The Battle of Medina Ridge was a tank battle fought on February 27, 1991, during the Gulf War, between the U.S. 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Republican Guard's Medina Luminous Division outside Basra, Iraq. The U.S. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, another major contributor, led the attack. Iraq's Motorized Division also participated. Medina Ridge is the name American troops gave to an approximately long low rise.

The battle was fought for over two hours, making it the largest tank battle of the Gulf War. The battle took place west of phase line Kiwi, east of phase line Smash, and north of phase line Grape. Phase lines are map references occurring every few kilometers used to measure progress of an offensive operation.

History

The 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Ron Griffith, consisted of some 3,000 vehicles including 348 M1A1 Abrams tanks. The 1st Armored Division's Cavalry Squadron - 1-1 Cavalry - made contact with the Medina Division and informed the division commander of the location of the enemy forces. 1st Armored Division's 2nd Brigade (comprising three battalions TF 4-70th Armor, TF 2-70th Armor and TF 1-35th Armor) saw major action in this battle and was commanded by Colonel Montgomery Cunningham Meigs (a descendant of General Montgomery C. Meigs of Civil War fame). 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel James Riley, replaced 1st Armored Division's 1st Brigade for the duration of the war and was also heavily involved in the battle. Medina Ridge was one of the few battles during Desert Storm in which American forces encountered significant Iraqi resistance. The Iraqi forces were well fortified and hidden, so that they could not be seen by American forces advancing until after they had finished cleared the top of the ridge line. This reverse slope position was intended to give the Iraqis protection from the powerful long-range direct fire of the M1 Abrams tanks and the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs).

During the battle, the American forces destroyed 186 Iraqi tanks (mostly T-72Ms, Asad Babil and obsolete Type 69s) and 127 other armored vehicles. Only four Abrams tanks were directly hit in the battle. Evidence suggests that some of them were hit by Iraqi T-72 fire. Ballistics reports have further confirmed this as well as physical evidence such as obvious sabot holes. Thirty-eight of the Iraqi tanks were destroyed by US air support formed of U.S. Army AH-64 Apaches and U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. The 75th Field Artillery Brigade and Battery B, 25th Field Artillery, the division's target acquisition battery, conducted counter-artillery fire missions and destroyed two Medina Field Artillery battalions in the process. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment also eventually participated in these counter-battery missions. On February 25, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division conducted a 113 km movement to destroy elements of the 26th Infantry Division, resulting in the capture of 299 prisoners of war (POWs). On February 26, the 3rd Brigade was ordered to attack east to gain contact with and destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) in zone. The 3rd Brigade began an aggressive movement which covered 74 km in 12 hours, while fighting multiple engagements throughout the day and night with elements of the 52nd Armored Division, 17th, Adnan, and Tawakalna Divisions. During one engagement with the Tawakalna Division, the brigade destroyed 27 Soviet export model T-72 tanks which had established a hasty defense to cover the Iraqi forces withdrawing from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation.

On February 27, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division was ordered to transition to pursuit operations to establish contact with and destroy the RGFC forces in the area. As the brigade attacked and fought through the Adnan Division, securing a RGFC major logistics base, it captured 465 POWs and made contact with the Medina Armored Division, which was augmented by elements of four other Iraqi divisions. The battle ended in the destruction of 82 tanks, 31 armored personnel carriers, 11 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 3 anti-aircraft guns and the capture of 72 POWs for the loss of 2 Bradley Cavalry vehicles, 1 Killed In Action (KIA), and 30 soldiers Wounded In Action (WIA). This gave the US units the upper hand, as the Abrams tanks specialize in long-distance kills; their Chobham armor is extremely resistant to long-range fire. The American height advantage also reduced the effective range of the Iraqi tanks and presented the Iraqi gunners with a targeting situation for which they were under-trained. Despite their lack of training for such circumstances, Iraqis shot down an A-10 Thunderbolt II, and two AH-64 Apache helicopters. Most of the units belonging to the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division were awarded Valorous Unit Award citations. The same newspaper articles notes that, "The Americans had more than 100 battle tanks on hand, about the same as the total number of tanks in the Iraqi force. But the Americans had some noteworthy advantages over the Iraqis like attack helicopters and A-10 anti-tanks planes. The Iraqis had no support aircraft."

2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division Units Cited

  • HHC, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division
  • 6th Battalion, 6th Infantry
  • 1st Battalion, 35th Armor
  • 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor
  • 2nd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery
  • 47th Support Battalion
  • 4th Battalion, 70th Armor

Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division Valorous Unit Award Citation

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division distinguished itself by gallantry in action against an armed enemy during Operation Desert Storm February 23 - 28th, 1991. The brigade conducted combat operations to ascertain enemy dispositions along the division's zone of advance. The brigade's aircraft conducted continuous flight operations as the division's movement to contact accelerated into Iraq. Time and again the attack helicopters were employed against Iraqi armored elements forward of the division's ground forces. The brigade conducted thirty-nine straight hours of continuous combat operations, rotating companies into and out of the battle. Because of their integration into the division's close fight, the destruction of the Medina and Adnan Divisions was assured. Attack helicopters maintained a steady destructive presence in front of the division, engaging targets of opportunity and rapidly shifting their focus and combat power as the scenario required. The brigade's final battle commenced when the division raced to clear its zone of advance to the Kuwaiti border prior to the impending cease-fire. The brigade completed its combat operations without suffering the loss of any aircraft, vehicles or personnel. Through their expertise, tenacity, and courage, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division actions reflect great credit upon themselves and the United States Army.

Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division Units Cited

  • HHC, Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division
  • 2nd Battalion, 1st Aviation
  • 3rd Battalion, 1st Aviation
  • Company I, 1st Aviation Other sources put it second behind the Battle of Norfolk.

References

Further reading

  • Carhart, Tom (1994). Iron Soldiers: How America's 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq's Elite Republican Guard. New York: Random House..
  • History of 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division "The Iron Brigade" at GlobalSecurity.org
  • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73yDXCSdW8k