverse slope of the ridge, the German infantry began , an attack on the British lines along a front, to eject them from positions along the ridge. The Germans captured several British-controlled tunnels and mine craters before halting their advance and digging in. Small counter-attacks by battalions of the 140th and 141st Brigades took place on 22 May but were foiled. The Canadian Corps relieved IV Corps along the western slopes of Vimy Ridge in October 1916.

Prelude

Strategy

On 28 May 1916, Byng took command of the Canadian Corps from Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Alderson. Discussions for a spring offensive near Arras began, following a formal conference of corps commanders held at the First Army Headquarters (HQ) on 21 November 1916. In March 1917, the army HQ formally presented Byng with orders giving Vimy Ridge as the Canadian Corps objective for the Arras Offensive.

A plan, adopted in early March 1917, drew on the briefings of staff officers sent to learn from the experiences of the French Army during the Battle of Verdun. For the first time the four Canadian divisions would fight together. The nature and size of the attack needed more resources than the Canadian Corps possessed and the British 5th Division, artillery, engineer and labour units were attached to the corps, bringing the nominal strength of the Canadian Corps to about 170,000 men, of whom 97,184 were Canadian.

Tactics

thumb|left|upright|The Canadian Corps plan of attack outlining the four coloured objective lines – Black, Red, Blue and Brown

In January 1917, three Canadian Corps officers accompanied other British and Dominion officers attending lectures by the French Army on their experiences during the Battle of Verdun. The French counter-offensive devised by General Robert Nivelle had been one of a number of Allied successes of 1916. Following extensive rehearsal, eight French divisions had assaulted German positions in two waves along a front. Supported by extremely powerful artillery, the French had recovered lost ground and inflicted severe casualties on five German divisions.

On their return from the lectures, the Canadian Corps staff officers produced a tactical analysis of the Verdun battles and delivered corps and divisional-level lectures to promote the primacy of artillery and stress the importance of harassing fire and company and platoon flexibility. The report of the 1st Canadian Division commander, Arthur Currie, highlighted the lessons he believed the Canadian Corps could learn from the experiences of the French. The final plan for the assault on Vimy Ridge drew on the experience and tactical analysis of the officers who attended the Verdun lectures. The First Army commander, General Henry Horne approved the plan on 5 March 1917.

upright|thumb|[[Julian Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy|Byng during the battle|alt=Julian Byng in a black and white chest high portrait with foliage behind him. Byng has a moustache and is wearing a general officer's uniform that consists of a tailored jacket adorned with brass buttons. The collar is embellished with additional decorations denoting rank and service branch. He is wearing a peaked cap featuring ornate insignia indicating his rank and unit affiliation.]]

The plan divided the Canadian Corps advance into four coloured objective lines. The attack would be made on a front of , with its centre opposite the village of Vimy, to the east of the ridge. The first objective, the Black Line, was the German forward defensive position. The final objective of the northern flank was the Red Line, taking the highest point on the ridge, the fortified knoll known as the Pimple, la Folie Farm, the (intermediate position) and the hamlet of Les Tilleuls. The southern two divisions were to achieve two more objectives, the Blue Line, encompassing the village of Thélus and the woods outside the village of Vimy and the Brown Line, which aimed at capturing (Twelve Trench) and the German second position. The infantry would advance close to a creeping barrage by field guns, advancing in timed increments. The medium and heavy howitzers would establish a series of standing barrages further ahead of the infantry against defensive positions.

The plan called for units to leapfrog as the advance progressed, to maintain momentum during the attack. The initial wave would capture and consolidate the Black Line and then push forward to the Red Line. The barrage would pause for reserve units to move up, then move forward with the units pushing beyond the Red Line to the Blue Line. Once the troops secured the Blue Line, advancing units would once again leapfrog them and capture the Brown Line. Conducted properly, the plan would leave the German forces little time to exit their deep dugouts and defend their positions against the infantry. If the corps maintained its schedule, the troops would advance as much as and have the majority of the ridge under control by 1:00pm on the first day.

German defences

thumb|upright|Position of the defending and attacking forces before the battle

The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench position was no longer effective against the firepower that the Entente armies had accumulated. Ludendorff published a new defensive doctrine in December 1916, in which deeper defences were to be built, within which the garrison would have room to manoeuvre, rather than rigidly holding successive lines of trenches. Along Vimy Ridge, the German forces had spent two years constructing fortifications designed for rigid defence. An extensive network of tunnels and trenches south of Neuville St Vaast was known as "The Labyrinth". Little reconstruction based upon the new defence-in-depth doctrine had been accomplished by April 1917 because the terrain made it impractical.

The ridge was across at its narrowest point, with a steep drop on the eastern side, all but eliminating the possibility of counterattacks if the ridge was captured. The Germans were apprehensive about the inherent weakness of the Vimy Ridge defences. Their defensive scheme was to maintain a front line defence of sufficient strength to withstand an initial assault and move operational reserves forward, before the enemy could consolidate their gains or overrun the remaining German positions. The German defence at Vimy Ridge relied largely on the firepower of machine guns.

Three divisions, comprising seven infantry regiments were responsible for the immediate defence of the ridge. The paper strength of each division was approximately 15,000 men but their actual strength was significantly lower. In 1917, a full-strength German rifle company was 264 men; at Vimy Ridge, each rifle company contained approximately 150 men. Each German regiment held a zone approximately wide, as far back as the rear area. When the Canadian Corps attacked, each German company faced two or more battalions of approximately 1,000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept about back instead of assembling close behind the second line, according to the defence-in-depth theory.

Artillery

thumb|upright|Map showing rolling artillery barrage for the advance

The eight field artillery brigades of the Canadian Corps divisional artillery and two heavy artillery groups were reinforced with British artillery units. Four heavy artillery groups, nine field artillery brigades, three divisional artillery groups and the artillery complement of the 5th Division was attached to the Canadian Corps. Ten heavy artillery groups of the flanking I and XVII Corps were assigned tasks in support of the Canadian Corps. The artillery batteries of I Corps were particularly important because they enfiladed German gun positions behind Vimy Ridge.

The British provided twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of four hundred and eighty 18 pounder field guns, one hundred and thirty-eight 4.5 inch howitzers, ninety-six 2 inch trench mortars, twenty-four 9.45 inch mortars, supported by 245 siege guns and heavy mortars. This firepower gave a density of one heavy gun for every and one field gun for every of the corps frontage, representing a considerable average increase, including three times the heavy guns over the distribution of artillery at the Battle of the Somme in 1916.

On 8 February, the First Army issued a 3,000-word artillery plan devised by Horne and his principal artillery commander, Major General H. F. Mercer. Brigadier-General Edward Morrison developed and issued a 35-page multi-phased fire support plan called Canadian Corps Artillery Instruction No.1 for the Capture of Vimy Ridge to support the efforts of the infantry. The Canadian Corps received three times the artillery normally assigned to a corps for regular operations. To manage the supply of the extra guns, the Royal Artillery staff officer, Major Alan Brooke, coordinated communication and transport plans to work with the barrage plans.

A 1.6million shell allotment allowed the artillery along the Canadian Corps front to maintain a high rate of fire. Improvements in the quality of the shells ensured fewer duds. The new instantaneous No. 106 fuze greatly improved results, the fuse burst reliably with the slightest of contact, unlike older timed fuses, making it especially effective at wire cutting. Field units laid over of telegraph and field telephone cables, normally at a depth of . The corps conducted counter-battery shoots before the battle. The First Army Field Survey Company printed barrage maps, artillery boards and counter-battery support with flash spotting groups and sound ranging sections. Using flash spotting, sound ranging and aerial reconnaissance from 16 Squadron and Balloon Companies Royal Flying Corps (RFC) in the week before the battle, the counter-battery artillery (Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew McNaughton) fired 125,900 shells, harassing an estimated 83 per cent of the German gun positions.

Training

thumb|Large model of German trench lines|alt=a vast full-scale model of the Vimy Ridge battlefield sprawls out across the landscape, resembling a football field in size. The intricate details of the terrain, including trenches, craters, and rough terrain, are meticulously recreated, providing a vivid representation of the historic battleground. Along the periphery of the model, soldiers stand, their figures adding a human dimension to the scene. The soldiers' presence shows the scale of the battlefield model.

In February 1917, the British General Staff released a training pamphlet SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, espousing the return to the pre-war emphasis on fire and movement tactics and the use of the platoon as the basic tactical unit. The pamphlet noted the importance of specialist hand grenade, rifle grenade, rifle and Lewis gun sections in suppressing enemy strong points by exploiting the characteristics of different weapons to fight forward, allowing other units to advance. Coupled with the observations and suggestions made by Currie in the report he submitted in January 1917 following the Verdun lectures, the Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigour. The corps implemented the tactical doctrine for small units by assigning objectives down to the platoon. Assaulting infantry battalions used hills behind the lines as full-scale models of the battlefield.

Taped lines demarcated German trench lines while officers on horseback carried flags to represent the advancing front of the artillery barrage. Recognizing that leaders were likely to be wounded or killed, soldiers learned the jobs of those beside and above them. At the First Army headquarters, a large plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and used to show commissioned and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system. Upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield. The new measures gave each platoon a clearer picture of how it fitted into the greater battle plan and in so doing, reduced the command problems that plagued First World War operations.

Underground operations

thumb|British-dug fighting tunnel in Vimy sector|alt=A narrow first World War fighting tunnel carved through chalk is depicted. The tunnel, roughly the height of a person, is illuminated by the white of the chalk, casting shadows along its walls. On the floor, there is rubble pilled to one side. The rough-hewn walls bear marks of manual excavation.

Operations along the Vimy Ridge were accompanied by extensive excavations. The Arras–Vimy sector was conducive to tunnelling, owing to the soft, porous, yet extremely stable nature of the chalk underground. Mine warfare had been conducted on the Vimy sector since 1915 and Bavarian engineers had blown twenty mines in the sector by March 1915. By early 1916, German miners had gained an advantage over their French counterparts. British tunnelling companies of the Royal Engineers took over from the French between February and May 1916.

On their arrival, the British began offensive mining against German miners, first stopping the German underground advance and then developing a defensive strategy that prevented the Germans from gaining a tactical advantage by mining. The German Historical Service estimated that the 6th Army suffered 79,418 casualties during April and May 1917, 22,792 were classified as missing. Crown Prince Rupprecht estimated 85,000 casualties for the 6th Army, with 3,404 men taken prisoner at Vimy Ridge. Losses of the 79th Reserve Division from 1 to 11 April were 3,473 and in the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division 3,133. Casualties from the bombardment amongst reinforcements and divisions are additional.

Following the defeat, the chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, ordered (OHL, Supreme Army Command) to conduct a court of enquiry into the defensive collapse of the Arras sector. The court concluded that the 6th Army headquarters had disregarded reports from commanders in the front line noting a possible imminent attack and reserve units were too distant to counter-attack before the Canadians could consolidate. The court concluded that 6th Army commander General Ludwig von Falkenhausen failed to apply an elastic defence according to German defensive doctrine. Instead, the defensive system comprised strong points and lines of resistance, which the Allied artillery had isolated and destroyed. Hindenburg removed Falkenhausen from his command and transferred him to Belgium, where he served the remainder of the war as governor-general.

thumb|Lt.-Gen. Sir Julian Byng views equipment captured during the battle. The mortar in foreground is a [[24 cm schwerer LadungsWerfer Ehrhardt|24 cm LadungsWerfer Ehrhardt.]]

German military commanders did not consider the Canadian Corps' capture of Vimy Ridge a defeat. Contemporary German sources viewed the action, at worst, as a draw, given that no breakthrough followed the attack. The Germans did not try to recapture the ridge, even during the Spring Offensive in 1918 and it remained under British control until the end of the war. The loss of Vimy Ridge forced the Germans to reassess their defensive strategy in the area. Instead of mounting a counterattack, they pursued a scorched earth policy and retreated to the Oppy–Méricourt line. The failure of the Nivelle Offensive in the week after the Battle of Arras placed pressure on Field Marshal Douglas Haig to keep the Germans occupied in the Arras sector to minimize French losses. The Canadian Corps participated in several of these actions including the Battle of Arleux and the Third Battle of the Scarpe in late April and early May 1917.

Awards

Victoria Cross

Four members of the Canadian Corps were awarded a Victoria Cross, highest military award of the British honours system for their actions during the battle:

  • Private William Johnstone Milne, 16th (Canadian Scottish) Battalion
  • Lance-Sergeant Ellis Wellwood Sifton, 18th (Western Ontario) Battalion
  • Private John George Pattison, 50th (Calgary) Battalion
  • Captain Thain Wendell MacDowell, 38th (Ottawa) Battalion

Pour le Mérite

At least two Orders Pour le Mérite, the Kingdom of Prussia's highest military order, were awarded to German commanders for their actions during the battle.

  • Oberstleutnant , commander of Prussian Reserve Infantry Regiment 261, of the 79th Reserve Division.
  • General of the Infantry , commander of the VIII Reserve Corps ().

Commemoration

Influence on Canada

The Battle of Vimy Ridge has considerable significance for Canada. Although the battle is not generally considered the greatest achievement of the Canadian Corps in strategic importance or results obtained, it was the first instance in which all four Canadian divisions, made up of troops drawn from all parts of the country, fought together. The image of national unity and achievement is what, according to one of many recent patriotic narratives, initially gave the battle importance for Canada. According to Pierce, "The historical reality of the battle has been reworked and reinterpreted in a conscious attempt to give purpose and meaning to an event that came to symbolize Canada's coming of age as a nation". That Canadian national identity and nationhood were born out of the battle is an opinion that in the late twentieth century became widely held in military and general histories of Canada. McKay and Swift contend that the theory that Vimy Ridge is a source of Canada's rise as a nation is highly contested and developed in the latter part of the twentieth century after most of those who experienced the Great War had died but in 1919 Hopkins had attributed to F.A. MacKenzie the recognition "...that Dominions sharing the common burden shall share the common direction of the Empire's war policy" and related Lloyd George's commitment that the Dominions would not again be engaged in wars without consultation.

Vimy Memorial

thumb|King [[Edward VIII unveiling the figure Canada Bereft on the Vimy Ridge Memorial|alt=In the black and white photograph, the unveiling of the Vimy Memorial is captured. A figure stands atop a stage draped in flags, positioned in front of the poignant statue of Canada Bereft. A vast crowd of people is gathered and facing towards the stage.]]

The Canadian National Vimy Memorial is Canada's largest overseas war memorial. Located on the highest point of the Vimy Ridge, the memorial commemorates Canadian Expeditionary Force members killed during the First World War and those killed in France during the First World War with no known grave. A section of preserved trenches and a portion of a tunnel have been made accessible to visitors.

The memorial was designed by Toronto architect and sculptor Walter Seymour Allward, who described it as a "sermon against the futility of war". The memorial took eleven years and cost $1.5million ($ million in present terms) to build. The unveiling was conducted on 26 July 1936, by King Edward VIII accompanied by President Lebrun of France and a crowd of over 50,000 people, including at least 6,200 Canadian veterans and their families.|group="Note"

thumb|left|Ghosts of Vimy Ridge, painting by [[Will Longstaff|alt=The painting depicts the Vimy Memorial atop a hill ravaged by battle. The contrast between the darkened ground and sky accentuates the stark white of the memorial. In the foreground, countless ghostly figures, adorned in military attire, traverse the battlefield, evoking a haunting sense of the past.]]

The Prime Minister of Canada, Mackenzie King, was absent as he had not fought in the war and was reluctant to meet veterans. Mackenzie King's harsh treatment of Byng during the 1926 King–Byng affair caused many veterans to despise him and he felt that a war veteran from the Cabinet should attend in his place.

See also

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

Further reading

  • The Battle of Vimy Ridge Battle info, video footage and photos
  • The Vimy Foundation
  • Canadian War MuseumThe Battle of Vimy Ridge
  • Vimy Ridge Virtual Interactive (Veterans Affairs Canada)
  • The Underground War: Military Mining Operations in Support of the Attack on Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917
  • Veterans Affairs CanadaVimy Ridge 100th anniversary
  • Vimy Ridge played by the Band of H.M. Royal Marines