The Battle of Camperdown (Dutch: Zeeslag bij Kamperduin) was fought on 11 October 1797 between the Royal Navy's North Sea Fleet under Admiral Adam Duncan and a Batavian Navy fleet led by Vice-Admiral Jan Willem de Winter. Duncan's fleet won a complete victory over de Winter's in what was the most significant engagement between British and Batavian forces during the French Revolutionary Wars, capturing eleven ships without losing any of their own.
In 1795, the Dutch Republic was overrun by France and reorganised into the Batavian Republic, a French sister republic. After several French Navy campaigns ended in disaster, the Batavian navy was ordered to move to Brest in 1797. This rendezvous never occurred, as the French and their allies failed to capitalise on the Spithead and Nore mutinies that paralysed the British Channel and North Sea fleets in the spring of 1797. By September, the Batavian navy was blockaded in the Texel by the North Sea Fleet under Duncan, though the British were forced to return to Yarmouth for supplies in October. De Winter used the opportunity to lead the Batavian fleet into the North Sea; when they returned to the Dutch coast on 11 October, a waiting Duncan intercepted them off Camperduin.
Attacking the Batavian line of battle in two groups, Duncan's ships broke through its rear and van before engaging with de Winter's frigates. The battle split into a leeward melee, where superior British forces overwhelmed the Batavian rear, and a windward melee, where a more even exchange centred on battling flagships. As the Batavians attempted to reach shallower waters and escape Duncan's attack, the British leeward ships joined the windward melee and forced de Winter's flagship and ten other ships to strike their colours.
The loss of Vrijheid prompted the remaining Batavian ships to disperse and retreat, and Duncan ordered his fleet to sail back to Yarmouth with their prizes. Struck by gales en route, two prizes were wrecked and another had to be recaptured before Duncan's fleet reached England. Casualties in both fleets were heavy, and the Batavian Navy was broken as an independent fighting force, losing eleven ships and more than 1,100 men.
Background
In the winter of 1794–1795, forces of the French Republic overran the neighbouring Dutch Republic during the French Revolutionary Wars. The French then reorganised the country as a client state named the Batavian Republic, and it joined France against the allies in the War of the First Coalition. One of the most important Dutch assets of which the French gained control was the Dutch States Navy. The Dutch fleet provided a substantial reinforcement to the French forces in northern European waters, which were principally based at Brest on the Atlantic Ocean and whose main opponent was the Royal Navy's Channel Fleet. The location of the main anchorage of the Dutch fleet in the waters off the Texel prompted a reorganisation of the distribution of British warships in Northern European waters, with a new focus on the importance of the North Sea. With the Navy suffering severe shortages in men and equipment and with other theatres of war deemed more important, small, old and poorly maintained ships were activated from reserve and based in harbours in East Anglia, principally the port of Yarmouth, under the command of Admiral Adam Duncan. The 65-year-old Duncan was a veteran of the wars of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) and had fought at numerous engagements with distinction and success. Standing at he was also noted for his physical strength and size: a contemporary described him as "almost gigantic".
The French Navy had suffered a series of one-sided defeats in the opening years of the war, suffering heavy losses at the Glorious First of June in 1794 and during the Croisière du Grand Hiver the following January. In late 1796, after prompting from representatives of the United Irishmen (a society dedicated to ending British rule of the Kingdom of Ireland), the French Atlantic Fleet launched a large scale attempt to invade Ireland, known as the Expédition d'Irlande. This too ended in disaster, with twelve ships lost and thousands of men drowned in fierce winter gales. Their ambitions frustrated, the representatives of the United Irishmen, led by Wolfe Tone, turned to the new Batavian state for support and were promised assistance in the coming year by a united French and Dutch fleet. A plan was formulated to merge the French and Dutch fleets and attack Ireland together in the summer of 1797. Tone joined the staff of Vice-Admiral Jan Willem de Winter on his flagship in the Texel and 13,500 Dutch troops were equipped in preparation for the operation, the fleet waiting only for the best moment to take advantage of easterly winds and sweep past the British blockade and down the English Channel.
Spithead mutiny
For the Royal Navy, the early years of the war had been successful, but the commitment to a global conflict was creating a severe strain on available equipment, men and financial resources. The navy had expanded from 134 ships at the start of the conflict in 1793, to 633 by 1797, and personnel had increased from 45,000 men to 120,000, an achievement possible only as a result of the impressment service, which abducted criminals, beggars and unwilling conscripts for compulsory service at sea. Wages had not been increased since 1653, and were usually months late, rations were terrible, shore leave forbidden, and discipline harsh. The list was deliberately ignored on the instructions of First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Spencer, and, on 16 April, the sailors responded with the Spithead Mutiny: a largely peaceful strike action led by a delegation of seamen from each ship tasked with negotiating with the authorities and enforcing discipline. For a month the fleet remained at stalemate, until Lord Howe was able to negotiate a series of improvements in conditions that induced the strikers to return to regular service. The mutiny had achieved almost all of its aims; increasing pay, removing unpopular officers, and improving conditions for the men serving in the Channel Fleet and, ultimately, the whole navy.
While the upheaval continued at Spithead, Duncan had retained order in the North Sea Fleet at Yarmouth by the sheer force of his personality. When men from his flagship, , clambered up into the rigging and roared three cheers in a prearranged signal for the revolt to begin on 1 May, Duncan initially threatened to run the ringleader through with his sword. Calmed by his subordinates, he instead assembled his officers and the Royal Marines aboard his ship and advanced on the men in the rigging, demanding to know what they were doing. So fierce was his tone that the men fell silent and hesitantly returned to their quarters except for five ringleaders, whom he admonished personally on his quarterdeck before issuing a general pardon and dismissing them to their duty. The following week, he assembled all of the men and demanded to know whether they would follow his orders: in response, the crew nominated a spokesman, who apologised for their actions, saying, "we humbly implore your honour's pardon with hearts full of gratitude and tears in our eyes for the offense we have given to the worthiest of commanders who has proved a father to us".
Nore mutiny
thumb|Duncan speaking to his crew to persuade them not to join the mutiny
Despite his initial success, Duncan was unable to retain control in the face of a more widespread revolt on 15 May among the ships based at the Nore, which became known as the Nore Mutiny. Led by a sailor named Richard Parker, the Nore mutineers quickly organised and became a significant threat to water traffic in the Thames Estuary. Duncan was informed that his fleet at Yarmouth might be ordered to attack the mutineers and, although reluctant, responded, "I do not shrink from the business if it cannot otherwise be got the better of". Duncan later wrote that, "To be deserted by my own fleet in the face of the enemy is a disgrace which I believe never before happened to a British admiral, nor could I have supposed it possible."
Aware that the escape of the Dutch fleet into the North Sea at such a vulnerable time could be disastrous for Britain, Duncan maintained his position off the Texel for three days, during which the wind was ideal for a Dutch foray, and he disguised his two vessels as different ships on each day and ordered the frigate to make a flurry of nonsensical signals to a fictitious British fleet beyond the horizon. and on the fourth day, with conditions still perfect for the Dutch, he anchored his squadron in the Marsdiep Channel and gave orders for them to fight until their ships sank, thereby blocking the channel. In a speech to his men, he announced that "The soundings are such that my flag will continue to fly above the water after the ship and her company have disappeared". The expected attack never came: the Dutch army that was to have joined the fleet was not prepared, and Duncan's misleading signals had successfully convinced De Winter that a large British fleet waited just beyond the horizon. The winds subsequently changed direction, and, on 10 June, six more ships joined Duncan's squadron from the Channel Fleet, and, on 13 June, a Russian squadron arrived.
De Winter's cruise
By the middle of August 1797, after six weeks of constant easterly winds that kept his ships trapped in their harbour, De Winter decided that an attempt to join the French at Brest as the first stage of an invasion of Ireland was impractical and he abandoned the plan. In addition to his concerns about the proficiency of his men, De Winter was also worried about their loyalty: the dominion of France over the Batavian Republic and the country's enforced participation in distant theatres of warfare were unpopular among the Dutch people. Although De Winter was an avowed republican, who had fought in the French Army against the Netherlands between 1793 and 1795, support for the House of Orange remained strong among the Dutch population and with the fleet's sailors. Wolfe Tone wrote in frustration that "The destiny of Europe might have been changed for ever<!--delspaceP--><!--check-->... the great occasion is lost, and we must do as well as we can."
When news of this decision reached the Admiralty, they recalled Duncan's blockade fleet to Yarmouth for a refit on 1 October; the admiral insisted on sending some of his ships back to the Dutch coast two days later under Captain Henry Trollope in HMS Russell, accompanied by HMS Adamant and the small ships , Circe and with the hired armed cutter Black Joke. Their arrival off Texel on 6 October coincided with De Winter's much delayed expedition. Although some sources, particularly in France, have claimed that De Winter was determined to bring Duncan to battle, in reality he was more concerned that his men were disaffected and inexperienced by their long stay in port, and had reluctantly acceded to orders from the Batavian government to conduct a brief sweep in the Southern North Sea in search of weak British forces that could be overwhelmed by his fleet or drawn into the dangerous shallow waters of the Dutch coastline. He may also have been hoping to resurrect the plan to augment the French at Brest if he was able to pass westwards down the English Channel undetected. and this was repeated by William Laird Clowes in his 1900 history. This view was followed in 2008 by Noel Mostert. In 1963, Christopher Lloyd ascribed the signal to the lugger Speculator, which was followed within hours by the cutters Active and Vestal who brought detailed accounts of De Winter's movements. All of the accounts agree on the manner in which the unknown vessel arrived at Yarmouth. Black Joke was not among the vessels listed as qualifying for either the prize money for the captured Dutch ships, nor for the Naval General Service Medal, though both Active and Speculator were.|group=Note Duncan sending the final message to the Admiralty: "The wind is now in the NE and [I] shall make good course over to them, and if it please God, hope to get at them. The squadron under my command are unmoored and I shall put to sea immediately." Since leaving the Texel, De Winter had been unable to escape from Trollope's ships: on the evening of 10 October, several Dutch vessels were detached to drive his squadron away while the Dutch fleet lay off the Maas, but could not close with the faster British vessels. Meanwhile, further messages from Trollope reporting the Dutch movements had reached Duncan and he turned his fleet west, following the Dutch coastline. The first clear sighting was reported by Captain Peter Halkett of Circe, who had climbed the mainmast to get a better view.
Duncan's attack
thumb|upright=1.3|Period drawing of Admiral Duncan's attack with a legend showing the location of each ship, a few moments before firing began.
At 09:00, Duncan made the signal to prepare for battle while De Winter organised his ships into a line of battle to meet the British attack in a solid defensive formation, sailing on the port tack in a northeasterly heading. As they manoeuvred into their assigned stations, the Dutch fleet drew closer to the shore. To compensate, Duncan signalled for his ships to form line and sail southeast on the port tack so that they had the wind directly behind them. Shortly afterwards, concerned that the Dutch might make the shoreline before he could bring them to battle despite his wry insistence that "I am determined to fight the ships on land if I cannot by sea", At 11:00, Duncan sought to remedy increasing gaps between his vessels by ordering the faster ships to slow down and wait for their compatriots. He then made an effort to re-establish the line on the starboard tack before realising that the Dutch fleet was still in order awaiting the British attack and continually drawing closer to the dangerous coastline. Abandoning his previous signals, Duncan ordered the entire fleet to turn towards the Dutch and attack directly, each ship to "steer for and engage her opponent".
The combined effect of Duncan's orders was to split his fleet into two uneven divisions, each sailing in a loose formation towards the unified Dutch line. The northern, or windward, division comprised six third rate ships of the line, two fourth rate ships and the frigate Circe, tasked with repeating signals from the flagship Venerable, which led the division with and close behind. Behind the two divisions lay a line of small craft tasked with repeating Duncan's signals so that the entire fleet could see his intentions. At 11:53, Duncan raised the signal for each ship to pass through the Dutch line and attack from the far side, but the poor weather prevented the more distant ships from recognising the signal.
Battle
Collapse of the Dutch rear guard
At 12:05, Duncan raised the signal ordering his ships to engage the enemy closely. At the same time, the , under Rear-Admiral Hermanus Reijntjes, fourth from the southern end of the line, opened fire on the rapidly approaching Monarch. Striking the small gap between the ships, Onslow fired raking broadsides into both vessels and then turned to lay his ship alongside Reyntjes' flagship. As he did, the Dutch frigate and the brig Daphné pulled out of the second line and attempted to fill the gap Monarch had created, firing into the British ship of the line as they did so.