The Battle of 73 Easting was fought on 26 February 1991, during the Gulf War, between Coalition armored forces (US VII Corps and UK 1st Armoured Division) and Iraqi armored forces (Republican Guard and Tawakalna Division). It was named for a UTM north–south coordinate line (an "Easting", measured in kilometers and readable on GPS receivers) that was used as a phase line by Coalition forces to measure their progress through the desert. The battle was later described by Lt. John Mecca, a participant, as "the last great tank battle of the 20th century." This battle took place several hours after another, smaller, tank battle at Al Busayyah.

The main U.S. unit in the battle was the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), a 4,500 man reconnaissance and security element assigned to VII Corps. It consisted of three ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an attack helicopter squadron (4th), and a support squadron. Each ground squadron was made up of three cavalry troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer battery, and a headquarters troop. Each troop comprised 120 soldiers, 12–13 M3 Bradley fighting vehicles and nine M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks. Task Force 1-41 Infantry breached the berm on the borders between Saudi Arabia and Iraq which was the initial Iraqi defensive position and performed reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance missions prior to the 2nd ACR's actions. This generally included destroying or repelling the Iraqis' reconnaissance elements and denying their commander any observation of friendly forces. The corps' main body consisted of the American 2nd Armored Division (Forward), 1st Armored Division (1st AD), 3rd Armored Division (3rd AD), 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), and the British 1st Armoured Division (1 AD).

The job of the 2nd ACR was to cross the border and advance east as a forward scouting element, led by cavalry scouts in lightly armored M3A1 Bradleys with highly advanced thermals to detect enemy positions. Following closely behind were M1A1 Abrams tanks covering them from the rear, ready to move forward and engage the enemy. Originally advancing ahead of the 3rd Armored Division until late on 25 February, they shifted to the east and ahead of the advancing 1st Infantry Division as it moved north from its initial objectives. The regiment's mission was to strip away enemy security forces, clear the way of significant defenses, and locate the Republican Guard's defensive positions so they could be engaged by the full weight of the armored forces and artillery of the 1st Infantry Division.

On the night of 23/24 February, in accordance with General Norman Schwarzkopf's plan for the ground assault called "Operation Desert Sabre", VII Corps raced east from Saudi Arabia into Iraq in a wide, sweeping maneuver later described by Schwarzkopf as a "Hail Mary." The Corps had two goals: to cut off Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and to destroy five elite Republican Guard divisions near the Iraq–Kuwait border that might attack the Arab and Marine units moving into Kuwait to the south. Initial Iraqi resistance was light and scattered after the breach, and the 2nd ACR fought only minor engagements until 25 February.

The primary battle was conducted by 2nd ACR's three squadrons of about 4,000 soldiers, along with the 1st Infantry Division's two leading brigades (2nd Armored Division),

thumb|An Iraqi defensive position in [[Task Force 1-41 Infantry's sector of operations during the Battle of 73 Easting. The tops of Iraqi tanks can be seen as they sit in defensive entrenchments. More destroyed Iraqi armor sits in the distant background.]]

2nd ACR's three armored cavalry squadrons deployed in line, with Second Squadron in the north, Third Squadron in the center, and First Squadron in the south. Fourth Squadron (the combat aviation squadron) flew reconnaissance and attack missions chiefly in the northern and central zones. Weather restricted flight operations severely, however, and kept Fourth Squadron grounded for about half of the daylight hours. Unusually for a corps covering force, 2nd ACR lacked a reserve tank or mechanized infantry battalion.

Moving through the Republican Guards' security area on the morning of the 26th undetected, 2nd ACR encountered the Tawakalna Division and 12th Iraqi Armored Division (12th AD) in a line facing them with Tawakalna in the north and 12th AD in the center and south. All Iraqi units occupied well-constructed defensive emplacements and had prepared alternate positions which enabled them to reorient to the west to face VII Corps's attack. 12th AD's assignment to the Republican Guard was not known at the time of the engagement.

Despite extensive aerial and artillery bombardment by U.S. forces, most Iraqi units defending along 70 Easting remained effective. 2nd ACR employed M270 MLRS artillery fire from the supporting 27th Field Artillery Regiment, as well as air strikes, and attack helicopters (both AH-64 Apaches of 2-1 Aviation and AH-1 Cobras of Fourth Squadron) against the Republican Guard units as the armored cavalry squadrons moved east through the security zone. Sandstorms slowed this movement throughout the day, restricting visibility to as little as .

Approach to the 70 Easting

During the period of 23 February 1991 the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, with its attached operational control, attacked into Southern Iraq in the lead of VII Corps with such audacity that the Dragoon Battle Group quickly overwhelmed superior enemy forces, demoralizing them and taking hundreds of enemy prisoners. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the regiment destroyed two brigades of the Iraqi Republican Guards Tawakalna Division. The 2nd Squadron, 2nd ACR alone contributed 55 Iraqi tanks destroyed, 45 other armored vehicles, an equal number of trucks, hundreds of Iraqi infantry KIA, and 865 Iraqi soldiers taken prisoner.

As part of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and VII Corps main effort, Task Force 3-37th Armor breached the Iraqi defense on 24 February 1991, clearing four passage lanes and expanding the gap under direct enemy fire. The Task Force then attacked 300 kilometers across southern Iraq into northern Kuwait, severing Iraqi lines of communication, and then drove north once again into Iraq to assist in the seizure of the City of Safwan and the securing of the Safwan Air Base for the Coalition Forces–Iraqi cease-fire negotiations. During the operation, over 50 enemy combat vehicles were destroyed and over 1,700 prisoners were captured.

The aviation squadron led by Lt. Colonel Don Olson established a screen along the 50 Easting by 7 am, and by 8 am the armored cavalry squadrons had moved into their new zones. Third Squadron, operating in the center, destroyed a T-72 tank before 8 am, establishing the first ground contact with the Iraqi Republican Guard's Tawakalna Division. All three squadrons were in contact with security forces by 9 am but a violent sandstorm blew into the area and movement to the regiment's limit of advance, the 60 Easting, took until 11 am.

Air cavalry operations ceased just after 9 a.m. and would not resume until afternoon. Lt. Colonel Tony Isaac's First Squadron meanwhile encountered scattered enemy positions in the south and by noon had reported destroying 23 T-55 tanks, 25 armored personnel carriers, six artillery pieces and numerous trucks. Lt. Colonel Mike Kobbe's Second Squadron troops all reported resistance from small Tawakalna Division security outposts while Third Squadron destroyed similar outposts in the Regimental center. Lt. Gen. Franks visited the regiment's main command post just before 1 p.m. There, the regimental executive officer, Lt. Colonel Roger Jones, and the S2, Major Steve Campbell, briefed him on the situation and informed him that sensors were reporting movement of tracked vehicles to the north out of the regiment's zone.

By 3 p.m. Third Armored Division had reached the 50 Easting and begun to move abreast of the regiment to the north. 1st Infantry Division's movement to join the fight was taking longer than expected, however. Lt. General Franks therefore directed the Second Armored Cavalry to continue its attack as far as the 70 Easting and to make contact with the Republican Guard's main defenses and prevent their movement. At the same time, he ordered the regiment to avoid becoming decisively engaged (meaning to refrain from committing all its maneuver forces and thereby losing freedom of action).

Colonel Holder issued a Fragmentary Order at 3:20 to comply with the Corps Commander's directive and by 3:45 Second Squadron's E and G Troops were in contact with well-organized defenses of the Tawakalna Division. At the same time the Third and First squadrons in the center and south moved to clear their zones, encountering T-72s in Third Squadron's north and T-62 and T-55 tanks of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division further south. Eagle Troop Abrams and Bradleys returned fire, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued east with the two tank platoons leading. The nine M1A1 tanks of Eagle Troop destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, 16 personnel carriers and 30 trucks in 23 minutes with no American losses.

At about 16:20 Eagle crested a low rise and surprised an Iraqi tank company set up in a reverse slope defence on the 70 Easting. Captain McMaster, leading the attack, immediately engaged that position, destroying the first of the eight enemy tanks to his front. His two tank platoons finished the rest.

Three kilometers to the east McMaster could see T-72s in prepared positions. Continuing his attack past the 70 limit of advance, he fought his way through an infantry defensive position and on to high ground along the 74 Easting. There he encountered and destroyed another enemy tank unit of eighteen T-72s. In that action the Iraqis stood their ground and attempted to maneuver against the troop. This was the first determined defense the regiment had encountered in its three days of operations. Still, the Iraqi troops had been surprised because of the inclement weather and were quickly destroyed by the better trained and better equipped American troops.

After defeating that force, McMaster sent a scout platoon of two M3 Bradleys north to regain contact with G Troop. In doing that the scout platoon encountered another Iraqi tank position of thirteen T-72s. The lightly armored Bradleys, each equipped only with a 25-mm cannon and two TOW missiles, are intended for reconnaissance, not direct engagement with armored tanks. Despite a misfire, and having to reload the launchers in the face of the enemy, the two Bradleys destroyed 5 tanks before help arrived.

Other 2nd ACR Troops I (call sign "Iron"), K ("Killer"), and G ("Ghost") joined the fight minutes later. Iron Troop of Third Squadron had halted around the 67 Easting to control the limit of advance with its tank cannon. As the troop moved north to secure its northern boundary around 16:45, it came under fire from the same group of buildings E Troop had fought through an hour earlier.

thumb|Wrecked [[M2 Bradley|Bradley IFV K-12 burns after being hit by Iraqi tank fire during the first stages of the battle]]

Captain Dan Miller, commanding I Troop, silenced the resistance with return fire and then attacked to the 70 Easting. There he confronted T-72s in defensive positions south of those that E Troop had just destroyed. With initial support from Captain Mac Haszard's K Troop, Miller's tanks destroyed sixteen enemy tanks on that position and then attacked through it. Just beyond the defenses, I Troop observed another formation of enemy tanks moving in its direction and attacked it with tank and TOW fire. During that engagement, TOW missile fire from a K Troop Bradley struck and destroyed an I Troop Bradley, wounding all three crewmen.

By 16:30, Captain Joe Sartiano's G Troop had gained a position on a ridge overlooking a wadi at and parallel to the 73 Easting, north of E Troop. As the regiment's northernmost unit, G Troop secured an open flank that would later become the 3rd Armored Division sector when they arrived 5hrs later. Sartiano oriented due east, they engaged two Iraqi BMP-1s within bunkers, facing south. Afterwards, 2nd Platoon of G Troop an M1A1 tank platoon (White-1), lead 1LT Andy Kilgore, reported thermal signatures beyond the smoke and dust of the sand storm they were engulfed in, and requested permission to move east forward past the burning BMPs. Taking his platoon of tanks beyond the plumes of smoke, he moved on a Republican Guard motorized rifle company position facing south-southwest, Sartiano lost visual contact with Kilgore’s platoon, As 2nd PLT LT Kilgore’s moved to engage with multiple contacts consisting of T-72s, BMP-1s, and infantry dismounts they found beyond the smoke. LT Kilgore’s Platoon exhausted a variety of weapons, including main guns of the M1A1, coaxial machine guns, turret mounted M240 machine gun and a single M1911 pistol.

During this time, Sartiano desperately attempted to contact LT Kilgore’s platoon over the troop net, however, LT Kilgore had switched down to his platoon net to direct and concentrate the fires of his platoon. Once the fight was over, LT Kilgore’s PLT rejoined Ghost Troops

as moved to their ordered limit of advance at 73 Easting. They would be later relived by H Co of their squadron 2/2ACR after passing 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment of the First Infantry Division thru their lines at 2030hrs after most of the heavy fighting in the Ghost Troop sector had ceased.

Sartiano's men engaged Iraqi 18th Brigade tanks that initially were in defensive positions. Very quickly, however, G Troop found itself facing counterattacks by tank units of the Tawakalna Division and the Iraqi 12th Armored Division. Additionally, other Iraqi units attempted to retreat to the north along the wadi, which led them directly into G Troop's position.

By 18:30, the first of several waves of Iraqi T-72 and T-55 tanks advanced into the wadi. Fierce fighting ensued as wave after wave of tanks and infantry charged the troop. Combat became so intense at times that only massed artillery and mortar fires, attack helicopters and Air Force close air support prevented the enemy from closing with G Troop. At one point a military intelligence (MI) platoon from the 2nd ACR's 502nd MI Company had to suspend its signal intelligence operation and return the fire of Iraqi soldiers who exited a burning BMP-1 and continued to attack.

During the fierce six-hour battle, the G Troop fire support team called in 720 howitzer and MLRS rounds, while using its own mortars continually to turn back attackers at close range. By 21:00, G Troop had expended nearly half of its TOW missiles and was becoming short of 25 mm and 120 mm cannon ammunition. To remedy the emergency, Lt Colonel Kobbe sent his tank company, Captain Bruce Tyler's Company H ("Hawk"), to relieve the troop. By then, G Troop had destroyed "at least two companies of Iraqi armor. Hundreds of Iraqi infantrymen and their lightly armored transporters lay scattered on the wadi floor." The 210th FA Brigade commander estimated that his two FA battalions and single M270 MLRS, C Battery 4th 27th FA, destroyed 17 tanks, seven APCs, six artillery pieces and around 70 other vehicles. The number of vehicles damaged by artillery was greater. The number of enemy infantry casualties caused by indirect fire proved impossible to determine but almost certainly exceeded the thirty infantrymen claimed.

Sporadic fire continued throughout the night, but no major engagements occurred after 22:00. The regiment used artillery fire and some close air support between the end of active fighting and the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division at the line of contact.

Based on the intelligence gained during the battle, Colonel Holder advised the corps commander that the 1st Infantry Division should pass through the southern units of the regiment. Committing the division in that area would keep it clear of the chaotic post-battle conditions to the north and, more importantly, would steer the main attack around now-known positions of the Republican Guard divisions.

Lt. General Franks accepted that recommendation and, beginning around 02:00, two brigades of the 1st Infantry Division passed through the regiment's positions along the 70 Easting. When the division had completed passage of all its combat units around 6 a.m., the Second Cavalry Regiment became part of VII Corps' reserve.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the 2nd ACR destroyed two brigades of the Iraqi Republican Guards Tawakalna Division in the Battle of 73 Easting. The 2nd Squadron, 2nd ACR alone contributed 55 Iraqi tanks destroyed, 45 other armored vehicles, an equal number of trucks, hundreds of Iraqi infantry KIA, and 865 Iraqi soldiers taken prisoner. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment also captured 2,000 prisoners, destroyed 159 enemy tanks, and 260 other vehicles. The regiment's losses include 6 dragoons killed, and 19 wounded. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment would travel over 155 miles during combat operations.

After over 300 kilometers movement to contact the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division engaged enemy forces in prepared defensive positions, engaging the enemy with direct fire, massive artillery and Army aviation. The 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division destroyed the first lines of defense and an attempted armored counterattack.

Task Force 1-41 Infantry participation

thumb|An Iraqi tank destroyed by Task Force 1-41 Infantry during a night combat operation during the Gulf war, February 1991.

Task Force 1-41 Infantry served at the Battle of 73 Easting with the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) along with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. They were responsible for destroying the Iraqi 18th Mechanized and 9th Armored Brigades of the Republican Guard Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division and the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. The Tawakalna Republican Guard Division was Iraq's most powerful division which included approximately 14,000 soldiers, 220 T-72 tanks, 284 infantry fighting vehicles, 126 artillery pieces, and 18 MLRS. In moving to and through the Battle of 73 Easting, 2nd ACR and the 1st Infantry division's lead brigades, which included Task Force 1-41, destroyed 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and more than 80 wheeled vehicles, along with several anti-aircraft artillery systems during the battle.

74 Easting and beyond

By 22:30, the battle at 2nd ACR's front, at 74 Easting, was ending with most of the engaged Iraqi elements burning or destroyed as the 1st Infantry Division began its forward passage of lines. The 1st Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's line in total darkness and continued to advance on Objective Norfolk, an area encompassing the intersection of the IPSA Pipeline Road, several desert trails, and a large Iraqi supply depot. Now, instead of three armored cavalry squadrons, the Iraqi 18th and 37th Armored Brigades faced six heavy battalions of American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and another six battalions of 155 mm field artillery. At approximately 23:30, yet another encounter took place: Lt Colonel Taylor Jones's 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor, of Task Force 1-41 Infantry ran into an Iraqi tank battalion equipped with T-55s. As before, the Iraqis did not run or surrender, but manned their vehicles and weapons to face the advancing Americans. Initially, many American units advanced past Iraqi tanks and crews, who were in shelters or had not yet turned on their engines and so did not appear to be threats in the American crew's thermal sights.

A slightly disoriented Bradley platoon, attempting to follow the M1 tanks, moved across the front of these Iraqi positions, illuminated by burning vehicles behind them. The Iraqis took advantage of this excellent target and opened fire from three directions. The initial volley hit a Bradley, killing three American soldiers.

Battle of Norfolk

The forces involved in the battle were the American 1st Infantry Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division (fwd) (Hell on Wheels) and the Iraqi 18th Mechanized and 9th Armored Brigades of the Republican Guard Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division along with elements from eleven other Iraqi divisions including the Iraqi 26th, 48th, 31st, and 25th Infantry Divisions. By dawn, the 1st Infantry Division had taken Objective Norfolk and the fight shifted away from the 73 Easting area to 1st Armored Division's attack to the north, started at 20:00 on 26 February, and the 3rd Armored Division attack just to the south of the 1st Division.

The British 1st Armoured division was responsible for protecting the right flank of VII Corps. It was assumed by the corps' planners the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division counterattacked VII Corps once their penetration into Iraqi defenses was discovered. The British 1st Armoured Division had two brigades which participated in Operation Desert Storm, the 4th and 7th Brigades. They both rotated responsibilities as the lead brigade. The 1st Armoured was equipped with the Challenger main battle tank. With a 120mm rifled main gun, thermal optics, and Chobham armor, its only rival in theatre was the American M1A1 Abrams tank. British infantry rode into battle on the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. It had reasonable armor protection and a 30-mm gun. Modified versions of the vehicle included mortar carriers, Milan antitank systems, and command and control vehicles; and the British possessed a variety of light armored vehicles built on their Scorpion chassis. British artillery was primarily American made M109 howitzers (155mm), M110 howitzers (203mm), and MLRS systems which were compatible with American systems. Their air support consisted of Gazelle helicopters, used for reconnaissance, and the Lynx helicopter. The British had their full contingent of engineer, logistics, and medical units.

On 27 February 1991 the British 1st Armoured Division secured the final objectives on the Basra Highway north of Multa Ridge.

Significance of the battle

The Battle of 73 Easting and the movement to contact south of the battle brought the regiment's covering force mission for VII Corps to its conclusion. During the operation the regiment covered the advance of three different U.S. divisions in turn, moved 120 miles in eighty-two hours and fought elements of five Iraqi Divisions. The violent battle at 73 Easting fixed the southern forces of the Iraqi Republican Guard Corps and permitted the Corps Commander to launch 1st Infantry Division into the depths of the Iraqi defenses and on into Kuwait.

The 2nd ACR, which advanced between the Iraqi 12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division, was the only American ground unit to find itself significantly outnumbered and out-gunned. Yet, the 2nd ACR was very efficient. The 2nd Squadron, 2nd ACR alone contributed 55 Iraqi tanks destroyed, 45 other armored vehicles, an equal number of trucks, hundreds of Iraqi infantry KIA, and 865 Iraqi soldiers taken prisoner. It is considered the third largest battle of the Gulf War, however, it has received more recognition than any of the other Gulf War battles;

Notes

References

  • "Ghost Troop, Battle at 73 Easting." Crawley, Vince, Armor, May–June 1991, VOL C, #3.
  • "The 2nd ACR at the Battle of 73 Easting." Davis, 1LT Daniel L., Field Artillery Journal, PB 6-92-2, Apr 92, Pg 48.
  • "A Swift Kick, 2nd ACR's Taming of the Guard." Army Times, 5 Aug 1991.
  • "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting." Armor, May–June 1992, VOL CI, #3.
  • Draft Report The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991, a historical introduction to a simulation. Krause, Col Michael, US Army Center of Military History, 2 May 1991.
  • Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting, retired Colonel Douglas A. MacGregor Naval Institute Press, Fall 2009.
  • Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War, Rick Atkinson, HarperCollins, London 1994; Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1993.
  • Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War, Stephen A. Borque, Center of Military History Publication 70-73-1, Washington, DC, 2002.
  • "Second Armored Cavalry Regiment: Operation Desert Storm", Major Steve Gravlin, Troop Information Paper, Headquarters 2d ACR, April 1991
  • "Summary of Fire Missions, 25 and 26 February 1991", Major John Klemencic, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, February 1991
  • Memorandum for Record, Operation DESERT STORM, Lt. Colonel Scott Marcy, Headquarters 3d Squadron, 2d ACR, 8 March 1991
  • Conference Papers from "73 Easting: "Lessons Learned from Desert Storm via Advanced Distributed Simulation Technology, 27–29 August 1991", J. Orlansky and J Thorpe, editors, IDA Doc D-1110, IDA, Alexandria VA, April 1992. (Including presentations by Major General Paul Funk, 3rd Armored Division, "Keynote Address"; Colonel Mike Krause, Center for Military History, "Presentation of the 73 Easting Battle"; Colonel (ret.) Gary Bloedorn, Institute for Defense Analysis, "Data Collection Methodology"; Major Douglas Lute, Headquarters Department of the Army, "The Battle of 73 Easting: The Regiment's Perspective")
  • "Extract of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment's Operations Log", Headquarters Second Armored Cavalry, ca. April 1991
  • Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. United States. Dept. of Defense. 1992.
  • Bradley vs BMP: Desert Storm 1991 by Mike Guardia
  • Guardia, Mike. Days of Fury: Ghost Troop and the Battle of 73 Easting, 7 Dec. 2021, Pgs 158-163,
  • "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," by Stephen Biddle. From International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996)
  • An account of Ghost Troop's fight, by Stars and Stripes
  • Douglas MacGregor's presentation on Warrior's Rage: the Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting at the Pritzker Military Library
  • Eagle Troop at the Battle of 73 Easting, a 2016 analysis by H. R. McMaster.