The Battle of Suomussalmi was fought between Finnish and Soviet forces in the Winter War. The action took place from 30 November 1939 to 8 January 1940. The outcome was a Finnish victory against superior forces. The battle is considered the war's clearest, most important, and most significant Finnish victory in the northern half of Finland.

Order of battle

Soviet army

9th Army

  • 163rd Rifle Division
  • Parts of 47th Rifle Corps
  • 44th Rifle Division

Finnish army

North Finland Group

  • Susi Group (Ryhmä Susi)
  • Siilasvuo Group
  • 9th Infantry Division

Course of battle

thumb|163rd Division in the Battle of Suomussalmi

On 30 November 1939, Zelentsov leading the Soviet 163rd Rifle Division (the 81st and Sharov's 662nd Infantry Regiments with tanks and cavalry) left Ukhta and crossed the border near Juntusranta, while the 759th Infantry Regiment and Division reconnaissance battalion crossed at Raate, as the Soviets advanced towards Suomussalmi. The Soviet objective was to advance to the city of Oulu, effectively cutting Finland in half. At the road connecting Peranka with Hyrynsalmi, the 662nd turned north intending to capture Peranka, while the 81st regiment turned south to join the 759th in attacking Suomussalmi. On 4 December, the Finnish Independent battalion (ErP 15) and the 4th Field Replacement Battalion fought the Soviets from Raate to Suomussalmi, but Suomussalmi was captured on 7 December. On 6 December, I. Pallari's ErP 16 stopped the Soviet advance on Peranka at the Piispajärvi straits. Paavo Susitaival took over command of Task Force Susi north and east of the Palovaara junction, while Salske took command of ErP 16 after Pallari was wounded.

By 9 December the Hjalmar Siilasvuo's Regiment JR 27 had arrived, stopping the Soviet advance towards Hyrynsalmi at a ferry just south of Suomussalmi. By the 11th, JR 27 had severed the Soviet Raate road communication link to the east of Suomussalmi. A Finnish battalion then cut off Soviet communications at Hulkonniemi, northwest of Suomussalmi. Over the next two weeks, Siilasvuo was able to contain the Soviets, while Finnish artillery arrived. On 25 December, Siilasvuo's forces were reorganized as the 9th Division, with the addition of Regiment JR 64, guerilla battalion Sissi P1, and bicycle battalion PPP 6. On 27 December, Task Force Susi, reinforced by Regiment JR 65, captured Palovaara, preventing the Soviet 662nd Regiment from supporting the rest of the 163rd Division.

On 24 December, surrounded on all sides in the Hulkonniemi-Suomussalmi area, Zelentsov tried to break out to the south, but was stopped by JR 27's Second Battalion. On 25 December, the Soviets tried to break out to the west, but were once again stopped. On 27 December, Siilasvuo made his move, with Kaarle Kari attacking from the northwest along columns led by Frans Fagernäs and Martti Harola, while Battalion PPP 6 struck from the north, and Paavola prevented any northern movement along Lake Kiantajärvi.

  • Finnish troops possessed higher mobility due to skis and sleds; by contrast, Soviet heavy equipment confined them to roads.
  • The Soviet objective to cut Finland in half across the Oulu region, while appearing reasonable on a map, was inherently unrealistic, as the region was mostly forested marshland, with its road network consisting mainly of logging trails. Mechanized divisions had to rely on them and so became easy targets for the mobile Finnish ski troops.
  • Finnish strategy was flexible and often unorthodox, for example, Finnish troops targeted Soviet field kitchens, which demoralised Soviet soldiers fighting in a sub-Arctic winter.
  • The Soviet army was poorly equipped, especially with regard to winter camouflage clothing; by contrast, Finnish troops' equipment were well-suited for warfare in deep snow and freezing temperatures.
  • The Finnish army had very high morale, resulting from the fact that it was defending their nation. Soviet troops, however, had exclusively-political reasons for their attack, consequently losing their will to fight soon despite continual efforts by Soviet propagandists.
  • An additional factor remained Soviet counter-intelligence failures: Finnish troops often intercepted the Soviet communications, which relied heavily on standard phone lines.
  • The Finnish tactics involved simplicity where needed, as the final assault was a simple head-on charge, which decreased the chances of tactical errors. Rough weather also favoured comparatively-simple plans.

See also

  • Battle of Raate Road
  • List of Finnish military equipment of World War II
  • List of Soviet Union military equipment of World War II

References

Citations

Notes

Bibliography

  • Battle of Suomussalmi. by Sami H. E. Korhonen (2006), www.winterwar.com. Texts with plenty of maps. In two parts, the second part. Retrieved 2014-03-16.
  • Winter War This site is produced by the Finnish Military Museum (in English, Finnish, Russian, Swedish). Dozens of battle maps made by Ari Raunio.
  • Finnish Wartime Photograph Archive Thousands of photos from January 1939 to December 1945