| casualties1 = 58 killed <br> 2 heavy cruisers damaged <br> 1 light cruiser damaged
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The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and in Japanese sources as the , and colloquially among Allied Guadalcanal veterans as the Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks, was a naval battle during the Solomon Islands campaign of the Pacific War of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. The battle took place on 8–9 August 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign, the first of several naval battles in the straits later named Ironbottom Sound, near the island of Guadalcanal.
The Imperial Japanese Navy, in response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, mobilized a task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. This task force sailed from Japanese bases in New Britain and New Ireland down New Georgia Sound (also known as "The Slot") with the intention of interrupting the Allied landings by attacking the supporting amphibious fleet and its screening force. The Allied screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle. In a night action, Mikawa thoroughly surprised and routed the Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers, while suffering minimal damage in return. Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox, director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, considers this battle and the Battle of Tassafaronga to be two of the worst defeats in U.S. naval history, surpassed only by the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
After the initial engagement, Mikawa, fearing Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight, decided to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to locate and destroy the Allied invasion transports. The Japanese attack prompted the remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force to withdraw earlier than planned (before unloading all their supplies), temporarily ceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese. This early withdrawal of the fleet left the Allied ground forces (primarily United States Marines), which had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before, in a precarious situation with limited supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead.
Mikawa's decision to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports was based primarily on concerns over possible Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight. In reality, the Allied carrier fleet, similarly fearing Japanese attack, had already withdrawn beyond operational range. This missed opportunity to cripple (rather than interrupt) the supply of Allied forces on Guadalcanal contributed to Japan's failure to recapture the island. At this critical early stage of the campaign, it allowed the Allied forces to sufficiently entrench and fortify themselves and defend the area around Henderson Field until additional Allied reinforcements arrived later in the year.
The battle was the first of five costly, large-scale sea and air-sea actions fought in conjunction with the ground campaign on Guadalcanal, as the Japanese sought to counter the American offensive in the southern Pacific. These sea battles took place after increasing delays by each side to regroup and refit, until the 30 November 1942 Battle of Tassafaronga—after which the Japanese, due to increasing losses, resorted to resupplying their troops on Guadalcanal by submarine and barges. The final naval battle of the campaign, the Battle of Rennell Island, took place months later on 29–30 January 1943, by which time the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their remaining land forces and withdraw.
Background
Operations at Guadalcanal
On 7 August 1942 Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands. The landings were meant to deny the use of these islands to the Japanese as bases, especially the nearly completed airfield that was being constructed on Guadalcanal. If Japanese air and sea forces were allowed to establish forward operating bases in the eastern Solomons, they would be in a position to threaten the critical supply routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as launching points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign, which was then building momentum under General Douglas MacArthur. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.
The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the waters around Guadalcanal and Tulagi was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover to Allied forces in the region. U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Also under Turner was Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley's screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and five minesweepers. This screening force was tasked with protecting Turner's ships and providing gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship, the Australian heavy cruiser . In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier-based fighter aircraft. Some historians contend that Fletcher's fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher used it to justify a premature withdrawal from the combat zone.
Even though the unloading was proceeding more slowly than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover, he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart the next day.
The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware. Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of 8–9 August when he could employ his night-battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George on the evening of 7 August and then headed east-southeast. The first Hudson's crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. Receiving no acknowledgment, they returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible. The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15:00. For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively.
Mikawa's floatplanes returned around 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. By 13:00, he reassembled his warships and headed south through Bougainville Strait at . Mikawa entered The Slot by 16:00 and began his run towards Guadalcanal.
thumb|left|Chart of the disposition of ships the night of 8 August
To protect the unloading transports during the night, Crutchley divided the Allied warships into three groups. A "southern" group, consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia and , cruiser , and destroyers and , patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A "northern" group, consisting of the cruisers , and , and destroyers and , conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An "eastern" group consisting of the cruisers and with destroyers and guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands. Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages. Loxton states that Blue found the schooner to be "harmless" The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them.
At 01:44, as Mikawa's ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yūbari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either because of a steering problem, Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria, destroying the cruiser's engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astorias remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasas searchlight but missed and hit one of Chōkais forward turrets, putting the turret out of action and causing moderate damage to the Japanese vessel. returning to Guadalcanal only to be sunk in the engagement off Battle of Rennell Island on January 30, 1943. For several weeks after the naval defeat off Savo Island, Japanese warships maintained command of the sea around Guadalcanal, particularly at night. Japanese naval commanders took advantage of this by carrying out multiple intense shore bombardments of Allied ground forces at Henderson Field well into late fall 1942. Although these bombardments destroyed several Allied aircraft and damaged valuable supply stocks, they ultimately were not enough to facilitate a collapse of the Allied perimeter on the island.
Despite their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the larger battle for Guadalcanal, an important step in the defeat of Japan. In hindsight, according to Richard B. Frank, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships and go after the Allied transports on the morning of 9 August, he could have improved the chances of Japanese victory in the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, potentially altering the course of the war in the Pacific. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, the transport fleet remained unaffected. Many of these same transports were later used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months. Mikawa's decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity proved to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese. Crutchley was later gazetted with the Legion of Merit (Chief Commander).
Admiral Turner assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle:
The report of the inquiry caused the U.S. Navy to make many operational and structural changes. All the earlier models of U.S. Navy cruisers were retrofitted with emergency diesel-electric generators. The fire mains of the ships were changed to a vertical loop design that could be broken many times and still function. During the battle, many ship fires were attributed to aviation facilities filled with gas, oil, and planes. Motorboats were filled with gasoline and also caught fire. In some cases, these facilities were dead amidships, presenting a perfect target for enemy ships at night. Ready-service lockers (lockers containing ammunition that is armed and ready for use) added to the destruction, and it was noted that the lockers were never close to being depleted, i.e., they contained much more dangerous ammunition than they needed to. A focus was put on removing or minimizing flammable amidship materials.
See also
- The Second Battle of Savo Island (a.k.a. the Battle of Cape Esperance)
- The Third Battle of Savo Island (a.k.a. the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal)
- The Fourth Battle of Savo Island (a.k.a. the Battle of Tassafaronga)