right|thumb|[[Adolf Hitler (hand on hip) looking at the statue of Ferdinand Foch before starting the negotiations for the armistice at Compiègne, France (21 June 1940)]]

right|thumb|[[Ferdinand Fochs railway car, at the same location as after World War I, prepared by the Germans for the second armistice at Compiègne, June 1940]]

The Armistice of 22 June 1940 (French: L’armistice du 22 juin 1940 ; German: Waffenstillstand vom 22. Juni), sometimes referred to as the Second Armistice at Compiègne, was an agreement signed at 18:36 on 22 June 1940 near Compiègne, France by officials of Nazi Germany and the French Third Republic. It became effective at midnight on 25 June. Signatories for Germany included Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel, head of the German armed forces (OKW), while those on the French side held lower ranks, led by General Charles Huntziger. The preamble goes on to claim that the choice of the forest of Compiègne for this new armistice will re-establish "justice", and end Germany's "deepest humiliation".

In the last sentence of the preamble, the drafters inserted: "However, Germany does not have the intention to use the armistice conditions and armistice negotiations as a form of humiliation against such a valiant opponent", referring to the French forces. In Article 3, Clause 2, the drafters said that Germany did not intend to heavily occupy north-west France after the cessation of hostilities with Britain.

William Shirer, who was present on that day, reported, "I am but fifty yards from him. [...] I have seen that face many times at the great moments of his life. But today! It is afire with scorn, anger, hate, revenge, triumph." Then, on 21 June 1940, in the same railway carriage in which the 1918 Armistice had been signed (removed from a museum building and placed exactly where it was in 1918), Hitler sat in the same chair in which Marshal Ferdinand Foch had sat when he faced the representatives of the defeated German Empire. After listening to the reading of the preamble, Hitler—in a calculated gesture of disdain for the French delegates—exited the carriage, as Foch had done in 1918, leaving the negotiations to the chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces), General Wilhelm Keitel. The negotiations lasted one day, until the evening of 22 June 1940: General Huntziger had to discuss the terms by phone with the French government representatives, who had fled to Bordeaux, mainly with the newly nominated defence minister, General Maxime Weygand.

Terms

thumb|The map shows the division of France as per all the historical realities of the era: Nazi Germany annexed Alsace Lorraine, and occupied northern metropolitan France and all the Atlantic coastline down to the border with Spain. That left the rest of France, including the remaining two-fifths of southern and eastern metropolitan France, Overseas France and North Africa unoccupied, and under the control of a collaborationist French government based at the city of Vichy, and headed by Marshal Philippe Pétain.

thumb|[[Fall Rot in June exploited and sealed the German blitzkrieg of Fall Gelb in May]]

Adolf Hitler had a number of reasons for agreeing to an armistice. He wanted to ensure that France did not continue to fight from French North Africa, and he wanted to ensure that the French Navy was taken out of the war. In addition, leaving a French government in place would relieve Germany of the considerable burden of administering French territory, particularly as he turned his attentions towards Britain. Finally, as Germany lacked a navy sufficient to occupy France's overseas territories, Hitler's only practical recourse to deny the British use of them was to maintain a formally independent and neutral French rump state.

According to William Shirer's book Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, French General Charles Huntziger complained that the armistice terms imposed on France were harsher than those imposed on Germany in 1918. They provided for German occupation of three-fifths of metropolitan France north and west of a line through Geneva and Tours and extending to the Spanish border, so as to give Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine access to all French Channel and Atlantic ports. All people who had been granted political asylum had to be surrendered and high occupation costs were demanded of France by Germany, approximately 400 million French francs a day. A minimal French Army would be permitted. As one of Hitler's few concessions, the French Navy was to be disarmed but not surrendered, for Hitler realised that pushing France too far could result in France fighting on from the French colonial empire. An unoccupied region in the south, the Zone libre, was left relatively free to be governed by a rump French administration based in Vichy. The Vichy regime also administered the occupied zones (other than Alsace-Lorraine) to some extent, albeit under severe restrictions.

This was envisaged as a temporary treaty until a final peace treaty was negotiated. At the time, both French and Germans thought the occupation would be a provisional state of affairs and last only until Britain came to terms, which they both thought was imminent. For instance, none of the French delegation objected to the stipulation that French soldiers would remain prisoners of war until the cessation of all hostilities. Nearly 1,000,000 Frenchmen were thus forced to spend the next five years in German POW camps. About a third of the initial 1,500,000 prisoners taken were released or exchanged as part of the Germans' Service du Travail Obligatoire forced labour programme by the time the war ended.

A final peace treaty was never negotiated, and the free zone () was invaded by Germany and its ally Italy in Case Anton following the invasion of French North Africa by the Allies in November 1942.

Article 19 of the Franco-German armistice required the French state to turn over to German authorities any German national on French territory, who would then frequently face deportation to a concentration camp (the "Surrender on Demand" clause). Keitel gave verbal assurances that this would apply mainly to those refugees who had "fomented the war", a euphemism for Jews, and especially German Jews who until then had enjoyed asylum in France. Keitel also made one other concession, that French aircraft need not be handed over to the Germans.

The French delegation—led by General Charles Huntziger—tried to soften the harsher terms of the armistice, but Keitel replied that they would have to accept or reject the armistice as it was. Given the military situation that France was in, Huntziger had "no choice" but to accede to the armistice terms. The cease-fire went into effect at 00:35 on 25 June 1940, more than two days later, only after another armistice was signed between France and Italy, the main German ally in Europe.

The armistice did have some relative advantages for the French, compared to worse possible outcomes, such as keeping the colonial empire and the fleet, and, by avoiding full occupation and disarmament, the remaining French rump state in the unoccupied zone could enforce a certain de facto independence and neutrality vis-à-vis the Axis.

Destruction of the armistice site in Compiègne

The Armistice site was demolished by the Germans on Hitler's orders three days later. The carriage itself was taken to Berlin as a trophy of war, along with pieces of a large stone tablet. The Alsace-Lorraine Monument (depicting a German Eagle impaled by a sword) was also destroyed and all evidence of the site was obliterated, except notably the statue of Ferdinand Foch; Hitler ordered it to be left intact, so that it would be honoring only a wasteland. The railway carriage was later exhibited in Berlin, and then taken to Crawinkel in Thuringia in 1945, where it was destroyed by SS troops and the remains buried. After the war, the site and memorials were restored by German POW labour.

See also

  • Paris Protocols

Notes

References

  • United States Department of State, Publication No. 6312, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, IX, 671–676. Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1956.

Further reading

  • Gates, Eleanor. End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1939–1940 (1980)
  • Jackson, Julian. France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944 (2001) ch 6
  • Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890–1944 (1984; English ed. 1991),
  • Potts, William J. The German-French Armistice of June, 1940, and the German Armistice Commission, 1940–1942 1966.
  • Shirer, William. The Collapse of the Third Republic (1969)