The Battle of Maychew () was the last major battle fought on the northern front during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. The battle consisted of a failed counterattack by the Ethiopian forces under Emperor Haile Selassie making frontal assaults against prepared Italian defensive positions under the command of Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The battle was fought near Maychew (Mai Ceu), Ethiopia, in the modern region of Tigray.
Background
On 3 October 1935, General Emilio De Bono advanced into Ethiopia from Eritrea without a declaration of war, leading a force of approximately 100,000 Italian and 25,000 Eritrean soldiers towards the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. In December, after a brief period of inactivity and minor setbacks for the Italians, De Bono was replaced by Badoglio.
Under Badoglio, the advance on Addis Ababa was renewed. Badoglio overwhelmed the armies of ill-armed and uncoordinated Ethiopian warriors with mustard gas, tanks, and heavy artillery. He defeated the Ethiopian armies at the Battle of Amba Aradam, the Second Battle of Tembien, and the Battle of Shire.
Korem and Maychew
On 1 March 1936, Emperor Haile Selassie arrived by foot at his new headquarters in Korem. He arrived forty years to the day from the decisive Ethiopian victory at Adwa during the First Italo-Ethiopian War. On 19 March, both Ras Kassa Haile Darge and Ras Seyum Mangasha made their way to Korem to join the Emperor. In addition, Ras Getachew Abate arrived with a fresh army from Kaffa Province. The Emperor divided his army into four groups. He arranged that one group would be commanded directly by himself and that the other three groups would be commanded by Ras Kassa, Ras Seyum, and Ras Getachew.
Compared to other Ethiopian forces, Haile Selasie's army was extremely well armed. He had an artillery regiment of twenty 75mm field guns, some Oerlikon 37mm guns, and even a few 81mm Brandt mortars. However, compared to the resources available to Badoglio, Haile Selasie's army was hopelessly outmatched.
Badoglio had the four divisions of the Italian I Army Corps and the three divisions of the Eritrean Corps at Maychew. Badoglio also enjoyed the intelligence edge of being able to intercept most of the Ethiopian radio communications, as well as the mobility of mechanized infantry.
On 21 March, Haile Selassie sent a radio message to his wife, Empress Menen Asfaw:
:"Since our trust in our Creator and in the hope of His help and as we have decided to advance and enter the fortifications and since God is our only help, confide this decision in secret to the Abuna, to the ministers and to the dignitaries and offer unto God our fervent prayers."
As soon as Badoglio intercepted this message indicating that Haile Selassie had decided to advance, he cancelled orders for his own proposed offensive. Instead, Badoglio would prepare defensive positions for an Ethiopian attack.
On 23 March, looking across a lush green valley towards the Italian positions at Maychew, the Emperor contemplated his decision to strike first. His army was the last intact Ethiopian army between Badoglio and Addis Ababa. He decided he would direct the attack personally in accordance with tradition and the expectation of his followers. Six battalions of the Imperial Guard (Kebur Zabangna) would be part of his force of approximately 31,000 fighters. Haile Selassie chose to attack against the advice of his foreign experts and against his own better judgement.
Had Haile Selassie attacked on 24 March as he originally planned, things may have gone differently; many of the Italians had only recently arrived at Maychew after the fall of Amba Aradam. But, during a week frittered away by the Ethiopians in war councils, banquets, and prayers, the Italians had time to strengthen their defenses and time to bring up reserves. advanced against the Eritreans holding Mekan Pass on the Italian left flank. Haile Selassie hoped to face less resistance from the Eritreans. From 0700 to 0800 hours, the Ethiopians kept up a steady onslaught and, despite taking heavy casualties, were beginning to make gains. But at 0800 Badoglio unleashed the bombers of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) and the Ethiopians could hear the ominous engine roar as they closed in with poison gas.
Haile Selassie's order to retreat was to be late in coming. He placed Ras Getachew Abate as Asmach. But the Ethiopians had lost many front line commanders, the soldiers had not eaten since before dawn, and discipline had understandably broken down. To make matters even worse, as the Ethiopians fled from the battlefield, they were mercilessly bombed from above by the Italian Royal Air Force and harassed on the ground by the Azebu Galla.
After the battle
On the evening of 31 March, Haile Selassie sent another message to his wife:
:"From five in the morning until seven in the evening our troops attacked the enemy's strong positions, fighting without pause. We also took part in the action and by the grace of God remain unharmed. Our chief and trusted soldiers are dead or wounded. Although our losses are heavy, the enemy too has been injured. The Guard fought magnificently and deserve every praise. The Amhara troops also did their best. Our troops, even though they are not adapted for fighting of the European type, were able to bear comparison throughout the day with the Italian troops."
Retreat
On the night of 2 April, the Emperor finally ordered a retreat. The retreating columns set off before dawn the next day towards Lake Hashenge and the highlands of Korem. Haile Selassie, wearing a pith helmet, rode a white horse and the retreat was initially not chaotic. In the early morning, circumstances changed as two latent threats materialized. The Azebo Oromos started attacking the flanks and Italian aircraft arrived. The Imperial Guard, as part of the rear guard commanded by Asmach Getachew, lost more men over the next two days than were lost during the battle.
Late on 3 April, the Ethiopian columns reached Korem and the relative safety of the highlands. It was now decided that the columns would be dispersed. As a result, all semblance of order and organization were lost.
Pilgrimage to Lalibella and plan to stand at Dessie
It was believed among the Ethiopians that it might be possible to make a stand at Dessie. The Crown Prince Asfa Wossen had been sent there to raise a new army. With the Crown Prince in Dessie were Shum Wadajo Ali and Fitawrari Fikremariam. Wadajo Ali was the "real" Governor of Wollo and Fikremariam commanded the Guard and the Shewan garrison at Dessie. Ammunition and supplies were accumulated in anticipation of protracted operations in the north.
Before getting to Dessie, the Emperor decided to make a pilgrimage to the holy city of Lalibella. Included in the Emperor's retinue was Coptic Abuna Petros, Etchage Gabre Giyorgis, Ras Kassa, Dejazmach Adafersaw Yenadu, Dejazmach Wondosson Kassa, and Dejazmach Aberra Kassa. From 12 April the Emperor spent three days there in prayer. On 15 April, Haile Selassie left Lalibella and rejoined his army as it continued its plodding march towards Dessie. At Magdala, the Emperor was to learn that the Crown Prince had abandoned Dessie on 14 April without firing a shot. He also learned that the city was already occupied by the Eritreans. The Emperor's column turned towards Worra Ilu, but runners then brought the news that Worra Ilu had fallen too. By forced march, the Emperor and his party made their way to Fikke in Salale.
Addis Ababa
From Fikke, Haile Selassie made his way towards Addis Ababa. By 1 May, he had arrived in the capital. This was one month after the Battle of Maychew. With him were Ras Kassa and Asmach Getachew. When the Emperor arrived, he found a city in a state of near panic.
See also
- Ethiopian Order of Battle Second Italo-Abyssinian War
- Army of the Ethiopian Empire
- List of Second Italo-Ethiopian War weapons of Ethiopia
- Italian Order of Battle Second Italo-Abyssinian War
- Royal Italian Army
- List of Italian military equipment in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War
References
;Footnotes
;Citations