Battle of Longewala

The Battle of Longewala (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the western sector during the India–Pakistan war of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers accompanied by four Hawker Hunter and three HAL Marut fighter-bombers and 2,000–3,000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 40 tanks. It is considered one of the greatest battles in the history of the Indian Army and a military victory against the odds.

A company of the Indian Army's 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, commanded by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a Pakistani mechanized infantry force. Choosing the former, Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly deployed and made the best use of his strong defensive position, as well as weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was also fortunate that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.

The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their strategic intelligence to foresee the availability of Indian fighter-bombers in the Longewala area, exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance. This left the Pakistani brigade group extremely vulnerable. Their armored vehicles, attempting to deploy from a single track, bogged down in unsuitable terrain and were exposed to air attack. Their use of external fuel storage in tactical combat made them even more susceptible to enemy fire. Furthermore, the night attack over unfamiliar ground quickly fell apart. The infantry was surprised by unexpected obstacles, causing confusion which stalled the assault. This negated the concealment that otherwise would have protected them from Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire. It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run. Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy—"The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West".

Prelude

The Western sector

Khan's policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and that since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war effort should be concentrated on occupying as much Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. The initial plans for the offensive called for at least temporary air dominance by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. The PAF launched pre-emptive strikes on the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities in the western theatre. The city of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border, formed a critical communication centre for Khan's forces and, situated on the Sindh–Punjab railway, remained a vulnerable link in Khan's logistics. The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the railway as well as road link between Sindh and West Punjab, starving Khan's forces of fuel and ammunition delivered to Karachi.

Indian battle plans called for a strike by the 12th Indian Division across the border towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim Yar Khan. This would destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir sector, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.

Pakistan, which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a pre-emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh.

The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer.

Indian defensive planning

thumb|[[Jonga that destroyed several tanks during battle]]

On the Indian side, the post was held by A Company, 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, led by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the area that was largely intractable to vehicles.

The Longewala post had no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of the 170 Field Regiment, tasked with direct support of the battalion, and the 168 Field Regiment, which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support battery was attached to the 168 Field Regiment and served as its "Sierra" Battery. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December, Chandpuri dispatched a 20-man-strong patrol under Second Lieutenant Dharam Veer to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, on the border. This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the advances of Pakistani forces.

Battle

thumb|[[Jonga, mounted with 105 mm RCL gun, which destroyed several tanks]]

thumb|200px|right|One of the three [[HAL Marut used by the IAF against Pakistani armour at Longewala]]

During the night of the 4th, Dharam Veer's platoon, while on a patrol, detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching. These were soon confirmed by reports—from the Army's air observation post aircraft flown by Major Atma Singh—in the area of a armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post. Directing Dharam Veer Bhakri's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri contacted battalion headquarters, requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion headquarters gave him the choice of staying put and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available that night. Despite his command having all the transportation to retreat back on time, he chose to stay and fight back the advancing enemy.

The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am. As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery, killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 45 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process. The Indian infantry held their fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to within before firing their PIATs.

In the morning, the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct the newly assembled 122 Squadron under the command of WC Donald Melvyn Conquest comprising HAL HF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night-vision equipment, and so had to wait until dawn. With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC), Singh, in a HAL Krishak observation aircraft. The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with 16 Matra T-10 rockets and 30 mm ADEN cannons on each aircraft. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the 12.7 mm anti-aircraft heavy machine guns mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets. Indian air attacks were made easier by the barren terrain. Many IAF officers later described the attack as a "turkey shoot", signifying the lopsidedness.

By noon the next day, the assault had ended completely, having cost Pakistan 36 tanks, 22 of which were destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by ground anti-tank fire, and 2 captured after being abandoned, with a total of around 100 vehicles destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. This battle was a major event against the Pakistani war effort since their army had an approximate ~200 tanks, 36 of which were destroyed in one battle. The Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when Indian tanks from the division's cavalry regiment, the 20th Lancers, commanded by Colonel Bawa Guruvachan Singh, along with the 17th Battalion, Rajputana Rifles, launched their counter-offensive to end the six-hour engagement.

Notwithstanding the Indian victory, there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides. India's intelligence service failed to provide warning of such a large armoured force in the western sector. Moreover, the defending post was not heavily armed. Finally, they did not push home their advantage and destroy the fleeing Pakistani tanks while the IAF had them on the run. They did, however, destroy or capture some 20+ tanks, one of the most disproportionate tank losses for one side in a single battle after World War II. Some Pakistani tanks suffered engine failure due to overheating in trying to extricate themselves, and were abandoned. The open desert battleground provided little to no cover for the tanks and infantry from air attacks. The plan to capture Longewala may have been good in conception, but failed due to lack of air cover. As a result, two tank regiments failed to take Longewala.

x216px|right|thumb|Maj. Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, [[Maha Vir Chakra|MVC, VSM]]

For his part, the Indian company commander, Chandpuri, was decorated with India's second-highest gallantry award – the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards were earned by members of the defending company and the battalion's commander. On the other hand, the Pakistani divisional commander was dismissed from service.

In 2008, the battle was the subject of disagreement, some officers of the time ascribing all the combat success to the IAF. This led to Chandpuri suing for the token amount of one rupee.

In popular culture

The Battle of Longewala was depicted in the 1997 Hindi film Border, which was directed by J. P. Dutta and starred Sunny Deol as Major Kuldeep Singh, Jackie Shroff as Wing Commander M.S. Bawa, Sunil Shetty as Assistant Commandant Bhairon Singh (BSF), and Akshaye Khanna as Dharam Veer. The main criticism of the film was that it showed Indian forces being in a terrible position before any sort of help came from the IAF.

India has built the Longewala War Memorial at Longewala, and the Sadhewala War Memorial 15 km north-east of Longewala, which are part of Bharat Ranbhoomi Darshan initiative of the Indian Military which entails 77 battleground war memorials in border area including Siachen base camp, Kargil, Galwan, Pangong Tso, Rezang La, Doklam, Bum La, Cho La, Kibithu, etc. This will boost border tourism, patriotism, local infrastructure and economy while reversing civilian outward migration from these remote locations.

Citations and notes

References

Indivisible Air Power, Strategic Analysis, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1984, v.8, 1185–1202
Imprint, Justified Press, 1972, v.12:7–12 (Oct 1972 – Mar 1973)
Alter, Stephen, Amritsar to Lahore: A Journey Across the India-Pakistan Border, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000
Nordeen, Lon O., Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985
Suresh, Kukke, Wg. Cdr. (Retd), Battle of Longewala: 5 and 6 December 1971, 1971 India Pakistan Operations, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com
Sharma, Gautam, Valour and Sacrifice: Famous Regiments of the Indian Army, Allied Publishers, 1990

External links

The battle from the Indian Air Force Journal, 1997
The Western Theatre in 1971;— A Strategic and Operational Analysis by A.H. Amin – Orbat