The Battle of Kasserine Pass was a series of engagements which took place from 19–24 February 1943 around Kasserine Pass, a gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains in west central Tunisia. It was a part of the Tunisian campaign of World War II.
The Axis forces, led by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, were primarily from the Afrika Korps Assault Group, the Italian Centauro Armored Division and two Panzer divisions detached from the 5th Panzer Army. The Allied forces were from the U.S. II Corps (Major General Lloyd Fredendall), the British 6th Armoured Division (Major General Charles Keightley) and other parts of the First Army (Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson).
The battle was the first major engagement between U.S. and Axis forces in Africa. The participating American battalions suffered many casualties and were successively pushed back over from their original positions west of Faïd Pass, until they met an advancing brigade of the U.S. 1st Armored Division. As a result of lessons learned in this battle, the U.S. Army instituted sweeping changes in unit organization and tactics, and replaced some commanders British forces were also driven back, losing all 11 of their tanks in the process. After such reversals, Allied reinforcements with strong artillery support stopped the Axis advance. By the 22nd, the Axis force was low on fuel, ammunition and reserves, and the Allies were reinforcing their lines. Rommel wanted to concentrate in Southern Tunisia, to strike against the 8th Army. Rommel told Kesselring that continuing the offensive would have no chance of success, and Rommel was authorised to withdraw. On 23-24 February, the retreating Axis forces were subjected to "hammer-blow air attacks by the U.S. air force" in the Feriana—Kasserine area. By the end of the battle on February 24, the Kasserine Pass had been reoccupied by the Allies.
Casualties and losses
Shortly before his death in 1981, General Omar Bradley wrote that the series of battles were "the worst performance of the U.S. army in their whole proud history." American losses totalled 300 killed, 3,000 wounded, and 3,000 captured, and 7,000 replacements were needed to recover units to their original strength. The French losses of the totalled 50 killed, 200 wounded and 250 missing. Regarding Allied personnel captured, Rommel and Ziegler claimed 3,721 prisoners captured but in a consolidated report of February 24 they reported 4,026 Allied prisoners of war. Allied forces captured 73 German and 535 Italian soldiers.
Rommel
thumb|upright=1.35|[[Rommel in Tunisia speaking with troops riding a captured American-built M3 half-track]]
Rommel had hoped to take advantage of the inexperience of the new Allied commanders but was opposed by von Arnim who, wanting to conserve strength in his sector, ignored Kesselring's orders and withheld the attached heavy tank unit of 10th Panzer. Rommel felt that most U.S. units and commanders had shown their inexperience, losing sight of the broader picture. Rommel was later impressed with how quickly U.S. commanders came to understand and implement mobile warfare and also praised U.S. equipment: "British experience has been put to good use in American equipment". Of particular interest to the Germans was the sturdy M3 armored half-track, and for some time after the battle, German units deployed large numbers of captured U.S. vehicles.
The Allies studied the results equally seriously. Positioned by senior commanders who had not personally reconnoitered the ground, U.S. forces were often located too far from each other for mutual support. It was also noted that U.S. soldiers tended to become careless about digging in, exposing their positions, bunching in groups when in open view of enemy artillery observers, and positioning units on topographic crests, where their silhouettes made them perfect targets. Too many soldiers, exasperated by the rocky soil of Tunisia, were still digging shallow slit trenches instead of deep foxholes.
The 1st Armored Division was on the receiving end of German anti-tank and screening tactics and had not learned about those tactics from experienced British armored units. Others in the U.S. Army were well aware of the German deception tactics. The Allies were also unable to prevent the Germans from attaining air superiority over the battlefield, limiting effective Allied air reconnaissance and allowing relentless German bombing and strafing attacks that disrupted Allied attempts at deployment and organization. Attacks by the Luftwaffe in close support of German ground offensives often neutralized U.S. attempts to organize effective defensive artillery fire.
Eisenhower
General Dwight D. Eisenhower began restructuring the Allied command, creating the 18th Army Group, commanded by General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, to tighten the operational control of the three Allied nations involved and improve their coordination. Major General Lloyd Fredendall was relieved by Eisenhower and sent to the U.S. to lead the Central Defense Command, responsible for forces in the midwestern states. Eisenhower found through Major General Omar Bradley and others, that Fredendall's subordinates had lost confidence in him and Alexander told U.S. commanders, "I'm sure you must have better men than that". Major General Ernest N. Harmon, called Fredendall both a moral and physical coward and later said he was "a son of a bitch".
Fredendall took the blame but Anderson, the First Army commander, was judged to be at fault for the failure to concentrate Allied armored units and keep forces concentrated, that later disintegrated into individual units. When Fredendall disclaimed all responsibility for the poorly equipped French XIX Corps and denied French requests for support, notably when under pressure at Faïd, Anderson allowed the request to go unfulfilled. Anderson was also blamed for dispersing the three combat commands of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, despite the objections of Major General Orlando Ward, the divisional commander.