Battle of Five Forks

Historian Edward G. Longacre discounts the reliability of the report of this message, saying it was recalled 30 years later by Pickett's widow, who tended to exaggerate, distort and falsify her husband's records. He wrote that Pickett's report only mentions Lee's direction to protect the road to Ford's Depot and that no copy of the message has ever been found, which historian Douglas Southall Freeman also had noted in 1944. Even if it were not the best location for a defense, Five Forks had to be defended. Pickett later wrote that he assumed Lee had his message and would make a helpful diversion and send reinforcements. While particular attention was given to improving the refused left flank, Pickett did not have the line that initially had been constructed when his men had reached Five Forks substantially improved after his men returned from Dinwiddie Court House. The location of the line was not well chosen because some of it was in low places.

Disposition of Confederate force

thumb| Major General [[William Henry Fitzhugh Lee|W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee ]]

Not only did the Confederate line at Five Forks consist only of slim pine logs with a shallow ditch in front but Pickett's disposition of his force was poor. The cavalry in particular were poorly placed in wooded areas inundated by heavy streams so that they could only move to the front by a narrow road. At the Warren Court of Inquiry 24 years later, Fitzhugh Lee said the Confederates made less careful dispositions than usual along White Oak Road at Five Forks because they expected to face only cavalry or to be supported by Lieutenant General Richard Anderson's corps if Union infantry left their lines to support Sheridan's force. Historian Ed Bearss has written that Fitzhugh Lee and Pickett either did not know the result of the Battle of White Oak Road or failed to realize its significance. Two of Major General Bushrod Johnson's brigades, from Anderson's only division, already were with Pickett and the troops left at White Oak Road and Claiborne Road were weakened and cut off to the west after the battle.

Pickett's line across Five Forks was dug mainly just north of White Oak Road, with a "refused" (bent back) left flank. It extended about about half on each side of the junction of White Oak Road with Dinwiddie Court House Road (Ford's Road to the north) and Scott Road. Pickett placed W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalry on the right of the line with Rufus Barringer's brigade watching the right flank at the western edge of Gilliam's farm. From right to left the line was held by the brigades of Brigadier General Montgomery Corse, Colonel Robert M. Mayo, who replaced the injured Brigadier General William R. Terry, and Brigadier Generals George H. Steuart, William Henry Wallace and Matt Ransom. On the left flank, the 8th Virginia Cavalry Regiment from Colonel Thomas T. Munford's division was in contact with the understrength cavalry brigade led by the Confederate Army's youngest general, Brigadier General William Paul Roberts. This small unit of a regiment plus a battalion was assigned to cover the between the end of Pickett's line and the end of the main Confederate defensive line at the junction of Claiborne Road and White Oak Road. The rest of Munford's division was positioned on Ford's Road behind the center of the line at Five Forks. Three of artillery Colonel Willie Pegram's six guns were placed along the line where fields of fire in the wooded location could be found, with the other three placed in battery at Five Forks. Four guns of Major William M. McGregor's Battalion were put on the right flank. Thomas L. Rosser's division was in reserve, watching the wagon train north of Hatcher's Run. Rosser later recalled that he asked for this assignment because his horses had been ridden hard and needed attention. Sheridan ordered Merritt to pursue Pickett's force with Custer's and Devin's divisions. Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) William Wells's brigade of Custer's division was recalled from guarding the wagon train.

When Custer reached the junction of Adams Road and Brooks Road with Pennington's and Capehart's brigades, he found Ayres's division of Warren's corps had arrived at that location about dawn. Due to the wet ground, Merritt decided to deploy Custer's men dismounted and move them cross country to turn the Confederate right flank. Custer's troopers captured a few Confederate stragglers and drove off a patrol guarding the Scott Road crossing of Bear Swamp. When Custer's men approached within several hundred yards of the Confederate defensive line at White Oak Road, he decided not to attack the apparently strong defenses but to send out combat patrols to test the line. They could not find a weak spot in the line so Custer told his men to hold their ground. Stagg then sent his mounted force along with the 1st U.S. Cavalry Regiment to follow Fitzhugh's men across while the rest of Gibbs's brigade covered the right flank and rear of the division. After this move, Pennington was across Scott Road from Fitzhugh's brigade, rather than from Stagg's brigade. The dismounted troopers threw up log breastworks while waiting for further orders.

Wells's brigade of Custer's division arrived at Dinwiddie Court House with the wagons at 11:00 am. After Wells allowed his men to rest until 1:00 pm, they moved up to the battle line to report to Custer.

Sheridan replied to Babcock that he hoped that would not be necessary.

Sheridan's plan of attack; V Corps called up

thumb| Major General [[Philip Sheridan ]]

Sheridan then planned an attack whereby Custer would feint toward the Confederate right flank with Capehart's brigade, Warren's infantry corps would attack the left flank and Devin, joined by Pennington's brigade, would make a frontal attack on the Confederate entrenchments when they heard Warren's attack begin.

Gillespie reached Warren at J. Boisseau's farm at 1:00 p.m. with Sheridan's instructions. Bankhead gave Crawford and Griffin the message and sent another officer to contact Ayres while he waited to see that the orders were obeyed as promptly as possible by the divisions at the farm.

Sheridan told Warren to advance with his entire corps in a two-division front oblique to the road with the third division following in reserve. He wanted the attack in a single blow and not piecemeal. Warren's corps would cover about a front with about 12,000 officers and men, reduced from 15,000 by casualties, detachments and stragglers over the past 3 days.

Crawford's division reached Gravelly Run Church first and deployed as Warren instructed.

If the angle or "return" in the Confederate line had been where Warren was led to believe it was, Crawford's men would hit it first and Griffin would be with him to reinforce the attack. Ayres division would prevent the Confederate troops in the earthworks facing White Oak Road from reinforcing Ransom's brigade which was holding the return. Warren had to draw up the orders in reliance on what he was told about the location of the Confederate line and without making a personal reconnaissance. Colonel James W. Forsyth, Sheridan's chief of staff said that Sheridan also saw a copy of Warren's diagram and instructions and approved them. The instructions directed the corps to advance northwestwardly to the White Oak Road, wheel to the left, take a position at right angles to the road and that as soon as they were engaged, Custer's and Devin's men were to charge along the rest of the line. No cavalry were on the right with the V Corps but Mackenzie's troopers were reported to be advancing on White Oak Road toward the V Corps' position. Warren offered to move with those troops which were ready if Sheridan so directed, but Sheridan wanted all the infantry to attack at once. Warren denied Sheridan's allegation that Warren had given the impression he wanted the sun to go down before the attack could be made and that there were 2.5 hours of daylight still left at 4:00 pm. Sheridan called up Mackenzie's division. They moved up the Adams and Dinwiddie Court House Roads to J. Boisseau's and turned on to the Crump Road, intending to move to the White Oak Road and set up a roadblock, with Major James E. McFarlan's battalion of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry in the lead. Union brigade commander Colonel Samuel P. Spear was wounded in the mopping up operation.

When he was informed of Mackenzie's success, Sheridan ordered Mackenzie to leave a detachment to block White Oak Road and to bring his division to Five Forks. Pickett and Lee accepted. Some of Roberts's men fled into Pickett's line while others retreated into Anderson's end of the main Confederate White Oak Road line at Claiborne and White Oak roads. The dispersal of Roberts's command meant that Pickett was cut off and if any reinforcements were sent, they would need to fight their way through on White Oak Road to reach his position or take a very circuitous route. Fitzhugh Lee asked Munford to check this personally and to order up his division if necessary and report back.

Soon after Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee left for lunch, Colonel Munford saw the Union attack shaping up as he prepared to have his cavalry division defend the left flank against the attack. Munford sent several couriers to look for Pickett or Fitzhugh Lee to tell them of the impending attack but they could not be found. Captain Henry Lee of Fitzhugh Lee's staff also could not find them. Sheridan had ordered Mackenzie to strike toward Hatcher's Run, turn west and occupy Ford's Road, covering the V Corps' right flank. Warren soon realized that the V Corps had crossed White Oak Road east of the left of the Confederate line and Crawford's division was starting to diverge from Ayres's. The movement of Colonel Richard N. Bowerman's brigade to the left opened a space in the line which Ayres filled with Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) Frederick Winthrop's brigade which had started in reserve. Ayres then led the line in the attack.

Ayres's men had faltered briefly when they became exposed to closer, more accurate firing from Ransom's brigade. Sheridan then rode along the battle line shouting encouragement. On his horse, Sheridan called for his battle flag. His color sergeant was killed. An officer in one of Ransom's regiments later wrote: "The Yankees simply run over us and crowded us so that it became impossible to shoot." The color-sergeant of the 190th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment planted the first Union flag on the Confederate line. Ayres had taken the key to the entire Confederate line, over 1,000 prisoners and eight battle flags but among the Union casualties was Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) Frederick Winthrop who was mortally wounded and Colonel Richard N. Bowerman who was severely wounded.

Warren searches for Griffin, Crawford

thumb| Major General [[Gouverneur K. Warren ]]

When Griffin's and Crawford's divisions diverged from Ayres, Ayres sent a message to Griffin to come up on his right. Sheridan also sent orders to Griffin and Crawford to come in on the right. Warren sent staff officers in pursuit of them. about north of the end of the Confederate refused line, by the volleys that caused Gwyn's brigade to recoil. Warren first found Colonel John A. Kellogg's brigade and told him to form his brigade at right angles to its previous direction and wait until another brigade could close up on his right. Warren and his staff officers could not find Crawford to tell him to move his other brigades. When Warren came back from the woods, Kellogg was gone, having been ordered forward by one of Sheridan's staff officers who was also searching for Crawford. A patrol of Munford's cavalry stopped Kellogg's advance from positions inside the Sydnor house. found Crawford and had him swing to the right to join Kellogg. Since Kellogg had moved, Crawford proceeded toward the Chimneys, with the brigades of Brigadier General Henry Baxter and Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) Richard Coulter, encountering a few of Munford's pickets as they progressed. Griffin had pushed ahead of Crawford's division and had gone even further to the right of the end of the refused segment of the Confederate line. Griffin also rode to Sydnor's field and saw the Confederate movement along White Oak Road. The three Confederate brigadier generals quickly threw up a new defensive line with light field works at a right angle to White Oak Road in the woods at the west end of Sydnor's field in order to protect Ford's Road. Another of Chamberlain's regiments and a battalion continued to pressure the Confederate line. Chamberlain rushed two regiments to help.

Sheridan orders Ayres, Griffin, Chamberlain forward

As the second Confederate return line collapsed, Ayres and Sheridan came forward. Sheridan ordered Chamberlain to take command of all the infantry in the vicinity and to push for Five Forks. Instead, Sheridan rode west on White Oak Road, following Griffin and Bartlett who had just come up.

After Ayres's division had captured the return, Warren again went to search for Crawford. He found Crawford's division in good order on the east side of the Boisseau farm, facing west. Unfortunately for Warren, Sheridan asked for Warren at about this time and no one could say where he was. Sheridan then ordered Griffin to take command of the corps.

Pickett learns of attack; rides back to battle

During the shad bake lunch at Rosser's camp, two of Munford's pickets rode up to report that Union forces were advancing on all roads. Then they saw a Union Army battle line coming toward the road.

Pickett crossed the ford just as some of Munford's cavalrymen were falling back with Kellogg's brigade pressing them closely. A small group of the Confederate cavalrymen, led by Captain James Breckinridge, who was killed, charged the advancing Union soldiers, giving Pickett enough time to pass using the horse's head and neck as a shield.

Third Confederate left flank formed, collapses

Pickett pulled Mayo's brigade from the line west of Five Forks along with Graham's two guns to shore up the line and added stragglers from Ransom's and Wallace's brigades to the line in order to man a third line of resistance east of Ford's Road. Coulter's Union brigade faced fierce fire from Mayo's brigade and Graham's battery but continued to advance with the support of Crawford's two other brigades and two of Bartlett's regiments.

Mayo's brigade broke when Coulter's men rushed into the woods and over their line, although Mayo was able to reform part of the brigade in Gilliam's field. Coulter's brigade took a large number of prisoners from Mayo's brigade and captured Graham's two guns.

Corse, Rooney Lee cover Confederate withdrawal

When Pickett sent Mayo off the field, he called for Corse's brigade to come from the front and deploy on the west side of Gilliam's field at a right angle to White Oak Road. Mackenzie had to pause twice to break up pockets of resistance. Realizing that they only could get trapped by continuing to fight, Pickett ordered Munford to rejoin Fitzhugh Lee north of Hatcher's Run. They did so after recrossing the run to the west at W. Dabney's Road and reported to Fitzhugh Lee after dark. Pennington was at Custer's command post where Custer told him to call for his "led horses" so he could support Custer's flank attack, contrary to Merritt's orders that he should attack dismounted along with Devin's men.

Within minutes of speaking with Custer, Pennington heard the sound of firing, followed by the appearance of a staff officer who told him that Merritt had sent Pennington's brigade into the attack.

After Ayres's division broke the Confederate line, Steuart and Wallace had to withdraw a large number of their troops to man the new defensive line at right angles to White Oak Road. Nonetheless, Pennington's men were being held back at the breastworks and Sheridan halted them temporarily because he was concerned that Ayres's men would fire into them. When the firing started, Pegram woke up and rushed to the Five Forks intersection. Pegram rode out between the guns to give orders without dismounting and, after shouting "Fire your canister low, men!," was mortally wounded. Pegram died the following morning. Then the Union battle line moved to the west of the junction.

Miles blocks White Oak Road

At 5:30 p.m. on April 1, Grant sent Brigadier General Nelson Miles's division of the II Corps to hold White Oak Road at Claiborne Road and prevent reinforcements moving to Pickett over White Oak Road.

Custer held off; pursues Fitzhugh Lee

Before the Union attack began, Custer positioned Capehart's and Wells' brigades opposite the Confederate right and remounted them as ordered by Merritt.

Custer began his flank attack when the 15th New York Cavalry began their attack on the front and swung his mounted brigades around the Confederate flank. Covered by Rooney Lee's troopers from Barringer's brigade, McGregor's battery, many infantry, wagons and ambulances and Beale's cavalry brigade withdrew north of Hatcher's Run.

Warren leads a final charge

thumb|Artillery position, from which General Lee observed the final Federal attack

Warren found Crawford's division hesitating at the edge of the woods on the east side of Gilliam's field at the same time Custer's division was being held back by Rooney Lee's men to the south and west. The men then rose and followed their officers and color bearers to attack Corse's brigade, capturing many prisoners and dispersing the other Confederates.

After Corse's brigade had been scattered, Crawford's men moved west on White Oak Road about . After mopping up a few pockets of resistance, Warren halted the pursuit since no more Confederates could be seen and night was falling. Warren had earlier sent his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Locke, to tell Sheridan he had gained the enemy's rear, taken over 1,500 prisoners and was pushing in a division as fast as he could.

When Pickett ordered Corse to the west side of Gilliam's field, he ordered Rooney Lee to prepare to withdraw to the South Side Railroad. A. Wilson Greene later gives the same figures. John S. Salmon gives Union casualties as 830 and Confederate casualties as 605 plus 2,000 to 2,400 taken prisoner for a total of about 3,000 lost. This is nearly identical to the National Park Service figures.

Aftermath

Confederate survivors move toward railroad

The survivors of the Confederate infantry brigades moved north through the woods and fields to ford Hatcher's Run and moved over the W. Dabney road to a position near the South Side Railroad. In his after action report, Sheridan cited what he perceived to be Warren's lack of effort in getting his troops ready for the attack at the staging area at Gravelly Run Church. Sheridan also drafted an order putting Griffin in charge of the V Corps, Bartlett in charge of Griffin's division and Pearson in charge of Bartlett's brigade and directing them to pursue the Confederates down White Oak Road. By this time the victory was complete and Sheridan and Griffin had reached Five Forks. Considering the 1883 verdict of the Warren Court of Inquiry that Sheridan's removal of Warren was unjustified, many historians also have stated that Sheridan's action was unjust.

Porter reports victory to Grant; Grant orders general assault

Colonel Horace Porter, Grant's staff officer and observer of the battle, started back for Grant's headquarters at about 7:30 pm. He excitedly reported the victory and told Grant over 5,000 prisoners were taken. Grant told the officers at his headquarters that he had ordered a general assault along the lines.

Meade asked Grant for clarification because Grant had ordered a 4:00 a.m. attack all along the line. If the Confederates held their line, Grant said that Humphreys should send Miles's division down White Oak Road to reinforce Sheridan. Lincoln took the flags and said: "Here is something material – something I can see, feel and understand. This means victory. This is victory."

Lee learns of defeat, sends troops west to railroad

After the battle on the night of April 1, Fitzhugh Lee informed Robert E. Lee of the defeat and rout at Five Forks from Church's Crossing near the Ford Church's Road junction with the South Side Railroad where the remaining forces of Rooney Lee and Thomas Rosser joined him. Lee also ordered troops from Richmond to come to Petersburg to help defend against attacks which he thought to be imminent. Sheridan's cavalry camped at the Gilliam Farm near Five Forks while Mackenzie's men settled in near the Ford's Road crossing of Hatcher's Run.

Footnotes

Notes

References

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External links

Battle of Five Forks in Encyclopedia Virginia
Animated history of the Siege of Petersburg and Surrender at Appomattox
National Park Service battle description
CWSAC Report Update