1970 Chilean presidential election

thumb|right|Original ballot

Presidential elections were held in Chile on 4 September 1970. Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity alliance won a narrow plurality in a race against independent Jorge Alessandri and Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic. Allende's victory was confirmed by a contingent election after the Christian Democrats voted in favor of his candidacy.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union invested money into the election through their intelligence agencies and other sources. The US attempted to sabotage Allende's campaign while the Soviets supported him. US ambassador Edward M. Korry played a major role in anti-Allende campaigns during the election.

Eduardo Frei Montalva and his Christian Democratic Party later united with Allende's opponents to form a congressional majority in an attempt to declare his presidency illegal in August 1973, catalyzing the military coup a few weeks later.

Electoral system

The election was held using the absolute majority system, under which a candidate had to receive over 50% of the popular vote to be elected. If no candidate received over 50% of the vote, both houses of the National Congress would come together to vote on the two candidates who received the most votes.

Campaign

Salvador Allende

Allende was a self-described Marxist and lifetime member of the Chilean Socialist Party. He had a career in politics that included being a senator and three consecutive bids for the presidency prior to the 1970 election cycle. In 1970, he ran for the Popular Unity coalition, a political alliance consisting of the leftists of Chile, including the Chilean Communist Party and the Socialist Party. His platform included 40 promises that would benefit the lower class, including ending inflation, greatly reducing the cost of medicine, and adjusting public housing rent. He spent a large portion of his political career campaigning for a coalition between Christian Democrats and leftists, despite most members of both groups consistently opposing his idea. He was known for being egotistical but nonetheless a very charismatic speaker. His campaign benefited from the prestige of being ambassador to Washington, as well as his friendship with President Frei. However, it was hurt by his continued insistence on forming a coalition and his direct criticism of the Christian Democratic Party's own bills and the Frei administration's reforms. He was the predecessor to Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. His conservative independent platform represented voters who were concerned by the reforms Frei had implemented over the course of his administration.

Another major factor was his campaign being staffed mostly by amateurs, which led to the wasting of resources, ineffective propaganda, issues mobilizing supporters, and trouble spreading a positive message to voters. US intelligence reports stated that supporters believed Alessandri could win using his name alone and spent most of the campaign attacking Frei's reforms instead of directly promoting Alessandri.

The CIA did not provide direct assistance to any candidate, as they had during the 1964 elections, but rather focused on anti-Allende propaganda, and the 40 Committee approved $435,000 for that purpose. In fact, that represented only about half the money spent by the CIA to influence the election; the Church Committee put the total amount at between $800,000 and $1 million. The money approved by the 40 Committee was used in a "scare campaign" of posters and pamphlets linking an Allende victory with the violence and repression associated with the Soviet Union. This CIA campaign was very inefficient. CIA director Richard Helms complained that he was ordered by the White House to "beat somebody with nobody."

Track I and Track II

The United States executive branch had two plans to prevent Allende from ascending to power if he won the vote. Track I was led by the State Department and involved manipulation of Chilean politics within the bounds of the Chilean constitution to lead to President Frei being re-elected. The CIA was not involved with it. Track II, or Project FUBELT, was a CIA operation that did not involve the State Department or Department of Defense, consisting of forming and supporting a group within the Chilean military who would stage a coup.

In the summer before the election, reports indicated that out of the 200 senators and deputies in Congress, Allende had 82 supporters, including the 80 members of Popular Unity, Schneider was known for defending the "constitutionalist" doctrine, which held that the army's role is exclusively professional and aimed at protecting the country's sovereignty, not interfering in politics. He had vehemently opposed organizing a coup d'état if Salvador Allende was ultimately chosen by the National Congress as president.

Schneider's death was viewed unfavorably by the public and rallied citizens and military personnel in support of Allende. Ultimately, on 24 October, the National Congress chose Allende as the President. On 26 October, President Eduardo Frei appointed General Carlos Prats as the new commander in chief of the army, succeeding René Schneider. Prats himself resigned in August 1973, and Allende appointed General Augusto Pinochet, then presumed to be loyal to Allende, as his successor; a few weeks later, Pinochet would overthrow Allende in the 1973 Chilean coup d'état and lead the resulting military junta.

Allende's presidency was eventually ratified after he agreed to sign a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees," pledging not to undermine the constitution.

References

External links

Archivos Internet Salvador Allende - A pro-Allende Spanish-language source, provides enormous day-by-day detail on the events between the election and Allende's inauguration as president