The Bataan Death March was the forcible transfer by the Imperial Japanese Army of around 72,000 to 78,000<!-- Better sources needed (e.g. other scholarly sources). Interaksyon ref claims 80,000 --> Filipino (about 66,000) and American (about 12,000) prisoners of war (POWs) from the municipalities of Bagac and Mariveles on the Bataan Peninsula to Camp O'Donnell via San Fernando.

The transfer began on April 9, 1942, after the three-month Battle of Bataan in the Philippines during World War II. The total distance marched from Mariveles to San Fernando and from the Capas Train Station to various camps was . Sources also report widely differing prisoner of war casualties before reaching Camp O'Donnell: from 5,000 to 18,000 Filipino deaths and 500 to 650 American deaths during the march.

The march was characterized by severe physical abuse and wanton killings, including the Pantingan River massacre during which up to 400 prisoners were executed. POWs who fell or were caught on the ground were shot. After the war, the Japanese commander, General Masaharu Homma, and two of his officers, Major General Yoshitaka Kawane and Colonel Kurataro Hirano, were tried by United States military commissions for war crimes and sentenced to death on charges of failing to prevent their subordinates from committing atrocities. Homma was executed in 1946, and Kawane and Hirano in 1949. However, Masanobu Tsuji, the mastermind behind the Pantingan River massacre, fled and went into hiding, evading prosecution for his crimes. Tsuji served for several foreign intelligence agencies after the war, before disappearing in Laos in April 1961. Tsuji was declared dead seven years later.

Background

thumb|General [[Edward P. King discusses surrender terms with Japanese officers to end the Battle of Bataan]]

Prelude

When General Douglas MacArthur returned to active duty, the latest revision of plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands—War Plan Orange 3 (WPO-3)—was politically unrealistic, as it assumed a conflict only involving the United States and Japan, not the combined Axis powers. However, the plan was tactically sound, and its provisions for defense were applicable under any local situation.

Under WPO-3, the mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. If the enemy prevailed, the Americans were to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula, which was recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay. It was to be defended to the "last extremity". MacArthur assumed command of the Allied army in July 1941 and rejected WPO-3 as defeatist, preferring a more aggressive course of action. He recommended—among other things—a coastal defense strategy that would include the entire archipelago. His recommendations were followed in the plan that was eventually approved.

The main force of General Masaharu Homma's 14th Army came ashore at Lingayen Gulf on the morning of December 22, 1941. The defenders failed to hold the beaches. By the end of the day, the Japanese had secured most of their objectives and were in position to emerge onto the central plain. Late in the afternoon of December 23, General Jonathan Wainwright telephoned MacArthur's headquarters in Manila and informed him that any further defense of the Lingayen beaches was "impracticable". He requested and was permitted to withdraw behind the Agno River. MacArthur decided to abandon his plan for defense and revert to WPO-3, evacuating President Manuel L. Quezon, High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, their families, and his headquarters to Corregidor on December 24. A rear echelon, headed by the deputy chief of staff, Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall, remained behind in Manila to close out the headquarters and to supervise the shipment of supplies and the evacuation of the remaining troops.

On December 26, Manila was officially declared an open city, and MacArthur's proclamation was published in the newspapers and broadcast over the radio.

The Battle of Bataan began on January 7, 1942, and continued until April 9, when the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) commander, Major General Edward P. King, surrendered to Colonel Motō Nakayama of the 14th Army. He made the following statement: "You men remember this. You did not surrender … you had no alternative but to obey my order."]]

thumb|Prisoners photographed during the march. They have their hands tied behind their backs. They are (left to right): Pvt Samuel Stenzler (d. May 1942); Pvt Frank Spears (killed June 1945); Capt James McDonnell Gallagher, who died shortly after this picture was taken on April 9, 1942

thumb|Portion of Bataan [[Burial#Exhumation|disinterment map highlighting the site of the Panintingan massacre]]

Following the surrender of Bataan on April 9, 1942 to the Imperial Japanese Army, prisoners were amassed in the towns of Mariveles and Bagac. They were ordered to turn over their possessions. American Lieutenant Kermit Lay recounted how this was done:

150px|thumbnail|right|San Fernando station (Pampanga) April 1942 monument

Word quickly spread among the prisoners to conceal or destroy any Japanese money or mementos, as their captors would assume it had been stolen from dead Japanese soldiers.|source=

Prisoners started out from Mariveles on April 10 and from Bagac on April 11, converging in Pilar and heading north to the San Fernando railhead. The first atrocity—attributed to Colonel Masanobu Tsuji—occurred when approximately 350 to 400 Filipino officers and non-commissioned officers under his supervision were summarily executed in the Pantingan River massacre after they had surrendered. Tsuji—acting against General Homma's wishes that the prisoners be transferred peacefully—had issued clandestine orders to Japanese officers to summarily execute all American "captives".

During the march, prisoners received little food or water, and many died. On the march, the "sun treatment" was a common form of torture. Prisoners were forced to sit in sweltering direct sunlight without helmets or other head coverings. Anyone who asked for water was shot dead. Some men were told to strip naked or sit within sight of fresh, cool water. and "cleanup crews" killed those too weak to continue, though trucks picked up some of those too fatigued to go on. Prisoners were randomly stabbed with bayonets or beaten.

Once the surviving prisoners arrived in Balanga, the overcrowded conditions and poor hygiene caused dysentery and other diseases to spread rapidly. The Japanese did not provide the prisoners with medical care, so U.S. medical personnel tended to the sick and wounded with few or no supplies. Upon arrival at the San Fernando railhead, prisoners were stuffed into sweltering, brutally hot metal box cars for the one-hour trip to Capas, in heat. At least 100 prisoners were pushed into each of the unventilated boxcars. The trains had no sanitation facilities, and disease continued to take a heavy toll on the prisoners. According to Staff Sergeant Alf Larson: