Algerian nationalism

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Algerian nationalism is pride in the Algerian identity and culture. It has been historically influenced by the conflicts between the Regency of Algiers and European countries, the French conquest of Algeria and the subsequent French colonial rule in Algeria, the Algerian War, and since independence by Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, pan-Arabism, and Islamism.

Early manifestations

Formation of the Algerian identity

It is hard to designate when Algerian identity formed. Medieval Islamic chroniclers divided the Maghreb region into three distinctive geographical and cultural regions before the Regency of Algiers (Dawla al-Jaza'ir) was established.

al-Maghrib al-Adna (the near Maghrib; also known as Ifriqiya), which included the lands extending from Alexandria to Tarabulus (modern-day Tripoli) in the west.
al-Maghrib al-Awsat (the middle Maghrib), which extended from Tripoli to Bijaya (Béjaïa).
al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (the far Maghrib), which extended from Tahart (Tiaret) to the Atlantic Ocean.

The exact borders of these regions were flexible and were not fixed at that time. but there existed dynasties controlling these regions previously, and the borders were constantly changing between these 3 rival dynasties.

The area of the Central Maghreb (Maghreb al-Awsat) or what could be seen as the predecessor of Algeria were defined as being between Algiers in the west, and Annaba in the east by most medieval chroniclers such as Ibn Khaldun, although this was not always the case and some defined different borders for it.

Regency of Algiers (1515-1830)

The transition from "Central Maghrebi" to the "Algerian" identity started in the early 16th century, with the establishment of the Regency of Algiers ("Dawlat Al-Jaza'ir", or "State of Algeria" in Arabic). Several patriotic works such as the Sirat al-Mujahid Khayr al-Din were created in this era, and it is in this era that Algerian identity and patriotism really took shape. The state of Algiers, while initially independent, came under Ottoman rule in 1520, and gained significant autonomy over the years until it became de fact independent in 1710. In this era Algerian patriotism at this time was mainly influenced by conflicts with the neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia, and conflicts with European states, mainly Spain and France, with sayings such as "Algiers is protected by Allah" becoming extremely popular after the failed Algiers expedition in 1541. Generally, the Algerian authorities classified people into 5 main groups: Abdelkader fought against the French for 15 years until 1847, and commandeered a coalition composed of Arab, Kabyle, Chenoua and Chaoui tribes with him as the Emir, or Sultan. He wished to establish a modern fully independent nation state in Algeria, and established a modern army, invested into education and the economy of his nation. His emirate stretch from the modern Moroccan-Algerian border in the west to the region of Kabylia and M'Sila in the east. The only region not under the control of Abdelkader was the Constantinois which was controlled by Ahmed Bey ben Mohamed Chérif (who fought a Jihad to restore the Regency of Algiers against the French), before it was taken by the French in 1837.

Early 1900s

A new generation of Muslims emerged in Algeria at the time of World War I and grew to maturity during the 1920s and 1930s. It consisted of a small but influential class of évolués, other Algerians whose perception of themselves and their country had been shaped by wartime experiences, and a body of religious reformers and teachers. Some of these people were members of the few wealthy Muslim families that had managed to insinuate themselves into the colonial system in the 1890s and had with difficulty succeeded in obtaining for their sons the French education coveted by progressive Algerians. Others were among the about 173,000 Algerians who had served in the French army during World War I or the several hundred thousand more who had assisted the French war effort by working in factories. Many Algerians stayed in France after 1918, and sent the money they earned there to their relatives in Algeria. In France they became aware of a standard of living higher than any they had known at home and of democratic political concepts, taken for granted by Frenchmen in France, which colons, soldiers, and bureaucrats had refused to apply to the Muslim majority in Algeria. Some Algerians also became acquainted with the pan-Arab nationalism growing in the Middle East.

Political movements

Viollette Plan

The manifesto of the Algerian People

In March 1943, Abbas, who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination, presented the French administration with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, signed by fifty-six Algerian nationalist and international leaders. Outlining the perceived past and present problems of colonial rule, the manifesto demanded specifically an Algerian constitution that would guarantee immediate and effective political participation and legal equality for Muslims. It called for agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an official language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full range of civil liberties, and the freeing of political prisoners of all parties. Encouraged by i.e. Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser (r. 1954–71), their role was to gain foreign support for the rebellion and to acquire arms, supplies, and funds for the wilaya commanders. In October, the CRUA renamed itself the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN), which assumed responsibility for the political direction of the revolution. The National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, ALN), the FLN's military arm, was to conduct the War of Independence within Algeria. FLN and ALN diffused the civil-military relations, and the army remained present throughout the end of the war and beyond, although in the end the victory would in the end be a political one rather than a military one. The FLN resorted to populist rhetoric and used symbolic slogans, such as "one sole hero: the people"; however, they remained somewhat distanced from the population during the war. This was partly a consequence of the inability of a class strong enough to emerge and articulate a credible and overarching consensus about revolutionary resistance strategies under the oppression of the colonial system. The FLN was a complex organisation, entailing much more than what perceived at first glance, they were characterised by an anti-intellectualism and a conviction that the country (and thereby also the abstract masses) had to be liberated by a violent group of dedicated revolutionaries.

Defining the nation

The many and versatile events of the war of liberation in Algeria (see Algerian war) between 1954 - 1962, one of the longest and bloodiest decolonisation struggles, have in different ways shaped past and present ideas about the Algerian nation. Both warring parties resorted extensively to violence, and the collective memory of torture during the Algerian War of Independence still lingers heavily on the national identity of Algeria.

The FLN was, after some time, more or less the predominant organisation in the national struggle against France; however, support of the national liberation rested partly on a cornerstone of intimidation, aimed at promoting compliance from the native population. To be seen as a pro-French Muslim—a "béni-oui-oui"—could cause immediate retribution. Before, during, and after the Algerian war Algerian nationalism was heavily influenced by Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. These ideologies spread from the Middle East, and were promoted by popular foreign Arab nationalist figures like Gamal Abdel Nasser. The FLN, especially after independence, espoused Arabism and began the Arabization process of the country as a way to combat "colonial divides" created by France, which, however, led to the estrangement of Berber areas, and unrest.

The dissonant role of the Woman in Algerian nationalism

Women played a major role in the Algerian War as physical participants but also as symbolic contestation. The war could, in one way, be seen as a battle to win the hearts and minds of the people, and the body and idea of the Muslim woman was an arena of major confrontation between the French and the FLN. On the one hand, French rule was justified (as in many other conflicts and contexts) by pointing to the Islamic family regulations as problematic and backwards and something that needed to be corrected and governed, an issue that only the "emancipatory power of French values" could solve. Moreover, it was thought that appealing to the Muslim woman was the only way to "win the hearts and minds of the family as a whole". As a response, the (often rural) veiled Muslim woman became a symbol of Algerian resistance, an allegory of purity and the impenetrability of Islam. They made sure to diffuse images of women bearing weapons and participating in the war, and argued that only emancipation from colonial rule would lead to this absolute liberation of women. Abbas once said, inspired by the works of Fanon, that "Women are the symbol of the new society and shall in shaping new societies." The event is said to have sparked the Battle of Algiers (1956–57). Djamila and the political engagement of women in the independence war were depicted in the Egyptian film Jamila, the Algerian (1958)—a movie that managed to mobilise huge support for the Algerian resistance movement throughout the Arab world. Later, the trio also played an important part in the Battle of Algiers, produced in 1966. Popular culture enforced the idealised image of the emancipated Algerian mujahadinat. These three women, together with, for example, the "three Djamilas" (Djamila Bouhired, Djamila Bouazza, and Djamila Boupacha), became important figures to resort to in the construction of the Algerian self.

The treatment and torture of these women and other prisoners taken during the battle of Algiers also played a great role in damaging French legitimacy as a moral authority. Simultaneously, the (partly self-chosen) depoliticization of their actions contributed to a scattered gender order.

FLN as the symbol of national liberation

The Battle of Algiers (1956–57) was a phase of the war that could be described as militarily won by the French but politically won by FLN. Whereas French policies changed over time, and in addition were highly fragmented due to the ideological factions between the settler population, the mainland French government, and the Organisation armée secrète, the outspoken political objective of FLN remained national independence. This allowed them to some extent to create an image of unity and common purpose, somehow embodying the people's voice in their official discourse. Even though they failed to articulate broad-based national goals and strategies to achieve them, they remained a symbol of national liberation, something that, to this day, might be what has contributed largely to their legitimacy.

Algeria – Mecca of the revolutionaries

In 1962, Ben Bella was named president of the independent Algeria after a turbulent couple of months, and drawing upon a largely mythical and invented past, tried to ambitiously govern the post-colonial reality. The relationship between leaders and ordinary people was, in the first years of independence, a seemingly egalitarian one, building upon the social levelling present in Algerian nationalism even since Messali Hadj. The festival was an important event in the continued construction of the national identity and partly contributed to restoring some of its appeal to the youths of Algeria. The festival became a huge two-day carnival where performances, expositions, and intellectual conferences merged. It hosted important figures from the entire African continent as well as from the African diaspora, such as Miriam Makeba, Archie Shepp, Nina Simone, Maya Angelou, members from the Black Panthers, and members from Patrice Lumumba's Congolese independence movement. In many ways, the first PANAF was a subversive and temporary space which had never been seen before and might never occur again. During a grand synopsium, Boumediene addressed three main questions that to a large extent shaped the discourse surrounding the festival and pointed to the role of culture in the construction of national as well as panafricain identities. Firstly, the reality of the African culture, secondly, the role of African culture in national liberation struggles and in the consolidation of an African unity, and thirdly, the role of African culture in the future social development of Africa. The nationalist project of Boumediène was articulated as a dual one, in the sense that it aimed to go back to traditional values and norms, progress, and develop in the modern world of science and technology. One of the consequences of arabisation was the introduction of the Algerian Family Code, a law informed by a reading of Islamic law which highly compromised the rights of women. The "liberation" some women had experienced during the war of independence was step by step halted or withdrawn. The mujahedinat past of some women could, however, still legitimise some activists' campaigns on women's rights issues in the 1980s and after, since their proven belonging to the nation could (at least partly) provide proof that their ideas were not simply a consequence of westernisation. In this context, polarisation bloomed, the political climate toughened, and materialised in violence, making it increasingly complex to debate differences verbally. The situation culminated in the Algerian civil war between multiple Islamist groups and the military, who had taken control over the government when the FLN seemed to face defeat. Once again the Algerian society experienced extensive and ruthless violence, which culminated in the late 1990s. In essence, the Algerian entre-soi was torn apart. In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a member of the FLN, was elected president, and a number of amnesty laws allowed many former Islamists to lay down arms, simultaneously launching extensive counter-terrorist attacks, which forced a large number of insurgents out of the country. The violence continued but slowly changed form, and by 2006, the only Islamist splinter group that was still in place, GSPC, joined Al-Qaeda and internationalised their goal. Having before stated that they wanted to "build an Islamic state with sharia law in Algeria", they later proclaimed that they had moved ideologically towards Al-Qaeda's global jihad and aspired to establish an Islamic state in the entire Maghreb.

Young generation and the fall of Bouteflika

The current anti-Bouteflika demonstrations in Algeria (Manifestations de 2019 en Algérie or 2019 Algerian protests) were, especially in the beginning, extremely careful not to be identified with the Islamist civil war of the 1990s or with the Arab Spring of early 2010. The protests have been enormous and reoccurred every Friday, but remained peaceful for a long time. Later protests have seen increased presence of the military, which has a long history of intervening in Algerian politics.

Some important symbols stemming from earlier times of Algerian history have, however, appeared later in the movement. For example, the slogan "one sole hero, the people" is once again visible on the streets. The movement has also referred to the independence in 62 as the "liberation of the state", thus pointing to the current manifestations as a way to obtain "liberation of the people". Moreover, partly as a consequence of one of the earlier Fridays of demonstrations coinciding with the International Women's Day, women very quickly took part in the demonstrations as well. Starting in the 1940s alternative strains of national sentiment began to form in intellectual circles among mainly Kabyle proponents of the Algerian national movement (such as Ali Yahia Abdennour, and Hocine Aït Ahmed) arguing for a so-called "Algerian Algeria", a form of nationalism that specifically distinguishes the country from other Arab nations, and espousing a pluralist view on the Algerian national identity. This movement was explicitly an Algerian nationalist one, and proclaimed that the Arab-Islamic model of Algerian nationalism defied the complexity of Algeria as a nation, and demanded a more inclusive conception of Algerian nationalism. This was however was opposed to by other more conservative factions of the national movement. This culminated in a schism in 1949 within the MTLD known as the "Berberist crisis", prompting leaders such as Ali Yahia Abdennour to leave the party, while others were purged or relegated in significance. The dominant line within the party viewed this sentiment as a threat to national unity within the fledgling national movement. While this split did give rise to the Berberist movement, contemporary lines and strains differ significantly from the original form of the movement espousing a unique form of Algerian nationalism, and nowadays often takes shape in anti-Arab racism or in some cases even separatism and are separate from its original form. Over the next years, the nature of Algerian nationalism and various ideas of it continued to be a hot topic of debate within the nationalist movement between both Arab and Berber nationalists, and while the party line officially adopted the definition of Algeria as an Arab-Islamic nation, this was continuously contested by proponents who espoused alternative views. In spite of the conflict, Berbers ultimately ended up being at the forefront of the Algerian national movement during the ensuing Algerian war.

Post-independence

After a brief power struggle in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella, an avowed Arab nationalist, consolidated power within the newly founded Algerian state. Following the takeover, the FLN's new leadership began a purge of hostile leaders. The 1963 Algerian constitution drafted shortly after that explicitly declared Algeria to be an Arab-Islamic state, Opponents to the FLN sought and promoted an alternative form of Algerian nationalism. In 1963, in opposition to Ben Bella's consolidation of power into a one-party state, the Socialist Forces Front began a small-scale insurgecy in the Kabylia region led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, which was eventually suppressed. The Arabic language was the sole educational language as part of a massive push for Arabization, and Berber identity was in general recast as a threat to national unity within the state. Under the era of Houari Boumédiène's leadership from 1965 to 1978, the issue of nationalism and national identity was increasingly centralized within the Algerian state, and cultural plurality was seen as destabilizing. In spite of this, Berber identity and he idea of an Algerian Algeria continued to be a suppressed, but persistent narrative of the nation. Berberist views on the Algerian national identity began developing as somewhat of a counter-discourse, seeking to challenge the currently established definition of Algerian nationhood, Tension between the government and Berber population, especially Kabyles mounted over the years since independence, the National Charter of 1976 did not take into account Berber demands in spite of protests, and a convergence of state repression, university bodies of Berber students, and the Berber Academy eventually resulted in massive riots mostly by Berber students and violent repression in 1980 known as the Berber Spring. The violent repression by the state authorities resulted in 123 death and thousands of injuries. While the movement was violently repressed it was the first sign of active resistance against the Algerian state's narrative since 1963, and many later important Berber politicians made their names during the protests. Civil strikes and protests continued in the 1990s, and violent riots broke out in 2001 over the murder of a student named Massinissa Guermah by the police. The events known as the Black Spring resulted in over 128 deaths, but for the first time in Algerian history, constitutional amendments were made recognizing Tamazight as Algeria's national language in 2002. Finally, in 2016, a constitutional amendment recognized Tamazight alongside Arabic as an official language of Algeria, and the constitution's preamble stated that Amazighity or Amazighism is a central component and influence of Algeria's national identity.

Algerianism

The term Algerianism has had two meanings in history: one during the French colonial era and another after the independence of Algeria.

During the French era, algérianisme was a literary genre with political overtones, born among French Algerian writers (see Algerian literature) who hoped for a common Algerian future culture, uniting French settlers and native Algerians. The term algérianiste was used for the first time in a 1911 novel by Robert Randau, "Les Algérianistes". A Cercle algérianiste was created in France in 1973 by Pieds-Noirs, with several local chapters. It has for "purpose to safeguard the cultural heritage born from the French presence in Algeria."

In Algerian contemporary politics, "Algerianist" is a political label given to Algerian nationalists whose policies focus more on the unity of Algeria's nation-state beyond regional idiosyncrasies.

The modern Arabic language has two distinct words which can be translated into English as nationalism: qawmiyya قومية, derived from the word qawm (meaning "tribe, ethnic nationality"), and wataniyya وطنية, derived from the word watan (meaning "homeland, native country"). The word qawmiyya has been used to refer to pan-Arab nationalism, while wataniyya has been used to refer to patriotism at a more local level (sometimes disparaged as "regionalism" by those who consider pan-Arabism the only true form of Arab nationalism). Algerianism is the Algerian patriotism, against pan-Arabist nationalism and different forms of regionalisms.

References

Original text: Library of Congress Country Study of Algeria
Encyclopædia Britannica

External links

The Colonial System and Algerian Nationalism